Situational Severability

Severability doctrine can level an entire statute based on a single unconstitutional provision or application. Yet scant attention has been paid to the contexts in which the federal courts address severability. The courts assume that they can address severability whenever they confront a partially invalid law and that they can apply the same standard (calling for a wide-ranging search for the legislature’s likely intent) in all cases.

This unitary approach is problematic because it ignores that courts address severability in different contexts, which raise their own unique concerns. As a result, courts have answered severability questions in ways that violate the rules of Article III standing and the separation of powers. For instance, they have addressed severability at the jurisdictional stage of adjudication to determine a litigant’s standing—even though doing so runs counter to the principle that jurisdictional questions should be kept distinct from those concerning the rights and duties of the parties. And courts have deployed severability doctrine at the merits stage to identify what rights the legislature has authorized a litigant to assert—even though the severability standard gives short shrift to the principle of legislative supremacy that animates the courts’ general, text-bound approach to determining the statutory rights available to litigants. Moreover, courts have applied severability doctrine after resolution of a case to determine whether and how other parts of a partially invalid law will apply in the future—even though doing so violates basic Article III standing principles.

In offering the first comprehensive account of the ways in which courts apply severability doctrine, this Article illuminates these deficiencies. It also proposes a new, situation-sensitive approach to severability that would correct them. In short, this Article proposes that severability doctrine should be situational—just like severability itself.

Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the Constitutional Right to Martyrdom

Since the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted to preserve and define civil rights. When states fail to protect the rights of minority groups, the courts step in by creating constitutional safeguards for minorities, juveniles, and religious objectors. In the context of juvenile rights, the Supreme Court has consistently relied on scientific data to define the rights attributed to people under the age of majority. Since the greater psychological community has accepted that a minor’s cognitive abilities reach a state of maturity around age sixteen, the Supreme Court may be poised to clear up a century-old controversy regarding a minor’s right of self-determination. This Note explores whether a minor can exercise her First Amendment Free Exercise rights to make medical treatment choices.

Competitive Public Contracts

Public agencies in the United States have long contracted with private firms for a wide range of public goods and services. Together, public procurement contracts account for more than ten percent of the entire U.S. economy. Yet examples of breathtaking cost overruns, delays, and substandard contractor performance are ubiquitous, particularly in the high-stakes realm of large-scale public projects. Despite the magnitude of this contractor-performance problem, it remains largely unexplored by legal scholars. This Article argues that the contractor-performance problem is at its core a contract-remedies problem: Governments lack an effective, credible remedy for poor contractor performance. Although a number of scholars have assumed that the remedies used by private buyers can be similarly utilized by government buyers, that is not the case. Because of the unique political and institutional context in which the government operates, neither traditional contract damages nor the alternative, reputation-based remedies often utilized by private firms translate to government contracts. This Article proposes an alternative remedial approach that can be utilized effectively by government buyers. By horizontally dividing contracts between multiple, competing firms, a government can foster ongoing competition to incentivize peak performance and, when necessary, obtain cost-effective substitute performance by terminating one contract and exercising a call option for the same scope of work in a second contract. Through thoughtful design, accounting for public and private incentives and the nature of the good or service being procured, nearly any public procurement contract can be divided—and remedied—in this manner.