Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere

Contract law attempts in various ways to regulate the information that contracting parties exchange. However, most contract law doctrines (and most contract law scholars) have yet to come to grips with the practical issues involved in regulating information. For instance, the disclosure of information can produce costs as well as benefits, by distracting parties from other, more important information; so it is often hard to decide which information should have been disclosed in any given case. Similar costs and benefits are often involved even in cases involving false statements (misrepresentations), where liability might seem less controversial.

While these issues are underappreciated in contract law, they are much more familiar in federal consumer protection law, especially in cases involving false advertising; and they are beginning to be recognized in products liability cases involving the duty to warn. This Article suggests various ways to improve contract law’s handling of misrepresentation and nondisclosure, all of which involve closer attention to the relevant costs and benefits.

“The Indispensable Basis of Democracy”: American Catholicism, the Church-State Debate, and the Soul of American Liberalism, 1920-1929

Several recent works of scholarship explore how Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been shaped by broader political debates over the role of religion in public life. This literature focuses on the politics of anti-Catholicism, particularly during the early years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the1940s and 1950s. While not questioning the centrality of this period to the historical narrative, this Note argues that the political contest over church and state took shape in an earlier debate over the compatibility of Catholicism and the Constitution during the 1920s. The Church’s response to the anti-Catholicism of this period was of particular importance. Catholic apologists actively challenged the widespread argument that Catholicism could not be reconciled with a democratic liberal political order. In fact, Catholics not only defended the doctrinal compatibility of Catholic social thought and the constitutional separation of church and state. They argued that Catholicism was ideally suited to preserving the moral foundations of the free society. Far from imperiling American democracy, Catholicism was, in the words of the Church’s leading social theorist, “The Indispensable Basis of Democracy.” Thus, rather than aiming to depoliticize the church-state fracas of the 1920s, American Catholics drove the issue ever more fully into the realm of politics and culture. In the process, Catholics developed a worldview that now stands at the heart of Establishment Clause politics.

Justifying Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences

Why do we have a right to self-defense? Over the years, this seemingly simple question has proved difficult to answer. The right to self-defense arises in situations that involve culpable, non-culpable or non-agent aggressors. The difficulty is to find an explanation that justifies self-preference in each of these instances and maintains the moral distinction between the permitted killing of aggressors and the prohibited killing of innocent bystanders.

This Essay examines three lines of justifications that have been developed over the past three decades: lesser harmful results, forced choice and the rights theory. The “lesser harmful result” argument maintains that the killing of the aggressor is a lesser harm than the death of the defender. The “forced choice” argument says that self-defense is either justified because the defender is uniquely forced to choose between his life and the life of the aggressor, or excused because the he lacks real choice. Finally, the “rights theory” justifies self-defense by the prevailing right of the defender not to be killed over that of the aggressor.

This Essay argues that all three explanations fall short of the comprehensive justification needed to answer this question. It develops a new justification based on a theory of forced consequences. This justification combines two principles: the commonly recognized civil-law principle of fault-based selection and the principle according to which—in situations where either A or B must pay the costs for A’s “bad luck”—A must be the one to pay these costs and may not transfer the burden onto B.