Reconsidering The Legal Definition of Gambling: A Resuscitation of the Gambling Instinct Test

The modern chance-based test for gambling is fundamentally flawed. It is descriptively inaccurate, difficult to apply, and easily circumvented. Despite these shortcomings, the test is by-and-large the only test employed for the identification of gambling activity. But this was not always the case. In the first part of the twentieth century, some courts employed a competing test that looked to the underlying psychological phenomenon rather than the mechanical form of the activity. This Note advocates for a re-adoption of that test. The modern test, originally put forth as the definition of a lottery, was never intended to be a test for gambling. Over time, courts warped this definition to the point where many forms of gambling could reasonably be deemed a “lottery,” blurring the distinctions between gambling and lotteries to such a degree that some states’ highest courts have held that the two terms are synonymous.

The competing test—referred to by modern academics as “the Gambling Instinct Test”—has been understudied and mischaracterized by the literature. Admittedly, the decisions applying the test were unstructured in their analysis; however, closer examination of those cases reveals that the test can be distilled into two steps: (1) whether there exists a contingent contract, and (2) whether the prospect of receiving a return of disproportionate value induced the gambling party into conveying her consideration. As so refined, resuscitation of the Gambling Instinct Test would bring the legal doctrine in lockstep with medical conceptions of gambling. Given the explosion of gambling activity in recent years, such a change has never been more necessary.

Introduction

As one of the traditional vices, gambling has long been regulated by governments.1.See Nat’l Inst. L. Enf’t & Crim. Just., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776–1976, at 4–13 (1977) [hereinafter Development of the Law of Gambling].Show More During the post-medieval period in England, gambling in and of itself was not unlawful, but the law tried to address its collateral consequences, such as the disruption of the public peace and members of the aristocracy gambling away their estates.2.Id. at 39–41, 240.Show More In early colonial America, the justification for and degree of regulation varied widely, from the wholesale condemnation of gambling as a form of idleness in Puritan Massachusetts, to more permissive laws in the southern colonies that only dealt with the evils of gambling as they arose.3.See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 361, 368–74 (2010).Show More Since those early days, gambling has twice gone through cycles of legalization and prohibition.4.Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have legalized sports betting since that decision, and a number of other states are currently in the process of legalization. Will Yakowicz, Where Is Sports Betting Legal? A Guide to All 50 States, Forbes (Jan. 9, 2023, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyakowicz/2022/01/07/where-is-sports-betting-legal-americ‌a-2022/ [https://perma.cc/Y67H-4SNL].Show More Given the rapid legalization of sports betting at the state level that has occurred in the years following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision that a federal statute’s prohibition on state authorization of sports betting violated the anti-commandeering principle,5.See Rose, supra note 4, at 374–75 (tracing the third wave of legal gambling back to the early 1930s).Show More we appear to be approaching the crest of what one prominent gambling law scholar terms “the third wave of legal gambling.”6.Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1123, 1129 (1996) (citing examples of such cases from a number of states); D.A. Norris, Annotation, What Are Games of Chance, Games of Skill, and Mixed Games of Chance and Skill, 135 A.L.R. 104, 107 (1941) (“In construing statutes or ordinances prohibiting gaming, gambling, or gambling devices wherein nothing is said about chance or a game of chance or skill, many courts have required, inter alia, the element of chance to be involved.”).Show More

Although gambling in the modern-day United States is primarily defined by statute, courts, “concerned that clever operators would find ways to subvert the [statutory] prohibitions,” have frequently held that a game or activity constituted gambling if the three elements of the common law definition—Prize/Chance/Consideration—were present.7.See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:37-1(b) (West 2023).Show More Many modern state statutes now utilize this definition, often with slight variations.8.See 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954).Show More However, this definition should not apply to all forms of gambling—nor was it originally intended to. The case most often cited in support for this definition, FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., was defining a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme,” not gambling writ large.9.See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (“Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries.”).Show More Historically, lotteries have been recognized as a distinct form of gambling, not as an interchangeable term.10 10.Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, a Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 Drake L. Rev. 383, 390–91 (2009) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance]; Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play: Is It Time for a New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 Nev. L.J. 197, 202 (Winter 2003–2004) [hereinafter Cabot & Csoka, The Games People Play].Show More Accordingly, in using this definition to evaluate all forms of gambling, courts have stretched and twisted the three elements in order to fit their intuitions of whether a gambling-like activity should be prohibited or not.

Chance is the most consistently problematic element from this definitional framework. The prevailing test for the chance element is the Dominant Factor Test: if the winner is determined predominantly by chance, as opposed to skill, then the activity is gambling.11 11.For instance, Haralabos Voulgaris has made millions as both a professional sports bettor and poker player, and he parlayed his success using statistical models in sports gambling into becoming the Director of Quantitative Research and Development for the Dallas Mavericks. See Marton, Haralabos Voulgaris’s Life: Biggest Profits, Losses, Private Life & Net Worth, So Much Poker (Aug. 20, 2020), https://somuchpoker.com/haralabos-voulgaris-life-biggest-profits-losses-private-life-net-worth/ [https://perma.cc/Z9CU-JKNQ].Show More Although appealing at first glance, the chance/skill dichotomy is a nebulous concept. Various paradigmatic forms of gambling, such as poker and sports wagering, have such a material skill component that highly skilled gamblers have been able to make a substantial living off of their pursuits.12 12.See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961).Show More On the other hand, certain “games of skill”—such as common carnival games or hole-in-one contests—can be structured so as to create games where the luck component predominates over the skill component, even for the most skilled participants.13 13.See, e.g., Indoor Recreation Enters. v. Douglas, 235 N.W.2d 398, 400–01 (Neb. 1975) (upholding a ruling that chess and checkers—paradigmatic examples of games of skill—are games of chance).Show More Even outside of these edge cases, the chance element has proved to be sufficiently confusing for courts in the analog context.14 14.See Yash Nair, What Does RNG Mean in Gaming?, DOT Esports (July 12, 2022, 11:16 AM), https://dotesports.com/general/news/what-does-rng-mean-in-gaming [https://perma.cc/H2DH-XLU7] (describing how video games use random number generators in which an algorithm decides a number value that determines certain in-game outcomes).Show More Given the importance of random number generation to the outcome of e‑sports contests, the chance element is bound to cause even greater confusion in the coming years.15 15.Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Economic Value, Equal Dignity and the Future of Sweepstakes, 1 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1, 10–15 (2010) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes] (citing FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954)).Show More

The other two elements, consideration and prize, have seen difficulties as well. Although consideration is a well‑defined concept in contract law, the Supreme Court in FCC v. American Broadcasting Co. departed from the so-called “contract theory” of consideration in favor of what is now referred to as the Economic Value Test, which many states have subsequently adopted.16 16.See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 23–36.Show More There has been continual debate and disagreement over how to evaluate non-monetary consideration and the possibility of free entry under this test.17 17.See Mark D. Griffiths, Is the Buying of Loot Boxes in Video Games a Form of Gambling or Gaming?, 22 Gaming L.R. 52, 53 (2018). The loot box mechanism works as follows: “Players use real money to buy virtual in-game items and can redeem such items by buying keys to open the boxes where they receive a chance selection of further virtual items.” Id. at 52.Show More Prize has come under less scrutiny historically, but has recently come to the forefront in the debate over whether video game loot boxes should be considered gambling schemes.18 18.U.K. Gambling Commission, Virtual Currencies, eSports and Social Casino Gaming – Position Paper ¶ 3(17)–(18) (2017), https://assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4A644HIpG1‌g2ymq11HdPOT/ca6272c45f1b2874d09eabe39515a527/Virtual-currencies-eSports-and-soci‌al-casino-gaming.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HL8-E9FX] (“Where prizes are successfully restricted for use solely within the game, such in-game features would not be licensable gambling, notwithstanding the elements of expenditure and chance.”).Show More The U.K. Gambling Commission declined to designate these loot boxes as a form of gambling because they did not view the in-game items awarded as prizes to have any real-life value outside of the game.19 19.The Federalist No. 37, at 180 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).Show More Though the current definition of gambling can be summed up in a pithy phrase, its application in practice misses the forest for the trees.

A critical threshold in any system of regulation is the identification of the regulated activity. The modern application of Prize/Chance/Consideration has often resulted in normative policy judgments being made simultaneously with the classification of the activity—a fundamental misstep. Although we may now find that the outright prohibition of vices like gambling creates more harms than it prevents, we, as James Madison once warned, “ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.”20 20.See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 393–94.Show More Separating classification from moralization would better allow a regulatory scheme to adjust to changes in information, custom, and societal attitudes.

In lieu of the modern framework, this Note advocates for a modern revitalization of the Gambling Instinct Test, which simply looks to whether the activity in question triggers one’s gambling instinct.21 21.See Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice, in The Handbook of Deviance 45, 46 (Erich Goode ed., 2015).Show More The Gambling Instinct Test is a superior doctrine because it homes in on the central harm‑causing mechanism of gambling. Like other vices, gambling is “prone to excess” and “particularly likely to compromise rational decision-making,” even amongst non-addicted adults.22 22.213 N.W. 335, 339 (Wis. 1927).Show More As described in City of Milwaukee v. Johnson:

The machine makes an appeal to the gambling instinct, because the player has constantly before him the chance that the next play will assure him of the right on the next succeeding play to secure from 2 to 20 trade checks. Were it not for this appeal to the gambling instinct, these machines, which attempt to adhere to the letter of the law while violating its spirit, would never have been placed upon the market.23 23.See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 4–5.Show More

The Gambling Instinct Test is typically associated with the deontological view of gambling: that gambling is a sin and inconsistent with a moral society.24 24.See, e.g., Mills-Jennings of Ohio, Inc. v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 435 N.E.2d 407, 409–10 (Ohio 1982) (detailing Ohio’s shift away from an anti-gambling public policy).Show More This test, peaking in usage in the 1930s, has mostly fallen out of favor since the 1950s, alongside the broad changes to society’s moral judgment of gambling that occurred in that time period.25 25.See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 394.Show More The Gambling Instinct Test has also been criticized for being a highly subjective test that “can vary widely in its application to particular games.”footnote_id_27_26 In light of these considerations, it may seem counterintuitive that this test would be a good fit for the modern era, where paternalistic legislation of morality is increasingly disfavored and more objective judicial methodologies are preferred. However, a broad, flexible definition better enables a smart, robust system of regulation than the illogical application of the current doctrine.

The Gambling Instinct Test is justly maligned for its subjectivity. This Note attempts to ameliorate this defect by providing more color to what it means to “appeal to the gambling instinct,” first by delving deep into the cases which applied this test, and then by drawing from empirical research to find evidentiary indicators of when that instinct is being stimulated. But before doing so, some background on the current doctrinal definition is needed.

  1.  The earliest English anti-gambling statute was enacted by King Richard II in 1388. R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 Miss. L.J. 565, 622–23 (2002) (citing 1388, 12 Rich. 2 c. 6 (Eng.)). Records from third-century India indicate that there was a governmental department responsible for the regulation of gambling during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya. Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 11, 16 (1992) (citing Will Durant, Our Oriental Heritage 444 (1954)); Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India 78 & n.2 (1919) (citing Arthasāstra bk. 3, ch. 20).
  2.  See Nat’l Inst. L. Enf’t & Crim. Just., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776–1976, at 4–13 (1977) [hereinafter Development of the Law of Gambling].
  3.  Id. at 39–41, 240.
  4.  See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 361, 368–74 (2010).
  5.  Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have legalized sports betting since that decision, and a number of other states are currently in the process of legalization. Will Yakowicz, Where Is Sports Betting Legal? A Guide to All 50 States, Forbes (Jan. 9, 2023, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyakowicz/2022/01/07/where-is-sports-betting-legal-americ‌a-2022/ [https://perma.cc/Y67H-4SNL].
  6.  See Rose, supra note 4, at 374–75 (tracing the third wave of legal gambling back to the early 1930s).
  7.  Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1123, 1129 (1996) (citing examples of such cases from a number of states); D.A. Norris, Annotation, What Are Games of Chance, Games of Skill, and Mixed Games of Chance and Skill, 135 A.L.R. 104, 107 (1941) (“In construing statutes or ordinances prohibiting gaming, gambling, or gambling devices wherein nothing is said about chance or a game of chance or skill, many courts have required, inter alia, the element of chance to be involved.”).
  8.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:37-1(b) (West 2023).
  9.  See 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954).
  10.  See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (“Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries.”).
  11.  Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, a Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 Drake L. Rev. 383, 390–91 (2009) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance]; Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play: Is It Time for a New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 Nev. L.J. 197, 202 (Winter 2003–2004) [hereinafter Cabot & Csoka, The Games People Play].
  12.  For instance, Haralabos Voulgaris has made millions as both a professional sports bettor and poker player, and he parlayed his success using statistical models in sports gambling into becoming the Director of Quantitative Research and Development for the Dallas Mavericks. See Marton, Haralabos Voulgaris’s Life: Biggest Profits, Losses, Private Life & Net Worth, So Much Poker (Aug. 20, 2020), https://somuchpoker.com/haralabos-voulgaris-life-biggest-profits-losses-private-life-net-worth/ [https://perma.cc/Z9CU-JKNQ].
  13.  See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961).
  14.  See, e.g., Indoor Recreation Enters. v. Douglas, 235 N.W.2d 398, 400–01 (Neb. 1975) (upholding a ruling that chess and checkers—paradigmatic examples of games of skill—are games of chance).
  15.  See Yash Nair, What Does RNG Mean in Gaming?, DOT Esports (July 12, 2022, 11:16 AM), https://dotesports.com/general/news/what-does-rng-mean-in-gaming [https://perma.cc/H2DH-XLU7] (describing how video games use random number generators in which an algorithm decides a number value that determines certain in-game outcomes).
  16.  Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Economic Value, Equal Dignity and the Future of Sweepstakes, 1 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1, 10–15 (2010) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes] (citing FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954)).
  17.  See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 23–36.
  18.  See Mark D. Griffiths, Is the Buying of Loot Boxes in Video Games a Form of Gambling or Gaming?, 22 Gaming L.R. 52, 53 (2018). The loot box mechanism works as follows: “Players use real money to buy virtual in-game items and can redeem such items by buying keys to open the boxes where they receive a chance selection of further virtual items.” Id. at 52.
  19.  U.K. Gambling Commission, Virtual Currencies, eSports and Social Casino Gaming – Position Paper ¶ 3(17)–(18) (2017), https://assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4A644HIpG1‌g2ymq11HdPOT/ca6272c45f1b2874d09eabe39515a527/Virtual-currencies-eSports-and-soci‌al-casino-gaming.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HL8-E9FX] (“Where prizes are successfully restricted for use solely within the game, such in-game features would not be licensable gambling, notwithstanding the elements of expenditure and chance.”).
  20.  The Federalist No. 37, at 180 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
  21.  See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 393–94.
  22.  See Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice, in The Handbook of Deviance 45, 46 (Erich Goode ed., 2015).
  23.  213 N.W. 335, 339 (Wis. 1927).
  24.  See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 4–5.
  25.  See, e.g., Mills-Jennings of Ohio, Inc. v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 435 N.E.2d 407, 409–10 (Ohio 1982) (detailing Ohio’s shift away from an anti-gambling public policy).
  26.  See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 394.

Reconstructing Reconstruction-Era Rights

It is conventional wisdom that the Reconstruction generation distinguished between civil rights, with respect to which the Fourteenth Amendment would require equality, and political and social rights, which would be excluded from coverage. This Article challenges that wisdom. It demonstrates that social rights were not a concept relevant to the coverage of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. Antebellum legal and political sources used the term “social rights” in a variety of ways, but none tracked the purported Reconstruction-era trichotomy of civil, political, and social rights; most uses of the term connected social rights to civil rights, which Article IV (and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment) reached.

The harder question is whether the Fourteenth Amendment reaches “public” rights and privileges as opposed to “private” rights. A close examination of antebellum jurisprudence suggests that public rights were excluded from the scope of Article IV because they were privileges of “special” citizenship but not “general” citizenship common to the citizens “in the several states.” Public privileges are likely included under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, which guarantees the privileges and immunities of citizens “of the United States” within particular states, including the privilege of all U.S. citizens to the public privileges of their own states to which they contribute through general taxation. If this framing is correct, then both the interracial marriage and school desegregation cases are easier to sustain on originalist grounds than prior studies have suggested.

Introduction

It is conventional wisdom that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the public that ratified it, divided rights into three categories: civil rights, with respect to which the Amendment guaranteed equality, and social and political rights, which were excluded from coverage. Jack Balkin, for example, has written that the Reconstruction generation “divided the rights of citizens into three parts—civil, political, and social—and held that equal citizenship meant equality of civil rights.”1.Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 139 (emphasis omitted).Show More According to this “tripartite theory of citizenship,”2.Id. at 146; see also Balkin, Living Originalism, supranote 1, at 227 (arguing that members of Congress who debated what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1875 “accepted the basic distinction” between civil, political, and social rights and argued “over whether access to public education was a civil or a social right”).Show More most members of the Reconstruction Congresses and the public of the time “did not consider blacks to be full social equals with whites, and so they believed that states should still be able to restrict interracial marriage and perhaps even segregate some public facilities.”3.Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 19 (2004).Show More

Michael Klarman agrees: “Most northern whites supported only civil rights for blacks, such as freedom of contract, property ownership, and court access—rights guaranteed in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, for which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to provide a secure constitutional foundation.”4.Id.Show More But “[m]any northern whites, including some Republicans, still resisted black political rights, such as voting or jury service, and social rights, such as interracial marriage or school integration.”5.Bruce Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution 130 (2014).Show More Similarly, Bruce Ackerman states: “For Reconstruction Republicans, only three spheres of life were worth distinguishing: the political sphere, which involved voting and the like; the civil sphere, which involved the legal protection of life and liberty, including rights of property and contract; and the social sphere, which involved everything else”; and “[w]ithin this traditional trichotomy, the Reconstruction Amendments protected political and civil rights but not social rights.”6.Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1016, 1025 (1995) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).Show More

Michael McConnell, in his famous article defending Brown v. Board of Education on originalist grounds, writes that this “tripartite division of rights . . . between civil rights, political rights, and social rights” was “universally accepted at the time,” and that “this tripartite division of rights forms the essential framework for interpreting the Amendment as it was originally understood.”7.Id. at 1016–29.Show More For this proposition, McConnell relies on the legislative debates in Congress over what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1875.8.For other examples, see Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71, 130 n.241 (2013) (“Another possible reason why marriage would not be covered by the Fourteenth Amendment is that it was regarded as a social right rather than a civil right.”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1120 (1997) (“Distinctions among civil, political, and social rights functioned more as a framework for debate than a conceptual scheme of any legal precision . . . . Social rights were those forms of association that, white Americans feared, would obliterate status distinctions and result in the ‘amalgamation’ of the races.”); David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1169 (2012) (describing it as a “familiar and important point[]” that “the Reconstruction Congress distinguished among civil, political, and social rights: the Fourteenth Amendment, as that Congress conceived it, protected civil rights but not political rights (quintessentially the right to vote) or social rights (of which the clearest example was the right to marry a person of another race)”); Ronald Turner, The Problematics of the Brown-Is-Originalist Project, 23 J.L. & Pol’y 591, 599 (2015) (noting “the three separate and distinct categories of rights recognized in the Reconstruction era: civil rights, political rights, and social rights,” and that “at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment social rights (including the right to attend a desegregated school and to marry a person of another race) were deemed to be outside the protective scope of the amendment, a fact which calls into question the notion and conclusion that Brown is consistent with originalism”); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1207, 1207 (1992) (“The Constitution’s revision after the Civil War reflected distinctions that the Reconstruction’s legal culture drew among different kinds of rights. That culture operated comfortably with distinctions among civil rights, political rights and social rights.”). Richard Primus has called into question the logic of these categories but observes that “[a]ccording to prominent modern scholars in both history and law,” understanding the “typology by which political and legal actors classified rights as ‘civil,’ ‘political,’ or ‘social’” is “essential for understanding the constitutional legacy of Reconstruction.” Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 128 (1999); William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 94 (1988) (distinguishing between the three categories and describing social rights as including “equal access to public accommodations and education”).Show More This trichotomy is so engrained in the modern literature that nearly every study of the Fourteenth Amendment assumes it to have been widely accepted by the Reconstruction generation.9.See, e.g., Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 146 (arguing that the trichotomy emerged “out of political necessity” in the Reconstruction Congresses); David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 823 (1998) (noting the distinction between social and civil rights “was arguably consistent with the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (discussing work by Klarman and McConnell on the legislative debates in the 1870s).Show More

This Article challenges that assumption. It takes a methodological approach different from most other studies of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most modern-day originalist (and non-originalist) scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment plumb the depths of the legislative debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress (or subsequent Congresses).10 10. Ilan Wurman, The Second Founding: An Introduction to the Fourteenth Amendment 15–63 (2020). For example, due process of law derives from the Magna Carta in 1215. Id. at 17. The protection of the laws also dates back at least to the Magna Carta and is elaborated upon by William Blackstone. Id. at 40–42. And privileges and immunities clauses can be traced back to the Articles of Confederation and even earlier to international treaties. Id. at 49–52.Show More This Article, in contrast, presumes that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment can be determined from legal history because each of the central terms of the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section—due process of law, the protection of the laws, and the privileges and immunities of citizenship—is written in legal language.11 11.When Representative Andrew Jackson Rogers of New Jersey asked Representative John Bingham of Ohio, the principal author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, what he understood by the phrase “due process of law,” Bingham responded: “I reply to the gentleman, the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman can go and read their decisions.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). When Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan presented the proposed Amendment to the Senate, he observed that the Senators “may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary” on the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause “by referring to a case adjudged many years ago.” Id. at 2765 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)). Many of the Constitution’s provisions are written in legal language. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1321, 1330 (2018). See generally John O. McGinnis, Michael B. Rappaport, Ilya Shapiro, Kevin Walsh & Ilan Wurman, The Legal Turn in Originalism: A Discussion (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 18-350, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201‌200 [https://perma.cc/J3EU-398N (discussing and debating the trends towards the use of legal methods to interpret the Constitution)].It is also likely that the Founding-era public was aware that legal terms would be construed legally. Ilan Wurman, The Legal U-Turn, in The Legal Turn in Originalism: A Discussion, supra, at 15.Show More What is more, the principal authors of the Amendment suggested that the language of the amendment would be interpreted in accordance with its legal history.12 12.Though a full defense of this particular claim will have to await a future paper. SeeIlan Wurman, Reversing Incorporation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).Show More The legal meaning is also consistent with the public meaning.13 13.U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).Show More

Although some scholars argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment14 14.See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 163–80 (1998); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights 1–10 (1986); Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship 65, 91–108 (2014).Show More was principally intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states,15 15.See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1414–20 (1992) (arguing that many in Congress “thought that the privileges or immunities of citizens consisted of rights defined by state positive law”);McConnell, supranote 7, at 999–1000 (“The better view is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected citizens against denials by their own states of the same set of rights that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protected against infringement by other states, and possibly, in addition, other rights of United States citizenship.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1393, 1410 (“At a bare minimum then, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause included the enumerated rights in the Civil Rights Act such as the right to make or enforce contracts.”); Christopher R. Green, Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution: The Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 52–60, 66–67 (2015); Wurman, supranote 11, at 101–02.Show More many originalist scholars now agree that the Clause was intended to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and that the rights covered by the Clause are at a minimum coterminous with the “privileges and immunities” guaranteed in Article IV, § 2.16 16.U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.Show More Known today as the Comity Clause, that Section provided, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of the citizens in the several states.”17 17.See, e.g., Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 626–27 (1860) (asserting that the Clause “was always understood as having but one design and meaning, viz., to secure to the citizens of every State, within every other, the privileges and immunities (whatever they might be) accorded in each to its own citizens”). See generallyLash, supranote 15, at 20–26 (tracing the history of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to the Articles of Confederation and visitation treaties between nations); Wurman, supranote 11, at 49–56 (arguing that the historical legal meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause required comity).Show More Its meaning was that whatever “privileges and immunities” a state granted its own citizens, it had to accord such privileges and immunities to citizens from other states traveling through or residing in the state.18 18.U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; seesources cited supra note 16.Show More As I have recently argued, and as others have argued before me, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that no state shall “abridge” the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” at a minimum does for intrastate discrimination what the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV did for interstate discrimination.19 19.This Article takes this position as a given and does not put forward any new evidence in support of it; it summarizes the argument in Section I.A infra.Show More

If that is correct, then the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” refers at a minimum to the set of privileges and immunities to which Article IV referred.20 20.See, e.g., Jud Campbell, Fundamental Rights at the American Founding 8–9 (forthcoming) (on file with author) (explaining that many revolutionary-era Americans believed that “[a]t the formation of a political society . . . natural rights became ‘civil’ rights”); see also infraSection I.B (discussing the distinction between “political rights” and “civil rights”).Show More What I aim to show is that the set of rights guaranteed by Article IV included all “civil rights” and excluded “political rights” such as voting, holding office, and sitting on juries. Civil rights are those rights individuals had in the state of nature but which the laws of society modify and regulate;21 21.These are rights that Jud Campbell has labeled “fundamental positive rights.” See Campbell, supra note 21, at 16–17. As Campbell explains, founding-era Americans understood “the importance of fundamental positive rights in securing natural rights”; “[t]o declare ‘natural rights,’ on this view, meant enumerating the customary common-law rules that safeguarded life, liberty, and property.” Id. at 17. More generally, the best description of “privileges and/or immunities” that I have found comes from Eric Claeys. He writes, “[P]rivileges and immunities associated with citizenship referred to civil laws established to secure important moral rights considered crucial to the political community.” Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 777, 785 (2008). “In these contexts, privileges and immunities relate to both natural and civil law. They are creations of positive law, but with the purpose of carrying the natural law into effect.” Id.; see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *125 (1765) (explaining that the “rights” and “liberties” of Englishmen are either “private immunities,” namely the “residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience,” and “those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals”).Show More the category also encompasses other rights like due process and the protection of the laws that are fundamental to the social compact and to securing natural rights.22 22.See infranotes 73–74 and accompanying text.Show More Political rights relate to the support and management of government and do not exist in the absence of political society. Civil rights belong to all “citizens,” but not all citizens have political rights.23 23.Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (guaranteeing equal right “to make and enforce contracts”).Show More

So far, so conventional. The present contested point is that “social rights,” whatever those are, had nothing to do with the scope of the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV. No use of that term in antebellum sources tracked the meaning of the term within the conventional understanding of the Reconstruction-era trichotomy. In each of the antebellum uses, social rights either included civil rights or were otherwise intimately connected with them.

If that is correct, then education and marriage are indisputably civil rights. Neither depends on political society. Certainly, each can be pursued and obtained through contract, and contract was the quintessential civil right guaranteed by Article IV (and the Civil Rights Act of 1866).24 24.Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 343 (1834); see infraSection I.D.Show More In one high-profile antebellum case involving the education of nonresident Black girls, it was assumed that Article IV reached at least private education.25 25.Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855); Connor’s Widow v. Adm’rs & Heirs of Connor, 10 La. Ann. 440, 449 (1855); see infraSection I.D.Show More And in another case from 1855 involving a marriage contract with a nonresident, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the case on the ground that marriage was not covered by Article IV which, if it had been true, would have been the easiest way to resolve the case. Neither the courts nor the parties even questioned that the Clause reached marriage laws.26 26.Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 565–68 (2007) (distinguishing between “public rights” held by the public as a whole, such as title to public lands and stewardship of the public treasury, public waters, and public roads; “private rights,” namely the rights to personal security, liberty, and property; and “privileges” or “entitlements” that “had no counterpart in the Lockean state of nature” and were created by the State “to carry out public ends”); Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J. 1015, 1020–21 (2006) (defining public rights to be “claims that were owned by the government—the sovereign people as a whole—rather than in persons’ individual capacities,” and including statutory rights in addition to the proprietary interests of the government within that term).I am using the terms “public right” and “public privilege” interchangeably to refer to those rights that are not “private rights” within Professor Nelson’s taxonomy. Public rights is arguably the broader term, subsuming both those rights actually held by the public (such as rights of way), as well as public privileges. In my view, statutory rights are not public rights, although they are considered so today under modern administrative law doctrine. All private rights are natural rights modified and regulated by the laws of civil society. It should not make a difference whether the source of that regulation is common law or statutory law.Show More

The more complicated question is the status of “public rights,” or “public privileges,” in the sense of the classic private rights/public rights divide.27 27.The classic examples of public rights are rights of way, such as public roads and waterways; public privileges like welfare benefits, public employment, and public land grants; and, in the antebellum period, corporate privileges. See Woolhandler, supra note 27, at 1021 (public lands); Nelson, supranote 27, at 566 (same); Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal Stud. 3, 3–4 (1983) (distinguishing traditional liberty and property from government “benefits” including public employment and “government transfers or social insurance”). For corporate privileges, see infraSection II.C.Show More Private rights are those we have in the state of nature, as modified by the laws of civil society—that is, civil rights. Public rights, in contrast, are rights held by the public at large or are entitlements private individuals can claim from the government.28 28.Robert Natelson argues that “privileges” in Article IV were distinct from “rights” and referred only to state-bestowed rights. This would include privileges such as trial by jury, but also “public privileges” in the sense I am using the term here, such as welfare benefits and university tuition discounts. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1117, 1189 (2009). This Article disagrees with Natelson’s view that there is a distinction between privileges and rights for purposes of the Clause, because all natural rights are modified, explained, and protected by the laws of civil society and are thus “privileges” even in the sense that Natelson uses the term. See alsoClaeys, supranote 22, at 785 (discussing Claeys’s definition of privileges and immunities). And “immunities” would include any natural rights left untouched by civil law, at least if Blackstone’s definition is any guide. Id. at 789–90. There is a difference, however, between such privileges, which are effectively private rights, and “public privileges” such as welfare benefits and in-state tuition. As to the latter, this Article shows, contra Natelson, that public privileges would not be covered by Article IV.Show More No study has examined the status of public rights under Article IV and the implications for the Privileges or Immunities Clause.29 29.See infraSection III.A for a more in-depth discussion.Show More Yet the status of public rights and privileges must be addressed to provide a definitive originalist answer to the question of whether Brown v. Board of Education is correct because public education is a public privilege and not a private right.

Public rights differ from both traditional civil rights and political rights. Although some public rights, like welfare benefits or corporate privileges, do not exist in the state of nature, they have analogs in the state of nature: they involve the kinds of rights that already existed or were obtainable in the state of nature or in a private market. Additionally, many public privileges take the form of private rights in that they are supported through general taxation, which involves property rights, and because they are generally distributed and provided for private rather than public purposes.30 30.N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (observing that the doctrine permitting certain cases to be adjudicated in legislative courts “may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued”).Show More These public rights therefore have similarities to civil rights despite that, like political rights, they depend on political society.

The distinction between private rights and public rights is, or at least historically was, important in many areas of law involving the separation of powers. For example, sovereign immunity tended to bar claims against the government when a private party alleged that the government had wrongfully withheld a public privilege, such as a land grant or welfare benefits.31 31.Id. at 67–68 (explaining this line of cases); Nelson, supranote 27, at 582–85 (similar); William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1540–47 (2020) (similar); see also Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (holding that Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty,” but that “there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper”).Show More Hence, non-Article III courts could adjudicate such matters because Congress’s greater power to refuse consent to suit includes the lesser power to consent to an executive branch adjudication.32 32.The distinction held until Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), which rejected the public/private distinction as applied to welfare benefits and due process. See also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 778–79 (1964) (arguing that public welfare and privileges should be treated on par with traditional property).Show More The distinction historically explained why the Due Process Clause did not apply to the withdrawal of welfare benefits.33 33.See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights and Taxation: A Brief Response to Professor Parrillo3–4 (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf‌m?abstract_id=4003530 [https://perma.cc/RJQ9-RHJL].Show More And scholars have argued that Congress could delegate more freely in the context of public rights because the government had wide discretion as to how to administer its resources.34 34.Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 442 (1973) (noting that many states require “nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled,” although not addressing the constitutionality of that practice).Show More

This Article concludes that the legal materials from the antebellum period support the proposition that public rights and privileges were excluded from Article IV because a state could reserve such rights for its own citizens. To this day, for example, a state does not have to extend the benefits of in-state tuition to out-of-state residents.35 35.In a new book, Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick argue that public privileges and political rights like voting can become part of the “privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens if as a matter of present-day social facts we understand such privileges to be fundamental. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit 22 (2021). As this Article will show, that is incorrect. The criterion for inclusion under Article IV was not that a right was “fundamental,” but rather that it was a civil right, all of which are fundamental. Civil rights, which are pre-political natural rights as modified by the rules of civil society, are categorically different than political rights and public rights. Although in modern discourse the term “civil rights” is casually understood to include political rights, that was not the meaning ascribed to that term or to the term “privileges or immunities” of citizens by those in the antebellum period. Moreover, Barnett and Bernick argue that under their reading, the reach of the Privileges or Immunities Clause can expandto include new rights that we deem fundamental, but it can never contract to eliminate protection for pre-political, natural civil rights like property rights or gun rights. Id. at 25. But if the criterion is what is “fundamental” by today’s lights, why could the reach of the Clause not contract as well as expand?Show More The crucial question is why they were excluded. If they were excluded because “public privileges” are not “rights” in the sense of being “privileges and immunities of citizens,” then they are excluded from both Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. If, however, the right of a state’s own citizens to access public privileges of a certain type—at least those financed through taxation or other common resources, that are widely distributed and available, and that are for private rather than public use—is a “privilege or immunity” of all United States citizens within their particular states, the Fourteenth Amendment may reach such rights even if Article IV does not.36 36.McConnell, supranote 7, at 953–54.Show More

The implications for originalism and the school desegregation and interracial marriage cases are obvious. Michael McConnell’s classic study of the legislative debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 assumes that the question is whether integrated public education is a social right or a civil right and argues that the answer to this question is to be found in the post-enactment debates in the early 1870s.37 37.Id. at 1103–04. Barnett and Bernick similarly defend Brown on the ground that public education could become fundamental over time as a matter of contemporary social understanding and, if so, it becomes covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. Barnett & Bernick, supranote 36, at 30.Show More The claim here, in contrast, is that the answer to whether the Fourteenth Amendment reaches public education is to be found in pre-enactment, antebellum jurisprudence, which distinguished civil rights and political rights on the one hand, and private rights and public privileges on the other. Separate may or may not be equal, but at a minimum the Fourteenth Amendment applies to public education. This approach also improves upon McConnell’s argument that even if public education were not a civil right in 1868, it was certainly a civil right by 1954.38 38.Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 429, 434–35, 437 (describing Article IV, and thus the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as guaranteeing all “fundamental” rights, and arguing that public education was such a right).Show More Resorting to 1954 does not supply a complete answer, however, because the question is whether a public privilege could ever be considered within the scope of the privileges and immunities of citizenship.

This approach differs from other defenses of Brown as well. Steven Calabresi and Michael Perl argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only “fundamental” rights, defined as rights guaranteed by at least three-quarters of the states, and that public education was such a right in both 1868 and 1954.39 39.As noted previously, Calabresi and Perl argue the right was fundamental because it was recognized in at least three-quarters of the states’ constitutions. See id. But as McConnell writes, “[t]here was considerable force to the claim that public school systems in the South, which were the focus of attention in the debates, were too informal and rudimentary to support the notion that there was an established, legally enforceable right to attend public school.” McConnell, supranote 7, at 1039. McConnell argues that “[n]o comprehensive public school systems existed at all in the Southern states before the War, and progress after the War was fitful.” Id. “Public schools in the Southern states served only a fraction of the school-age population.” Id. Indeed, Calabresi and Perl themselves observe that several of the state constitutional provisions required the legislature to establish common schools “as soon as practicable” or “as soon as conveniently may be.” Calabresi & Perl, supranote 39, at 451 & n.100, 453 n.111, 454 nn.120 & 122, 455 n.125, 457 n.130 (quoting Del. Const. of 1831, art. VII, § 11; then quoting Miss. Const. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1; then quoting Pa. Const. of 1838, art. VII, § 1; then quoting S.C. Const. of 1868, art. X, § 3; then quoting W. Va. Const. of 1861, art. X, § 2; and then quoting Conn. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 2). These provisions are not particularly strong evidence of a fundamental right.Show More That approach faces several difficulties, including the validity of that criterion for determining fundamental rights, as well as the lower-order question whether public education in fact met that criterion (whether in 1868 or 1954).40 40.The defense of Brown presented here also does not depend on defining “equality” at a high level of generality, as earlier defenses have. Balkin, Living Originalism, supranote 1, at 230–31 (arguing that the civil rights revolution “was so successful in altering understandings of equality that the tripartite theory seems strange to us today,” and that modern views of “equal citizenship and equality before the law” obviously require school desegregation and the invalidation of anti-miscegenation laws). Nor does it depend on interpreting the “protection of the laws” broadly, for the original meaning of that phrase was quite narrow, likely referring only to judicial remedies and protection against private violence. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 1, 44–45 (2008) (arguing that “equal protection of the laws” has such a narrow meaning); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 219, 220–21 (2009) (showing that this narrow meaning was the prominent understanding of the Equal Protection Clause post-enactment).Show More The approach presented here, in contrast, assumes that all civil rights (but not political rights) are “fundamental” in the sense of being covered by Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment; the question then becomes whether public privileges were understood to be in this category when offered by a state, regardless of how many other states offered such privileges.41 41.This argument, too, is in contrast to prior scholarship. SeeCalabresi & Matthews, supranote 16, at 1419 (arguing that the question is whether the right to marry is a fundamental right, and answering that “[t]he right to marry would surely have been thought to be a fundamental and longstanding common law right in 1868”).Show More

Under this approach, there is even less question that the Privileges or Immunities Clause reaches marriage. The right to marry is not a public privilege and is not a political right. It is a civil right. It is therefore covered by the Fourteenth Amendment.42 42.388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws).Show More And the legal methodology adopted here also challenges the claims of non-originalist scholars that the Fourteenth Amendment could not compel the result in Loving v. Virginia43 43.Michael J. Klarman, Brown,Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1883 (1995) (arguing that Brown is inconsistent with originalism); Eric J. Segall, Originalism as Faith52–53 (2018) (arguing that Loving is inconsistent with originalism); David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 12–13 (2010) (arguing that Brown is not only inconsistent with originalism but that the Brown Court stated that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment would not support the Brown decision).Show More or Brown v. Board,44 44.Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. Am. Hist. 884, 888 (1987) (“The domains of civil, political, and social rights were thus not sharply set off from each other. Equality was a fuzzy concept, and its supporters often simply ignored their disagreements over the concept’s application to particular problems.”).Show More or that the Amendment was irreducibly ambiguous as to which rights it applied.45 45.See, e.g., id. at 889–90; see alsoRichard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights156 (1999) (arguing that “many rights were not clearly fixed in one category or another” of the trichotomy).Show More

This methodological approach should also therefore encourage a rethinking of Reconstruction rights discourse more generally. Numerous scholars have shown the illogic of the trichotomy.46 46.Primus, supra note 46, at 155.Show More Richard Primus, for example, has explained that one could argue social rights applied only to private actions, like private schools, but that many argued schooling altogether, whether private or public, was a social right.47 47.Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 42 (1993); Wiecek, supra note 9, at 94.Show More Cass Sunstein and William Wiecek adopt the view that public education is a social right.48 48.W.R. Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865–1867, at 19 (1963).Show More W.R. Brock, on the other hand, argues education is a political right.49 49.This issue did arise occasionally. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849) (holding that segregated public schools did not violate any Massachusetts law).Show More The approach here has the potential to dissolve at least some of the controversy and contestation because civil rights, political rights, and public privileges are amenable to more concrete definition.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the connection between Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the evidence for the proposition that the Clause reached all civil but not political rights. It then examines four prominent antebellum uses of the term “social rights,” none of which tracked the purported Reconstruction-era trichotomy. It concludes with an examination of two marriage and education cases that suggest marriage and education were civil rights, although these cases are hardly dispositive of the question.

Part II analyzes antebellum jurisprudence surrounding public privileges, specifically the natural resources or common property of a state, the poor relief laws, and corporate privileges. It concludes that such privileges were excluded from Article IV because they were privileges of “special” rather than “general” citizenship and because under principles of comity a state could reserve such rights for its own citizens.

Part III makes the argument that such public privileges, although excluded from Article IV, are likely included within the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It then investigates the use of the term “social rights” in the Reconstruction Congresses and concludes that with few exceptions, the members of these Congresses adhered to the classic distinctions between civil and political rights on the one hand, and private rights and public rights and privileges on the other. To be sure, it may be that the Reconstruction generation confronted a problem that rarely arose in the antebellum period: the question of compelling association in common carriers and common schools.50 50.And in this sense, Loving was an easier case than Brown. See infra Part IV.Show More (This argument would not apply to prohibitions on interracial marriage.footnote_id_52_51) To the extent that this generation did identify a new category of “associational” rights in common institutions, the public rights/private rights distinction still helps clarify the analysis because it reveals that the Fourteenth Amendment at least requires equality with respect to such public privileges. It is, therefore, a merits question whether enforcing associational segregation in fact abridged the privileges and immunities of Black citizens. Part IV concludes.

  1.  Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 139 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Redemption]; see also Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 222–23 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Living Originalism] (articulating the tripartite distinction).
  2.  Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 139 (emphasis omitted).
  3.  Id. at 146; see also Balkin, Living Originalism, supra note 1, at 227 (arguing that members of Congress who debated what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1875 “accepted the basic distinction” between civil, political, and social rights and argued “over whether access to public education was a civil or a social right”).
  4.  Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 19 (2004).
  5.  Id.
  6.  Bruce Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution 130 (2014).
  7.  Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1016, 1025 (1995) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
  8.  Id. at 1016–29.
  9.  For other examples, see Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71, 130 n.241 (2013) (“Another possible reason why marriage would not be covered by the Fourteenth Amendment is that it was regarded as a social right rather than a civil right.”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1120 (1997) (“Distinctions among civil, political, and social rights functioned more as a framework for debate than a conceptual scheme of any legal precision . . . . Social rights were those forms of association that, white Americans feared, would obliterate status distinctions and result in the ‘amalgamation’ of the races.”); David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1169 (2012) (describing it as a “familiar and important point[]” that “the Reconstruction Congress distinguished among civil, political, and social rights: the Fourteenth Amendment, as that Congress conceived it, protected civil rights but not political rights (quintessentially the right to vote) or social rights (of which the clearest example was the right to marry a person of another race)”); Ronald Turner, The Problematics of the Brown-Is-Originalist Project, 23 J.L. & Pol’y 591, 599 (2015) (noting “the three separate and distinct categories of rights recognized in the Reconstruction era: civil rights, political rights, and social rights,” and that “at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment social rights (including the right to attend a desegregated school and to marry a person of another race) were deemed to be outside the protective scope of the amendment, a fact which calls into question the notion and conclusion that Brown is consistent with originalism”); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1207, 1207 (1992) (“The Constitution’s revision after the Civil War reflected distinctions that the Reconstruction’s legal culture drew among different kinds of rights. That culture operated comfortably with distinctions among civil rights, political rights and social rights.”). Richard Primus has called into question the logic of these categories but observes that “[a]ccording to prominent modern scholars in both history and law,” understanding the “typology by which political and legal actors classified rights as ‘civil,’ ‘political,’ or ‘social’” is “essential for understanding the constitutional legacy of Reconstruction.” Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 128 (1999); William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 94 (1988) (distinguishing between the three categories and describing social rights as including “equal access to public accommodations and education”).
  10.  See, e.g., Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 1, at 146 (arguing that the trichotomy emerged “out of political necessity” in the Reconstruction Congresses); David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 823 (1998) (noting the distinction between social and civil rights “was arguably consistent with the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (discussing work by Klarman and McConnell on the legislative debates in the 1870s).
  11. Ilan Wurman, The Second Founding: An Introduction to the Fourteenth Amendment 15–63 (2020). For example, due process of law derives from the Magna Carta in 1215. Id. at 17. The protection of the laws also dates back at least to the Magna Carta and is elaborated upon by William Blackstone. Id. at 40–42. And privileges and immunities clauses can be traced back to the Articles of Confederation and even earlier to international treaties. Id. at 49–52.

  12.  When Representative Andrew Jackson Rogers of New Jersey asked Representative John Bingham of Ohio, the principal author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, what he understood by the phrase “due process of law,” Bingham responded: “I reply to the gentleman, the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman can go and read their decisions.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). When Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan presented the proposed Amendment to the Senate, he observed that the Senators “may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary” on the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause “by referring to a case adjudged many years ago.” Id. at 2765 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)). Many of the Constitution’s provisions are written in legal language. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1321, 1330 (2018). See generally John O. McGinnis, Michael B. Rappaport, Ilya Shapiro, Kevin Walsh & Ilan Wurman, The Legal Turn in Originalism: A Discussion (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 18-350, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201‌200 [https://perma.cc/J3EU-398N (discussing and debating the trends towards the use of legal methods to interpret the Constitution)].

    It is also likely that the Founding-era public was aware that legal terms would be construed legally. Ilan Wurman, The Legal U-Turn, in The Legal Turn in Originalism: A Discussion, supra, at 15.

  13.  Though a full defense of this particular claim will have to await a future paper. See Ilan Wurman, Reversing Incorporation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
  14.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
  15.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 163–80 (1998); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights 1–10 (1986); Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship 65, 91–108 (2014).
  16.  See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1414–20 (1992) (arguing that many in Congress “thought that the privileges or immunities of citizens consisted of rights defined by state positive law”); McConnell, supra note 7, at 999–1000 (“The better view is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected citizens against denials by their own states of the same set of rights that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protected against infringement by other states, and possibly, in addition, other rights of United States citizenship.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1393, 1410 (“At a bare minimum then, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause included the enumerated rights in the Civil Rights Act such as the right to make or enforce contracts.”); Christopher R. Green, Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution: The Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 52–60, 66–67 (2015); Wurman, supra note 11, at 101–02.
  17.  U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
  18.  See, e.g., Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 626–27 (1860) (asserting that the Clause “was always understood as having but one design and meaning, viz., to secure to the citizens of every State, within every other, the privileges and immunities (whatever they might be) accorded in each to its own citizens”). See generally Lash, supra note 15, at 20–26 (tracing the history of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to the Articles of Confederation and visitation treaties between nations); Wurman, supra note 11, at 49–56 (arguing that the historical legal meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause required comity).
  19.  U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; see sources cited supra note 16.
  20.  This Article takes this position as a given and does not put forward any new evidence in support of it; it summarizes the argument in Section I.A infra.
  21.  See, e.g., Jud Campbell, Fundamental Rights at the American Founding 8–9 (forthcoming) (on file with author) (explaining that many revolutionary-era Americans believed that “[a]t the formation of a political society . . . natural rights became ‘civil’ rights”); see also infra Section I.B (discussing the distinction between “political rights” and “civil rights”).
  22.  These are rights that Jud Campbell has labeled “fundamental positive rights.” See Campbell, supra note 21, at 16–17. As Campbell explains, founding-era Americans understood “the importance of fundamental positive rights in securing natural rights”; “[t]o declare ‘natural rights,’ on this view, meant enumerating the customary common-law rules that safeguarded life, liberty, and property.” Id. at 17. More generally, the best description of “privileges and/or immunities” that I have found comes from Eric Claeys. He writes, “[P]rivileges and immunities associated with citizenship referred to civil laws established to secure important moral rights considered crucial to the political community.” Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 777, 785 (2008). “In these contexts, privileges and immunities relate to both natural and civil law. They are creations of positive law, but with the purpose of carrying the natural law into effect.” Id.; see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *125 (1765) (explaining that the “rights” and “liberties” of Englishmen are either “private immunities,” namely the “residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience,” and “those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals”).
  23.  See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
  24.  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (guaranteeing equal right “to make and enforce contracts”).
  25.  Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 343 (1834); see infra Section I.D.
  26.  Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855); Connor’s Widow v. Adm’rs & Heirs of Connor, 10 La. Ann. 440, 449 (1855); see infra Section I.D.
  27.  Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 565–68 (2007) (distinguishing between “public rights” held by the public as a whole, such as title to public lands and stewardship of the public treasury, public waters, and public roads; “private rights,” namely the rights to personal security, liberty, and property; and “privileges” or “entitlements” that “had no counterpart in the Lockean state of nature” and were created by the State “to carry out public ends”); Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J. 1015, 1020–21 (2006) (defining public rights to be “claims that were owned by the government—the sovereign people as a whole—rather than in persons’ individual capacities,” and including statutory rights in addition to the proprietary interests of the government within that term).

    I am using the terms “public right” and “public privilege” interchangeably to refer to those rights that are not “private rights” within Professor Nelson’s taxonomy. Public rights is arguably the broader term, subsuming both those rights actually held by the public (such as rights of way), as well as public privileges. In my view, statutory rights are not public rights, although they are considered so today under modern administrative law doctrine. All private rights are natural rights modified and regulated by the laws of civil society. It should not make a difference whether the source of that regulation is common law or statutory law.

  28.  The classic examples of public rights are rights of way, such as public roads and waterways; public privileges like welfare benefits, public employment, and public land grants; and, in the antebellum period, corporate privileges. See Woolhandler, supra note 27, at 1021 (public lands); Nelson, supra note 27, at 566 (same); Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal Stud. 3, 3–4 (1983) (distinguishing traditional liberty and property from government “benefits” including public employment and “government transfers or social insurance”). For corporate privileges, see infra Section II.C.
  29.  Robert Natelson argues that “privileges” in Article IV were distinct from “rights” and referred only to state-bestowed rights. This would include privileges such as trial by jury, but also “public privileges” in the sense I am using the term here, such as welfare benefits and university tuition discounts. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1117, 1189 (2009). This Article disagrees with Natelson’s view that there is a distinction between privileges and rights for purposes of the Clause, because all natural rights are modified, explained, and protected by the laws of civil society and are thus “privileges” even in the sense that Natelson uses the term. See also Claeys, supra note 22, at 785 (discussing Claeys’s definition of privileges and immunities). And “immunities” would include any natural rights left untouched by civil law, at least if Blackstone’s definition is any guide. Id. at 789–90. There is a difference, however, between such privileges, which are effectively private rights, and “public privileges” such as welfare benefits and in-state tuition. As to the latter, this Article shows, contra Natelson, that public privileges would not be covered by Article IV.
  30.  See infra Section III.A for a more in-depth discussion.
  31.  N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (observing that the doctrine permitting certain cases to be adjudicated in legislative courts “may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued”).
  32.  Id. at 67–68 (explaining this line of cases); Nelson, supra note 27, at 582–85 (similar); William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1540–47 (2020) (similar); see also Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (holding that Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty,” but that “there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper”).
  33.  The distinction held until Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), which rejected the public/private distinction as applied to welfare benefits and due process. See also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 778–79 (1964) (arguing that public welfare and privileges should be treated on par with traditional property).
  34.  See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights and Taxation: A Brief Response to Professor Parrillo 3–4 (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf‌m?abstract_id=4003530 [https://perma.cc/RJQ9-RHJL].
  35.  Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 442 (1973) (noting that many states require “nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled,” although not addressing the constitutionality of that practice).
  36.  In a new book, Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick argue that public privileges and political rights like voting can become part of the “privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens if as a matter of present-day social facts we understand such privileges to be fundamental. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit 22 (2021). As this Article will show, that is incorrect. The criterion for inclusion under Article IV was not that a right was “fundamental,” but rather that it was a civil right, all of which are fundamental. Civil rights, which are pre-political natural rights as modified by the rules of civil society, are categorically different than political rights and public rights. Although in modern discourse the term “civil rights” is casually understood to include political rights, that was not the meaning ascribed to that term or to the term “privileges or immunities” of citizens by those in the antebellum period. Moreover, Barnett and Bernick argue that under their reading, the reach of the Privileges or Immunities Clause can expand to include new rights that we deem fundamental, but it can never contract to eliminate protection for pre-political, natural civil rights like property rights or gun rights. Id. at 25. But if the criterion is what is “fundamental” by today’s lights, why could the reach of the Clause not contract as well as expand?
  37.  McConnell, supra note 7, at 953–54.
  38.  Id. at 1103–04. Barnett and Bernick similarly defend Brown on the ground that public education could become fundamental over time as a matter of contemporary social understanding and, if so, it becomes covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. Barnett & Bernick, supra note 36, at 30.
  39.  Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 429, 434–35, 437 (describing Article IV, and thus the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as guaranteeing all “fundamental” rights, and arguing that public education was such a right).
  40.  As noted previously, Calabresi and Perl argue the right was fundamental because it was recognized in at least three-quarters of the states’ constitutions. See id. But as McConnell writes, “[t]here was considerable force to the claim that public school systems in the South, which were the focus of attention in the debates, were too informal and rudimentary to support the notion that there was an established, legally enforceable right to attend public school.” McConnell, supra note 7, at 1039. McConnell argues that “[n]o comprehensive public school systems existed at all in the Southern states before the War, and progress after the War was fitful.” Id. “Public schools in the Southern states served only a fraction of the school-age population.” Id. Indeed, Calabresi and Perl themselves observe that several of the state constitutional provisions required the legislature to establish common schools “as soon as practicable” or “as soon as conveniently may be.” Calabresi & Perl, supra note 39, at 451 & n.100, 453 n.111, 454 nn.120 & 122, 455 n.125, 457 n.130 (quoting Del. Const. of 1831, art. VII, § 11; then quoting Miss. Const. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1; then quoting Pa. Const. of 1838, art. VII, § 1; then quoting S.C. Const. of 1868, art. X, § 3; then quoting W. Va. Const. of 1861, art. X, § 2; and then quoting Conn. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 2). These provisions are not particularly strong evidence of a fundamental right.
  41.  The defense of Brown presented here also does not depend on defining “equality” at a high level of generality, as earlier defenses have. Balkin, Living Originalism
    ,

    supra note 1, at 230–31 (arguing that the civil rights revolution “was so successful in altering understandings of equality that the tripartite theory seems strange to us today,” and that modern views of “equal citizenship and equality before the law” obviously require school desegregation and the invalidation of anti-miscegenation laws). Nor does it depend on interpreting the “protection of the laws” broadly, for the original meaning of that phrase was quite narrow, likely referring only to judicial remedies and protection against private violence. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 1, 44–45 (2008) (arguing that “equal protection of the laws” has such a narrow meaning); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 219, 220–21 (2009) (showing that this narrow meaning was the prominent understanding of the Equal Protection Clause post-enactment).

  42.  This argument, too, is in contrast to prior scholarship. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 16, at 1419 (arguing that the question is whether the right to marry is a fundamental right, and answering that “[t]he right to marry would surely have been thought to be a fundamental and longstanding common law right in 1868”).
  43.  388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws).
  44.  Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1883 (1995) (arguing that Brown is inconsistent with originalism); Eric J. Segall, Originalism as Faith

    52–53 (2018) (arguing that Loving is inconsistent with originalism); David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 12–13 (2010) (arguing that Brown is not only inconsistent with originalism but that the Brown Court stated that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment would not support the Brown decision).

  45.  Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. Am. Hist. 884, 888 (1987) (“The domains of civil, political, and social rights were thus not sharply set off from each other. Equality was a fuzzy concept, and its supporters often simply ignored their disagreements over the concept’s application to particular problems.”).
  46.  See, e.g., id. at 889–90; see also Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights

    156 (1999) (arguing that “many rights were not clearly fixed in one category or another” of the trichotomy).

  47.  Primus, supra note 46, at 155.
  48.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 42 (1993); Wiecek, supra note 9, at 94.
  49. W.

    R. Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865–1867, at 19 (1963).

  50.  This issue did arise occasionally. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849) (holding that segregated public schools did not violate any Massachusetts law).
  51.  And in this sense, Loving was an easier case than Brown. See infra Part IV.

Bad Faith Prosecution

There is no shortage of claims by parties that their prosecutions are politically motivated, racially motivated, or just plain arbitrary. In our increasingly polarized society, such claims are more common than ever. Donald Trump campaigned on promises to lock up Hillary Clinton for her handling of State Department-related emails, but he subsequently complained that the special counsel’s investigation of his campaign’s alleged contacts with Russian operatives was a politically motivated witch hunt. Kenneth Starr’s pursuit of investigations of Bill Clinton evoked similar arguments of political motivation.1.See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 397 (2001) (using the Starr investigation as a point of departure for discussing prosecutorial abuses generally).Show More

The advent of “progressive” prosecutors will no doubt increase claims of bad faith prosecution, given their announcements of crimes they will and will not prosecute. Typically, they promise not to prosecute for lesser violations such as prostitution and drug possession.2.See Memorandum from Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, Cnty. of New York (Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Day-One-Letter-Policies-1.03.2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/A336-ERT6] (announcing a policy to decline prosecution for, inter alia, marijuana misdemeanors, failing to pay a fare for public transportation, aggravated unlicensed operation, and prostitution); Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1203, 1205–06 (2020) (providing examples of progressive prosecutors’ policies).Show More Although crime victims generally cannot complain that a perpetrator was not prosecuted, non-prosecution policies could strengthen claims of bad faith prosecution when prosecutors nevertheless prosecute some individuals for such delicts. In addition, candidates’ and officials’ statements that they intend to pursue certain individuals or groups may bolster claims of bad faith—as evidenced in Donald Trump’s arguments of political motivation for investigations by New York Attorney General Letitia James.3.See Complaint at 6, 11, 29, Trump v. James, No. 21-cv-01352, 2022 WL 1718951 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2022) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief inter alia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to limit the investigation, and relying on numerous statements by James as a candidate and as the New York Attorney General with respect to Trump); Trump v. James, 2022 WL 1718951, at *19–20 (dismissing the complaint based on Younger [v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),] abstention); id. at *13 (stating that the plaintiffs had not established that the subpoena enforcement action was commenced for a retaliatory purpose). Within days of the complaint being dismissed, the plaintiffs appealed. See Trump v. James,No. 21-cv-01352, 2022 WL 1718951 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2022), appeal docketed,No. 22-1175 (2d Cir. May 31, 2022).Show More

Introduction

The varying cries of “foul” raise questions as to what should count as a politically motivated, racially motivated, or generally bad faith prosecution. The pitfalls of too easy or too difficult a standard for showing selective prosecution are evident. The investigation and prosecution of Paul Manafort might not have occurred absent his political visibility, but one may not necessarily think that his evasion of income taxes should therefore be excused.4.See United States v. Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258, 272 (D.D.C. 2018) (refusing to suppress evidence from an allegedly overbroad search).Show More On the other hand, the fact that Yick Wo violated San Francisco’s ordinance against operating a laundry in a wooden building should not preclude a claim of discriminatory prosecution.5.See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial . . . of that equal protection of the laws . . . .”). But cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 Ill. L. Rev. 1359, 1369–70, 1373, 1376 (arguing that the decision was based on an invasion of property rights and was not about discriminatory prosecution, although later cases attributed that meaning to Yick Wo).Show More

The Supreme Court has required relatively high standards for claims of race- or speech-motivated prosecution. Under Armstrong v. United States, defendants in criminal cases must make a significant showing to obtain discovery as to discriminatory purpose and effect.6.517 U.S. 456, 459–61, 463–65, 469–70 (1996).Show More And under Hartman v. Moore, plaintiffs seeking damages for a previous prosecution must allege the absence of probable cause in addition to bad motivation.7.547 U.S. 250, 260–61 (2006). There are, of course, other ways for checking prosecutorial abuse such as elections and criminal process. The criminal process provides for possible determinations by grand juries and judges that probable cause is lacking, including by way of motions for acquittal and appeals for insufficiency of evidence.Show More

Many have condemned the standards used by the Supreme Court as unduly limiting bad faith prosecution claims8.See, e.g., Alison Siegler & William Admussen, Discovering Racial Discrimination by the Police, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 987, 991 (2021) (criticizing difficulties of proof); John S. Clayton, Policing the Press: Retaliatory Arrests of Newsgatherers After Nieves v. Bartlett, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 2275, 2294–96 (2020); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in Criminal Procedure Stories 351, 369 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 618 (1998); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1071, 1073–74 (1997); Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 932, 963 (1997).Show More and as inconsistent with ordinary standards for proving cases of unconstitutional motivation.9.See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 267 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.); Kristin E. Kruse, Comment, Proving Discriminatory Intent in Selective Prosecution Challenges—An Alternative Approach to United States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L. Rev. 1523, 1536 (2005) (recommending use of the employment discrimination framework from cases such as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); cf. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in a damages case alleging an arrest in retaliation for speech, arguing that a showing of lack of probable cause should not be required by the Court because a constitutional violation did not require such a showing); id. at 1737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standards of Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), strike the proper balance between government interests and individual rights).Show More After all, if we look beyond the setting of criminal prosecutions, the Court has made it comparatively easier to vindicate rights in the face of constitutionally improper motivations. The Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle famously introduced a two-part test that requires, upon a showing by the plaintiff that a constitutionally improper motivation prompted his termination, the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s termination would in any event have come to pass.10 10.429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977).Show More

In other words, the Mt. Healthy test—which has spread beyond its original First Amendment setting—more readily allows a claimant to have her claim heard on the merits.11 11.Under the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a plaintiff can prevail on the liability phase if the plaintiff shows that a factor such as race was “a motivating factor for an employment practice”; the defendant has a burden of persuasion at the remedy phase if the defendant wishes to show that the adverse employment action would have occurred for an alternative reason. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018); see also George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination Law 53–54 (5th ed. 2021) (discussing aforementioned statutes). The Court, however, has eschewed burden shifting under certain other employment discrimination statutes, see id.; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 178–79 (2009) (not applying burden shifting in a case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018)); id. at 179 (questioning the burden shifting approach generally). There may be some question, then, of whether the Court will continue to use the burden shifting framework where statutes do not specifically require it.Show More Why should a similar approach not hold sway in the setting of criminal prosecutions? We have a succinct answer to this question: the same approach should not apply because the setting of criminal prosecutions is fundamentally different.

To take up this argument, we first provide what we hope is a useful taxonomy of different types of claims of bad faith prosecution and the procedural settings in which they arise. We also describe the standards of proof in the different procedural settings. We then address criticisms that the standards of proof for bad faith prosecutions unduly deviate from the ordinary standards for proving unconstitutional motivation. We suggest that there are good reasons for requiring higher standards for showing bad faith prosecution as compared to other areas of alleged illicit motivation such as employment discrimination. There may be a presumption that criminal behavior, rather than bad faith, is the reason for prosecution of nontrivial violations.12 12.Cf. McAdams, supra note 8, at 653 (“Perhaps the more fundamental basis for hostility to selective prosecution claims is that they are presented by the guilty.”).Show More And despite the academic chorus reprobating prosecutorial discretion,13 13.See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511–12, 579–81 (2001) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion leads to over-criminalization but suggesting difficulties with eliminating such discretion); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 379 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion gives too much power to prosecutors, upsetting our system of checks and balances); Leslie B. Arffa, Note, Separation of Prosecutors, 128 Yale L.J. 1078, 1082 (2019) (noting that many see prosecutorial power as a central problem of the American criminal justice system); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1099, 1104–05, 1129–31 (2014) (describing critiques of prosecutorial discretion and citing authority).Show More greater judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial motives may be less helpful than safeguards within prosecutors’ offices—as Professor Barkow has argued.14 14.See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 908–09 (2009); Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 1132 (providing reasons for prosecutorial discretion); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379–81 (1973) (detailing reasons why judicial review of prosecutorial discretion would be undesirable); cf. Hannah Shaffer, Prosecutors, Race, and the Criminal Pipeline, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 1–2) (suggesting that limiting prosecutorial discretion or blinding them to defendants’ race may inadvertently offset prosecutors’ giving less weight to the criminal records of Black defendants than white defendants in decisions affecting incarceration); id. (manuscript at 25–26, 37, 45, 54) (not attributing the lesser weight to records of Black defendants to progressive elected prosecutors, although finding that beliefs of individual prosecutors affected results). Our views thus could be characterized as a “checks and balances” approach, under which prosecutors’ offices adopt organizational structures that reduce incentives and opportunities to pursue constitutionally improper motives, rather than a “separation of powers” approach—that is, an approach that involves other branches of government—to regulate prosecutorial discretion. See Daniel Epps, Checks and Balances in the Criminal Law, 74 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2021) (contrasting checks and balances approaches with separation of powers approaches); id. at 73–74 (recommending separation of functions within prosecutors’ offices, as suggested by Barkow).Show More This does not mean that prosecutors’ offices should be immune from scrutiny, but it may suggest that Armstrong’s and Hartman’s hurdles to opening up judicial review of prosecutorial motives are appropriate.

In addition, we discuss the special difficulties of addressing political and racial motivations in the prosecutorial setting. While all deplore politically motivated prosecutions, there are difficulties in drawing lines between appropriate and inappropriate political influences on prosecutorial policies and decisions,15 15.Cf. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (discussing that agency decisions are often informed by politics).Show More which in turn suggests high standards of proof. What is more, the Court assumes that disparate racial impact evidence may hold reduced probative value in the prosecution context, given the difficulties of determining the populations of those who might have been prosecuted but were not.16 16.See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218, 2257–58 (2019) (referring to studies suggesting some crimes may be committed disproportionately by different groups); Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 Criminology 680, 690 (2016) (noting the debate as to whether differential participation or differential selection causes racial disparities in criminal justice).Show More

We also address other arguable inconsistencies between the standards for bad faith prosecution claims and related areas and offer resolutions. (1) In damages (Hartman) cases, the plaintiff must make a showing of no-probable-cause that is not required when a motion is brought in a criminal proceeding (Armstrong cases), but we conclude that the difference is warranted. (2) In retaliatory arrest claims, the Court in Nieves v. Bartlett allowed for an exception to the no-probable-cause showing for minor crimes that rarely evoke enforcement,17 17.139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724, 1727 (2019).Show More but it is unclear whether such an exception exists for Hartman retaliatory prosecution claims. We suggest recognition of such an exception for bad faith prosecution claims. (3) Some lower federal courts have more easily allowed discovery with respect to claims in criminal cases of discriminatory “enforcement” as distinguished from Armstrong discriminatory “prosecution” motions.18 18.See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2017); infra note 70 (describing differing views in the circuit courts).Show More We suggest that the experience with broader discovery warrants continuing caution in loosening discovery for bad faith prosecution claims. (4) Lower federal courts have prescribed somewhat different elements for damages claims under various theories in the nature of malicious prosecution.19 19.See Erin E. McMannon, The Demise of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law from the Fourth Amendment, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479, 1485, 1493 (2019) (discussing varying standards and citing cases and secondary authority); Lyle Kossis, Malicious Prosecution Claims in Section 1983 Lawsuits, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1635, 1646–48 (2013) (discussing various standards).Show More For example, there is an issue of whether malicious prosecution claims brought under the Fourth Amendment require proof of subjective bad motivation.20 20.See, e.g., Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99–101 (1st Cir. 2013) (alluding to differences among the circuits).Show More We suggest a way to make the standards more uniform across different types of claims.21 21.Compare Kossis, supra note 19, at 1662–63 (favoring use of common law elements), with McMannon, supra note 19, at 1504 (disfavoring use of common law elements in favor of a Fourth Amendment-based framework).Show More

Finally, we show how the rise of progressive prosecutors may make proof of bad faith prosecutions easier. That is because policies of non-prosecution will provide claimants with more comparators for making out their claims.

Part I discusses what we mean by bad faith prosecution, and we provide a taxonomy of bad faith prosecution claims arising under different constitutional provisions and as they arise in particular procedural settings. Although we principally focus on claims that a prosecution was motivated by race or speech, we also describe other theories that may support a claim of bad faith prosecution. Part II describes the standards of proof for bad faith prosecution claims as they arise in different procedural contexts. Part III addresses criticisms that these standards are too high and inconsistent with other claims involving subjective ill will and provides rationales for the elevated standards for bad faith prosecution. Part IV briefly considers whether certain other inconsistencies in the doctrine suggest changes to requirements for proving bad faith prosecutions. Part V discusses the possible impact of progressive prosecutors on claims of bad faith prosecution.

  1.  See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 397 (2001) (using the Starr investigation as a point of departure for discussing prosecutorial abuses generally).
  2.  See Memorandum from Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, Cnty. of New York (Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Day-One-Letter-Policies-1.03.2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/A336-ERT6] (announcing a policy to decline prosecution for, inter alia, marijuana misdemeanors, failing to pay a fare for public transportation, aggravated unlicensed operation, and prostitution); Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1203, 1205–06 (2020) (providing examples of progressive prosecutors’ policies).
  3.  See Complaint at 6, 11, 29, Trump v. James, No. 21-cv-01352, 2022 WL 1718951 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2022) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief inter alia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to limit the investigation, and relying on numerous statements by James as a candidate and as the New York Attorney General with respect to Trump); Trump v. James, 2022 WL 1718951, at *19–20 (dismissing the complaint based on Younger [v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),] abstention); id. at *13 (stating that the plaintiffs had not established that the subpoena enforcement action was commenced for a retaliatory purpose). Within days of the complaint being dismissed, the plaintiffs appealed. See Trump v. James, No. 21-cv-01352, 2022 WL 1718951 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2022), appeal docketed, No. 22-1175 (2d Cir. May 31, 2022).
  4.  See United States v. Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258, 272 (D.D.C. 2018) (refusing to suppress evidence from an allegedly overbroad search).
  5.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial . . . of that equal protection of the laws . . . .”). But cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 Ill. L. Rev. 1359, 1369–70, 1373, 1376 (arguing that the decision was based on an invasion of property rights and was not about discriminatory prosecution, although later cases attributed that meaning to Yick Wo).
  6.  517 U.S. 456, 459–61, 463–65, 469–70 (1996).
  7.  547 U.S. 250, 260–61 (2006). There are, of course, other ways for checking prosecutorial abuse such as elections and criminal process. The criminal process provides for possible determinations by grand juries and judges that probable cause is lacking, including by way of motions for acquittal and appeals for insufficiency of evidence.
  8.  See, e.g., Alison Siegler & William Admussen, Discovering Racial Discrimination by the Police, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 987, 991 (2021) (criticizing difficulties of proof); John S. Clayton, Policing the Press: Retaliatory Arrests of Newsgatherers After Nieves v. Bartlett, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 2275, 2294–96 (2020); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in Criminal Procedure Stories 351, 369 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 618 (1998); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1071, 1073–74 (1997); Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 932, 963 (1997).
  9.  See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 267 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.); Kristin E. Kruse, Comment, Proving Discriminatory Intent in Selective Prosecution Challenges—An Alternative Approach to United States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L. Rev. 1523, 1536 (2005) (recommending use of the employment discrimination framework from cases such as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); cf. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in a damages case alleging an arrest in retaliation for speech, arguing that a showing of lack of probable cause should not be required by the Court because a constitutional violation did not require such a showing); id. at 1737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standards of Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), strike the proper balance between government interests and individual rights).
  10.  429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977).
  11.  Under the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a plaintiff can prevail on the liability phase if the plaintiff shows that a factor such as race was “a motivating factor for an employment practice”; the defendant has a burden of persuasion at the remedy phase if the defendant wishes to show that the adverse employment action would have occurred for an alternative reason. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018); see also George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination Law 53–54 (5th ed. 2021) (discussing aforementioned statutes). The Court, however, has eschewed burden shifting under certain other employment discrimination statutes, see id.; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 178–79 (2009) (not applying burden shifting in a case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018)); id. at 179 (questioning the burden shifting approach generally). There may be some question, then, of whether the Court will continue to use the burden shifting framework where statutes do not specifically require it.
  12.  Cf. McAdams, supra note 8, at 653 (“Perhaps the more fundamental basis for hostility to selective prosecution claims is that they are presented by the guilty.”).
  13.  See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511–12, 579–81 (2001) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion leads to over-criminalization but suggesting difficulties with eliminating such discretion); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 379 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion gives too much power to prosecutors, upsetting our system of checks and balances); Leslie B. Arffa, Note, Separation of Prosecutors, 128 Yale L.J. 1078, 1082 (2019) (noting that many see prosecutorial power as a central problem of the American criminal justice system); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1099, 1104–05, 1129–31 (2014) (describing critiques of prosecutorial discretion and citing authority).
  14.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 908–09 (2009); Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 1132 (providing reasons for prosecutorial discretion); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379–81 (1973) (detailing reasons why judicial review of prosecutorial discretion would be undesirable); cf. Hannah Shaffer, Prosecutors, Race, and the Criminal Pipeline, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 1–2) (suggesting that limiting prosecutorial discretion or blinding them to defendants’ race may inadvertently offset prosecutors’ giving less weight to the criminal records of Black defendants than white defendants in decisions affecting incarceration); id. (manuscript at 25–26, 37, 45, 54) (not attributing the lesser weight to records of Black defendants to progressive elected prosecutors, although finding that beliefs of individual prosecutors affected results). Our views thus could be characterized as a “checks and balances” approach, under which prosecutors’ offices adopt organizational structures that reduce incentives and opportunities to pursue constitutionally improper motives, rather than a “separation of powers” approach—that is, an approach that involves other branches of government—to regulate prosecutorial discretion. See Daniel Epps, Checks and Balances in the Criminal Law, 74 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2021) (contrasting checks and balances approaches with separation of powers approaches); id. at 73–74 (recommending separation of functions within prosecutors’ offices, as suggested by Barkow).
  15.  Cf. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (discussing that agency decisions are often informed by politics).
  16.  See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218, 2257–58 (2019) (referring to studies suggesting some crimes may be committed disproportionately by different groups); Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 Criminology 680, 690 (2016) (noting the debate as to whether differential participation or differential selection causes racial disparities in criminal justice).
  17.  139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724, 1727 (2019).
  18.  See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2017); infra note 70 (describing differing views in the circuit courts).
  19.  See Erin E. McMannon, The Demise of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law from the Fourth Amendment, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479, 1485, 1493 (2019) (discussing varying standards and citing cases and secondary authority); Lyle Kossis, Malicious Prosecution Claims in Section 1983 Lawsuits, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1635, 1646–48 (2013) (discussing various standards).
  20.  See, e.g., Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99–101 (1st Cir. 2013) (alluding to differences among the circuits).
  21.  Compare Kossis, supra note 19, at 1662–63 (favoring use of common law elements), with McMannon, supra note 19, at 1504 (disfavoring use of common law elements in favor of a Fourth Amendment-based framework).