Preserving Collective-Action Rights in Employment Arbitration

Arbitration has great promise as a vehicle for efficiently and cost-effectively resolving work-related disputes on the merits—and doing so in a way that is more likely than litigation to satisfy all concerned parties. To preserve this promise, judges and policymakers must be vigilant in monitoring the use of arbitration by nonunion employers, lest it become a tool for exacerbating the imbalances of power between workers and management, and, thus, ultimately discredited. Of particular concern are attempts by employers to use predispute arbitration agreements as a means of class-action avoidance. Indeed, the prospect of limiting exposure to large-scale employment litigation through arbitration has given companies a substantial incentive to require their workers, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to sue in court and instead submit claims to binding arbitration.

The proliferation of employer-promulgated arbitration pacts that explicitly or implicitly prohibit multiparty actions likely will bring to the fore a question which courts have yet to confront directly: whether such an agreement, entered into as a precondition of employment, constitutes an unfair labor practice by interfering with the rights of employees to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose . . . of mutual aid or protection,” as guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.

Precedent indicates that many employment arbitration agreements are, in fact, vulnerable to unfair-labor-practice charges to the extent that they require employees to surrender their rights to collaborate in dispute resolution as a condition of employment. This Note suggests, however, that employers can preserve a form of mandatory individual arbitration without undermining the policies behind Section 7, offering a solution through which employers and employees can retain the practical benefits of arbitration within a system that allows employees to work in conjunction with one another to resolve claims of mutual concern. Specifically, it advocates that employers embrace transparency in their arbitration systems by instituting procedures that provide for public disclosure of outcomes and the right of participants to present relevant prior awards as persuasive precedent.

Such an approach—which this Note terms “open arbitration”—not only would allow courts to reconcile the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” with the objectives of Section 7, but it also would mute many of the criticisms that have led courts to invalidate mandatory ADR agreements.

Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford

Professor Tom Lininger examines the impact of Crawford v. Washington on prosecutions of domestic violence. Prior to Crawford, these prosecutions relied heavily on hearsay, in part because accusers often recant or refuse to testify. Crawford has raised significant doubts about the admissibility of such evidence unless the government provides the accused with an opportunity for cross-examination. 

Professor Lininger surveyed 64 district attorneys’ offices in California, Oregon and Washington to determine the effect of Crawford on domestic violence cases. The counties involved in this survey make up approximately 90 percent of the population in the three states. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents indicated that the Crawford decision significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence in their jurisdictions. Moreover, 76 percent of respondents indicated that after Crawford, their offices are more likely to drop domestic violence charges when the accusers recant or refuse to cooperate.

The article suggests legislative reforms that would adapt the states’ evidence codes to the new constitutional requirements of Crawford in order to facilitate effective prosecutions of domestic violence. One category of proposals would maximize opportunities for pretrial cross-examination of accusers. Another set of proposals would expand certain statutory hearsay exceptions. Finally, the author suggests miscellaneous reforms that would better protect battered women before trial, would help juries to understand the psychology of recanting accusers, and would diversify the charges brought by prosecutors so that hearsay statements are not indispensable. 

The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment

When is a death sentence, a sentence of imprisonment, or a fine so “excessive” or “disproportionate” in relation to the crime for which it is imposed that it violates the Eighth Amendment? Despite the urgings of various commentators and the Supreme Court’s own repeated, albeit uncertain, gestures in the direction of proportionality regulation by the judiciary, the Court’s answer to this question within the past few decades is a body of law that is messy and complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint. In the core of this ineffectual and incoherent proportionality jurisprudence lies a conceptual confusion over the meaning of proportionality. The Court’s latest statement on this question, Ewing v. California, is symptomatic of the Court’s confusion. This Article seeks to prepare the ground for a more coherent and potent jurisprudence of proportionality to develop by clarifying the concept of proportionality. First, this Article describes the way in which the Court’s confusion over the meaning of “proportionality” has been the source of the problem by discussing four different ways in which the Court has understood the term. Second, this Article proposes “retributivism as a side constraint” as a conception of proportionality that would bring together the disparate elements of the case law to establish a more coherent and effective constitutional doctrine. Third, this Article specifies the meaning of retributivism as a side constraint, emphasizing the distinction between comparative and noncomparative aspects of retributivism and the significance of the distinction for understanding not only what it means for one to “deserve” a punishment, but also the Supreme Court case law on excessive punishment.