Contract’s Role in Relational Contract

What role do contracts play in long-term relationships? Very little, if any, according to the relational contract literature. It is not the contract that induces promise keeping but the imposition of (or threat of imposing) relational or informal sanctions, such as suspension or termination of trade. Yet, in reality, parties in long-term relationships write elaborate contracts enforceable through litigation (often with vague, open-ended clauses such as “best efforts”) or set up dispute resolution mechanisms that mimic formal adjudication processes.

Why go through all that trouble if formal mechanisms are to be used rarely? This Article attempts to answer this question. The Article argues that formal sanctions have two important advantages that informal sanctions often lack. First, with formal sanctions, parties can design the remedy (for example, liquidated damages) and even the adjudication process (for example, arbitration). Such flexibility allows them to decouple the deterrence benefit of the sanction from the cost of its imposition, and achieve a better deterrence cost-benefit ratio. With relational sanctions, by contrast, both the deterrence benefit and the execution cost are largely dictated by the value of future relationship: The more valuable the future relationship, the larger the deterrence benefit from threatening to terminate it, but also the larger the cost of carrying out that threat. Second, the formal adjudication process often uncovers evidence that parties and other market actors can use to better tailor relational sanctions. In fact, the desire to generate more accurate information might explain why contracting parties use vague, open-ended standards, such as “best efforts.” Recognizing these benefits but wary of inducing too much litigation, the most effective means for deterring breach of contract will often combine relational and legal sanctions, an approach commonly observed in the real world. The Article also shows how various empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions and how the findings can inform courts in interpreting good faith obligations.

A Market-Based Tool to Reduce Systematic Undervaluation of Collateral in Residential Mortgage Foreclosures

This Note addresses the problem of the systematic undervaluation of collateral in residential mortgage foreclosures. Public policymakers have been wrestling with this problem for nearly a century. As a result of the perceived flaws in the typical foreclosure auction, public authorities have tried to supplement the auctions with various rules intended to encourage higher sale prices or to protect against substantial undervaluation. While each of the supplemental devices promulgated by public policymakers has its strengths and weaknesses, none of them has completely solved the undervaluation problem.

This Note uses the underlying principles of credit bidding in bankruptcy proceedings to develop a new market-based tool that can deter the systematic undervaluation of collateral in residential mortgage foreclosures. Deficiency forfeiture sales options—the tool developed in this Note—target the two main problems with foreclosure auctions: (1) accurately determining the fair market value of the underlying property and (2) incentivizing lenders to bid that value at the auction. Similar to credit bidding, the new tool proposed by this Note will result in a transfer of wealth from lenders to borrowers, but only if lenders bid or collude with or tolerate third-party bidders who bid below the fair market value of the underlying property at the foreclosure auction. The threat of this permanent transfer of wealth from the lender to the borrower should be an effective and efficient deterrent of systematic undervaluation of collateral in residential mortgage foreclosures, just as the threat of a transfer of value from a bankrupt estate to a secured creditor as a result of credit bidding deters undervaluation in bankruptcy proceedings.

The Monitor-“Client” Relationship

After the government discovers wrongdoing by a corporation, the corporation and the government often enter into an agreement stating that the corporation will retain a “monitor.” A corporate compliance monitor, unlike the gatekeeper, is not charged with “monitoring” the corporation in an attempt to detect and prevent wrongdoing. A monitor, unlike the probation officer, is not solely charged with ensuring that the corporation complies with a previously determined set of requirements. Instead, a corporate compliance monitor is responsible for (1) investigating the extent of the wrongdoing already detected and reported to the government; (2) discovering the cause of the corporation’s compliance failure; and (3) analyzing the corporation’s business needs against the appropriate legal and regulatory requirements. A monitor then provides recommendations to the corporation and the government meant to assist the corporation in its efforts to improve its legal and regulatory compliance—the monitor engages in legal counseling. The ad hoc structure of monitorships has, however, failed to facilitate the monitor’s function as a legal counselor. This failure is largely the result of structuring monitorships in an environment lacking binding rules and conceiving of monitorships as if a monitor’s only function is that of a governmental agent.

Yet the current monitorship structure is not necessary to achieve the monitorship’s goal, which is to establish a corporate compliance structure that deters and prevents future misconduct. This Article argues that providing a set of clear, enforceable, predictable rules regarding the scope of monitorships that facilitate a monitor’s function as a legal counselor will improve the long-term effectiveness of monitorships. This Article suggests one mechanism for achieving this goal—a statutory privilege—aimed at encouraging a formalized relationship amongst a monitor, the government, and the corporation, which re-conceptualizes the relationship as “The Monitor-‘Client’ Relationship.”