What If Nothing Works? On Crime Licenses, Recidivism, and Quality of Life

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We accept uncritically the “recidivist premium,” which is the notion that habitual offenders are particularly blameworthy and should be punished harshly. In this Article, I question that assumption and propose a radical alternative. Consider the individual punished repeatedly for hopping subway turnstiles. As convictions accumulate, sentences rise—to weeks and ultimately months in jail. At some point, criminality comes to signal something other than the need for punishment. It signals the presence of need. Perhaps, the recidivist was compelled by economic or social circumstances. Perhaps, he was internally compulsive or cognitively impaired. The precise problem matters less than the fact that there was one. No rational actor of freewill would continue to recidivate in the face of such substantial and increasing sentences. My claim is that, in these circumstances, it would be better to just stop punishing.

To that end, I offer a counterintuitive proposal, which is to provide “crime licenses” to recidivists. But I limit this prescription model to only a collection of quality-of-life offenses, like drug possession, vagrancy, and prostitution. My goals are at once narrow and broad. I present the crime license as a modest opportunity to test bolder concepts like legalization, prison abolition, and defunding police. I situate the provocative proposal within a school of social action called “radical pragmatism,” which teaches that radical structural change is achievable, incrementally. I draw upon successful prescription-based, radical-pragmatic reforms, like international addiction-maintenance clinics, where habitual drug users receive free heroin in safe settings. I endorse “harm reduction,” the governance philosophy that grounds those reforms. And I imagine our system reoriented around harm reduction, with crime licenses as one pragmatic, experimental step in that direction.

Introduction

Speaking on the subject of prison-based rehabilitation, the influential sociologist, Robert Martinson, famously proclaimed that “nothing works.”1.Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, Nat’l Affs., Spring 1974, at 22, 48.Show More Martinson would eventually take a rosier view.2.Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 243, 244 (1979).Show More But the slogan took on a life of its own. Over the past half century, the mantra that “nothing works” has served as something of an indictment of the entire enterprise of rehabilitation and most other innovative attempts to reshape the criminal-legal system.3.Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline 28, 192–93 (2007) (“Dr. Martinson’s message, ‘Nothing Works,’ became not simply a description of the impacts of correctional programming but a default characterization of most governmental efforts to cope with the crime problem.”).Show More

I am not so sure that Martinson was wrong, however. Or, rather, he might have been right in a wholly unappreciated way. Consider the proclamation that nothing works. My claim is not that no reform works, but that there is a particular form of negative reform—simply put, doing nothing—that might work surprisingly well. At least in some contexts, a viable first step forward could be for the criminal-legal system to just stop—to stand down, to do nothing, to let go. And, controversially, doing nothing could work best for the very offenders our criminal-legal system currently hits hardest—longtime recidivists.

My claim, here, is contingent and almost wholly unproven. I do not mean to announce authoritatively: Doing nothing works! To the contrary, I merely pose the question of whether doing nothing could work—and when, why, and for whom.4.Infra Parts III–IV.Show More More to the point, I provide moral and prudential reasons to doubt our prevailing premises about the “recidivist premium,”5.Infra Part III; see, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 Crim. Just. Ethics 54, 55 (1982) (using the term “recidivist premium” to describe the sentencing enhancement for repeat offenders); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control in the Age of Broken Windows 159–62 (2019) (using the term “additive imperative” for the same concept).Show More and I offer ideas to test my hypothesis naturally.6.Infra Part IV.Show More Concretely, I propose crime licenses—prescriptions for longtime offenders to engage in conduct otherwise criminally proscribed.7.Infra Part IV.Show More But I limit my analysis and proposal to one set of crimes only—low-level, quality-of-life offenses, including recreational drug possession and use, panhandling, vagrancy, subway turnstile hopping, unlicensed vending, and prostitution.8.Infra Part I.Show More In sum, my novel contribution is the counterintuitive claim that we could all be made better by immunizing some recidivists against arrest, prosecution, and punishment—and, perhaps more surprisingly, that the circumstances under which crime licenses are likeliest to work are somewhat obvious and predictable.9.To my knowledge, only one scholar has argued for anything even analogous to the immediate proposal. In a forthcoming article, Christopher Lewis pushes for a recidivist sentencing discount, based on prevailing inequities and criminogenic social conditions. Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2021). To a degree, Lewis’s article and my own are compatible, and we have traded drafts. In the places where our ideas overlap, I cite him accordingly. Our reasoning is often different. And I go substantially further than him in advocating for categorical immunity to commit certain crimes. More importantly, we adopt different conceptual frames for our respective claims, though we both briefly draw on the reasoning of the “capabilities approach.” Infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text. But I build my reforms principally around theories of harm reduction and radical pragmatism, upon which Lewis does not rely. Finally, my analysis is limited to the special context of quality-of-life enforcement and adjudication, whereas Lewis is concerned principally with felony convictions and traditional sentences of imprisonment.Show More

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Quality-of-life offenses typically involve malum prohibitum (or, at most, relatively trivial and largely victimless malum in se) conduct over which reasonable minds disagree already.10 10.See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 211, 279–80 & n.318 (2012) (discussing disagreement over the blameworthiness of malum prohibitum conduct); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1666–67 n.44 (2010) (discussing offenses that “lack inherent blameworthiness” and noting that “a community is more likely to demand criminal condemnation for a given killer than a given graffiti artist, prostitute, drug possessor, turnstile hopper, or public urinator”); infra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing shifting conceptions of disorder).Show More Plausible policy perspectives range from legalization or decriminalization to heavy-handed enforcement. And, at least with respect to marijuana policy, current approaches span the spectrum—not only across jurisdictions but also sometimes within a given jurisdiction longitudinally. New York City, for instance, has observed such a shift. During the Giuliani and first Bloomberg mayoral administrations, authorities concentrated enforcement energies on the localized practice of full-custodial arrest for marijuana offenses.11 11.Infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (discussing “broken windows” policing).Show More But, over the past few years, the city has almost abandoned its reliance on arrest (at least for simple possession of marijuana).12 12.Infra note 136 and accompanying text.Show More And, of course, as of this writing, several jurisdictions have legalized recreational marijuana altogether.13 13.See, e.g., infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text (discussing marijuana reform).Show More With respect to a borderline offense like marijuana possession, a licensing regime could serve as a pilot program, enabling a jurisdiction to test run decriminalization, without adopting the policy categorically.

It might seem strange to decriminalize criminal conduct for a finite population only—particularly for only the most noncompliant offenders. But it is not so farfetched. There are even existing models to which we could look for guidance. At the beginning of the twentieth century, American municipalities established addiction-maintenance clinics, where doctors were authorized to prescribe opiates to recreational drug users in safe settings.14 14.Josh Bowers & Daniel Abrahamson, Kicking the Habit: The Opioid Crisis, America’s Addiction to Punitive Prohibition, and the Promise of Free Heroin, 80 Ohio St. L.J. 787, 794–95 (2019) (discussing historical addiction-maintenance programs).Show More Indeed, the medical community considered this palliative approach to be the standard of care—at least once other interventions failed. The operating philosophy was harm reduction, not law enforcement.15 15.Infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text (describing harm reduction).Show More And, though the existing data are limited, it seemed to have worked well until it was abandoned in favor of a criminal war on drugs.16 16.Infra notes 315–17 and accompanying text.Show More

More to the point, internationally, a number of cities and countries have updated the addiction-maintenance model. In Vancouver, Canada, and throughout Switzerland and Portugal, government-run clinics provide patients with free, uncontaminated, and comparatively safe narcotics for use in sterile, medically supervised facilities.17 17.Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 797–804.Show More The data-keeping is robust, and the results are remarkable.18 18.Id.Show More Communities have enjoyed an uptick in quality of life in neighborhoods where illegal drug markets formerly flourished.19 19.Id. at 804.Show More Overdose deaths have dropped dramatically.20 20.Id. at 801.Show More And drug-dependent individuals have more readily managed to remain socially integrated—less affected by the most destructive aspects of not only drug abuse but also the criminal-legal war against it.21 21.Id. at 805.Show More

There is nothing obviously exceptional about drug policy. Just as the contemporary American drug war is counterproductive and even criminogenic, so too other forms of “punitive prohibition” are counterproductive and criminogenic.22 22.Infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing criminogenic consequences of quality-of-life policing and adjudication). See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Punitive Prohibition in America, in Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice 321–33 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997).Show More Isolation and othering produce antisocial behavior. And blame and shame produce isolation and othering. A prescription model, by contrast, holds promise as a problem-solving approach—as problem-solving crime, if you will. The starting point is an understanding that “what we did before simply was not working.”23 23.James L. Nolan, Jr., Reinventing Justice: The American Drug Court Movement 106 (2001).Show More The means are grassroots political action, self-help, and a tolerance for offending. And the primary end is harm reduction.

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Normative and instrumental concerns remain, of course. On the one side, there are the conventional law-and-order objections. Why give crime licenses to the very offenders who violate law most frequently—to the purportedly unmanageable recidivists who are (perceived to be) most deserving of punishment? Would crime licenses, in turn, engender resentment and resistance from law-abiding laypeople? Could crime licenses cause popular confusion about the legality of conduct? And what of moral hazard?24 24.Infra notes 391–405 and accompanying text (responding to objections).Show More Take the last objection, for instance. Arguably, habitual offenders would have strong and perverse incentives to commit more crimes to earn crime licenses. But there are ways, as I detail, for regulators to design a particular crime license such that recipients remain unaware of it.25 25.Infra notes 412–18 and accompanying text (discussing “acoustic separation” and crime licenses).Show More In any event, the concern could be addressed adequately simply by setting licensing prices high enough. At the right price, no rational offenders would calculate the benefit of a crime license to outweigh the punishment costs—the cumulative lifetime penalty—that must be prepaid to receive it.26 26.Infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text (discussing price setting).Show More

Consider, for instance, the seed of this project—a case from my former career as a public defender in Bronx County, New York. I had a client who had amassed well over thirty prior misdemeanor convictions for subway turnstile hopping (or “theft of services”). Theft of services is an A-level misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year in jail.27 27.N.Y. Penal Law § 165.15(3) (McKinney 2018).Show More However, offenders rarely face much, if any, time. Initial offenses tend to result in noncriminal dispositions. Subsequent offenses lead to misdemeanor convictions and days or, at most, weeks in jail. The longest sentences—months behind bars—are reserved for those few offenders, like my client, who do not (or cannot) stop. This is the “recidivist premium” in action. Escalation is the rule.

For my client, this translated to a plea offer of nine months. After pushing unsuccessfully for less, I quipped in frustration: “We would all be better off if the city would just give my client a lifetime transit pass.” It was a joke. But it was also true. My client and his community would have been better off, and the system and society would have been better off. Deterrence had not worked. Incapacitation had cost the city tens of thousands of dollars and had imposed serious social consequences. And, unsurprisingly, the city’s infamously harsh jails had failed to do anything to rehabilitate him.28 28.See, e.g., Torture Island’s Final Sentence: Rikers, One of America’s Most Notorious Jails, is to Close, Economist (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/10/26/rikers-one-of-americas-most-notorious-jails-is-to-close [https://perma.cc/PAR8-S84X] (describing conditions at New York City’s “most notorious jail”). See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment & Reoffending, 38 Crime & Just. 115, 116, 121 (2009) (discussing criminogenic effects of incarceration); Don Stemen, The Prison Paradox: More Incarceration Will Not Make Us Safer, Vera Inst. Just. 2–3 (July 2017) (same); Benjamin Ewing, Prior Convictions as Moral Opportunities, 46 Am. J. Crim. L. 283, 330 (2019) (same).Show More More to the point, in order to rehabilitate my client, the system would have had to reckon with what was wrong and how to fix it. The retributive assumptions of the recidivist premium dictate that my client was a willing scofflaw or worse—that he was on notice of what the law forbade, and still he persisted.29 29.Infra notes 124–34 and accompanying text (discussing rationales for the recidivist premium).Show More He needed to be taught a lesson, and it was his responsibility to learn from it. But recidivism does not inexorably screen for blameworthiness. At a certain point, it screens for the precise opposite.30 30.Infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text (discussing recidivism as a screen for socioeconomic deprivation or internal compulsion or irrationality).Show More

Why had legal coercion—in the form of increasingly punitive carceral sticks—failed to cow my client? The least plausible explanation is human agency and corresponding poor choice—that my client elected freely to break the rules. Likelier, he suffered from a pressing constraint on his will—some form of internal compulsion or situational duress. Why was his “crime-resistance capital” so low?31 31.Louis Michael Seidman, Entrapment and the “Free Market” for Crime, in Criminal Law Conversations 493, 499–500 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009); see also infra notes 222–27 and accompanying text (discussing luck, freewill, and the “American Dream”).Show More Why did he shell out so much (repeated and ever-longer stints in jail) for seemingly so little (free transit rides)? Simply put, at a certain point (reached long before he became my client), his crimes stopped paying. And that is precisely the point. Logically, his particular course of recidivism screened optimally for a crime license.32 32.See infra notes 374–90 and accompanying text (discussing optimal screening).Show More It demonstrated the ineffectiveness and injustice of his personal cycle of crime, capture, and escalating punishment.

To be sure, an optimal screen is not a perfect screen. Even a well-designed crime license would leave room for some games-playing at the margins. But “Blackstone’s Ratio” teaches us that a just system abhors inappropriate penalties more than unwarranted windfalls.33 33.Infra notes 407–10 and accompanying text (discussing “Blackstone’s Ratio” and unwarranted windfalls).Show More And this concern with inappropriate punishment is of particular relevance in the context of quality-of-life policing. Much of the work of many modern police departments consists of state attempts to use stops and arrests for low-level offenses to maintain public order and exert social control over predominately poor and minority populations.34 34.See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1119, 1122 (2008) (observing that most criminal court cases are petty nonfelony cases); Alec Karakatsanis, Usual Cruelty: The Complicity of Lawyers in the Criminal Injustice System 39, 59 (2019) (noting that nationally more people are arrested for marijuana offenses than all violent crimes combined); Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court 40–42 tbl.2.1 (1979) (describing study of Connecticut criminal court in which 58% of cases were “crimes against public morality” or “crimes against public order”).Show More These groups disproportionately shoulder the significant costs and very real dangers of inequitable and coercive policies and practices.35 35.Infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text; Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (2017) (discussing disparate impact and “downstream consequences” of quality-of-life policing, prosecution, and punishment).Show More It is no coincidence that so many infamous police killings started with efforts to combat perceived low-level disorder and rule-breaking. Officers suspected Eric Garner of selling loose cigarettes without a tax stamp and George Floyd of passing a counterfeit bill.36 36.See Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/‌nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/6A7S-TRT2] (“This was not a chance meeting on the street. It was a product of a police strategy to crack down on the sort of disorder that, to the police, Mr. Garner represented.”); see also Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 210–11 (2017) (discussing the death of Eric Garner); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”).Show More These are the stakes of petty-crime enforcement.

But these tragic incidents (and our current cultural moment) raise the contrary objection that my crime-license proposal would be piddling—too little, too late. I am sensitive to the worry. Today, we find ourselves in a moment of movement, with growing consciousness and even modest enthusiasm for radical ideas, like “defunding police” and “abolishing prisons.”37 37.See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2019); Paul Butler, Abolition Is Better Than Reform, and It Is Not Dangerous (Aug. 4, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 83 (endorsing “abolition of the police, closing jails and prisons, reparations, new paradigms of restorative justice, and broader economic divestment from punishment”).Show More So, why am I shying away from big steps now? I am on the record, almost a decade ago, calling for the wholesale decriminalization of malum prohibitum conduct.38 38.Bowers & Robinson, supra note 10, at 279–80 n.318; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1058 (2015) (overviewing rationales for the decriminalization of misdemeanors).Show More Why not argue for at least as much here? Why settle for the incremental approach? The answer is that it is easy enough to get on a soapbox and demand sweeping structural reform when there is little hope of it happening. But, especially in times like these, when the doors of opportunity pry open, the need grows to lay the appropriate groundwork—to determine what works and what does not and to push to persuade the unpersuaded-but-persuadable.39 39.See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1385–86 (1988) (“[U]ntil whites recognize the hegemonic function of racism and turn their efforts toward neutralizing it, African-American people must develop pragmatic political strategies. . . . It is a struggle to create a new status quo through the ideological and political tools that are available . . . maneuvering within and expanding the dominant ideology to embrace the potential for change.”); see also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 307 (1987) (arguing that structural change is sometimes best achieved incrementally and that “[t]he CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong”).Show More Pragmatism counsels a measure of caution.40 40.Infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text (discussing classical and radical pragmatism); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 284 (1998) (discussing experimentalism as a means for the “incremental realization” of social goals).Show More Social movements depend upon political will, and political will is shaped by proof of success.41 41.Infra notes 432–40 and accompanying text (discussing pragmatic efforts to build political support).Show More

But there is likewise a danger of missing the moment. So, small steps must be taken deliberately, with an appropriate focus on radical change. Roberto Mangabeira Unger sketched an attractive frame for this approach to social action, which he labeled “radical pragmatism”—a style of “political experimentalism” or “existential bootstrapping” that consists of “using the smaller variations that are at hand to produce the bigger variations that do not yet exist.”42 42.Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound 8, 43 (2007).Show More According to Unger, “it is about changing the context of established arrangement and assumed belief, little by little and step by step, as we go about our business.”43 43.Id. at 43; see also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 110 (1986) (discussing “opportunities for experimental revisions of social life in the direction of the ideals we defend,” pursued “piecemeal rather than only all at once”).Show More He distinguished this form of incrementalism from the incrementalism characteristic of classical American pragmatism—a “shrunken pragmatism” that, per Unger, too often leads only to “standing and waiting” and “singing in our chains.”44 44.Unger, supra note 42, at 1, 6.Show More Instead, the aim is to keep the radical objective always in sight while relying upon “piecemeal, experimental revision” to “shorten the distance” to structural reformation and to define more sharply the appropriate contours of the radical agenda and reformation.45 45.Id. at 7 (“[O]ur societies and cultures may be so arranged as to facilitate and to organize their own piecemeal, experimental revision. We then shorten the distance between routine moves within a framework and exceptional moves about the framework.”).Show More In a nutshell:

Society and culture may be so arranged as either to extend or to narrow the distance . . . . Our interest is to narrow this distance . . . . [T]he primary mode of transformative politics is radical reform, the piecemeal transformation of the structure that may nevertheless become radical in outcome if cumulatively pursued under a certain conception . . . . [W]hat this goal entails is a high-energy democracy—a democracy that raises the temperature and hastens the pace of politics and that multiplies occasions for the creation of counter models of the future in different localities and sectors.46 46.RSA, Freedom, Equality, and a Future Political Economy, YouTube (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CBW3aFvxVs&ab [https://perma.cc/2DBE-ZV3G] (emphasis added) (beginning at 4:36 and continuing at 5:02, 8:37, and 16:37).Show More

Today, we have just such a “high-energy democracy,” but we do not quite know what to do with it.47 47.Id. at 16:37.Show More We do not know precisely what we want. There is no generally accepted understanding of what it means to, say, defund the police or abolish prisons.48 48.See Butler, supra note 37, at 20 (“[A]bolition remains under-theorized, including on the important question of precisely what it is that its advocates want to abolish . . . . And what will the police do, if ‘locking people up’ is no longer part of their job description?”); Roberts, supra note 37, at 6 (“It is hard to pin down what prison abolition means.”).Show More Radical activists and sympathetic academics offer a range of prescriptions, often rooted in notions of harm reduction or adjacent theories.49 49.See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 1156, 1156 (2015) (arguing in favor of “gradual decarceration”); Butler, supra note 37, at 20–21 (distinguishing between different conceptions of abolition and different types of abolitionists, including “justice abolitionists” and “instrumental abolitionists”); Roberts, supra note 37, at 7–8 (noting that abolition is premised upon the notion that “we can imagine and build a more humane and democratic society that no longer relies on caging people to meet human needs and solve social problems”); Allegra McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1615 (2019) (“Justice for abolitionists is an integrated endeavor to prevent harm, intervene in harm, obtain reparations, and transform the conditions in which we live.”).Show More Short of categorically closing down institutions, dismantling police forces, or entirely stripping department budgets, these movements need test cases to determine, in the offing, what is practical and appropriate. This is hard work. But, consistent with the virtues of federalism, we may experiment with the “creation of counter models of the future in different localities and sectors” in efforts to discern the shape of ideas in practice.50 50.RSA, supra note 46, at 16:48; see also Patrick Sharkey, Why Do We Need the Police?, Wash. Post (June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/12/defund-police-violent-crime/ [https://perma.cc/6UMK-NLBH] (proposing “a demonstration project that is both more cautious and more radical than the call to defund the police,” and demanding “rigorous testing” of the pilot program); infra notes 419–27 and accompanying text (discussing radical experimentation, localism, and the virtues of federalism).Show More

In this vein, my proposal for crime licenses is akin to the now-defunct Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (“CHAZ”) in Seattle, Washington. The CHAZ was a grassroots experiment in eliminating police from a particular geographic area; my proposal would be an experiment in eliminating enforcement against a particular population. At the time I initially drafted this Article, the future of the CHAZ remained unclear. I predicted that the collective would likely collapse under its own anarchic weight.51 51.And it arguably did. After a series of shootings, the mayor issued a dispersal order and the police moved in. Brendan Kiley, Ryan Blethen, Sydney Brownstone & Daniel Beekman, Seattle Police Clear CHOP Protest Zone, Seattle Times (July 1, 2020), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-police-clearing-chop-protest-zone/ [https://perma.cc/5P8P-UW4R]. We can debate whether law enforcement intervention constitutes a collapse or dismantlement. In any event, the CHAZ had its problems and is now no more.Show More But, even so, I noted that we could learn from the effort. The alternative, I suggested, was that the CHAZ might thrive and reveal a viable, unorthodox social order. Obviously, that did not happen. But, even so, I imagine that some former participants still perceive the experiment as other than a total failure—that they experienced moments of beauty where others saw only disorder and violence. This is the nature (and virtue) of experimentation. We take risks and then track and learn from substantive and tactical missteps and successes. We anticipate what we can; we prepare for pitfalls; we wish for the best; and we debate, democratically, about our means, ends, and results.52 52.Infra notes 196–204 and accompanying text (discussing radical pragmatism).Show More

This is not to say that anything goes—just that the radical pragmatist need only formulate a hypothesis, develop plausible means to test it, and establish criteria to evaluate progress toward the preestablished revolutionary goal. For this project, the hypothesis is that sometimes the best first step to promote a healthy social order is to stop ordering people around. The means are to transition resources and authority (somewhat) from law enforcement to social services. And the goal is to replace (to the extent possible) entrenched structures of hierarchy with a commitment to individual and collective wellbeing.53 53.Sharkey, supra note 50 (“The idea that residents and local organizations can play a central role in creating safe and strong communities is not new, and it is not particularly controversial. And yet we have never made the same commitment to these groups that we make to law enforcement . . . . We have models available, but we’ve made commitments only to the police and the prison system.”).Show More It would be a mistake, of course, to stop with crime licenses, autonomous zones, or anything else. All such proposals are, at best, fragments of a mosaic—piecemeal reforms designed to close the gap between here and there. Thus, the Movement for Black Lives has not only deemphasized policing but also highlighted the significance of social work.54 54.Phillipe Copeland, Let’s Get Free: Social Work and the Movement for Black Lives, 5 J. Forensic Soc. Work 3 (2016).Show More A holistic methodology demands negation and addition—a pull back from criminal legalism and a commitment to alternative harm-reduction measures.55 55.Infra Sections III.C–D.Show More On this reading, a prescription model would constitute only a part of a broader social movement, consisting of much more than tolerance for rule breaking. In fact, a holistic reform agenda would lay bare an ugly truth about the prevailing paradigm’s relationship to the very idea of tolerance: it is punitive prohibition that is the too-tolerant regime—too tolerant of fractured lives and fractured communities, of food and housing insecurity, of employment and education inequities, of economic and racial subordination. Ours is a system that tolerates all but tolerance for those who offend the status quo.

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This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I examine “broken windows” policing theory and its entrenched assumptions about supposedly appropriate or preordained meanings of disorder and quality of life. I discuss the manner by which legal officials, in fact, use crime-making and discretion to settle upon and coercively impose subjective conceptions of these contested concepts. I then trace New York City’s recent history with broken windows policing. I look to the city’s experience because it is a paradigmatic example of quality-of-life policing in practice and, more to the point, because data are there. In Part II, I situate quality-of-life policing within the dominant landscape of crime-control governance. And I explain what it means to be a recidivist within that archetype. In Part III, I sketch alternative modes of social organization, oriented principally around harm reduction and related ideas, like forgiveness, human capabilities, autonomy, public health, social solidarity, and human flourishing. I survey positive examples of radical-pragmatic experiments—particularly international and domestic drug reforms. And I compare the results with conventional criminal-legal approaches. In Part IV, I examine the parameters of a defensible crime license. And I outline three potentially effective designs. I then return to New York City to discuss a grassroots radical-pragmatic experiment already underway. Finally, in the conclusion, I visit the question of whether the upheavals of our current historical moment have made radical-pragmatic structural reform more or less viable.

 

  1. * F.D.G. Ribble Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to Rebecca Rubin for her exceptional research assistance. Thanks also to Dan Abrahamson, Charles Barzun, Naomi Cahn, Anne Coughlin, Josh Fischman, Kim Forde-Mazrui, Thomas Frampton, Mike Gilbert, Andrew Hayashi, Rich Hynes, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Adi Leibovitch, Christopher Lewis, Gabe Mendlow, Fred Schauer, Micah Schwartzman, Jeff Sovern, and Ekow Yankah. I received constructive comments and questions at the University of Virginia Faculty Workshop Series, the Law & Society Annual Meeting, the University of Virginia Summer Workshop Series, and the St. John’s University Faculty Workshop Series.

  2. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, Nat’l Affs., Spring 1974, at 22, 48.

  3. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 243, 244 (1979).

  4. Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline 28, 192–93 (2007) (“Dr. Martinson’s message, ‘Nothing Works,’ became not simply a description of the impacts of correctional programming but a default characterization of most governmental efforts to cope with the crime problem.”).

  5. Infra Parts III–IV.

  6. Infra Part III; see, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 Crim. Just. Ethics 54, 55 (1982) (using the term “recidivist premium” to describe the sentencing enhancement for repeat offenders); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control in the Age of Broken Windows 159–62 (2019) (using the term “additive imperative” for the same concept).

  7. Infra Part IV.

  8. Infra Part IV.

  9. Infra Part I.

  10. To my knowledge, only one scholar has argued for anything even analogous to the immediate proposal. In a forthcoming article, Christopher Lewis pushes for a recidivist sentencing discount, based on prevailing inequities and criminogenic social conditions. Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2021). To a degree, Lewis’s article and my own are compatible, and we have traded drafts. In the places where our ideas overlap, I cite him accordingly. Our reasoning is often different. And I go substantially further than him in advocating for categorical immunity to commit certain crimes. More importantly, we adopt different conceptual frames for our respective claims, though we both briefly draw on the reasoning of the “capabilities approach.” Infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text. But I build my reforms principally around theories of harm reduction and radical pragmatism, upon which Lewis does not rely. Finally, my analysis is limited to the special context of quality-of-life enforcement and adjudication, whereas Lewis is concerned principally with felony convictions and traditional sentences of imprisonment.

  11. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 211, 279–80 & n.318 (2012) (discussing disagreement over the blameworthiness of malum prohibitum conduct); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1666–67 n.44 (2010) (discussing offenses that “lack inherent blameworthiness” and noting that “a community is more likely to demand criminal condemnation for a given killer than a given graffiti artist, prostitute, drug possessor, turnstile hopper, or public urinator”); infra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing shifting conceptions of disorder).

  12. Infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (discussing “broken windows” policing).

  13. Infra note 136 and accompanying text.

  14. See, e.g., infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text (discussing marijuana reform).

  15. Josh Bowers & Daniel Abrahamson, Kicking the Habit: The Opioid Crisis, America’s Addiction to Punitive Prohibition, and the Promise of Free Heroin, 80 Ohio St. L.J. 787, 794–95 (2019) (discussing historical addiction-maintenance programs).

  16. Infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text (describing harm reduction).

  17. Infra notes 315–17 and accompanying text.

  18. Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 797–804.

  19. Id.

  20. Id. at 804.

  21. Id. at 801.

  22. Id. at 805.

  23. Infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing criminogenic consequences of quality-of-life policing and adjudication). See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Punitive Prohibition in America, in Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice 321–33 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997).

  24. James L. Nolan, Jr., Reinventing Justice: The American Drug Court Movement 106 (2001).

  25. Infra notes 391–405 and accompanying text (responding to objections).

  26. Infra notes 412–18 and accompanying text (discussing “acoustic separation” and crime licenses).

  27. Infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text (discussing price setting).

  28. N.Y. Penal Law § 165.15(3) (McKinney 2018).

  29. See, e.g., Torture Island’s Final Sentence: Rikers, One of America’s Most Notorious Jails, is to Close, Economist (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/10/26/rikers-one-of-americas-most-notorious-jails-is-to-close [https://perma.cc/PAR8-S84X] (describing conditions at New York City’s “most notorious jail”). See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment & Reoffending, 38 Crime & Just. 115, 116, 121 (2009) (discussing criminogenic effects of incarceration); Don Stemen, The Prison Paradox: More Incarceration Will Not Make Us Safer, Vera Inst. Just. 2–3 (July 2017) (same); Benjamin Ewing, Prior Convictions as Moral Opportunities, 46 Am. J. Crim. L. 283, 330 (2019) (same).

  30. Infra notes 124–34 and accompanying text (discussing rationales for the recidivist premium).

  31. Infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text (discussing recidivism as a screen for socioeconomic deprivation or internal compulsion or irrationality).

  32. Louis Michael Seidman, Entrapment and the “Free Market” for Crime, in Criminal Law Conversations 493, 499–500 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009); see also infra notes 222–27 and accompanying text (discussing luck, freewill, and the “American Dream”).

  33. See infra notes 374–90 and accompanying text (discussing optimal screening).

  34. Infra notes 407–10 and accompanying text (discussing “Blackstone’s Ratio” and unwarranted windfalls).

  35. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1119, 1122 (2008) (observing that most criminal court cases are petty nonfelony cases); Alec Karakatsanis, Usual Cruelty: The Complicity of Lawyers in the Criminal Injustice System 39, 59 (2019) (noting that nationally more people are arrested for marijuana offenses than all violent crimes combined); Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court 40–42 tbl.2.1 (1979) (describing study of Connecticut criminal court in which 58% of cases were “crimes against public morality” or “crimes against public order”).

  36. Infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text; Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (2017) (discussing disparate impact and “downstream consequences” of quality-of-life policing, prosecution, and punishment).

  37. See Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/‌nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/6A7S-TRT2] (“This was not a chance meeting on the street. It was a product of a police strategy to crack down on the sort of disorder that, to the police, Mr. Garner represented.”); see also Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 210–11 (2017) (discussing the death of Eric Garner); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”).

  38. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2019); Paul Butler, Abolition Is Better Than Reform, and It Is Not Dangerous (Aug. 4, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 83 (endorsing “abolition of the police, closing jails and prisons, reparations, new paradigms of restorative justice, and broader economic divestment from punishment”).

  39. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 10, at 279–80 n.318; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1058 (2015) (overviewing rationales for the decriminalization of misdemeanors).

  40. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1385–86 (1988) (“[U]ntil whites recognize the hegemonic function of racism and turn their efforts toward neutralizing it, African-American people must develop pragmatic political strategies. . . . It is a struggle to create a new status quo through the ideological and political tools that are available . . . maneuvering within and expanding the dominant ideology to embrace the potential for change.”); see also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 307 (1987) (arguing that structural change is sometimes best achieved incrementally and that “[t]he CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong”).

  41. Infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text (discussing classical and radical pragmatism); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 284 (1998) (discussing experimentalism as a means for the “incremental realization” of social goals).

  42. Infra notes 432–40 and accompanying text (discussing pragmatic efforts to build political support).

  43. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound 8, 43 (2007).

  44. Id. at 43; see also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 110 (1986) (discussing “opportunities for experimental revisions of social life in the direction of the ideals we defend,” pursued “piecemeal rather than only all at once”).

  45. Unger, supra note 42, at 1, 6.

  46. Id. at 7 (“[O]ur societies and cultures may be so arranged as to facilitate and to organize their own piecemeal, experimental revision. We then shorten the distance between routine moves within a framework and exceptional moves about the framework.”).

  47. RSA, Freedom, Equality, and a Future Political Economy, YouTube (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CBW3aFvxVs&ab [https://perma.cc/2DBE-ZV3G] (emphasis added) (beginning at 4:36 and continuing at 5:02, 8:37, and 16:37).

  48. Id. at 16:37.

  49. See Butler, supra note 37, at 20 (“[A]bolition remains under-theorized, including on the important question of precisely what it is that its advocates want to abolish . . . . And what will the police do, if ‘locking people up’ is no longer part of their job description?”); Roberts, supra note 37, at 6 (“It is hard to pin down what prison abolition means.”).

  50. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 1156, 1156 (2015) (arguing in favor of “gradual decarceration”); Butler, supra note 37, at 20–21 (distinguishing between different conceptions of abolition and different types of abolitionists, including “justice abolitionists” and “instrumental abolitionists”); Roberts, supra note 37, at 7–8 (noting that abolition is premised upon the notion that “we can imagine and build a more humane and democratic society that no longer relies on caging people to meet human needs and solve social problems”); Allegra McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1615 (2019) (“Justice for abolitionists is an integrated endeavor to prevent harm, intervene in harm, obtain reparations, and transform the conditions in which we live.”).

  51. RSA, supra note 46, at 16:48; see also Patrick Sharkey, Why Do We Need the Police?, Wash. Post (June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/12/defund-police-violent-crime/ [https://perma.cc/6UMK-NLBH] (proposing “a demonstration project that is both more cautious and more radical than the call to defund the police,” and demanding “rigorous testing” of the pilot program); infra notes 419–27 and accompanying text (discussing radical experimentation, localism, and the virtues of federalism).

  52. And it arguably did. After a series of shootings, the mayor issued a dispersal order and the police moved in. Brendan Kiley, Ryan Blethen, Sydney Brownstone & Daniel Beekman, Seattle Police Clear CHOP Protest Zone, Seattle Times (July 1, 2020), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-police-clearing-chop-protest-zone/ [https://perma.cc/5P8P-UW4R]. We can debate whether law enforcement intervention constitutes a collapse or dismantlement. In any event, the CHAZ had its problems and is now no more.

  53. Infra notes 196–204 and accompanying text (discussing radical pragmatism).

  54. Sharkey, supra note 50 (“The idea that residents and local organizations can play a central role in creating safe and strong communities is not new, and it is not particularly controversial. And yet we have never made the same commitment to these groups that we make to law enforcement . . . . We have models available, but we’ve made commitments only to the police and the prison system.”).

  55. Phillipe Copeland, Let’s Get Free: Social Work and the Movement for Black Lives, 5 J. Forensic Soc. Work 3 (2016).

  56. Infra Sections III.C–D.

  57. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic, Mar. 1982, at 29.

  58. Id. at 31; see also Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods 10–11 (1990) (“[W]hatever the link between [disorder and crime] is, it is powerful. . . . [A] neighborhood’s reputation for tolerating disorder invites outside troublemakers. . . . [A] concentration of supposedly ‘victimless’ disorders can soon flood an area with serious, victimizing crime.”).

  59. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 56; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 215 (1985).

  60. Zimring, supra note 3, at 35.

  61. Skogan, supra note 57, at 9; see also id. at 5 (rejecting “the popular view [that] disorder is not immutable, and that it has reflected ethnic and class cleavages in society”); id. at 52 (rejecting the notion that “conventional definitions of order merely reflect the distribution of white, middle-class views about public deportment”).

  62. Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1531, 1557 (2010) (discussing offenses on the “periphery of crime . . . outside of the ‘core’ of wrongdoing”).

  63. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 265.

  64. Braman, Kahan & Hoffman, supra note 61, at 1535 (“Punishment Naturalists . . . perceive not conflict but consensus, not cultural heterogeneity but biological uniformity. As they read the evidence . . . ‘human intuitions of justice about core wrongdoing . . . are deep, predictable, and widely shared.’” (quoting Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1829, 1892 (2007))). See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law, at xv (1995) (reporting studies of community intuitions about culpability).

  65. Skogan, supra note 57, at 7 (quoting Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective 43 (1966)); see also Richard Sennett, The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity & City Life, at xvi (1970) (arguing that, as compared with the “self-imposed tyranny” and “safe and secure slavery” of conventional life, “dense, disorderly, overwhelming cities can become the tools to teach men to live with this new freedom”). See generally Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 15 (1961) (criticizing as paternalistic the efforts of urban planners to enforce their own notions of order apart from the needs of city dwellers).

  66. Skogan, supra note 57, at 5 (“[U]rban utopians argue that city dwellers have a positive taste for disorder, and that it is an aspect of life worth celebrating.”).

  67. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (Douglas, J.) (“If some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and no more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but a court thinks this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise his sights or go to jail as a vagrant.” (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205, 226 (1967))); see also Tom Waits, Heart of a Saturday Night, on Heart of a Saturday Night (Asylum Records 1974); John Steinbeck, Cannery Row (1945); Nelson Algren, The Texas Stories of Nelson Algren (1995); W.H. Davies, The Autobiography of a Super-Tramp (1908). Significantly, there is an entire popular music genre—punk—that fetishizes the disordered life. The Talking Heads, Don’t Worry About the Government, on Talking Heads: 77 (Sire Records 1977) (sarcastically: “My building has every convenience/It’s gonna make life easy for me/It’s gonna be easy to get things done.”); Iggy Pop, Lust for Life, on Lust for Life (RCA Records 1977) (“Here comes Johnny Yen again/With the liquor and drugs and a flesh machine/He’s gonna do another striptease.”). See generally Michael Azerrad, Our Band Could Be Your Life: Scenes from the American Indie Underground 1981–1991 (2001) (examining hardcore punk movement).

  68. Justice Douglas once recast perceived vagrancy in just such a way: “These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.” Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.

  69. Henry David Thoreau, Walden (1854); Donovan Hohn, Everybody Hates Henry, New Republic (Oct. 21, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/123162/everybody-hates-henry-david-thoreau [https://perma.cc/ZYR6-G3LQ] (discussing Thoreau’s laundry).

  70. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.

  71. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 115 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

  72. Amanda Y. Agan, Jennifer L. Doleac & Anna Harvey, Misdemeanor Prosecution 37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28600, 2021) (finding, contrary to conventional wisdom, that “not prosecuting marginal nonviolent misdemeanor defendants substantially reduces their subsequent criminal justice contact”); Mychal Denzel Smith, Incremental Change Is a Moral Failure: Mere Reform Won’t Fix Policing, Atlantic (Sept. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/police-reform-is-not-enough/614176 [https://perma.cc/XR69-RWH5] (rejecting the proposition that “in order to stop the violence of the hood you must impose the violence of the state . . . to protect the people from themselves, to enforce the discipline their culture lacks”).

  73. See Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, The First Step Is Figuring out What Police Are for, Atlantic (June 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/first-step-figuring-out-what-police-are/612793/ [https://perma.cc/5W23-TKEE] (endorsing a “new focus [that] should include state support for activities that may not be called ‘policing,’ but that every citizen of this country deserves”); Smith, supra note 71 (“The city could put more trash cans here, if keeping this neighborhood . . . clean . . . were important.”); infra notes 255–56 and accompanying text (discussing the literature on the “capabilities approach”).

  74. Bowers, supra note 36, at 131 (“The state manages my existence in public spaces. It picks sides.”).

  75. See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991) (providing a positivist understanding of how rules and sanctions compel behavior).

  76. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (2008) (“Not every system of command and control that calls itself a legal system is a legal system. We need to scrutinize it a little—to see how it works—before we bestow . . . the appellation [of] ‘law.’”).

  77. A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations 17 (1979).

  78. Id. at 17–18; see also id. at 23 (“[T]he fact that I have a ‘legal obligation’ or a ‘duty of citizenship’ will be a morally neutral fact; nothing will follow from this fact about any moral constraints on my actions. . . . If I am morally bound to obey the law or to be a good citizen, the ground of this bond will be independent of the legal and political institutions in question . . . .”).

  79. Lewis, supra note 9 (manuscript at 38–39) (“[T]here is no clear consensus on the true nature of wellbeing. And there may be good reasons for governments and government officials to remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good.”).

  80. Cf. infra notes 287–93 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of individualization to evaluate demands of justice, mercy, and “normative guilt and innocence”).

  81. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 307 (1979).

  82. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1442 (2016). See generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy (1983) (arguing that a legal education reproduces existing social hierarchies by inculcating law students into particular political attitudes and by preparing them to participate in the hierarchical role of the lawyer).

  83. The satirical newspaper, The Onion, recently published a piece poking fun at just such a dichotomy. Protestors Criticized for Looting Businesses Without Forming Private Equity Firm First, Onion (May 28, 2020), https://www.theonion.com/protestors-criticized-for-looting-businesses-without-fo-1843735351 [https://perma.cc/6P25-G4LR]. For a more sophisticated evaluation of violent political protests, see generally Avia Pasternak, Political Rioting: A Moral Assessment, 46 Phil. & Pub. Affs. 384 (2019) (arguing that political riots can take permissible forms even in democratic states).

  84. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 32 (“[O]ne cannot typically be prosecuted for [racial discrimination or sexual harassment], even though it might cause a lot of harm. The political system has chosen to pursue these other important goals without resort to the criminal system.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing 17 (2001) (“Everyday forms of tax evasion . . . are also disorderly. Insider trading, insurance misrepresentation, police corruption, and police brutality: these are all disorderly. Yet they figure nowhere in the theory of order-maintenance policing.”).

  85. Harcourt, supra note 83, at 210–11 (“The harm principle . . . does not address the relative importance of harms. . . . [W]e inevitably must look beyond the harm principle. . . . We must access larger debates in ethics, law, and politics—debates about power, autonomy, identity, human flourishing, equality, freedom. . . .”).

  86. Skogan, supra note 57, at 5; see also Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 26 (“[P]olitical power influences what we decide to criminalize. . . . [O]ur criminal laws are not an objective mechanism for increasing overall well-being by efficiently reducing harmful behavior. . . . [T]hey reflect our demons, past and present.”).

  87. Feeley, supra note 34, at 23–25 (“Decisions made under a strict application of rules often lead to outcomes that few find palatable.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 519 (2001) (“Broad criminal law . . . means that the law as enforced will differ from the law on the books.”).

  88. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2563 (2004); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521, 1531 (1981) (discussing prevalence of discretion “when dealing with minor offenses”); Wayne A. Logan, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police Power Takes a More Intrusive Turn, 46 Akron L. Rev. 413, 431 (2013) (“Florence, when combined with other Supreme Court decisions[,] afford[s] executive actors expansive discretionary power in their handling of low-level offenders.”).

  89. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (Douglas, J.) (observing that, under open-ended vagrancy laws, “poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, [and] idlers . . . may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts”); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 260 (“People are no longer arrested for status offenses such as being a vagrant, drunk, prostitute, drug addict, or unemployed. But for some people, the iterative logic of the [contemporary misdemeanor] model has functional similarities to the way vagrancy statutes were enforced in prior eras.”). See generally Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960s, at 1–4 (2016) (discussing how vagrancy laws “represented an approach to policing, [and] a vision of society”).

  90. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 932–33 (2006) (“[C]riminal laws do not create binding obligations but rather a menu of options for [law-enforcement] insiders.”); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea 3 (1981) (noting that legal officials “choose[] from a mass of overlapping and redundant criminal statutes”).

  91. Stuntz, supra note 86, at 519 (“Because criminal law is broad, prosecutors cannot possibly enforce the law as written: there are too many violators. Broad criminal law thus means that the law as enforced will differ from the law on the books.”); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice 87 (1969) (“[L]egislation has long been written in reliance on the expectation that law enforcement officers will correct its excesses through administration.”).

  92. New York Police Department, Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York 4–5 (1994); see also New York City Police Department, Tackling Crime, Disorder, and Fear: A New Policing Model 2 (2015) (defining quality-of-life policing as “enforcing a variety of laws against street drug dealing, public drinking, public marijuana smoking, open-air prostitution, and other minor offenses”); Harcourt, supra note 83, at 47–49; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 25. In addition to these offenses, the Inspector General of the New York Police Department has included the following: drug offenses, tobacco and alcohol offenses, offenses involving property damage, trespass, lewdness, disorderly conduct, unlicensed vending, jaywalking, loitering, urinating in public, spitting, resisting arrest, and petty theft, including turnstile hopping. Mark G. Peters & Philip K. Eure, New York City Department of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD, An Analysis of Quality-of-Life Summonses, Quality-of-Life Misdemeanor Arrests, and Felony Crime in New York City, 2010–2015, at 13–14, 81–82 (June 22, 2016). But, as I indicate, the relevant category of quality-of-life offenses consists of just whichever plausible examples of such offenses the department chooses to enforce.

  93. Harcourt, supra note 83, at 48, 252 (describing “an aggressive policy of misdemeanor arrests in the subways,” relying upon a “Bust Bus . . . retrofitted . . . into an arrest-processing center” (quoting William Bratton, Turnaround 155 (1998))).

  94. Alison Mitchell, Giuliani Appoints Bostonian to Run New York’s Police, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1993, at A1, B4.

  95. New York Police Department, Police Strategy No. 5, supra note 91, at 7.

  96. Peters & Eure, supra note 91, at 47–49; Meredith Patten et al., Misdemeanor Just. Project, Trends in Misdemeanor Arrests in New York, 1980 to 2017, at 15 (2018).

  97. Patten et al., supra note 95, at 46.

  98. Id. at 49; William J. Bratton, N.Y. Police Dep’t, Broken Windows and Quality-of-Life Policing in New York City 18 (2015) (noting that, by 2009, “officers were making more than 20,000 arrests per year for criminal trespass”). The city’s trespass policies and practices demand special attention as a particularly noxious form of social control of underprivileged people. Under a policy titled, alternatively, the “Clean Halls Program” or the “Trespass Affidavit Program,” officers would stake out public housing and some predominantly low-income private buildings, relying on often obsolete tenant rosters to round up the “usual suspects” who could not persuasively offer lawful reasons for their presence. See NYCLU Posts Notice of Ligon Settlement, N.Y.C. Liberties Union, https://www.nyclu.org/en/cleanhalls [https://perma.cc/U5NF-H6KR] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021) (describing the Ligon v. City of New York settlement agreement, which changed NYPD policies related to the Trespass Affidavit Program); see also Bowers, supra note 34, at 1124–32 (discussing biases in arrest, charge, and trial that lead police and prosecutors to focus inordinately on the “usual suspects”); Josh Bowers, Response, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 260, 262 (2009) (discussing “usual suspects” policing); Bratton, supra note 97, at 18 (“A significant element of quality-of-life policing . . . entailed confronting unauthorized people . . . . The Department increased its presence in the buildings through what is known as vertical patrols, or top-to-bottom walkthroughs of the structures.”). In my experience, I represented dozens of legally innocent defendants arrested pursuant to this policy. Infra notes 172–81 and accompanying text (discussing innocence in petty cases, including trespass).

  99. The figures vary a bit but all fall roughly in this range. Patten et al., supra note 95, at 20 (“In New York City, there were 64,745 misdemeanor arrests in 1980. This number increased to 247,496 in 2010, followed by a decrease to 155,798 in 2017.”); Bratton, supra note 97, at 12 (providing a figure of 292,219); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 45 fig.1.5 (tracking misdemeanor arrests over twenty-five-year period from 1990–2015, and showing peak in 2010).

  100. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 83, at 50, 252 n.3 (“This is not an exercise in police discretion . . . . It was about sweeps.”); Tim Newburn & Trevor Jones, Symbolizing Crime Control: Reflections on Zero Tolerance, 11 Theoretical Criminology 221, 226 (2007) (“Although . . . the main players in the New York policing story distanced themselves from the term Zero Tolerance, it became inextricably associated with the policing approaches developed under [Police Commissioner] Bill Bratton.”).

  101. Bratton, supra note 97, at 3.

  102. To be sure, the NYPD still found ways to be creative, but principally in finding novel means to arrest. Thus, in Betancourt v. Bloomberg, the NYPD innovated by arresting a homeless man using a penal ordinance intended to prohibit people from abandoning property on city streets. 448 F.3d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting vagueness challenge to ordinance); see also id. at 559 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The fact that a law against leaving . . . [inter alia] ‘movable property’ in a public place . . . was listed, by the police department, as an ‘enforcement option’ to target seemingly unrelated crimes . . . is evidence of that very unfettered discretion that causes vague texts to give rise to constitutional problems.”).

  103. Id. at 559 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“[T]he NYPD issued a catalog of ‘enforcement options’ to effectuate then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s ‘Quality of Life’ initiatives. This type of ‘guidance’ is anything but comforting.”).

  104. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 26–27 (quoting Interview by Issa Kohler-Hausmann with William J. Bratton, New York City Police Commissioner (July 21, 2013)); see also Peters & Eure, supra note 91, at 9 n.19 (“Based on interviews with NYPD officials, NYPD does not have a single official definition for what it considers a ‘quality of life offense.’”).

  105.  Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force, New Republic (Apr. 10, 2000), https://newrepublic.com/article/74124/excessive-force [https://perma.cc/RF8H-F5NS] (“[P]olice stop, frisk, and arrest vast numbers of young black and Hispanic men for minor offenses, in the hope that turnstile jumpers and pot smokers may also be guilty of more serious offenses.”); Jeffrey Fagan, Race, Legitimacy, and Criminal Law, 4 Souls 69, 70 (2002) (“Under the recent policies of the New York City Police Department, aggressive stops and searches have been disproportionately aimed at nonwhite citizens, far outpacing their actual involvement in crime.”); Jeffrey A. Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies & Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential Readings 309, 311, 323–25, 331–32 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) (finding that broken windows enforcement is concentrated in majority-minority neighborhoods); Reed Collins, Note, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New Crime in Baltimore, 14 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 419, 426 (2007) (“When police departments do adopt aggressive arrest policies to combat disorder, . . . the group[s] most affected by those strategies . . . [are] ‘both African Americans and the poor.’”); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1486 (2016) (“[O]ur perception of disorder is racialized . . . . [A] police officer is more likely to view three black teenagers on a street corner as a sign of disorder than he is to so view three white teenagers.”).

  106. Mike Laws, Why We Capitalize ‘Black’ (and Not ‘white’), Colum. Journalism Rev. (June 16, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-black-styleguide.php [https://perma.cc/5Z7H-CQT8] (“For many people, Black reflects a shared sense of identity and community. White carries a different set of meanings; capitalizing the word in this context risks following the lead of white supremacists.”).

  107. Patten et al., supra note 95, at 14, 76; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 51 fig.1.10 (tracking misdemeanor arrests by race and ethnicity from 1990–2015); cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (detailing more than 4.4 million stops over an eight-year period, overwhelmingly of people of color, with figures approaching 90% certain years). This is consistent with racial disparities in quality-of-life policing nationally. Harcourt, supra note 83, at 173 tbl.6.4 (finding that, across large American cities, police arrested Black people disproportionately to white people for every category of public-order misdemeanor).

  108. Patten et al., supra note 95, at 14–15.

  109. Peters & Eure, supra note 91, at 41, 43.

  110. Id. at 16.

  111. On the intersection between gentrification and racialized order-maintenance policing, see Harold Stolper, New Neighbors and the Over-Policing of Communities of Color, Cmty. Serv. Soc’y (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/New-Neighbors [https://perma.cc/89PJ-B89Y] (“The largest increases in NYPD-referred complaints occurred in communities of color with large influxes of white residents accompanied by new housing development.”); cf. Goluboff, supra note 88, at 234–35 (discussing use of vagrancy laws to control people “out of place”); Carbado, supra note 104, at 1492 (describing people of color who are “presumptively ‘out of place’ and therefore presumptively suspicious because of the racial geography”). See generally Robert J. Sampson, Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect, at ix (2012) (discussing the “powerful effects of ecologically concentrated disadvantage on individual outcomes as well as rates of behavior across neighborhoods”).

  112. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk As a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 159, 175 (2015) (“The fact that racial minorities in cities disproportionately encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional contexts fuels [their] perceptions of the illegitimacy of the police.”); Bowers & Robinson, supra note 10, at 246–52 (examining popular perceptions of order-maintenance policing); Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 71, 85 (2007) (finding that minority members of “distressed neighborhood[s]” harbor expectations of disrespectful treatment by police officers). Black musicians have described their experiences firsthand. See, e.g., Brand Nubian, Probable Cause, on Foundation (Arista Records 1998) (“Couldn’t believe it when he took me in/Threw me and my man up in the van, a seven-hour stand/ . . . Now Giuliani wanna talk about the ‘quality of life’/Think he got the right to follow me at night/ . . . Up in central booking . . . people looking.”).

  113. Aya Gruber, Why Amy Cooper Felt the Police Were Her Personal “Protection Agency,” Slate (May 27, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/05/amy-cooper-white-women-policing.html [https://perma.cc/9595-KDCJ].

  114. Skogan, supra note 57, at 6 (“After the Civil War, police focused their attention on minor offenses against public order. This led to skyrocketing arrests for public drinking, vagrancy, suspicion, and loitering.”); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 13 (2010).

  115. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 n.20 (1999) (“[M]any American vagrancy laws were patterned on these ‘Elizabethan poor laws.’ . . . In addition, vagrancy laws were used after the Civil War to keep former slaves in a state of quasi slavery.”); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Colo. 1969) (“Vagrancy control dates back to the fourteenth century . . . as an economic measure which sought to shore up the crumbling structure of feudal society by prohibiting mobility among the laboring class . . . [and] in post-feudal society as a means of protecting a local community from . . . undesirable strangers.”); Goluboff, supra note 88, at 253; Roberts, supra note 37, at 7–8 (noting that the “carceral punishment system can be traced back to slavery and the racial capitalist regime it relied on and sustained”); Connie Hassett-Walker, The Racist Roots of American Policing: From Slave Patrols to Traffic Stops, Conversation (June 2, 2020), https://theconversation.com/the-racist-roots-of-american-policing-from-slave-patrols-to-traffic-stops-112816 [https://perma.cc/4YZ4-RCJB]; Skogan, supra note 57, at 6 (discussing policing efforts to bring “immigrants into conformity with the labor discipline of industrial society”); Smith, supra note 71 (“[L]ocal governments can criminalize sleeping outside, or criminalize panhandling, which begins to look a lot like the criminalization of vagrancy as part of the Black Codes in the era that ended Reconstruction.”). See generally Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 16 (“If the function of the modern punishment system is to preserve racial and economic hierarchy through brutality and control, then its bureaucracy is performing well.”); Butler, supra note 81, at 144243 (arguing that the system is designed for racial and economic oppression); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 7 (“[A] Marxian approach understands punishment as social control by being an instrument of class control. . . . [T]he forms of punishment in our society are determined by the needs of the ruling class to control the laboring classes.”).

  116. Clay Cane, The Original Karens: From Emmett Till’s Accuser to the White Woman Who Sparked the Tulsa Massacre, BET (June 19, 2020), https://www.bet.com/news/national/‌2020/06/19/original-karens-emmett-till-accuser-tulsa-massacre.html [https://perma.cc/USC5-WT2B].

  117. Decoder Ring: The Karen, Slate (July 13, 2020), https://slate.com/podcasts/decoder-ring/2020/07/decoder-ring-the-karen [https://perma.cc/T7YL-37DQ].

  118. Harcourt, supra note 83, at 172 (“Law enforcement policies that target minor disorderly conduct only aggravate the black face of crime.”).

  119. See, e.g., Julian V. Roberts, Punishing Persistent Offenders: Exploring Community and Offender Perspectives 7–8 (2008); Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 610 (2009); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further Reflections, in Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives 1, 1–16 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010); Julian V. Roberts, First-Offender Sentencing Discounts: Exploring the Justifications, in Previous Convictions at Sentencing, supra, at 17–35; Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in Previous Convictions at Sentencing, supra, at 49–71; Christopher Bennett, “More to Apologize For”: Can a Basis for the Recidivist Premium Be Found Within a Communicative Theory of Punishment?, in Previous Convictions at Sentencing, supra, at 73–89; Richard Dagger, Playing Fair with Recidivists, in Recidivist Punishments: The Philosopher’s View 41, 41–59 (Claudio Tamburrini & Jesper Ryberg eds., 2012); Julian V. Roberts, Past and Present Crimes: The Role of Previous Convictions at Sentencing, in Recidivist Punishments: The Philosopher’s View, supra, at 115–33; Christopher Bennett, Do Multiple and Repeat Offenders Pose a Problem for Retributive Sentencing Theory?, in Recidivist Punishments: The Philosopher’s View, supra, at 137–56; Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 591, 594–95 (1981); Andrew von Hirsch, Criminal Record Rides Again, 10 Crim. Just. Ethics 2, 55 (1991); Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles 131–32 (2005); David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 Yale L.J. 733, 738–39 (2001).

  120. Lewis, supra note 9, at 3–6; infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (responding to prevention-based justification).

  121. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual, ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2016); Lewis, supra note 9, at 5 (“Some argue that in cases of repeat offending, we have more evidence of malice, ill will, or bad character than we do when someone is convicted of an otherwise similar first offense.”).

  122. Ewing, supra note 28, at 300–01.

  123. Lee, supra note 118, at 581, 585, 599–600, 609–10, 613–14 (2009) (noting that “the fact that one did not do what one was told to do is precisely at the heart of this type of criminality”); von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further Reflections, supra note 118, at 9 (“The offender’s original conviction and punishment should put him on notice that under certain circumstances he may be tempted to offend again.”); see also Jeffrey W. Howard, Punishment as Moral Fortification, 36 Law & Phil. 45, 49 (2017).

  124. Lewis, supra note 9, at 17–18; see also von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further Reflections, supra note 118, at 2; Roberts, First-Offender Sentencing Discounts: Exploring the Justifications, supra note 118, at 20–22; Roberts, Punishing Persistent Offenders, supra note 118, at 82; Dana, supra note 118, at 779 (“The ‘break’ given first-time violators can be understood . . . as morally appropriate because the violator may have simply made a mistake or acted foolishly out of impulse, rather than having determinedly flouted the moral authority of the laws.”).

  125. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 16 (2007) (discussing the sentiment that a “zero-risk environment is . . . a reasonable expectation, even a right”); infra notes 217–24 and accompanying text (discussing crime control and risk aversion).

  126. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 Hastings L.J. 829, 831–33 (2000) (examining the contemporary cultural depiction of the criminal as “monster,” and describing the criminal-legal system as a “civic religion” of us versus “them”); see also Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 67 (“The ‘law enforcement’ religion is hostile to the view that a society that is more equal would have less crime, not because that idea is untrue, but because the very goal of the criminal legal system is to preserve certain elements of an unequal social order.”); cf. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 6 (citing Émile Durkheim for the proposition that “punishment is a social enterprise that expresses a group’s foundational, shared moral order and sustains it by enacting rituals”).

  127. Kennedy, supra note 125, at 829; Lara Abigail Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159, 165–67 (2000); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 379, 408–11 (2017). See generally James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe 13 (2003) (discussing the powerful contemporary American “drive to hit every offender . . . hard”).

  128. Simon, supra note 124, at 108; Harcourt, supra note 83, at 26 (“Though [the convicted offender] may continue to live in the projects, he is no longer a ‘project resident,’ no longer a ‘citizen,’ and no longer has a legitimate voice.”).

  129. Zimring, supra note 3, at 192–93; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 268 (“[T]he instrumentalities of criminal law [are] the primary social control mechanisms in urban spaces of concentrated poverty and insecurity.”); Simon, supra note 124, at 10, 14 (describing crime control as a “first response” and urging “a movement to restore crime to its rightful place as one ‘social’ problem among many”).

  130. Zimring, supra note 3, at 192–93 (discussing the “everything works” crime-control mentality); Skogan, supra note 57, at 3 (observing that “disorder[] often lead[s] to complaints that the authorities ‘do something’”); United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 793 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (noting “the demands of [political] constituenc[ies] to ‘do something’ about the most pressing problem in America today—crime”).

  131. Simon, supra note 124, at 273 (noting that the logic behind broken windows is that “dangerous acts arise from dangerous people whom you know by their character, to be read in their minor conduct”).

  132. Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Introduction, in Forgiveness and Mercy 1, 2 (1988) (“[L]egal doctrines are rooted in specific passions (feelings, emotions) . . . . [T]he criminal law . . . institutionalizes certain feelings of anger, resentment, and even hatred.”). See generally William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust 34–35 (1997) (discussing the manner by which disgust and hatred produce a preference for punishment and ostracism).

  133. David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 131 (2001) (quoting James Q. Wilson).

  134. Lee, supra note 118, at 618, 620.

  135. Id. at 609–10, 613–14; Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 21 (“The standard narrative portrays ‘criminals’ as a vast collection of individuals who have each made a choice to ‘break the law.’ Convictions and punishments are consequences that flow naturally from that bad choice.”); infra notes 222–27 and accompanying text (discussing luck, freewill, and the “American Dream”).

  136. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (2013) (holding that NYPD’s practice of stop and frisk systematically violated the equal protection and Fourth Amendment rights of class-action litigants); Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 540–41 (2013) (holding the same as to the practice of stop and frisk as part of trespass enforcement).

  137. Peters & Eure, supra note 91, at 7 (emphasis added).

  138. Misdemeanor Justice Project, The Criminal Justice Reform Act Evaluation: Post Implementation Changes in Summons Issuance and Outcomes 7 (2018).

  139. Bratton, supra note 97, at 15 (“A person stopped for a violation of transit rules [even a non-criminal violation] who is identified as a transit recidivist is ineligible for a civil notice and must be arrested for the offense.”); see also Class Action Complaint at 12–13, R.C. v. City of New York, 100 N.Y.S.3d 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (No. 153739/2018) (detailing NYPD mandatory arrest policy for transit recidivists); Harold Stolper & Jeff Jones, Community Service Society of New York, The Crime of Being Short $2.75: Policing Communities of Color at the Turnstile 24 (2017).

  140. Alexa St. John, MTA Board Considers Banning Repeat Transit Criminals from Subway, Wall St. J. (June 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mta-board-considers-banning-repeat-transit-criminals-from-subway-11561414572 [https://perma.cc/N23W-TNN5]; cf. supra, infra notes 63, 131–134, 222–27 and accompanying text (discussing culture of blame and shame and “governing through crime”).

  141. Rocco Parascandola, Shayna Jacobs, Jillian Jorgensen, Thomas Tracy & Graham Rayman, NYPD Top Cop Slams DA Cy Vance for Not Prosecuting Some Fare-Beaters, N.Y. Daily News (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-top-slams-da-vance-not-prosecuting-fare-beaters-article-1.3803058; Alison Fox & Vincent Barone, Turnstile Jumpers With Open Summonses Will No Longer Be Arrested, AMNY (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.amny.com/news/fare-evasion-arrests-nyc-1-20238070/ [https://perma.cc/T68Y-5YDR]; Alexander C. Kaufman, As New York Cracks Down on Fare Evasion, Another City Weighs Free Transit, Huffington Post (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mbta-free-transit_n_5dd2e1d6e4b01f982f06b00c [https://perma.cc/7SH2-7M5H].

  142. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 5, 108, 132, 165, 252 (describing the process by which penalties escalate for recidivist misdemeanants and indicating that “the defendant’s record largely dictates . . . the sentence”); id. at 97 (quoting public defender: “[A] person can be stopped and searched fifteen times before they’re arrested. . . . And then they get an ACD. . . . And then once your fingerprint even reflects contact with the system, you’re in a different posture. . . . [Next time, y]ou get a [violation] and then you get a misdemeanor, and then you get jail time”).

  143. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 115, 293 n.37 (indicating that “operation spotlight” lasted over a decade but is “now largely defunct in some boroughs”); Julia Vitullo-Martin, Operation Spotlight, Etc., Gotham Gazette (June 1, 2002), https://www.gothamgazette.com/criminal-justice/1657-operation-spotlight-etc [https://perma.cc/788H-99QC]; Freda F. Solomon, Operation Spotlight: Year Four Program Report 1–4 (2007).

  144. Solomon, supra note 142, at 1–4, 12, 37 (detailing Operation Spotlight in practice); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 293 n.37 (same). It is not obvious which spotlight cases involved quality-of-life offenses. But it stands to reason that these charges were the overwhelming majority because—depending on the borough—only 3–8% of Operation Spotlight cases involved “harm to persons.” Solomon, supra note 142, at 11, 16. Comparatively, in every borough, more than one-half to more than two-thirds of spotlight cases involved drugs, trespass, or turnstile hops. Solomon, supra note 142, at 16.

  145. Solomon, supra note 142, at 10; John Feinblatt, Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator, Criminal Justice Indicator Report 15 (2013).

  146. Solomon, supra note 142, at 6.

  147. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 132, 264, 266 (coining the term “misdemeanorland” and explaining that the “moral meaning” of misdemeanors is distinct from felonies, but suggesting that longtime recidivists may “have the same cultural status” as felons); Garland, supra note 132, at 191–92 (discussing the manner by which “a record of prior offending affects the individual’s perceived moral status,” displacing “careful calculations of cost and effect” in favor of “a very different way of thinking which presses the imperatives of punishing criminals and protecting the public, ‘whatever the cost’”).

  148. McLeod, supra note 49, at 1616; Angela Y. Davis, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement 7, 90 (2016) (arguing that prison reform, as opposed to abolition, grants the current institution undue legitimacy); Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 93; see also Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 759–68 (2018) (highlighting the manner by which structural barriers undermine systemic reforms to the criminal-legal system).

  149. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 93; cf. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 921–23, 930–31 (2006) (comparing the incentives of criminal-legal insiders and outsiders).

  150. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 16, 73, 85 (cautioning against “advocates of some of the harshest punishments in the world pushing minor changes . . . for purposes that they do not acknowledge”); see also Butler, supra note 81, at 1466–68 (2016) (noting how incremental steps can distract from more meaningful systemic change).

  151. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 783, 830, 834–35 (2008); see also Daniel Abrahamson, Drug Courts Are Not the Answer: Guest Commentary, L.A. Daily News (May 12, 2015), https://www.dailynews.com/2015/05/12/drug-courts-are-not-the-answer-guest-commentary/ [https://perma.cc/M5CM-4U7G] (highlighting the practical shortcomings of California’s drug courts).

  152. Bowers, supra note 150, at 795–97.

  153. Id. at 786, 789 (“[D]rug courts . . . provide the worst results to their target populations . . . . Conversely, drug offenders who are noncompulsive or less compulsive ultimately do much better. . . . As such, the expected failure of addicts to respond to external stimuli seems an odd basis from which to subject them to alternative sentences that outstrip standard pleas.”); infra notes 228–37 and accompanying text (discussing recidivism as evidence of need).

  154. Bowers, supra note 150, at 807 (discussing “coerced treatment that uses conventional justice as a backstop”); see, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 253 (quoting a drug-court prosecutor: “[W]e have to take a stance and offer a jail alternative. We are a DA’s office in the end.”); cf. Erin R. Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts, 54 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1573, 1573 (2021) (noting that the problem with “the problem-solving court model . . . [is that] its entrenchment creates resistance to alternatives that might truly reform [or transform] the system”).

  155. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 843 (2000) (describing the first drug court in Miami-Dade County, Florida); The Early Drug Courts: Case Studies in Judicial Innovation 7 (W. Clinton Terry III ed., 1999) (describing efforts by drug court judges to address social harms that may contribute to drug dependency and criminal conduct).

  156. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 82 (“[A] movement to dismantle the punishment bureaucracy must learn how to distinguish little tweaks from big changes.”).

  157. Unger, supra note 42, at 29–32, 49–50.

  158. Id. at 30, 49.

  159. Id. at 49.

  160. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 154, at 841; see also Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 Md. L. Rev. 1120, 1130–31 (2014) (examining the pragmatic principles underlying problem-solving courts); Bowers, supra note 150, at 796 (“Drug courts . . . are experimentalist institutions born of incremental compromise. They developed from the ground up in ad hoc and undertheorized fashions.”).

  161. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 40, at 283–86.

  162. Bowers, supra note 150, at 807 (noting that drug court punishments “are informed by the same social, economic, and institutional pressure points that historically have led to disparate punishment under the conventional . . . war on drugs”).

  163. Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1541, 1542 (2002).

  164. Id.; see Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 Contemp. Pragmatism 35, 36 (2012) (“Dewey was nothing if not a fallibilist. He held that inquiry in its exemplary form—in the laboratory—was a process of continuous self-correction, of learning from mistakes . . . [of pursuing] the ideal of democracy.”); Unger, supra note 42, at 23 (“[T]he promises of democracy can be kept only by the ceaseless experimental renewal of their institutional vehicles.”).

  165. See Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 68–69 (arguing that the “‘law enforcement’ myth . . . lulls people into abandoning scrutiny of their assumptions”); Butler, supra note 81, at 1466–69.

  166. Peters & Eure, supra note 91, at 3, 8 (“What caused or contributed to the City’s decline in crime has been a continuing debate.”). Significantly, however, I endorse a radically different objective and metric for measuring success. Infra Section III.B. (discussing harm reduction and the “capabilities approach”).

  167. William Bratton & George L. Kelling, The Assault on ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, Wall St. J. (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/william-bratton-and-george-kelling-the-assault-on-broken-windows-policing-1418946183 [https://perma.cc/P3YS-T6YT]; George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Why We Need Broken Windows Policing, City J. (Winter 2015). See generally Wesley G. Skogan, Broken Windows: Why—and How—We Should Take Them Seriously, 7 Crim. & Pub. Pol’y 195 (2008) (describing broken windows policing’s effect on social order).

  168. See Franklin E. Zimring, supra note 3; see also Michael Tonry, Why Crimes Rates Are Falling Throughout the Western World, 43 Crime & Just. 1, 17–18 (2014) (describing national decline in American crime nationwide).

  169. Peters & Eure, supra note 91, at 4 (“Between 2010 and 2015 there was a dramatic decline in quality-of-life enforcement with no increase in felony crime. In fact, felony crime, with a few exceptions, declined along with quality-of-life enforcement . . . . [We] find[] no empirical evidence to suggest that crime control can be directly attributed to quality-of-life summonses and misdemeanor arrests.”); see also William Wan, Does New York City’s ‘Broken Windows’ Policing Work? New Report Says No, Wash. Post (June 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/06/22/does-nypds-broken-windows-policing-work-new-report-says-no/ [https://perma.cc/FNU8-MCS7] (refuting that quality-of-life policing was responsible for fewer felony crimes in New York City).

  170. Carbado, supra note 104, at 1486 n.14 (“The empirical evidence on this theory is mixed, at best.”).

  171. Zimring, supra note 3, at 80; Harcourt, supra note 83; see also Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271 (2006) (detailing the lack of positive evidence in favor of broken windows policing); Agan, Doleac & Harvey, supra note 71, at 37 (finding that, under some circumstances, not prosecuting individuals for nonviolent misdemeanors reduces recidivism).

  172. Lewis, supra note 9, at 8–9 n.21; see Carbado, supra note 104, at 1488–89 (observing that selective order-maintenance policing creates recidivists in some places but not others, depending upon where police exercise discretion to focus enforcement efforts); see also Simon, supra note 124, at 274; Harcourt, supra note 83, at 172 (explaining that because of the “disparate impact” of broken windows policing, it is “practically impossible to gauge [the rate of] misdemeanors reliably by race”).

  173. See Bowers, supra note 34, at 1124–32 (describing the incentives of police and prosecutors in public-order cases).

  174. See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 319 (2012) (describing “disposable” cases); see also Bowers, supra note 34, at 1124–27; Bowers, supra note 10, at 1698–99.

  175. Bowers, supra note 34, at 1124–27; Bowers, supra note 36, at 210 (describing “the propensity of the law enforcer to exercise dominion reflexively over the usual suspect”); Lewis, supra note 9, at 16 (“Having a prior criminal record itself makes people easier to monitor, and thus more likely to get caught . . . easier to detect.”).

  176. Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1655, 1674 (2017) (describing the practice).

  177. Bowers, supra note 34, at 1132–38 (describing “process pleas” to avoid “process costs”); see Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 124 fig.3.5, 132 (indicating that “the defendant’s record largely dictates . . . the incentive to take the plea at arraignment,” and finding a range of between approximately 50% and 70% of New York City sub-felony cases disposed of at arraignments between the years 1992 and 2014).

  178. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 97 (quoting a public defender: “[T]hat’s how a criminal record builds . . . . Good pleas, bad pleas. They were guilty, they weren’t. The main thing is to get out of jail.”); id. at 266 (“The probability of conviction . . . increases substantially with each subsequent criminal conviction.”); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 197, 215 (describing “street-cleaning” statutes as laws that “invite manipulation . . . for which the individualized adjudication of guilt is an unusually inadequate check on police and prosecutorial action”); Bowers, supra note 34, at 1124–31; Bowers, supra note 10, at 1705–12. See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice (2012) (describing the justice system’s emphasis on speedy convictions).

  179. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 264–65.

  180. See Wikipedia, Loosie, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loosie [https://perma.cc/NC8T-DVMW] (defining a “loosie” as a “single cigarette . . . purchased or sold . . . illegal[ly] and commonly . . . in low-income areas,” and noting that Eric Garner died after a confrontation with police while allegedly selling loosies) (last visited Mar. 12, 2021); Urban Dictionary, Dollar Cab, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=dollar%20cab [https://perma.cc/A3H2-UY26] (defining dollar cabs as “unmarked, unlicensed cabs, (usually vans) common in . . . ‘bad’ areas”) (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).

  181. Supra notes 97 & 174 and accompanying text (describing the likelihood of wrongful arrest of legally innocent “usual suspects” in quality-of-life trespass sweeps).

  182. See Bibas, supra note 177; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 263.

  183. See Michael Massoglia & Christopher Uggen, Settling Down and Aging Out: Toward an Interactionist Theory of Desistance and the Transition to Adulthood, 116 Am. J. Soc. 543, 544–45 (2010). See generally John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: Delinquent Boys to Age 70, at 4 (2003) (looking at patterns of criminal behavior over the life course of high-risk children); Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Emilie Andersen Allan, Miles D. Harer & Cathy Streifel, Age and the Distribution of Crime, 94 Am. J. Soc. 803, 803 (1989); Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, Key Issues in Criminal Career Research: New Analyses of the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development 207 (2007) (acknowledging that most offenders cease offending by age 40); Michael E. Ezell & Lawrence E. Cohen, Desisting from Crime: Continuity and Change in Long-Term Crime Patterns of Serious Chronic Offenders 269 (2005) (describing the phenomenon of “aging out” and its implications for society).

  184. See Johann Hari, Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the War on Drugs 212 (2015) (“Most addicts will simply stop, whether they are given treatment or not, provided prohibition doesn’t kill them first.”); Richard Lawrence Miller, The Case for Legalizing Drugs 53 (1991) (“Researchers have found chronological age to be a prevalent reason for drug abuse. Abuse is typically a young person’s habit, given up as the individual matures. Most opiate addicts relinquish their drug within [ten] years.”); The Sentencing Project, People Serving Life Exceeds Entire Prison Population of 1970, at 3 (2020) (“Even so-called ‘chronic-offenders,’ people who have committed repeated crimes, gradually desist from criminal conduct so that their public safety risk is substantially reduced by their late 30s or 40s.”).

  185. Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 Criminology 27, 49–50 (2011).

  186. John Feinblatt, Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator, Criminal Justice Indicator Report 5 (2013).

  187. Lewis, supra note 9, at 8; see also Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 Criminology 575, 588 (1996) (finding that “criminal history” correlates with recidivism).

  188. Solomon, supra note 142, at 5–6.

  189. Patten et al., supra note 95, at 27.

  190. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 108; cf. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 307, 319 (2009) (“[W]ith little exception, the outer years of [long prison] terms have no public safety value.”).

  191. Compare Joseph Kahn, Are Long Baseball Contracts Worth It?, Bos. Globe (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2015/04/01/are-long-baseball-contracts-worth/lJNSnCmD8VjSvO9YQLb0zH/story.html [https://perma.cc/2PFK-5DNW] (“Megadeals for players that stretch well into their 30s are perilous. So why do teams keep doing it?”), with The Sentencing Project, supra note 183, at 3 (“Most people serving life, including for murder, will not forever present a risk to public safety. . . . Therefore, from a public safety perspective, life imprisonment is an unwise investment.”).

  192. Hari, supra note 183, at 172–75.

  193. See, e.g., Robert Weiss, The Opposite of Addiction Is Connection: New Addiction Research Brings Surprising Discoveries, Psych. Today (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/love-and-sex-in-the-digital-age/201509/the-opposite-addiction-is-connection [https://perma.cc/5K5V-GES7]; Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 802 (“The environmental theory of addiction insists that pharmacology is only secondarily related to dependence. Chemicals have physiological effects to be sure, but plenty of drug users . . . maintain relative free will to ingest (or not) without becoming dependent.”); see also Hari, supra note 183, at 173 (describing how 95% of American addicts returning from the Vietnam War stopped using).

  194. See infra notes 384–90 and accompanying text (discussing link between incarceration, social isolation, and “lost time”).

  195. Hari, supra note 183, at 166.

  196. Supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text (discussing “Operation Spotlight”).

  197. Unger, supra note 42, at 7–8.

  198. Id. at 29, 31–32.

  199. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 40, at 284 (observing that “we do not aim to provide conclusive answers to particular controversies” because “[a] method founded on the generalization of experimental corrigibility would belie itself in proceeding otherwise”); supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text (discussing radical pragmatism as a social-movement strategy for political persuasion).

  200. Unger, supra note 42, at 37–38 (emphasis added); RSA, supra note 46.

  201. Unger, supra note 42, at 37–38, 43 (emphasis added). This is something John Dewey understood, as well: “Ideals express possibilities . . . . Imagination can set them free from their encumbrances . . . . But, save as they are related to actualities, they are pictures in a dream.” John Dewey, Individualism Old and New 72 (1999).

  202. Adrian Vermeule, Integration from Within, 2 Am. Affs. 202 (Spring 2018).

  203. Micah Schwartzman & Jocelyn Wilson, The Unreasonableness of Catholic Integralism, 56 San Diego L. Rev. 1039, 1041–43 (2019) (“Integralists argue that liberalism is a relentless and destructive ideology. . . . These are radical views . . . . Catholic integralism . . . conflict[s] with a conception of reasonableness that requires cooperating on fair terms, including by respecting the freedom and equality of citizens . . . .”).

  204. Vermeule, supra note 201; Matt Ford, The Emerging Right-Wing Vision of Constitutional Authoritarianism, New Republic (Apr. 2, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157132/emerging-right-wing-vision-constitutional-authoritarianism [https://perma.cc/XUR3-CB5W] (“[Vermeule] imagines a small coterie of integralists infiltrating elite institutions and the machinery of the liberal state so they can subtly co-opt them in favor of their ultimate goals.”).

  205. Vermeule finds critics on the right and the left. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Common-Good Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any Non-originalist Approach to the Constitution: This Wolf Comes as a Wolf, Atlantic (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/dangers-any-non-originalist-approach-constitution/609382/ [https://perma.cc/29WF-CVVC]; Garrett Epps, Common-Good Constitutionalism Is an Idea as Dangerous as They Come: It’s an Argument for Authoritarian Extremism, Atlantic (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/‌common-good-constitutionalism-dangerous-idea/609385/ [https://perma.cc/C6UC-XL74].

  206. Simon, supra note 124, at 259–83.

  207. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel, et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19, 382 N.E. J. Med. 2049, 2051–52 (May 21, 2020) (proposing “six specific recommendations for allocating medical resources in the Covid-19 pandemic”).

  208. See infra Conclusion (examining the ways in which our pandemic response could do more to embrace harm reduction).

  209. See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care (2015) (illustrating racial and ethnic disparities in America’s health care system and discussing changes to correct them).

  210. See, e.g., Jeneen Interlandi, Why Doesn’t the United States Have Universal Health Care? The Answer Has Everything to Do with Race, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/universal-health-care-racism.html [https://perma.cc/A7E7-FBDN].

  211. Jason Tan de Bibiana, et al., Changing Course in the Overdose Crisis: Moving from Punishment to Harm Reduction and Health 2 (2020) (defining “the principles of harm reduction,” as applied to addiction, as “a set of practical strategies and ideas aimed at reducing the negative consequences of drug use without insisting on cessation of use” and by treating drug abuse as “a public health problem rather than a criminal justice issue”).

  212. See generally Robert J. MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places 2 (2001) (assessing “the likely effects of legalization” and “review[ing] a wide variety of experiences and theories that have been used in the debates”); see also Robert J. MacCoun, Moral Outrage and Opposition to Harm Reduction, 7 Crim. L. & Phil. 83, 85 (2013) (examining “the tension between . . . prevalence reduction and harm reduction” and demonstrating that “many citizens are willing to blend” their different responses to risk); Robert J. MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Assessing Drug Prohibition and Its Alternatives: A Guide for Agnostics, 7 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 61, 73 (2011) (surveying the challenges and merits of ending drug prohibition, along with various alternatives to full prohibition); Robert J. MacCoun, Harm Reduction is a Good Label for a Criterion All Drug Programs Should Meet, 104 Addiction 341, 342 (2009) (arguing that “we should recognize explicitly three criteria—prevalence reduction, quantity reduction and average harm reduction—for any drug program, no matter how it might be labeled”); Don C. Des Jarlais, Harm Reduction in the USA: The Research Perspective and an Archive to David Purchase, 14 Harm Reduction J. 51 (2017) (recounting the history of harm reduction and the current challenges that it faces in the United States).

  213. It is not even obvious that widely available contraceptives do increase incidence of sex. Melissa Healy, Does No-Cost Contraception Promote Promiscuity? No, Says Study, L.A. Times (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-contraceptives-sex-promiscuity-20140306-story.html [https://perma.cc/TL5L-YPKY]; Julia Marcus, Americans Aren’t Getting the Advice They Need, Atlantic (May 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/no-one-telling-americans-how-reopen-their-lives/612172/ [https://perma.cc/YW6V-4FTY] (“People have argued against providing the HPV vaccine to teens out of concern that it will lead them to have sex earlier or with more people, even though no evidence shows this to be the case.”).

  214. Helena Bachmann, Sex in the City: Zurich’s Prostitution ‘Sex Boxes’ Deemed Success in Switzerland, USA Today (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/‌world/2018/08/24/sex-boxes-make-legal-prostitution-safe-zurich-switzerland-europe/1083444002/ [https://perma.cc/XKC8-BETL].

  215. Id.

  216. Id.

  217. Id. (quoting city’s website); see also id. (“The Swiss have taken this pragmatic approach to prevent exploitation, sexually transmitted diseases, links with criminal networks and other problems common in countries where sex commerce is banned.”).

  218. Glenn C. Loury & Bruce Western, Introduction: The Challenge of Mass Incarceration in America, 139 Daedalus 5, 6 (2010).

  219. How Stranger Danger Changed the Way Children Play, BBC News Mag. (Dec. 8, 2009); see also supra Section II.A (discussing crime-control governance and the irrationally costly and inequitable pursuit of a “zero-risk environment”).

  220. Simon, supra note 124, at 6–7, 14 (describing a culture of “fear and control” and noting that “[w]hat is visibly different about the way we govern since the 1960s is the degree to which crime is a first response”).

  221. Julia Marcus, Quarantine Fatigue Is Real, Atlantic (May 11, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/quarantine-fatigue-real-and-shaming-people-wont-help/611482/ [https://perma.cc/3VCP-AT2N] (“Public-health campaigns that promote the total elimination of risk, such as abstinence-only sex education, are a missed opportunity to support lower-risk behaviors that are more sustainable in the long term.”); supra notes 24–41 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of crime control and the failure to rationally assess them).

  222. Marcus, supra note 212. Notably, when we talk about “flattening the curve” of pandemic infection, we are speaking the language of harm reduction. We very much want case counts to drop, but that is not necessarily the primary goal. Our alternative aim is to reduce harm by spreading out the impact of infections across time and place to avoid overtaxing the medical personnel and resources.

  223. See, e.g., Horatio Alger, Jr., Ragged Dick: Or, Street Life in New York with the Boot Blacks (Hildegard Hoeller ed., 1868).

  224. Samuel Bazzi, Martin Fiszbein & Mesay Gebresilasse, Frontier Culture: The Roots and Persistence of “Rugged Individualism” in the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23997, 2017); cf. infra notes 463–66 and accompanying text (discussing “rugged individualism” and resistance to COVID-epidemic mask-wearing orders).

  225. Unger, infra note 42, at 40 (“The blind fortune that presides over our birth—out of the consequences of the accidental coupling of our parents—pursues us in the big things as well as in the little ones.”). Of course, the idea of “lucky breaks” is related to “luck egalitarianism” and John Rawls’ discussion of the “natural lottery.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 63–64 (1921) (discussing the “natural lottery”). See generally Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil. Stud. 77 (1989) (arguing that “the idea of equal opportunity for welfare is the best interpretation of the ideal of distributive equality”); G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906 (1989) (examining “[w]hat aspect(s) of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental”); Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice 4 (2009).

  226. E.B. White, Here Is New York 19 (1949).

  227. Seidman, supra note 31, at 13; see also Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory, 36 Criminology 441 (1998) (arguing that “an overreliance on incarceration as a formal control may hinder the ability of some communities to foster other forms of control because they weaken family and community structures”); Unger, infra note 42, at 18 (“What individuals can do with their lives depends on the way society is organized and on their place within the social order, as well as on achievement and luck.”).

  228. Garland, supra note 132, at 48; Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, 3 L. & Inequality 9, 64 (1985).

  229. von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further Reflections, in Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives, supra note 118, at 9; Julian V. Roberts, Punishing Persistent Offenders: Exploring Community and Offender Perspectives 2–7, 137–84 (2008) (observing that punishing recidivists more harshly is a persistent practice worldwide); cf. Lewis, supra note 9, at 29, 55–56 (offering reasons to do “the opposite of what human societies have done for millennia” with the recidivist premium).

  230. Kohler-Hausman, supra note 5, at 144–82 (discussing criminal-legal “marks”).

  231. Donald Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 Am. Socio. Rev. 34 (1983) (“There is a sense in which conduct regarded as criminal is often quite the opposite. Far from being an intentional violation of a prohibition, . . . it is self-help.”). On this score, I am reminded of the observation of my old boss, Robin Steinberg, former executive director of the Bronx Defenders. She claimed that—because the organization’s holistic-defense model served also the civil-legal and social-service needs of criminal-defense clients—it was a crime-fighting outfit; cf. Experts: Robin Steinberg, at http://gideonat50.org/experts/robin-steinberg/ [https://perma.cc/UX4C-TPL2] (describing holistic defense as a “model of representation to fight both the causes and consequences of involvement in the criminal justice system”). We eliminate crime by meeting people’s needs in the first instance.

  232. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 385, 389 (1976) (asking “whether a free choice to do wrong can be found . . . in the act of a ‘modern Jean Valjean’”); Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (1862) (telling the story of Jean Valjean).

  233. Aditi Bagchi, Lying and Cheating, or Self-Help and Civil-Disobedience?, 85 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 20–21 (2020).

  234. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (1875), reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader 382, 388 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).

  235. Ewing, supra note 28, at 283, 330 (observing that the recidivist premium “is problematic in practice because ex-offenders’ opportunities to avoid reoffending are arguably worsened by criminogenic prison conditions and collateral consequences of conviction to a greater extent than they are improved by . . . punishment”); see also Lee, supra note 118, at 618–20 (arguing that the state shares at least partial blame for an offender’s recidivism because it has “made it difficult for ex-offenders to pursue normal lives by denying them housing, welfare, education, certain jobs, and the ability to drive to work”); cf. Christopher Lewis, Incentives, Inequality, Criminality, and Blame, 22 Legal Theory 153 (2016) (arguing social conditions create incentives to commit crime, and, in such circumstances, blame is inappropriate). Ewing identified a number of moral and prudential objections to “large recidivist premiums,” including the criminogenic effect of long-term incarceration, the elasticity of criminal conduct, and corresponding concerns about the value of incapacitation. Ewing, supra note 28, at 292. But, to my thinking, Ewing did not go far enough. As I argue here, there are good reasons, in some circumstances, to doubt not only large recidivist premiums but any recidivist premium—and, in fact, any punishment at all for the longtime recidivist offender.

  236. Bowers, supra note 150, at 809 (describing akrasia in the context of addiction); Harry G. Frankfurt, Duty and Love, 1 Phil. Explorations 4, 5 (1998); see also Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 Legal Theory 215, 234 (2009); Ole-Jørgen Skog, The Strength of Weak Will, 9 Rationality & Soc’y 245 (1997); Donald Davidson, How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in Essays on Actions and Events 21 (2d ed. 2001) (1969); infra notes 356–61 and accompanying text (discussing “volitional necessity”).

  237. Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 439, 463, 523 (1999) (describing addiction as a “chronic, progressive, relapsing disorder”); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1479, 1485 (2004) (discussing the “inevitability of relapse”).

  238. Infra notes 255–61 and accompanying text (discussing environmental theories of addiction).

  239. Bowers, supra note 150, at 788 (“Ultimately, when drug courts imprison failing participants, they punish them not for their underlying crimes, but for their inability to get with the program.”); id. at 828 (“Drug courts . . . view the addict as only partially responsible (and, rhetorically, perhaps not even that) when valuing the retributive worth of his crime, but wholly rational and responsible when it comes to his success or failure at responding to the carrots and sticks of treatment.”).

  240. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979) (arguing that “people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. Risk & Uncertainty 297 (1992) (“develop[ing] a new version of prospect theory” that “allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses” and “confirm[s] a distinctive fourfold pattern of risk attitudes”).

  241. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1539 (1998) (defining hyperbolic discounting as an irrational “impatience . . . for near rewards . . . and aversion . . . for near punishments”); George Ainslie, A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motivation, 19 L. & Phil. 77, 91 (2000) (describing the hyperbolic discounter as one who “fails to develop a faculty for ‘utility constancy’”). On irrationality and addiction, see Michael Louis Corrado, Addiction and Responsibility: An Introduction, 18 L. & Phil. 579, 583–585 (1999); Michael Louis Corrado, Behavioral Economics, Neurophysiology, Addiction and the Law 1, 27 (Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 892007, 2006) (discussing the argument that addicts may discount hyperbolically because of “distorted reasoning[,] . . . a flaw in our way of approaching future costs and benefits . . . that . . . lands the addict . . . in hot water”); Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 205, 246 n.132 (1999) (“[W]e can see that criminals appear to be more risk seeking than the general population in both the decision to engage in prohibited behavior and in the decision to exacerbate penalties by hiding or running from detection.”); Lewis, supra note 9, at 15 (“[T]hose who commit crime tend to be impulsive and risk-seeking in general[.]”). On risk seeking and youth, see Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Scott Boggess, Laura Porter & Sean Williams, Teen Risk-Taking: A Statistical Portrait 22 (2000) (discussing statistics on risk-taking behaviors in adolescent males); Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 Dev. Rev. 78 (2008) (citing sources); supra notes 182–95 and accompanying text (examining the “aging out” process whereby offenders and drug users temper risk-seeking behavior with age).

  242. Ewing, supra note 28, at 293 (explaining that deterrence theory does not support recidivist premiums where the recidivist has “problems rationally assessing his options, exercising self-control, or protecting his future interests when they come into conflict with immediate desires”).

  243. Infra notes 374–90 and accompanying text (discussing optimal screening); cf. Richard J. Bonnie, Anne M. Coughlin, John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Peter W. Low, Criminal Law 9 (4th ed. 2015) (introducing the argument that, to account for “society’s own conduct in relation to the actor,” the criminal law should allow for more capacious excuse defenses based upon “physiological, psychological, environmental, cultural, educational, economic, and hereditary factors”) (quoting David Bazelon).

  244. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. § 511(3)(a)(ii), (b) (McKinney 2013) (defining felony aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle as, inter alia, “operating a motor vehicle while . . . ha[ving] in effect ten or more suspensions,” and mandating prison sentence for predicate felons).

  245. Id. (providing mandatory prison or probation for felony “unlicensed operation”).

  246. Links have been drawn between obsessive compulsive disorder and kleptomania. Jon E. Grant, Understanding and Treating Kleptomania: New Models and New Treatments, 43 Isr. J. Psych. & Related Sci. 81 (2006) (“Evidence suggests that there may be subtypes of kleptomania that are more like OCD, whereas others have more similarities to addictive and mood disorders.”).

  247. It is also possible that the problem was situational necessity, but that seems less likely given widely available public transportation in New York City. In another part of the country, however—where car travel is more central to everyday living—my client’s criminal history might have pointed to the manner by which unlicensed driving is a crime of poverty. Infra notes 353–55 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances where unlicensed driving may be a crime of situational necessity).

  248. Herbert Morris, Rehabilitation and Dignity, in Principled Sentencing 20 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992).

  249. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1247, 1253–54, 1268 (1976) (explaining that it is “respectful to the actor to hold the actor responsible”).

  250. Supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text (discussing luck, freewill, and the “American Dream”).

  251. Unger, supra note 42, at 35.

  252. Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 83, 111 (1993); Bibas, supra note 177, at xvi; Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 Stan. L. Rev. 987, 1021–24 (criticizing the dominant role of formalism in criminal procedure); supra notes 172–81 and accompanying text (discussing criminal-legal “machinery” and the need for individualized justice).

  253. Unger, supra note 42, at 35 (“A philosophy that takes sides with the agent . . . [endeavors to] reveal how we can redirect thought and reorganize society so that the vision of the agent able to use contingency against constraint becomes more real, and the picture of the toolmaker made into a tool . . . becomes less real.”).

  254. Id. at 26, 28, 35 (explaining that “[a] radicalized pragmatism” uses as its touchstone “the agent and his ambitions”).

  255. RSA, supra note 46, at 5:59 and 2:50.

  256. Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 46–56 (2013); see also Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 225–91 (2009); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in Quality of Life 30, 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).

  257. Nussbaum, supra note 255, at ix.

  258. Id. at 33–34, 49.

  259. Lewis, supra note 9, at 38–39 (discussing “conceptions of the good”); supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.

  260. Nussbaum, supra note 255, at 33–34; see also Kony Kim, Restoring Human Capabilities After Punishment: Our Political Responsibilities Toward Incarcerated Americans 39–40 (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (ProQuest); supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text (discussing the “environmental theory” of addiction).

  261. Nussbaum, supra note 255, at 20, 29–33 (emphasizing dignity and human flourishing); Amartya Sen, Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation, 10 Feminist Econ. 77, 77–80 (2004) (emphasizing a more generalized capabilities approach).

  262. Nussbaum, supra note 255, at 18-20; see also Kim, supra note 259, at 39 (“Among the most essential human capacities, in Nussbaum’s view, is the ability to make reasoned choices: in a word, agency . . . . When people are exercising agency reasonably, they’re living in a manner most worthy of their dignity. Thus, agency is vital to human flourishing, and respect for people’s dignity requires preserving and protecting their exercise of agency.”).

  263. Unger, supra note 42, at 51; cf. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1988) (describing Unger as the “premiere spokesperson for the communitarian left”).

  264. See Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster 3 (2009) (“The very concept of society rests on the idea of networks of affinity and affection, and . . . the keeping of one’s brothers and sisters.”).

  265. West, supra note 262, at 1–2.

  266. Unger, supra note 42, at 18. In a related vein, Ta-Nehesi Coates wrote: “Slavery is not an indefinable mass of flesh. It is a particular, specific enslaved woman, whose mind is active as your own, whose range of feeling is as vast as your own . . . , who loves her mother in her own complicated way.” Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me 69 (2015).

  267. See Kim, supra note 259, at 39 (“[E]fforts to protect agency must account for human vulnerability: by nature, people have inherent needs and weaknesses . . . . [P]eople need to inhabit societies that afford them freedom to flourish by meeting welfare needs, protecting against exploitation, and supporting the growth and exercise of essential human capacities.”).

  268. Unger, supra note 42, at 44.

  269. RSA, supra note 46, at 2:43; Unger, supra note 42, at 256.

  270. The concepts of mercy and forgiveness are, of course, familiar to many religious traditions. Murphy & Hampton, supra note 131, at 5.

  271. Luke 15:29–32 (King James) (“Lo, these many years do I serve thee, neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment: and yet thou never gavest me a kid, that I might make merry with my friends: but as soon as this thy son was come, which hath devoured thy living with harlots, thou hast killed for him the fatted calf.”).

  272. Arland J. Hultgren, The Parables of Jesus: A Commentary 80 (2002).

  273. Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 87 (“This might be the first step towards coming to like himself again.”).

  274. Kubo and the Two Strings (Laika Films 2016).

  275. Id. at 1:29:02.

  276. Id. at 1:29:19.

  277. Infra notes 299–301 and accompanying text (discussing libertarian-paternal “nudges”).

  278. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry 15 (2003); NYU Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, Disrupting the Cycle: Reimagining the Prosecutor’s Role in Reentry: A Guide to Best Practices 44 (2017).

  279. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 111, 151.

  280. Martha Minow, When Should Law Forgive? 153 (2019).

  281. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176, 1179 (1989) (“It is this dichotomy between ‘general rule of law’ and ‘personal discretion to do justice’ that I wish to explore . . . There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.”); David Dolinko, Some Naive Thoughts About Justice and Mercy, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 349, 349–51 (describing mercy as infliction of less punishment than deserved and recognizing the argument that “a deliberate departure from the requirements of justice [may be] an injustice”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 167–70 (“If mercy requires a tempering of justice, then there is a sense in which mercy may require a departure from justice.”); Minow, supra note 279, at 129 (“Forgiveness judgments must always consider the jeopardy to the rule of law and to the fair treatment of others who obey the rules.”).

  282. Bowers, supra note 10, at 1673, 1680–81 (discussing mercy’s relationship to justice and treating “like cases alike”); Bowers, supra note 36, at 135–37 (responding to rule-of-law objections to leniency).

  283. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 172 & n.7 (arguing that a “sophisticated theory” of justice is not “overrestricted and simplistic,” but rather remains flexible enough to account for “morally relevant differences”); infra notes 287–98 and accompanying text (discussing “normative guilt and innocence”).

  284. Bibas, supra note 177, at 97; see also Minow, supra note 279, at 142 (“The legal tools of forgiveness can themselves be abused, but that should not be a reason for less forgiveness in the law. Instead, it should be a reason for developing rigorous, reasoned analysis about when forgiveness is and is not warranted.”); infra notes 393–411 and accompanying text (discussing the objection of “undeserved windfall”).

  285. Supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (discussing contested concepts of disorder and quality of life).

  286. Supra note 146 and accompanying text.

  287. Infra notes 381–90 and accompanying text; cf. Minow, supra note 279, at 146, 153 (noting that forgiveness may be a means to use “a wider lens” and “acknowledge larger social failures to prevent misery [and] restrain power”).

  288. Nussbaum, supra note 251, at 85–86 (arguing complete justice requires legal justice tempered by equity, and recognizing the “close connection between equitable judgment—judgment that attends to the particulars—and mercy”); Bowers, supra note 10, at 1672, 1678–79 (“Complete justice demands both the simple justice that arises from fair and virtuous treatment and the legal justice that arises from the application of legal rules . . . Roughly, normative innocence is equivalent to a lack of blameworthiness, . . . [which] relies upon particularized exercise of practical intuition and intelligence, not on formal legal designations . . . [I]t demands a separate (and contextualized) evaluation.”); see also Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 288, 343 (1993) (“[M]ercy is neither a redundancy of justice nor an indefensible deviation from justice. Instead, . . . mercy is a guarantor of justice.”); C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics 294 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970) (“Mercy, detached from Justice, grows unmerciful. That is the important paradox. As there are plants which will flourish only in mountain soil, so it appears that Mercy will flower only when it grows in the crannies of the rock of Justice.”).

  289. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 26.; see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 162, 171, 180–81 (endorsing “individuation” as “a basic demand of justice,” and describing mercy as a “free gift” whether “acted on or not”); see also Ewing, supra note 28, at 316; cf. John Tasioulas, Mercy, 103 Proc. Aristotelian Soc. 101, 117–18, 122 (2003) (observing that not “taking . . . extenuating circumstances into account is unduly harsh”).

  290. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in Forgiveness and Mercy, supra note 131, at 27–28; see also Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 329, 333 n.14 (defending exercises of “humane compassion” in criminal justice).

  291. Bowers, supra note 36, at 157–60 (critiquing the special role played by formalism in criminal justice).

  292. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1214, 1242–43 (2010) (defending the notion of “treating like cases differently . . . because we . . . have differing opinions . . . of what constitutes right treatment”); David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? 12 (U. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 24, 2002) (arguing that, rather than measuring whether like cases are treated alike according to application of legal rules, the justice system could measure according to “morally relevant differences” of cases); Bowers, supra note 10, at 1674 (“[A] contextualized approach to criminal justice necessarily demands more than just a rigid application of legal rules pursuant to formal designations. It demands an evaluation of relative blameworthiness to ensure that equitably distinct cases are recognized as such, even if those cases happen to be legally identical under insufficiently discriminating statutes.”).

  293. Jeffries, supra note 58, at 201, 212; see also Bowers, supra note 36, at 193; Minow, supra note 279, at 146 (“Promoting legal forgiveness . . . may jeopardize the predictability, reliability, and equal treatment sought by the rule of law.”).

  294. Bowers, supra note 36, at 144–45; Bowers, supra note 251, at 988–89.

  295. Supra Section I.B.

  296. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

  297. Supra notes 86–112 and accompanying text (discussing large role played by discretion in quality-of-life enforcement and adjudication).

  298. Scalia, supra note 280, at 1175.

  299. In any event, leniency is a special case. Certain rule-of-law concerns—for instance, the concept of notice—are simply not as pressing when it comes to mercy, as compared to punishment. According to Meir Dan-Cohen: “[T]he rule of law allegedly promotes liberty or autonomy by increasing predictability. But the need for security of individual expectations is not a great obstacle . . . when decision rules are more lenient than conduct rules would lead people to expect. In such cases no one is likely to complain of frustrated expectations.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 31, at 3, 10–11 (2011); see also Anne M. Coughlin, Of Decision Rules and Conduct Rules, or Doing the Police in Different Voices, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 31, at 15, 16 (2011) (“What does the lawbreaker have to whine about? The fact that she thought she was going to be punished . . . ? That would be goofy, to say the very least.”). In other words, the rule of law tolerates pleasant surprises. Bowers, supra note 36, at 136, 147–48, 160 (“[P]ositive legality is not offended by pleasant surprises, and an exception that tends toward leniency produces only a pleasant surprise. . . . In other words, the rule of law abides pleasant surprises because such surprises do not affect the individual’s opportunities to plan conduct in the shadow of law.”).

  300. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 175–76 (2003) (“If no coercion is involved, we think that some types of paternalism should be acceptable to even the most ardent libertarian. . . . [I]n some cases individuals make inferior choices, choices that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower. . . . [P]lanners are forced to make some design choices.”); Michael Louis Corrado, Behavioral Economics, Neurophysiology, Addiction and the Law 35 (UNC Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 892,007, 2010) (“[I]f the behavioral economist is right we might arrange choices so that people can get what they want for the long run without our making the choice for them.”); cf. Bowers, supra note 150, at 790, 830–33 (describing a way to restructure drug courts around carrots, rather than sticks, as a means to “provide something akin to a ‘libertarian-paternal’ nudge in the right direction for the addicted ex-convict who found himself ready for treatment but who still required some help to get and to keep clean”).

  301. Minow, supra note 279, at 160 (quoting Katie J.M. Baker: “In restorative justice, . . . [the] emphasis is on repairing and preventing harm, not indefinite, often ineffective punishment”); see, e.g., Kony Kim, From Adversarial Legalism to Collaborative Problem-Solving: A Pragmatic Turn in American Criminal Justice 20–25 (examining the Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York).

  302. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 95 (“[M]aking whole the many survivors of systemic government atrocities is entirely absent from broader ‘criminal justice reform’ discourse.”); cf. supra notes 147–64 and accompanying text (critiquing the scope of internal criminal-legal “reformist” reforms, like drug courts).

  303. Richard Gonzales, To Reduce Gun Violence, Potential Offenders Offered Support and Cash, NPR (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/28/472138377/to-reduce-gun-violence-potential-offenders-offered-support-and-cash [https://perma.cc/J2WM-AA2T].

  304. Stephanie Pagones, New York City Gifting Alleged Criminals Baseball Tickets, Gift Cards as Part of $12M Perk Program, Fox Bus. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/new-york-city-gifting-alleged-criminals-baseball-tickets-gift-cards-as-part-of-12m-perk-program [https://perma.cc/8B7N-SATG]. I was a Reporter for the Uniform Law Commission’s recently adopted “Pretrial Release and Detention Act.” We included, in our proposed statute, a similar set of provisions that would require courts to consider whether “practical assistance” or “supportive service” could effectively manage release risks. Uniform Law Commission, Pretrial Release and Detention Act, § 305 (adopted July 15, 2020).

  305. Douglas B. Marlowe, Behavior Modification 101 for Drug Courts: Making the Most of Incentives and Sanctions 3 (2012); see also supra notes 150–64 and accompanying text (discussing drug courts).

  306. Vivian Vásquez Irizarry, Gretchen Hildebran & Julia Steele Allen, Decade of Fire, PBS (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/documentaries/decade-of-fire/ [https://perma.cc/S5K9-NV4R].

  307. Soraya Nadia McDonald, Out of the Chaos, a Beat: ‘Rubble Kings’ Explains How Gang Violence Gave Way to the Creation of Hip-Hop, Wash. Post (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2015/06/25/out-of-the-chaos-a-beat-rubble-kings-explains-how-gang-violence-gave-way-to-the-creation-of-hip-hop/ [https://perma.cc/Q5GE-RSAZ]; Jeff Chang, Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop Generation 60 (2005).

  308. Chang, supra note 306, at 80.

  309. Cf. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 32 (“[A] variety of other alternatives to human caging exist . . . education, employment, companionship, after-school art and theater programs, medical and mental health care, addiction treatment, and stable housing, to name a few.”).

  310. Maki Becker, The War on Drugs Hit Them Hard, So Oakland Is Saving Them a Spot in the Pot Trade, Buff. News (May 5, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/news/local/the-war-on-drugs-hit-them-hard-so-oakland-is-saving-them-a-spot-in/article_d0e501f1-b2bb-550c-a5dd-fb4fb25ed92a.html [https://perma.cc/5FBE-T9JF] (drawing an analogy to reparations); Max Blau, Legal Pot Is Notoriously White. Oakland Is Changing That., Politico (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/27/oakland-legal-cannabis-hood-incubator-217657/ [https://perma.cc/4ATX-E48W].

  311. Becker, supra note 309. In addition to $3 million in interest-free loans, the city is looking to provide commercial kitchen space for edible-cannabis processing. Id.

  312. Blau, supra note 309 (noting that, under the program, Oakland set aside at least half the permits “for residents who had been targets of the war on drugs”).

  313. Becker, supra note 309 (“It came down to this: White people were being allowed to sell and smoke marijuana—even getting rich off it—while African Americans were getting arrested.”); Blau, supra note 309 (describing one equity participant for whom “cannabis suppressed her life” but “now, cannabis will uplift her family’s life”); Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 96–97 (describing “[p]olicies to reserve profitable marijuana business licenses to people with prior marijuana convictions” as meaningful radical reform and a “reinvestment” effort designed to promote “community-based wellness”).

  314. Blau, supra note 309 (quoting a founder of the Hood Incubator that “[i]t’s there to help those most impacted by the war on drugs”).

  315. Supra notes 269–79 and accompanying text (discussing the Parable of the Lost Son as a tale of harm-reduction and restorative justice).

  316. Ellen M. Weber, Failure of Physicians To Prescribe Pharmacotherapies for Addiction: Regulatory Restrictions and Physician Resistance, 13 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 49, 56 (2010) (“[T]he medical community viewed addiction as a medical problem, and physicians prescribed opioid medications for the care of addicted patients without legal restrictions.”); David T. Courtwright, The Hidden Epidemic: Opiate Addiction and Cocaine Use in the South, 1860–1920, 49 J.S. Hist. 57, 71–72 (1983) (noting that as early as 1870, medical professionals began to conceive of addiction as a disease as opposed to a moral failing, and they responded to the epidemic by treating and ultimately tracking addicts).

  317. Hari, supra note 183, at 33–34 (quoting a contemporary physician that “the doctor knows just what should be done . . . that he has but to write a few words on the prescription blank that lies at his elbow, and the patient . . . will receive the remedy that would restore him miraculously to a semblance of normality”); id. at 37 (“[D]octors, vets, and dentists . . . [gave] out these drugs as they saw fit . . . addicts [were] dealt with compassionately in this way.”). See generally Henry Smith Williams, Drug Addicts Are Human Beings 14 (1938) (recounting the rise to prominence of the prohibitive approach towards drug-use).

  318. See, e.g., Edward Huntington Williams, Negro Cocaine ‘Fiends’ Are New Southern Menace, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1914, at 12 (warning in racist terms of the purported dangers presented by “cocaine-crazed negroes”); Hamilton Wright, Report on the International Opium Commission and on the Opium Problem as Seen Within the United States and Its Possessions, S. Doc. No. 61-377, at 49–50 (2d Sess. 1910); Cocaine Sniffers, N.Y. Daily Trib., June 21, 1903, at 11 (describing in racist terms the threats presented by a rise in “cocaine sniffing”); see also David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control 7 (3d ed. 1999), (explaining that “fantasies” about super-human strength resulting from cocaine use “characterized white fear, not the reality of cocaine’s effects”); Courtwright, supra note 315, at 70–71 (describing the “supercharged racial atmosphere” and “exaggerated reactions” of the white southern power structure); How Did We Get Here?, Economist, July 28, 2001 (A Survey of Illegal Drugs), at 4 (describing racist early-twentieth century perception of “drug-crazed, sex-mad negroes”).

  319. Courtwright, supra note 315, at 57; Hari, supra note 183, at 36.

  320. Hari, supra note 183, at 37.

  321. Musto, supra note 317, at 151; Hari, supra note 183, at 37; Courtwright, supra note 315, at 57–62; Weber, supra note 315, at 59 (“[F]ederal and state health officials and local law enforcement, beginning around 1912, created maintenance clinics in a dozen states that would prescribe medication in an effort to prevent suffering related to addiction and wean individuals from their drug use through the gradual reduction of dosage.”).

  322. Courtwright, supra note 315, at 60–62 (analyzing the data and observing that the clinics were “designed to supply narcotics to, as well as to keep track of, addicts”).

  323. Musto, supra note 317, at 151, 156–78.

  324. Hari, supra note 183, at 37.

  325. Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 Cath. U. L. Rev. 586, 594–95 (1973) (“[L]aw enforcement officials soon began to move to curtail the medical profession’s freedom to prescribe narcotics in the treatment of addicts.”).

  326. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).

  327. Harrison Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, 785 (1914) (repealed 1970). Compare Linder, 268 U.S. at 18 (“[W]e cannot possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other than medical purposes solely because he has dispensed . . . in the ordinary court and in good faith . . . morphine or cocaine for relief of conditions incident to addiction.”), with United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288–89 (1922) (holding that prescribing drugs for an addict was a crime regardless of the physician’s intent in the matter), and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 194 (1920) (holding that a physician’s lawful prescribing authority did not include “a distribution intended to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug”), and Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99–100 (1919) (“[T]o call such an order for the use of morphine a physician’s prescription would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion of the subject is required.”).

  328. Weber, supra note 315, at 56.

  329. Id. at 60.

  330. Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 324, at 596–97 (“[T]he addict could no longer turn to the medical profession for help: he was forced to turn to a new source of supply—the growing illicit drug market.” (quoting Rufus King, The Drug Hang-Up 43 (1972))); see also id. at 595 (“The unfortunate consequence of this policy was to drive from the field of drug treatment not only the unethical ‘script doctor’ but the legitimate doctor as well.”).

  331. Hari, supra note 183, at 200–02; Matthew Power, The Alleys of Vancouver, Slate (Feb. 3, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/02/the-alleys-of-vancouver.html [https://perma.cc/3PYW-7ZTF].

  332. See Matthew Power, Welcome to Insite, Slate (Feb. 1, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/02/welcome-to-insite.html [https://perma.cc/7A2S-QU9R]. See generally Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 261, 348 (2010) (describing supervised injection facilities as potentially “a pragmatic call for balance and for evidence-based decisionmaking”).

  333. JoNel Aleccia, As Seattle Eyes Supervised Drug-Injection Sites, Is Vancouver a Good Model?, Seattle Times (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/is-vancouvers-safe-drug-use-site-a-good-model-for-seattle/ [https://perma.cc/58S9-KB24]; see also Hari, supra note 183, at 203 (noting sharp drop in drug-related fatalities in British Columbia as a whole); Robert Matas, B.C. Drug Deaths Hit a Low Not Seen in Years, Globe & Mail (Dec. 9, 2008), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/bc-drug-deaths-hit-a-low-not-seen-in-years/article1067082/ [https://perma.cc/7VU9-YZMQ] (same). See generally Att’y Gen. of Can. v. PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc’y, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, 151 (Can.) (describing the impacts of Vancouver activism and reform).

  334. Evan Wood, et al., Changes in Public Order After the Opening of a Medically Supervised Safer Injecting Facility for Illicit Injection Drug Users, 171 CMAJ 731, 733 (2004). Between 1996 and 2006, life expectancy in the Downtown Eastside rose by several years. Sam Cooper, Life-Expectancy Jump Astounds, Province (Vancouver), Sept. 7, 2012, at A3.

  335. German Lopez, The Case for Prescription Heroin: Vancouver Gives Heroin to People Suffering from Addiction—and It Works, Vox (June 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/12/15301458/canada-prescription-heroin-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/L7RQ-T9X9].

  336. Hari, supra note 183, at 206, 209–10.

  337. Linnet Myers, Europe Finds U.S Drug War Lacking in Results, Chi. Trib., Nov. 2, 1995, at SW1.

  338. Hari, supra note 183, at 218–19. See generally John Strang, Teodora Gorshkova & Nicola Metrebian, EMCDDA Insights: New Heroin-Assisted Treatment 11, 13 (2012) (observing that, in various European countries, supervised injectable heroin treatment, though more expensive than optimized oral methadone treatment, led to significant societal savings).

  339. Gaëlle Faure, Why Doctors Are Giving Heroin to Heroin Addicts, Time (Sept. 28, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1926160,00.html [https://perma.cc/G2U3-WH8H].

  340. Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances: Crime, Regulation, and Policy 740 (2013).

  341. Lauren Frayer, In Portugal, Drug Use Is Treated as a Medical Issue, Not a Crime, NPR (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/18/524380027/in-portugal-drug-use-is-treated-as-a-medical-issue-not-a-crime [https://perma.cc/B7S8-AW2X].

  342. Id.

  343. Nicholas Kristof, How to Win a War on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2017 (Sunday Review), at 1; see also Hari, supra note 183, at 249–50, 268 (noting that the number of addicts, incidents of overdose, and the proportion of people contracting HIV from drug use have fallen in Portugal after the decriminalization); Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes & Alex Stevens, What Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?, 50 Brit. J. Criminology 999, 1014–15 (2010) (finding that after decriminalization, the number of drug-related deaths, young people becoming dependent on illicit drugs, and drug users diagnosed with HIV and AIDS in Portugal has decreased); Christopher Ingraham, Why Hardly Anyone Dies from a Drug Overdose in Portugal, Wash. Post (June 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/05/why-hardly-anyone-dies-from-a-drug-overdose-in-portugal/ [https://perma.cc/8VEQ-LPYQ] (same); Frayer, supra note 340 (same).

  344. Kristof, supra note 342. Other countries, like Uruguay and the Netherlands, have undertaken similar decriminalization reforms with promising results. Hari, supra note 183, at 264–73; Shirley Haasnoot, Opinion, Dutch Drug Policy, Pragmatic as Ever, Guardian (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/03/dutch-drug-policy-pragmatic.

  345. Lopez, supra note 334; Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 788–89; cf. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 5, at 144–82 (discussing criminal-legal “marks”).

  346. Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 801; infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing “downstream consequences” of arrest, charge, conviction, and punishment); Denis Ribeaud, Long Term Impacts of the Swiss Heroin Prescription Trials on Crime of Treated Heroin Users, 34 J. Drug Issues 163, 173 (noting 55% and 75% reduction in vehicle thefts among participants in the first and fourth years of treatment, respectively); Hari, supra note 183, at 221 (noting drop in HIV infections caused by injection drug use from 68% to 5%); Joanne Csete & Peter J. Grob, Switzerland, HIV and the Power of Pragmatism: Lessons for Drug Policy Development, 23 Int’l J. Drug Pol’y 82, 84 (2012) (noting drop in hepatitis infections caused by injection drug use from 51% to 10%); cf. Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 66 (“The drug war cost more than a trillion dollars, tens of millions of arrests, hundreds of millions of police stops, tens of millions of years in prison, tens of millions of lost jobs and educations and homes . . . .”).

  347. For instance, a study published in The Lancet found that the majority of participants in Switzerland’s addiction-maintenance clinics were able to pivot eventually to methadone or abstinence programs. Wim Weber, Heroin Prescription for Addicts in Switzerland Improves Quality of Life, 356 Lancet 1177, 1177 (2000); Hari, supra note 183, at 222 (citing studies showing that in Switzerland “[t]he number of addicts dying every year fell dramatically”); cf. Lopez, supra note 334 (describing clinics that provide social services); Karakatsanis, supra note 34, at 32 (“[A] mountain of evidence suggests that the punishment approach to drugs has actually increased drug use and the harms associated with it . . . .”); Agan, Doleac & Harvey, supra note 71, at 5–6, 37 (finding that not prosecuting marginal nonviolent misdemeanor defendants “reduces the likelihood of a new misdemeanor complaint by 24 percentage points . . . [and] a new felony complaint by 8 percentage points,” and speculating that the economic, social, and stigmatic consequences of criminal justice involvement explain the differences in recidivism rates); supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text (discussing manner by which social services may counteract the criminogenic aspects of conventional criminal legalism, and citing sources for the proposition that harm-reduction, safe-sex measures have not increased instances of sex).

  348. Supra notes 118–23, 222–28, 247–48 and accompanying text.

  349. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . .”); see, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 145.00 (McKinney 2021) (defining “criminal mischief,” inter alia, as “[i]ntentionally damag[ing] property of another”); N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10 (McKinney 2021) (defining “criminal trespass,” inter alia, as “enter[ing] . . . real property . . . which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders”).

  350. See supra Part III.

  351. See supra Part III (describing and championing harm reduction); see also The Purge (Universal Pictures 2013) (telling narrative of alternate America in which day-to-day crime is minimized by making all crimes legal for twelve hours annually); cf. infra note 442 and accompanying text (discussing willingness of even prison abolitionists to incapacitate the “dangerous few”).

  352. Supra Part I.

  353.  Supra Section I.A. (discussing undefined nature of the concept of disorder and corresponding quality-of-life offenses).

  354. With respect to possession of firearms, I could be convinced otherwise, particularly because enforcement of weapons offenses potentially produces distributive and racial inequities. Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2173, 2173 (2016) (“[R]ace- and class-based critiques . . . concerns about police and prosecutorial power . . . worries about the social and economic costs of mass incarceration . . . the same issues persist in an area—possessory gun crime—that receives much less criticism.”).

  355. Supra and infra notes 83, 110–11, 113, 170–71, 192, 402 and accompanying text (discussing intersection between order-maintenance enforcement and poverty); see, e.g., Stolper & Jones, supra note 138, at 24 (describing turnstile hopping as “an essential crime of poverty”); Parascandola, et al., supra note 140 (“Most people who jump the turnstiles are doing it because it’s a [sic] economic hardship.”); Vincent Barone, Brooklyn Turnstile Jumping Arrests Target Poor African-Americans: Report (Oct. 16, 2017) (“This is basically a crime of poverty.”), https://www.amny.com/transit/brooklyn-turnstile-jumping-arrests-target-poor-african-americans-report-1-14490216/ [https://perma.cc/5X7M-JFS6]; cf. Eduardo M. Penalver & Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1095, 1172 (2007) (endorsing situational excuse for economic necessity).

  356. Lawyers and activists have opposed driver’s license revocation laws on precisely these grounds. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Being Poor Can Mean Losing a Driver’s License. Not Anymore in Tennessee., N.Y. Times (July 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/us/drivers-license-tennessee.html [https://perma.cc/S3CB-YR24] (describing litigation as “a major victory for advocates of the poor who have targeted license revocation laws as some of the worst examples of statutes that effectively criminalize poverty”); Vivian Wang, Ticket to Nowhere: The Hidden Cost of Driver’s License Suspensions, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Aug. 15, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/ticket-to-nowhere-the-hidden-cost-of-drivers-license-suspensions-b99547649z1-321972931.html [https://perma.cc/RPX3-38Z9].

  357. Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 349–50 (1996) (describing the offender who “behaved virtuously, albeit lawlessly”).

  358. Frankfurt, supra note 235, at 5; see also Koppelman, supra note 235, at 216; supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing “volitional necessity”).

  359. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1263 (1994).

  360. See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, No. 19-267, slip op. at 2, 21 (2020); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 187–88 (2012); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (Nov. 16, 1993). 

  361. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 358, at 1263.

  362. Koppelman, supra note 235, at 216, 234.

  363. Id. at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted).

  364. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 358, at 1255, 1262, 1286 (urging “parity for religious belief, not privilege”); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1351, 1353, 1426 (2012) (“The problem . . . is that religion cannot be distinguished from many other beliefs and practices as warranting special constitutional treatment. . . . As a normative matter, religion is not special. . . . [R]eligious views, at least as traditionally conceived, cannot easily be distinguished from comprehensive secular doctrines on epistemic or psychological grounds.”).

  365. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 358, at 1286.

  366. Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy 151–91 (2003) (arguing against singling out religion for special treatment and defending legal exemptions for a wider range of claims of conscience).

  367. John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 779 (1986).

  368. Id. at 798, 800 (“I think religion is a lot like insanity. There are two aspects to the parallel, just as there are two aspects to the most commonly used test for insanity. The first is a cognitive aspect, which concerns defects in practical reasoning; the second is a volitional aspect, which concerns the ability to conform one’s conduct to legal norms one knows to be binding.”); see, e.g., Model Penal Code § 4.01 (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality . . . of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”).

  369. See, e.g., Julia Cameron, The Artist’s Way: A Spiritual Path to Higher Creativity, at xi–xiii (1992).

  370. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308, 320–21 & n.21(1991) (arguing that “bonds of ethnicity, interpersonal relationships, and social and political relationships, as well as religion may be, and are, integral to an individual’s self-identity”); see also Camille Lannert, The Perpetuation of Graffiti Art Subculture, 1 Butler J. Undergraduate Res. 47, 51 (2015) (“On the most primitive level, graffiti art is an individual’s outlet for self-expression, an outlet perceived as suppressed or blocked by society at large. For the graffiti artist, self-expression is central to the construction and maintenance of his or her identity.”).

  371. California Love Scared Straight, 99% Invisible, at 16:02 (Aug. 4, 2020), https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/california-love-scared-straight/ [https://perma.cc/2VJ8-NLVN].

  372. Michael A. Gonzales, The Holy House of Hip-Hop, N.Y. Mag. (Sept. 22, 2008), https://nymag.com/anniversary/40th/50665/ (“[T]he blackout that year spawned a whole new generation. . . . ‘During the looting, everybody stole turntables and stuff. Every electronics store imaginable got hit. Every record store. That sprung a whole new set of D.J.’s.’” (quoting Grandmaster Caz)).

  373. Julia Jacobs, The ‘Black Lives Matter’ Street Art That Contains Multitudes, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/arts/design/black-lives-matter-murals-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/5BYL-4D6B]. On street art and political expression, see generally Lindsay Bates, Bombing, Tagging, Writing: An Analysis of the Significance of Graffiti and Street Art (2014) (Master’s Thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania libraries); Joe Austin, Taking the Train: How Graffiti Art Became an Urban Crisis in New York City 6 (2001) (arguing that graffiti “writers” are underappreciated for their cultural and political contributions). Hip-Hop has long embraced street art. And Hip-Hop, in all its facets, is a powerful medium for political expression. See, e.g., Public Enemy, Night of the Living Baseheads, on It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back (Columbia Records 1988) (“Have you forgotten that once we were brought here, we were robbed of our name, robbed of our language? We lost our religion, our culture, our god . . . and many of us, by the way we act, we even lost our minds.” (quoting Khalid Abdul Muhammad)).

  374. Malcolm Gladwell, Complexity and the Ten-Thousand-Hour Rule, New Yorker (Aug. 21, 2013) (claiming that genius is principally a product of practice).

  375. Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice?—Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 1057, 1075–77, 1076 n.63 (2013) (noting that tax compliance and noncompliance may evidence “relative ability, well-being, or need” and thereby help identify the offenders who may be more deserving of exceptions); Wojciech Kopczuk, Redistribution When Avoidance Behavior Is Heterogeneous, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 51, 53 (2000); see also George A. Akerlof, The Economics of ‘Tagging’ as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 8, 8 (1978).

  376. Osofsky, supra note 374, at 1075–77 & n.63 (“[T]hese tags should identify groups of people who are, on average, needy. Individuals with these tags could then receive targeted benefits.”); Kopczuk, supra note 374, at 52–53.

  377. Kopczuk, supra note 374, at 53, 69 (“[I]mperfect enforcement of existing rules[] may be welfare improving[] and need not always reflect economic inefficiency of the underlying political system.”).

  378. Id. at 69 (“[O]bserve that black market activities are highly concentrated among low-income people. Their existence can be a cheap instrument of redistribution.”).

  379. Osofsky, supra note 374, at 1077.

  380. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218, 2221–22 (2019); Minow, supra note 279, at 157 (“Feeding the algorithms data that reflect disparate (or biased) law enforcement practices will repeat or amplify problematic practices. Rather than replacing human judgment, machine learning can push human beings to be more explicit and self-reflective about their judgments, predictions, biases, and use of discretion.”).

  381. Rodney A. Brooks & Anita M. Flynn, Fast, Cheap and Out of Control: A Robot Invasion of the Solar System, 42 J. Brit. Interplanetary Soc. 478 (1989); see also Fast, Cheap & Out of Control (American Playhouse & Errol Morris Films 1997) (documentary about Brooks).

  382. Solomon, supra note 142, at 6.

  383. Id.

  384. Id. at 28 (listing a figure of 32%).

  385. Supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text (discussing ages of different cohorts of misdemeanants in New York City).

  386. Supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (discussing phenomenon of “aging out”).

  387. Supra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing higher levels of risk-seeking and steep and hyperbolic discounting among offenders and drug-dependent individuals).

  388. Christopher Allen Mallett, Miyuki Fukushima Tedor & Linda M. Quinn, Race/Ethnicity, Citizenship Status, and Crime Examined Through Trauma Experiences Among Young Adults in the United States, 17 J. Ethnicity Crim. Just. 110, 110–11 (2019).

  389. Massoglia & Uggen, supra note 182, at 570–71.

  390. Supra notes 315–46 and accompanying text (discussing addiction-maintenance clinics).

  391. Supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text (discussing libertarian-paternal “nudge[s]”).

  392. Osofsky, supra note 374, 1079–80 (“Good screening mechanisms separate between a group of individuals who should be screened in for a certain benefit . . . and those who should be screened out . . . [but] what matters for a screening mechanism . . . is determining what groups systematically bear the costs . . . not . . . [the] cost in a particular case.”).

  393. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 Yale L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992) (“Prosecutors, like insurers, are charged with finding the occasional deserving claim in a sea of frauds.”). In the context of optimal tax screening, Leigh Osofsky explained: “[I]f high ability taxpayers are taxed at a higher rate when they earn high income, they can masquerade as low ability taxpayers by earning less income, which they can do by substituting leisure for work. . . . The fundamental dilemma of optimal tax theory, then, is how to meet its redistributive goal while minimizing the efficiency costs . . . .” Osofsky, supra note 374, at 1075.

  394. Osofsky, supra note 374, at 1078 (“Ordeals are costs attached to a desirable benefit.”).

  395. Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 Harv. L Rev. 2227, 2285 (2013).

  396. Id. at 2231–32, 2234.

  397. Supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text (addressing the debate over whether broken windows policing works).

  398. Huang, supra note 394, at 2230, 2232.

  399. Supra notes 270–72 and accompanying text (discussing the “Parable of the Prodigal Son”).

  400. Supra notes 347–48 and accompanying text (discussing anecdote).

  401. Supra Part II.

  402. Cf. Huang, supra note 394, at 2237 (discussing optimal design of licensing regimes and concluding that “[t]he desirability of any strategy will turn on costs and benefits . . . the tradeoffs for any given policy”).

  403. Supra note 111 and accompanying text (detailing studies examining perceptions of illegitimacy of order-maintenance enforcement).

  404. Supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the aims of radical pragmatism).

  405. Cf. supra notes 260–65 and accompanying text (describing the “capabilities approach” as a metric for evaluating crime licenses).

  406. Supra Part I (discussing contested notions of disorder).

  407. Huang, supra note 394, at 2288 (emphasis added).

  408. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”).

  409. Bowers, supra note 36, at 202 (“The rule of lenity, the presumption of innocence, the Double Jeopardy clause—these and many other procedural protections—are all liberal devices designed to correct (and even overcorrect) for potentially arbitrary errors that could harm the individual.”); see also Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1018 (1980) (discussing the liberal principle that “it is ultimately better to err in favor of nullification than against it”); Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By 445–46 (2012) (“Cruel and unusual punishments are expressly prohibited by the Constitution; merciful and unusual punishments are not.”).

  410. Bowers, supra note 36, at 202–03 (“[T]he costs of error extend . . . to moral arbitrariness. . . . Look no further than Blackstone’s maxim.”); Bowers, supra note 251, at 1041 (“[T]he state ought to criminalize no more conduct than necessary to promote crime control, public safety, and retributive goals . . . as Blackstone’s maxim prescribes . . . .”); see also Matt Matravers, Unreliability, Innocence, and Preventive Detention, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 31, at 81, 82 (“[A] situation in which someone is overburdened is worse from the point of view of justice than one in which someone carries a burden that is too light. It is worse, still, for someone for whom no burden is appropriate and yet a burden is applied.”); supra notes 287–98 and accompanying text (discussing normative guilt and innocence). Megan Stevenson and Sandy Mayson have likewise extended “Blackstone’s Ratio” beyond the context of legal guilt. Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and the Value of Liberty 46 (Feb. 16, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (engaging in a “translation of the Blackstone ratio to the preventive detention context”).

  411. Supra Parts I–II.

  412. Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1973) (arguing for “a blueprint for experimentation . . . at modest cost . . . designed to move from existing knowledge, empirically derived, to a scheme of larger, more coordinated experiments, and then ultimately, to a higher level of implementation”); supra notes 198–200, 380 (detailing this methodology).

  413. Infra notes 429–31 and accompanying text.

  414. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 625–26 (1984).

  415. Id. at 641.

  416. Alon Harel, Why Law Matters 107 (2014).

  417. Dan-Cohen, supra note 413, at 634–35 (indicating that only “partial acoustic separation” is possible).

  418. Supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary enforcement of quality-of-life offenses).

  419. Huang, supra note 394, at 2236 (“I introduce a distinct class of solutions aimed at ‘prompting’ observers to take account of the possibility of permission, yet without disclosure of the status of individual actors.” (emphasis omitted)).

  420. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1108 (2000) (“Decent conceptions of democratic rule and individual liberty require, at a minimum, that discretionary judgments and actions be open to the electorate.”). On the connection between pragmatism and “democratic experimentalism,” see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 40, at 314 (arguing that pragmatism, in the form of “democratic experimentalism,” promises “to create a form of collective problem solving suited to the local diversity and volatility of problems that confound modern democracies”); Sabel, supra note 163, at 35; supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between pragmatism and democratic engagement).

  421. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1748 (2005); Danzig, supra note 411, at 4 (describing a “particular type of innovation” that is “conceptually and emotionally closely tied to . . . decentralization”); cf. Sabel, supra note 163, at 40 (discussing Dewey’s “attraction to the local”); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 40, at 315 (“[E]ffective government is first and foremost local government.”). See generally Klein, supra note 162, at 1541–42 (endorsing a federalism that “seeks to preserve local control of the criminal-justice system”); Richard C. Schragger, City Power: Urban Governance in a Global Age 5 (2016); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371, 372 (2001).

  422. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099, 1126–27 (2005) (“The way that second-order diversity diffuses power in practice will depend on the institution in question. For some disaggregated institutions, second-order diversity frustrates the majority faction simply by disaggregating power. For others, it allows electoral minorities to ‘edit’ the law they lack the power to ‘authorize.’”).

  423. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 40, at 288, 314; see also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 210 (1998) (arguing that the criminal-legal system must be more responsive to affected communities where offenders and victims are “linked to [each other and to the local] majority by strong social and familial ties”); Tracey L. Meares, It’s a Question of Connections, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 579, 588–89 (1997).

  424. T.L. Short, Peirce on Science and Philosophy, 36 Phil. Topics 259, 271 (2008); see also Sabel, supra note 163, at 43 (“[A] persistent increase in uncertainty favors the emergence of a world congenial to Dewey—a world in which mutual learning and joint problem solving give rise to a democratic community.”). On the “virtues of federalism,” see, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.”).

  425. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 40, at 288.

  426. The Andy Griffith Show (CBS television broadcast 1960–1968) (depicting town drunk, Otis Campbell); The Simpsons (Fox television broadcast 1989–2020) (depicting town drunk, Barney Gumble).

  427. Cf. Brantly Keiek, Sobering Center for People Deemed “Publicly Intoxicated” Open Near New Orleans’ French Quarter, WXXV 25 (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.wxxv25.com/sobering-center-people-deemed-publicly-intoxicated-open-near-new-orleans-french-quarter/ [https://perma.cc/3JZ2-H848] (“The Sobering Center is a more appropriate destination than jails . . . as clients will . . . have a ‘warm handoff’ into medically supported detox or additional services if appropriate.”).

  428. Cf. Skogan, supra note 57, at 91 (“Community Policing relies upon organizational decentralization.” (emphasis omitted)).

  429. Supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text (discussing “institutional fetishism”).

  430. Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 797–98.

  431. See, e.g., Scott Burris, Evan D. Anderson, Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 St. Louis L.J. 1089, 1099 (2009) (discussing establishment of syringe exchanges as product of efforts by those who “bear the brunt of the human and financial costs associated with injection drug use and its collateral consequences”); Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 817 (“Public health innovations typically start underground. For years . . . sterile syringes were exchanged, medical marijuana was ingested, and naloxone was distributed and injected.”).

  432. Minow, supra note 279, at 134; see also Shiffrin, supra note 291, at 1225 (“[H]ow law is understood on the street by everyday citizens may actually, and rightly, have an important influence on its ultimate judicial interpretation.”). This point obviously intersects with an extensive literature on civil disobedience. That literature is largely beyond the scope of this article, but it is, of course, an important topic that is relevant to many of the same themes that inform this project—particularly, social action and social justice. See generally Lewis Perry, Civil Disobedience: An American Tradition (2013) (tracing the origins of the notion of civil disobedience); Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait (1964) (describing the manner by which civil disobedience may contribute to the nonviolent movement against racial discrimination in the United States).

  433. Supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text (describing recent farebeat crackdown).

  434. Nick Pinto, ‘Swipe It Forward’ Activists Protest NYPD Subway Arrests by Giving Out Free Rides, Village Voice (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/11/03/swipe-it-forward-activists-protest-nypd-subway-arrests-by-giving-out-free-rides/ [https://perma.cc/2WG8-VZTB]; James Ramsay, ‘Can I Get a Swipe?’ Can We Get in Trouble?, WNYC News (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/can-i-get-swipe-can-we-get-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/F9VX-M7Z2].

  435. Swipe It Forward (@swipeitforward), Twitter (May 11, 2018, 10:25 PM), https://twitter.com/swipeitforward/status/995127801324896257 [https://perma.cc/UAT2-LSGJ]; Swipe It Forward (@swipeitforward), Twitter (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://twitter.com/swipeitforward/status/980895528371277826.

  436. Pinto, supra note 433 (emphasis added).

  437. Id. (quoting Trujillo) (emphasis added) (describing goal to “highlight the role that fare-beating arrests have played in the application of the aggressive ‘Broken Windows’ police enforcement against minor ‘quality of life’ violations”).

  438. J. David Goodman & Jeffery C. Mays, Of 800,000 Poor New Yorkers, Only 30,000 Can Get the New Half-Priced MetroCards, N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/nyregion/fair-fares-metrocard-discount-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/98JJ-3JCC] (describing the program).

  439. Alexander C. Kaufman, As New York Cracks Down on Fare Evasion, Another City Weighs Free Transit, Huffington Post (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mbta-free-transit_n_5dd2e1d6e4b01f982f06b00c [https://perma.cc/PDT3-RLAL]; Beth Musgrave, Can a Bus Pass Help End Homelessness? Lexington Is About To Find Out, Lexington Herald Leader (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.kentucky.com/latest-news/article216452400.html. An advantage of universal free transit is that it might minimize the stigma and resentment that sometimes attach to subsidies for the poor. Recently, some school districts have experimented with universal free lunch to counteract precisely these pernicious perspectives. Amy Brown & Janna Bilski, Fighting the Stigma of Free Lunch: Why Universal Free School Lunch Is Good For Students, Schools, and Families, Ford Foundation (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.fordfoundation.org/just-matters/just-matters/posts/fighting-the-stigma-of-free-lunch-why-universal-free-school-lunch-is-good-for-students-schools-and-families/ [https://perma.cc/D58R-FSNC].

  440. Here, I am reminded of and inspired by the many ordinary people, including some of my own students (who were inspired, in turn, by the Movement for Black Lives) to start community bail funds in an effort to take tangible radical-pragmatic steps today. See, e.g., Fundraiser by Elizabeth Fosburgh: Blue Ridge Community, https://www.gofundme.com/f/blue-ridge-bail-fund [https://perma.cc/29YY-P8BR]; Jia Tolentino, Where Bail Funds Go from Here, New Yorker (June 23, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-activism/where-bail-funds-go-from-here [https://perma.cc/4JYR-KSH6]; Hannah Giorgis, Why It Matters That So Many People Are Donating to Bail Funds, Atlantic (June 6, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/06/why-sudden-popularity-bail-funds-matters/612733/ [https://perma.cc/TW23-WGGZ] (“The popularity of these donations signals a quietly radical shift in many people’s attitudes toward American policing.”). Nonprofit organizations, like The Bail Project, pursue two tracks simultaneously—first, pushing to change pretrial law to eliminate money bail and, second, paying for defendants’ release in the interim. The Bail Project, at https://bailproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/5T9P-JBVX]. Both tracks describe radical-pragmatic projects—with the latter representing a means by which activists may shift to a philosophy of assistance and support without having to convince anyone to upend the prevailing legal regime. See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2757–60 (2014) (“Social movements tend to emerge initially as a local source of power and moral authority . . . that draw on local resources (networks, information, relationships, and cultural symbols) . . . linking lived experience to an imagined alternative.”).

  441. As with any valid experiment, we would want a control group, which might mean that some recidivists would get licenses while other similarly situated individuals would not. Alternatively, we could provide licenses categorically to all similarly situated individuals and then compare results chronologically with past practices. But that kind of longitudinal study entails a greater number of confounding variables. In any event, we should not be too troubled about treating like cases unalike, not only for the reasons discussed supra Section III.B, but also because a genuinely random process is particularly fair, even if it produces disparate results. Bowers, supra note 10, at 1677 (“[T]here is no persuasive reason why equal treatment must be measured according to substantive outcomes only. A justice system could honor the equality principle just as well by adopting procedures that provide roughly equivalent probabilities of receiving some favorable result.”); Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 New Crim. L. Rev. 277, 306 (2012) (arguing that “roughly equalizing chances is the principle of fair treatment underlying our capital jurisprudence”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtue of Randomization, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 31, at 163, 167–70 (arguing that within reasonable ranges the criminal-legal system should “turn to the lottery” in making punishment and enforcement decisions); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1213 (1985) (“[T]he criminal justice system . . . and the lottery are fair so long as the ex ante costs and benefits are equalized among the participants.”). Indeed, Rawls identified a fair gamble as a paradigmatic example of “pure procedural justice.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 74–75 (1971) (“If a number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is.”).

  442. William Blake, Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion 8 (1804).

  443. Butler, supra note 37, at 19; Thomas Ward Frampton, The Dangerous Few: Taking Seriously Prison Abolition and Its Skeptics (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

  444. At a minimum, we must frankly acknowledge our stakes, rank, and corresponding cultural biases. Consider, for instance, the refreshingly honest way Duncan Kennedy concluded his own critique of legal education by recognizing his own privileged place in the paradigm: “Maybe I’m just wrong about what it’s like out there. Maybe my preoccupation with the horrors of hierarchy is just a way to wring the last ironic drop of pleasure from my own hierarchical superiority.” Kennedy, supra note 81, at 76.

  445. Supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (discussing the “machinery” of the criminal-legal system).

  446. Bowers, supra note 34, at 1118.

  447. Id. See generally Feeley, supra note 34, at 199–241 (famously arguing that “the process is the punishment” in lower criminal courts).

  448. Supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing “misdemeanorland”). On the distinction between legal and normative guilt, see Bowers, supra note 10, at 1678–80.

  449. Supra notes 441–44 and accompanying text (arguing that criminal legalism is working quite effectively as a system of subordination).

  450. Alice Ristroph, Games Punishers Play, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 31, at 173, 174.

  451. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reply, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 31, at 181, 183 (quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 72 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1989)).

  452. See supra Parts I–II.

  453. Cf. supra notes 182–95, 385–90 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon by which many offenders “age out” from crime in early middle age).

  454. Unger, supra note 42 at 7, 49 (“To the extent we move in this direction, the facts of society and culture cease to present themselves to our consciousness as an inescapable fate.”); cf. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 1 (2014) (explaining that it took the fallout from two World Wars and a depression to modify—albeit for only half a century—capitalist structures of wealth concentration).

  455. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, COVID-19 May Make Universal Basic Income More Palatable. That’s a Good Thing, L.A. Times (May 22, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-05-22/covid-19-universal-basic-income. See generally The Mackinac Center, The Overton Window, https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow [https://perma.cc/8899-URBR] (“The core concept is that politicians are limited in what policy ideas they can support—they generally only pursue policies that are widely accepted throughout society as legitimate policy options. These policies lie inside the Overton Window.”).

  456. Jamil Zaki, Habits of Kindness That Will Endure, Wall St. J. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/habits-of-kindness-that-will-endure-11585368061 [https://perma.cc/5U3Q-QU66]. This was a theme of Barack Obama’s 2020 commencement speech to all graduating high school seniors. Barack Obama, Graduate Together (May 16, 2020), https://www.obama.org/updates/president-obamas-graduation-message-class-2020/ [https://perma.cc/68SN-AQLJ] (“This pandemic has shaken up the status quo and laid bare a lot of our country’s deep-seated problems—from massive economic inequality to ongoing racial disparities to a lack of basic health care for people who need it . . . that our society and our democracy only work when we think not just about ourselves, but about each other.”).

  457. Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster 3 (2010). See generally Jamil Zaki, The War for Kindness: Building Empathy in a Fractured World 6 (2019) (describing how humanity’s “darkest times expose our noblest capacities”).

  458. Solnit, supra note 456, at 6, 9.

  459. Lee Moran, Irish Priest Pens Stirring Poem About the Coronavirus Lockdown, Huffington Post (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ireland-priest-coronavirus-lockdown-poem_n_5e748a0cc5b6f5b7c541e875 [https://perma.cc/8V3L-8A36].

  460. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 54 (1984) (“But people do not want just to be beastly to each other. To suppose so is to ignore facts. People want freedom to pursue happiness. But they also want not to harm others or be harmed themselves. The evidence is all around us that people are often caring, supportive, loving, and altruistic, both in their family lives and in their relations with strangers.”).

  461. Unger, supra note 42, at 7–8.

  462. See Anna North, White Americans Are Finally Talking About Racism. Will It Translate Into Action?, Vox (June 11, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/11/21286642/george-floyd-protests-white-people-police-racism (discussing polls finding that the proportion of white Americans who said that police were likelier to use force against Black people had risen from 25% in 2016 to 49% in 2020); see, e.g., Stephen Collinson, Trump Turns Clock Back 155 Years with Confederacy-Inspired Election Strategy, CNN (July 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/politics/donald-trump-politics-race-election-2020/index.html [https://perma.cc/7HSN-9D7R].

  463. See, e.g., Philip Elliott, With the Eviction Moratorium Over and Unemployment Checks Next to Exit, Congress Is Nowhere Near a Deal, Time (July 27, 2020), https://time.com/5872273/congress-new-coronavirus-relief-package/ [https://perma.cc/UTE7-QEZU]; Niv Elis, House Democrats Include $597 Million for Police Reform in Spending Bill, Hill (July 7, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/506152-house-democrats-propose-597-million-toward-police-reform [https://perma.cc/L2NW-SYK7].

  464. Zaki, supra note 455 (discussing possibility that the pandemic may lead us to turn away from “ruthless individualism”); see, e.g., Quint Forgey, ‘Everyone is Lying’: Trump Undercuts Public Health Officials in Fresh Attacks, Politico (July 13, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/13/trump-questions-public-health-experts-twitter-359388 [https://perma.cc/8FQZ-FCVR]; Jonathan J. Cooper, Arizona’s Rugged Individualism Poses Barrier to Mask Rules, Associated Press (July 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-us-news-ap-top-news-az-state-wire-phoenix-27afcc9ba34281ab425293a98c0726a3; Jake Sherman, Louie Gohmert, Who Refused to Wear a Mask, Tests Positive for Coronavirus, Politico (July 29, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/29/louis-gohmert-who-refused-to-wear-a-mask-tests-positive-for-coronavirus-386076 [https://perma.cc/2Q7Y-US6B].

  465. Eric Zorn, ‘Cancel Culture’ Is Just a New Name for an Old and Bipartisan Impulse, Chi. Trib. (July 31, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/eric-zorn/ct-column-cancel-culture-nba-charlie-kirk-zorn-20200731-nbohyowc3rbkzpvxsqgv3nljpu-story.html.

  466. Rhiannon Evans, ‘Wear a Damn Mask,’ Karens and Desmond Swayne—How Face-Coverings Became Political, Grazia (July 15, 2020), https://graziadaily.co.uk/life/in-the-news/face-masks-covid-karen-jennifer-aniston/; see, e.g., Nicole Gallucci, 8 Karens and Kens Who Threw Huge Tantrums Instead of Putting on Masks, Mashable (June 29, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/karen-no-mask-videos-tantrums-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/66A3-XL6P]; Eric Bradner & Sarah Mucha, Biden Blames Trump’s “Liberate Michigan” Tweet for Plot to Kidnap Michigan Governor, CNN (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/16/politics/joe-biden-trump-whitmer-kidnapping-plot/index.html [https://perma.cc/6M5X-TYQH]; cf. Julia Marcus & Jessica Gold, Colleges Are Getting Ready to Blame Their Students, Atlantic (July 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/colleges-are-getting-ready-blame-their-students/614410/ [https://perma.cc/RK52-J7UG] (discussing the blame universities are, perhaps unfairly, placing on young people for virus spread).

  467. Cf. Peter Wehner, Republicans Own This Insurrection, Atlantic (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/republicans-own-insurrection/617583/ [https://perma.cc/P6V2-7W3T] (arguing that many Republican officials bear some responsibility for the insurrection); cf. Elie Mystal, The People Aren’t Freedom Fighters—They’re Virus-Spreading Sociopaths, Nation (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/economy/liberate-america-covid/ [https://perma.cc/739Z-J5NH] (criticizing those who claim liberty and individualism entitles them not to wear masks).

  468. See supra Section II.C.

  469. Simon, supra note 124, at 6–7, 100–102; Garland, supra note 132, at 131–32; supra notes 217–23 and accompanying text (discussing risk aversion, fear, crime-control governance, mass incarceration, and mass misdemeanor arrest). Likewise, this same crime-control ethos led some politicians to demand draconian penalties for those who immunized out of formal order, rather than keeping focus on the more-important, harm-reduction aim of expeditiously putting vaccine shots in arms. See, e.g., Alexandra Kelley, New York Weighs Whether to Outlaw Cutting the Line for COVID-19 Vaccine, Hill (Jan. 4, 2021), https://thehill.com/changing-america/well-being/prevention-cures/532565-new-york-to-outlaw-cutting-the-line-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/ZL8M-PFD2].

  470. Marcus, supra note 220.

  471. Julia Marcus, The Fun Police Should Stand Down, Atlantic (Aug. 15, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/containing-the-pandemic-isnt-a-job-for-cops/615298/ [https://perma.cc/C5JW-M26W] (“In the meantime, not a single ticket was issued in Park Slope, a wealthy and predominantly white neighborhood, despite the crowds that gathered there in Prospect Park.”).

  472. Marcus, supra note 220.

  473. Id.

  474. Unger, supra note 42, at 49–50.

  475. Id. at 49 (arguing that radical pragmatism enables us to “draw the line between the alterable features of social life and the enduring character of human existence”).

Race, Ramos, and the Second Amendment Standard of Review

Gun control in the United States has a racist history. Nevertheless, federal courts and academics have invoked Southern gun restrictions enacted after the Civil War to suggest that history supports stringent regulation of the right to bear arms. We argue that courts’ reliance on these restrictions is illegitimate. Drawing on original research, we reveal how the post-war South restricted gun-ownership for racist reasons, deployed its new laws to disarm free Blacks, yet allowed whites to bear arms with near impunity. We then show how modern reliance on these laws contravenes the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, which deemed similarly tainted statutes unconstitutional. Since the Court will soon consider the validity of modern limits on concealed carry, placing Southern gun restrictions in their proper historical context matters today more than ever. While Southern gun control after the Civil War might tell us something about how the South sought to preserve white supremacy, it tells us almost nothing about the true scope of the Second Amendment.

Introduction

Imagine that a federal court must decide whether some challenged state action impermissibly burdens a constitutional right; say, the First-Amendment right to peacefully assemble. To discern how “fundamental” that right is, the court surveys the historical burdens past state legislatures have imposed upon it. It turns out that several states throughout the South enacted unlawful-assembly statutes from about 1870 to 1920. Relying on those historical restrictions, the court determines that it was then broadly agreed that states could curtail peaceful assembly. And that historical evidence, in the court’s view, shows that such a right must not be very “fundamental.” So on that basis, it upholds a modern law that likewise infringes the right to assemble.

But imagine, too, that the historical evidence the court relied upon was “tainted.” Further research reveals that Southern states enacted unlawful-assembly statutes in that period for racist reasons and enforced them disproportionately against racial minorities. Fearing newly freed slaves’ participation in political life, states passed facially neutral restrictions that they deployed in practice to bust up minority gatherings. The modern court invoking these laws apparently never discerned that critical context, taking them instead at face-value. Would anyone think the court wise to have relied on such tainted history in diluting modern assembly rights?

The answer, surely, is “no.” As the Supreme Court explained last year in Ramos v. Louisiana, laws enacted for racially discriminatory reasons that continue to burden constitutional rights deserve special scrutiny.1.140 S. Ct. 1390, 1410 (2020).Show More “[T]he racially discriminatory reasons” for which states originally adopted such laws cannot simply be “[l]ost in the accounting.”2.Id. at 1401.Show More To the contrary, laws’ “racially biased origins . . . uniquely matter,” especially when those laws continue to burden rights enshrined in the Constitution.3.Id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).Show More In Ramos itself, for instance, the Court deemed unconstitutional tainted state laws that denied criminal defendants their Sixth-Amendment right to be convicted only by a unanimous jury.4.Id. at 1394–95.Show More

But if it’s really so clear that courts must discount racially tainted laws in their calculus of how “fundamental” society considers a right, then something has gone seriously awry in our federal courts in the context of another constitutional guarantee: the Second Amendment. In its Heller decision, the Supreme Court recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep arms.5.District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).Show More Two years later, the Court’s McDonald decision incorporated that right against the states.6.McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). Uncertainty lingers over how the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states. In McDonald, four Justices opted to incorporate the Second Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 742. Justice Thomas wrote alone to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was the proper vehicle to accomplish incorporation. Id. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring). Whether the right is incorporated under the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause matters. The Due Process Clause protects persons, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause extends only to citizens. SeeU.S. Const. amend. XIV. Lower courts have largely ignored this distinction. SeeRyan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 795, 833 (2017) (noting that “lower courts have given little outward sign of even recognizing McDonald as a case calling for analysis under the Marks framework”); see alsoMaxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 504 (2020) (discussing the significance of Justice Thomas’s separate concurrence in McDonald). We take the position that though five Justices agreed to the judgment that the Second Amendment applies to the states, whether it does so via the Due Process Clause or, instead, the Privileges or Immunities Clause remains an open question. We also note that the clauses’ distinct language may affect the outcome in certain cases. Consider, for instance, whether a non-citizen may challenge a state law that restricts public carriage of firearms.Show More And recently, the Court agreed to hear a challenge to New York’s concealed-carry restrictions in the case New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Corlett (“NYSRPA II”).7.N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, (Apr. 26, 2021) (No. 20-843).Show More But for the last decade, the Court has said nothing further about the scope of the individual right. So the task of grappling with basic questions that remain in Heller’s wake, like the Second Amendment’s standard of review, has fallen to the lower courts. In that process, many courts have latched on to the sort of evidence that we just agreed was suspect: Southern gun restrictions enacted from about 1870 to 1920—the South’s race-relations “nadir.”8.Rayford W. Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–1901 (1954); see also Alton Hornsby, Jr., ed., A Companion to African American History 312, 381, 391 (2008).Show More Modern courts claim that those laws establish a historical consensus that states enjoy wide latitude to curtail the right to bear arms. And just as often, those courts have invoked such laws without a hint of appreciation that they might be marred by racial taint.

Though hardly unique, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Young v. Hawaii provides the latest example of this trend.9.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 773 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).Show More There, a majority of the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed Hawaii’s functional ban on bearing arms outside the home. As part of its analysis, the majority presented a historical survey of state gun regulations, focusing in particular on the post-war American South, where such regulations were common. Its survey of Southern cases and statutes, the majority said, revealed that it was then “broadly agreed” that “firearms [ ] could be banned from the public square.”10 10.Id.at 801.Show More Indeed, the majority reasoned, the legislatures of states like Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana evidently did not think those gun-control laws inconsistent with the right to bear arms. Since that historical conception apparently tolerated copious restrictions on the right, the plaintiffs had no firm historical basis to challenge Hawaii’s law.

Writing in dissent, Judge O’Scannlain urged caution about drawing too much from the “legislative scene following the Civil War.”11 11.Id.at 839 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More He noted that the antebellum South had a long history of explicitly race-based bans on gun ownership, and he suggested that Southern states might have been up to something similar after the war, too. Post-war “Black Codes,” for example, sought to infringe “freedmen’s fundamental constitutional rights.”12 12.Id. at 840.Show More And he noted that the majority offered “no enforcement history” for the later, ostensibly race-neutral statutes that it invoked.13 13.Id. at 844.Show More

For the majority, though, Judge O’Scannlain’s warning was hardly a speedbump in its path to affirming Hawaii’s law. In its 113-page opinion, the majority devoted a solitary footnote to his concern about the racial motivations behind the Southern laws the majority relied upon. It “d[id] not disagree” that the Black Codes were a relevant part of “the post-Civil War history.”14 14.Id.at 822 n.43.Show More But it happily noted that soon after the Black Codes’ advent, the nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to facilitate anti-discrimination laws and to bolster freedmen’s rights. Thus, according to the majority, “it is not clear how th[e] history” of racially discriminatory Southern laws—supposedly snuffed out by the Fourteenth Amendment—“informs the issue before us.”15 15.Id.Show More

It is that remarkable statement this Essay seeks to correct. Southern race discrimination via gun-control statutes did not evaporate in 1868. Sadly, it persisted long after and even through facially neutral statutes. By missing that insight, the Young majority and like-minded courts have erred by uncritically invoking gun-control laws from the postbellum South as serious evidence that a broad historical consensus supported limiting gun rights. In response, this Essay employs original primary-source research to establish two key points. First, the desire to limit Black gun ownership often motivated Southern states’ enactment of gun-control laws from around 1870 to 1920. Indeed, white society considered Black gun ownership conducive to chaos and disorder. Second, these racially biased motivations led to disproportionate enforcement of gun-control measures against Black citizens. In other words, these laws do not necessarily show a Southern distaste for the right to bear arms. But they certainly show disdain for exercise of that right by Blacks. So it is ironic—indeed, perverse—that courts should deploy these same tainted laws 150 years later to once again dilute American citizens’ constitutional rights.

The case against courts’ laundering of these racially tainted statutes proceeds in three parts. Part I details the present circuit split on the Second-Amendment standard of review and how various courts of appeals have deployed tainted historical statutes to dilute that standard. Part II presents the historical evidence that these Southern statutes were both racially motivated and unfairly enforced, even when neutral on their face. And Part III shows why continued reliance on such tainted statutes cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos. Put simply, when courts evaluate modern restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms, they should reject sullied statutes and rely instead on untainted historical evidence.

I. A Splintered Standard and a Tainted Record

Like its neighbors in the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment anticipates that citizens may exercise in distinct ways the right that it protects. By the Amendment’s terms, individuals may “keep . . . Arms” for self-defense, but they may also “bear” them.16 16.U.S. Const. amend. II.Show More The Supreme Court’s last words on the subject focused on the former issue—whether states may ban the “keeping” of commonly used arms.17 17.District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–82 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010).Show More Though answering that question in the negative, the Court gave no definitive guidance about the validity of state bans on the bearing of guns via open or concealed carry. Lacking further direction, lower courts have intractably split on whether states may restrict the right to bear arms and on the standard of review that courts must apply to such restrictions.

Some courts have endorsed the view that states may not ban citizens from carrying handguns for self-defense outside the home. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits are notable examples.18 18.Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).Show More Both shunned reliance on the “tiers of scrutiny” framework familiar to other areas of constitutional law, instead extending Heller to protect the bearing of arms outside the home. In reaching that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit declined “another round of historical analysis” to determine the scope of the “bear” right.19 19.Moore, 702 F.3d at 942.Show More In its view, Heller had already “decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”20 20.Id.Show More But other circuits have resisted that conclusion. The First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all adopted an “intermediate scrutiny” standard, under which they have upheld laws severely restricting the right to bear arms.21 21.Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 673 (1st Cir. 2018); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).Show More And critically, circuits in this camp—along with legion academic commentators—have all relied upon postbellum Southern gun control to bolster their rejection of that right.22 22.Many academics have relied on racially tainted postbellum Southern gun-control laws to reinforce their anti-gun-rights arguments. SeeEric J. Mogilnicki & Alexander Schultz, The Incomplete Record in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York, 73 SMU L. Rev. F. 1, 4–6 (2020); David T. Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right” Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 315, 339 (2011) (referencing facially neutral Southern gun control laws passed after the Civil War as historical evidence of constitutional limitations on the Second Amendment); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L. J. 82, 119 n.193, 120 n.195 (2013) (citing postbellum Southern gun-control laws without acknowledging possible tainted motivation for their enactment); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 95, 95 (2016) (fighting back against the “current state of scholarship on Second Amendment history [that] paints post-Civil War firearms regulations as racist efforts by Southern states to prevent blacks from defending themselves against racial violence.”); Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights, 80 L. & Contemp. Prob. 55, 62–64 nn.34–48 (2017) (listing a host of gun restrictions in different states).Show More

First to address the public-carry question was the Second Circuit in the 2012 case Kachalsky v. County of Westchester.23 23.Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81.Show More The dispute involved a New York law that requires citizens to show “proper cause” before obtaining a handgun-carry license—a requirement difficult to meet in practice.24 24.Id.at 84.Show More To analyze that restriction’s validity, the Second Circuit reviewed the “history and tradition of firearm regulation” to select the appropriate level of scrutiny.25 25.Id. at 101.Show More In so doing, the court detailed those historical laws that it thought supported “restrictions on the public carrying of weapons.”26 26.Id.at 90.Show More Among them were several postbellum Southern statutes that, in various ways, restricted gun ownership. Examples the Circuit cited included an 1870 law from Virginia, an 1871 law from Texas, an 1880 law from Kentucky, 1881 laws from Arkansas and North Carolina, and an 1885 law from Florida. That historical survey led the Circuit to conclude that “[i]n the nineteenth century, laws directly regulating concealable weapons for public safety became commonplace and far more expansive in scope.”27 27.Id.at 95.Show More Thus, in its view, “extensive state regulation of handguns has never been considered incompatible with the Second Amendment.” 28 28.Id.at 100.Show More And with that historical gloss, the Circuit settled on intermediate scrutiny to uphold New York’s “proper cause” requirement.29 29.Id.at 96.Show More

Likewise, in the 2013 case Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit looked back to the South to judge a current law in the North.30 30.Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2013).Show More The New Jersey law at issue required handgun-license applicants to demonstrate their “‘justifiable need’ to publicly carry a handgun.”31 31.Id.at 429.Show More In response to the appellants’ contention that this requirement violated the Second Amendment, the Third Circuit claimed that “[i]t remains unsettled whether the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home.”32 32.Id.at 430.Show More To select the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Third Circuit followed Kachalsky and undertook a review of historical gun regulations. The Circuit cited Kachalsky several times for the proposition that “19th Century” history undermined the notion that self-defense outside the home belongs to “the core of the [Second] Amendment.”33 33.Id.at 436.Show More Thus, after settling on intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement.34 34.Id.at 440.Show More

Dissenting, Judge Hardiman objected to the majority’s repeated invocation of Kachalsky. In his view, the Southern statutes that Kachalsky marshaled were distinguishable from New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement.35 35.Id.at 451 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).Show More For instance, he argued, Southerners considered those historical bans permissible only because the weapons they targeted were not the sort of “arms” thought core to the right.36 36.Id.Show More And “[t]o the extent that th[ose] state laws prohibited the carry of weapons used in war”—in other words, “arms”—“they were struck down.”37 37.Id.Show More So Judge Hardiman thought the historical statutes had “little bearing” on modern laws regulating concealed carry.38 38.Id.Show More But he left his criticism there, mentioning no further concern about possible racial taint.

In their own respective treatments of the issue, the First and Tenth Circuits have also invoked Kachalsky to reject Second-Amendment claims. In the 2013 case Peterson v. Martinez, the Tenth Circuit parried a challenge to a Colorado concealed-weapons law after concluding “that the carrying of concealed firearms is not protected by the Second Amendment[.]”39 39.Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013).Show More Citing Kachalsky, the Circuit noted that “concealed carry bans have a lengthy history” and that “most states banned concealed carry in the nineteenth century.”40 40.Id.at 1211.Show More Thus, it concluded, “the Second Amendment does not confer a right to carry concealed weapons.”41 41.Id.Show More Likewise, the First Circuit relied on Kachalsky to conclude “that there is no national consensus, rooted in history, concerning the right to public carriage of firearms.”42 42.Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018).Show More Rather, the restrictions Kachalsky detailed led the Circuit to suggest that history “conflict[ed]” about the scope of the right to bear arms.43 43.Id.Show More And given that supposed conflict, the court upheld the targeted restriction under intermediate scrutiny.44 44.Id. at 676.Show More

While most Circuits have been content to recycle Kachalsky, the Ninth Circuit offered a broader defense of why history undercuts the right to publicly bear arms. In its aforementioned Young decision, the en banc Ninth Circuit considered whether Hawaii’s functional ban on public carry violates the Second Amendment.45 45.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 773 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).Show More Judge Bybee, writing for the majority, held that it does not. Much of the historical record he dissected—for instance, the Statute of Northampton, ancient English treatises, and early colonial restrictions—falls well outside this Essay’s scope.46 46.Id.at 788–805.Show More But after analyzing those sources, the majority, like its sister-circuits, discussed several postbellum Southern statutes. It noted that Tennessee enacted a law in 1870 banning “publicly or privately carry[ing] a dirk, swordcane, Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol[,] or revolver.”47 47.Id.at 806.Show More Three years later, Texas restricted “the carrying of ‘any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-shot, sword-cane, spear, brass-knuckles, bowie-knife, or any other kind of knife.”48 48.Id. at 800.Show More The Louisiana Constitution of 1879, likewise, “provided that the right to keep and bear arms did ‘not prevent the passage of laws to punish those who carr[ied] weapons concealed.’”49 49.Id. at 817.Show More And Alabama, for its part, not only “prohibited persons from carrying a ‘pistol concealed,’ but [ ] also made it ‘unlawful for any person to carry a pistol about his person on premises not his own or under his control.’”50 50.Id.at 811.Show More

The majority then offered “several observations” about these statutes.51 51.Id.at 801.Show More First, it said, this historical survey revealed that “states broadly agreed that small, concealable weapons, including firearms, could be banned from the public square.”52 52.Id.Show More And “[s]econd, although many of the states had constitutional provisions that guaranteed some kind of right to keep and bear arms, state legislatures evidently did not believe that the restrictions [ ] discussed here were inconsistent with their state constitutions.”53 53.Id.at 801–02.Show More All told, then, the relevant history supposedly undercut any “general right to carry arms into the public square for self-defense.”54 54.Id.at 813.Show More

Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent, as we mentioned, broached several important criticisms of the majority’s reasoning. First, it noted the lack of any “record of enforcement” for the statutes at issue.55 55.Id.at 847 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More Merely symbolic gun laws that state governments never enforced presumably tell us little about the polity’s true thoughts on the right to bear arms. Next, Judge O’Scannlain observed that Southern states had long sought to regulate the possession of weapons by Blacks. In support of that point, he noted several sources from the 1860s that decried Southern attempts to strip freedmen of their right to keep and bear arms—a right those sources described as fundamental.56 56.Id.at 839–41, 847.Show More

The majority swept aside those points, however, with almost-blithe facility. It noted that soon after stories of the Black Codes emanated from the South, the nation ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.57 57.Id.at 822 n.43.Show More Its Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses “guaranteed that all citizens would enjoy the same rights as ‘white citizens,’ including Second Amendment rights.”58 58.Id.Show More But, said the majority,

those provisions do not tell us anything about the substance of the Second Amendment, any more than an equal right to enter into contracts or inherit property tells us whether the state may alter the Statute of Frauds or the Rule Against Perpetuities, so long as it does so for all citizens.59 59.Id.Show More

And with that, in an opinion that purported to exhaustively survey the historical evidence, the majority dismissed concerns about how race and discrimination might have informed its analysis.

II. “Every Negro in the City a Walking Arsenal”: The Racial Motivations Underlying Postbellum Southern Gun Control

For about the first two-hundred years of American history, the colonies and early states enacted various racially explicit gun bans. By frustrating slaves’ ability to rebel, these laws preserved white supremacy and the slave-based American economy. As early as 1640, for example, Virginia prohibited Blacks, slave and free, from carrying weapons.60 60.T. Markus Funk, Comment, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 764, 796 (1995) (“In 1640, Virginia set up the first recorded restrictive legislation which prevented blacks from owning a firearm”).Show More And it enacted a more extensive “act for preventing Negroes Insurrections” in 1680.61 61.Act X: An Act for Preventing Negroes Insurrections (June 1680), reprinted in 2 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the laws of Virginia, From the First Session of The Legislature in The Year 1619, 481 (William Waller Hening ed., n.d.), https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/an-act-for-preventing-negroes-insurrections-1680/. [https://perma.cc/X98X-PEP3]. Many of the historical sources we have quoted employ non-standard English. Rather than flagging each idiosyncrasy with a [sic] notation, we have chosen instead to present the source-language as it originally appeared.Show More The law forbade “any negroe or other slave to carry or arme himselfe with any club, staffe, gunn, sword or any other weapon of defence or offence.”62 62.Id.Show More A slave could possess such arms only with “a certificate from his master, mistris or overseer” for “perticuler and necessary occasions.”63 63.Id.Show More Without a permit, a slave in possession of arms would be “sent to the next constable, who [was] hereby enjoyned and required to give the said negroe twenty lashes on his bare back.”64 64.Id.Show More Those lashes, the law specified, were to be “well layd on.”65 65.Id.Show More

Similar laws pervaded other jurisdictions. In 1740, for instance, South Carolina enacted a statute making it illegal “for any slave, unless in the presence of some white person, to carry or make use of fire-arms.”66 66.1741-32 S.C. Acts 168, § 23.Show More A slave could bear arms only with a “license in writing from his master, mistress or overseer.”67 67.Id.Show More Whites who discovered slaves in possession of unlicensed weapons could seize the arms on the spot. If the slave resisted and seriously injured the white person, the law subjected the slave to a mandatory penalty of death.68 68.Id. §§ 23–24.Show More In the same vein, Florida, Georgia, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Mississippi passed their own racially explicit gun bans from around 1800 to 1860.69 69.Black Code, ch. 33, sec. 19, Laws of La. 150, 160 (1806); Act of April 8, 1811, ch. 14, sec. 3, Laws of La. 50, 52–54 (1811); An Act to Govern Patrols, secs. 8–9, Acts of Fla. 52, 55 (1825); Act of Jan. 28, 1831, Fla. Laws 28, 30 (1831); Act of Dec. 23, 1833, sec. 7, 1833 Ga. Laws 226, 228 (1833); An Act Concerning Slaves, ch. 58, sec. 6, 1841 Laws of Tex. 171, 172 (1841); State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250 (1844) (upholding North Carolina’s race-based ban); Act of Jan 1, 1845, ch. 87, 1845 Acts of N.C. 124; Act of Mar. 15, 1852, ch 206, sec. 1, 1852 Laws of Miss. 328; Act of Dec. 19, 1860, no. 64, Sec. 1, 1860 Acts of Ga. 56; see alsoStephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bills of Rights, 41 Baylor L. Rev. 629, 653 (1989) (“On November 6, 1866, the Texas legislature passed its first gun control measure, which was also the closest Texas came to adopting a black code provision to disarm freedmen.”).Show More Louisiana forbade slaves from possessing weapons, while Florida authorized whites to enter Black persons’ homes to search for and seize any firearms.70 70.Black Code, ch. 33, sec. 19, Laws of La. 150, 160 (1806); Act of Dec. 17, 1861, ch. 1291, sec. 11, 1861 Fla. Laws 38, 40.Show More Mississippi, too, heavily restricted slaves’ and free Blacks’ possession of arms. As late as 1865, it barred any “freedman, free negro or mulatto” from possessing “fire-arms of any kind” without a license from “the board of police of his or her county.”71 71.Certain Offenses of Freedmen, 1865 Miss. Laws p. 165, §1, reprinted in 1 Documentary History of Reconstruction 289 (Walter L. Fleming ed. 1950).Show More

Soon after, of course, Mississippi and the broader South lost the American Civil War. One consequence was the panoply of new laws the United States imposed upon that region that aimed to secure the fundamental rights of free Blacks. Those included several Civil Rights and Enforcement Acts, along with the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter’s ratification sought to ensure that freedmen might enjoy “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” along with “the equal protection of the laws.”72 72.U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Show More In the Young Court’s view, apparently, the advent of these guarantees heralded the end of invidious discrimination via Southern gun-control restrictions.73 73.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 822 n.43 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).Show More

But as this Essay shows, that was unfortunately not the case. Rather, Judge O’Scannlain’s dissenting appraisal was nearer the mark in three respects. First, to the extent that Southern states enacted new gun bans after the Civil War, race appears to have often motivated their decision to do so.74 74.Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1307, 1318 (1995) (“Free blacks were subject to a variety of measures meant to limit black access to firearms through licensure or to eliminate such access through outright prohibitions on firearms ownership.”).Show More Second, Southern states enforced these laws against their white populations only loosely. Third, to the extent that Southern states did enforce such laws, they enforced them disproportionately against their Black citizenry.75 75.F. Smith Fussner, That Every Man Be Armed, the Evolution of a Constitutional Right, 3 Const. Comment. 582, 585 (1986) (reviewing Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed (1984)) (“After the Civil War the states of the old Confederacy tried to use pretexts of various kinds to keep blacks from acquiring and using arms.”); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1359, 1415–16 (1998) (noting that “gun control in the nineteenth century was almost exclusively a Southern phenomenon. In the post-Civil War period, the Southern gun laws were clearly aimed at controlling the Freedmen; although written in racially neutral terms, the laws were meant for, and applied almost exclusively to, blacks.”).Show More We examine these points in turn.

A. How Race Informed the South’s Perceived Need for Gun Control

Across both time and space in the Reconstruction and Jim Crow South, white society reflected antipathy for the newfound phenomenon of Black gun ownership. Southern whites understood the relationship between guns and power. Precisely because the keeping of arms undergirds security and autonomy,76 76.Noted constitutional commentator St. George Tucker described the Second Amendment as “the true palladium of liberty” and “[t]he right of self defense [a]s the first law of nature.” 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia 300 (1803). Frederick Douglass likewise famously remarked “that the liberties of the American people were dependent upon the Ballot-box, the Jury-box, and the Cartridge-box[.]” The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass: From 1817–1882, 333 (John Lobb ed., 1882).Show More the antebellum South had denied that right to its Black population. So when, for instance, Black militias formed after the war’s end to protect voting freedmen and to repel lynch mobs, whites lamented Blacks’ nascent capacity for self-defense. That capacity engendered “[t]he white man’s fundamental enmity,” in other words, because it impugned his “position of authority.”77 77.Otis A. Singletary, The Negro Militia Movement During Radical Reconstruction, LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses, at vii (1954).Show More

In response, whites crafted narratives that reframed Black gun ownership not as a means of legitimate self-defense, but as a source of disorder and chaos. Already by 1866, a Norfolk periodical lamented “a mania which seems to exist among a portion of the negro population for carrying concealed weapons.”78 78.Virginia News, Alexandria Gazette and Virginia Advertiser, Dec. 6, 1866, at 1.Show More Likewise, a writer in Memphis, Tennessee complained in 1867 that “[n]early all the negroes in th[is] city carry concealed weapons.”79 79.Locals in Brief, Public Ledger, July 20, 1867, at 1.Show More “As a natural consequence,” the author wrote, “colored shooting affrays are becoming very frequent.”80 80.Id.Show More In 1871 South Carolina, Black gun ownership was said to have “brought the negroes into troubles, for without [arms], they would not have arrayed themselves in hostility to the white people.”81 81.The Fight at Carmel Hill, The Courier, Mar. 17, 1871, at 1.Show More And later writers in both South Carolina and Tennessee explicitly connected Black gun ownership to election fraud and voter intimidation. In 1879, for instance, a Democratic paper in South Carolina rued that the state’s Republican governor had, “in violation of every right of a free citizen, [disarmed] the whites . . . while the negro militia, in the midst of a heated political contest, [was] not only allowed to keep their rifles and muskets, but encouraged to use[ ] them, to menace the whites, and overawe and intimidate colored voters.”82 82.J.H. Evins, Unexampled Forbearance of the Whites, The Weekly Union Times, Apr. 4, 1879, at 1.Show More This show of force supposedly corrupted “the free choice of the voter,” thus rigging the system in favor of Republicans.83 83.Id.Show More In Mississippi too, alleged Republican encouragement for “negroes to carry pistols to the polls” had led to an “inexcusably brutal outrage” in 1881: when a white voter tried to cane a Black man at a polling place over a supposed insult, another Black man pulled a gun, shooting and killing the white assailant.84 84.Murder at Marion, The Memphis Daily Appeal, Nov. 11, 1881, at 1.Show More

These narratives on disorder and chaos persisted over time. In 1882, Kentucky’s Daily Evening Bulletin opined that “[t]his thing of negroes carrying concealed deadly weapons is a growing evil that should receive the strictest enforcement of the law.”85 85.The State of Lewis at Large, Daily Evening Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1882, at 1.Show More An 1883 column from Jacksonville, Florida likewise warned that “every negro in the city” had become “a walking arsenal.”86 86.Crimes in Jacksonville, The Savanah Morning News, Sept. 5, 1883, at 1.Show More Jacksonville police reported that “a large proportion of the negroes in this city are provided with a dirk knife, razor[,] or pistol”—a trend the column suggested should merit severe punishment.87 87.Id.Show More In Georgia too, the Lyons Morning News argued in 1893 for a new concealed-weapons law, since “[a]lmost every negro that one meets is armed.”88 88.The Concealed Weapon Evil, The Morning News, Sept. 8, 1893, at 6.Show More “Some of them,” according to the editor, even “carr[ied] two pistols and a Winchester rifle”—a behavior that “cursed” the population and merited “strictly enforced” legislative countermeasures.89 89.Id.Show More

One incident in North Carolina that drew on these narratives of chaos and disorder deserves special examination. Around the fall of 1898, white-supremacist Democrats, led in part by future North Carolina congressman John D. Bellamy, organized white resistance to the city of Wilmington’s biracial government. Bellamy and other prominent figures conspired to foment anger among white citizens about this so-called “Negro Rule” before the congressional elections of 1898.90 90.LeRae Umfleet, et al., 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report, North Carolina Dep’t of Cultural Resources 59–60, 76, 78, 83–84, 125, 371 (May 31, 2006).Show More After several increasingly violent attacks on Wilmington’s Black citizens, Bellamy’s associate Alfred Waddell assembled a posse of about 2,000 whites.91 91.1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report supra note 90, at 129.Show More After equipping itself at Wilmington’s armory, the posse roamed the streets, killing the Black persons they could find and destroying Wilmington’s Black-owned businesses.92 92.Id. at 121, 133.Show More Perhaps 60 Black citizens perished, while thousands of others fled and took shelter in nearby swamps.93 93.Id. at 1.Show More

Yet when Bellamy was later sued for his role in the massacre, he reframed the event as a “race riot” that ensued only after “a negro mob” had armed itself in “utter disregard . . . for law and order.”94 94.Dockery v. Bellamy: The Taking of Depositions Resumed, The Semi-Weekly Messenger, Apr. 14, 1899, at 3.Show More Bellamy argued that this was to be expected: “[N]egroes constantly carry concealed weapons,” he testified, “and . . . the razor, the pistol, the slingshot[,] and the brass knuckle seem to be their inseparable accompaniments as a class.”95 95.Id.Show More “[A]lthough there are some very respectable law-abiding and property acquiring citizens of that race,” he conceded, “it is a very small portion of them.”96 96.Id.Show More So, in Bellamy’s view, the posse’s brutality did not stem from the violent white-supremacist movement that he had cultivated. The true culprit, he said, was Black citizens’ carriage of arms. Bellamy eventually prevailed in the litigation, allowing him to take his seat in Congress.97 97.1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report supra note 90, at 200–01.Show More But while his actions were especially horrific, his rhetoric was familiar—that Black citizens’ possession of arms had instigated violence and disorder.

These themes continued to reverberate throughout the South during and after the turn of the twentieth century. In 1899, for instance, Cheneyville, Louisiana passed an ordinance that aimed to restrain the “custom among a certain class of worthless negroes to carry concealed weapons upon their persons[.]”98 98.To Restrain Worthless Negroes, New York Tribune, Aug. 14, 1900, at 1.Show More Similar rhetoric surfaced soon after in Georgia. In a 1901 lecture delivered at a Valdosta prison, Judge Estes of the Valdosta superior court opined that it was hard to believe the “worthless[ ],” “pistol toting negroes of the present generation are the descendants of the . . . good old negroes of the former days.”99 99.The Good Old Negroes: Judge Estes’ Lecture to Prisoners at Valdosta, The Morning News, Nov. 24, 1901, at 9.Show More A 1907 Mississippi paper, likewise, bemoaned “negro . . . pistol toting” and suggested “that there is needed extreme legislation for suppression of pistol toting; especially for protection of lives of the peace officers who are called on almost daily to arrest turbulent and recklessly murderous negroes.”100 100.The Pistol Toting Negro in Evidence, The Greenville Times, Dec. 28, 1907, at 1.Show More

Other contemporary sources were just as frank about the racial bias that had motivated Southern gun-control measures. While debating a 1901 South Carolina proposal, State Senator Stanwix Mayfield introduced an amendment requiring applicants for a concealed-carry permit to pay the princely sum of $50.101 101.Synopsis of the Daily Proceedings of the House and Senate, The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1.Show More “If a man thinks he ought to go armed let him pay a license,” Mayfield argued.102 102.Id.Show More Moreover, “[n]egroes will not take out a license and one-half of the population will thus be eliminated.”103 103.Id.Show More And that was the problematic half, in Mayfield’s view, since “[t]here is little trouble” arising from concealed carry “among white people.”104 104.Id.Show More In a similar vein, Charles R. Tarter of Brevard County, Florida suggested in 1907 to Virginia’s Clinch Valley News some lessons that Virginia might take from Florida’s treatment of “the race problem.”105 105.Charles R. Tarter, The Race Problem in Florida, Clinch Valley News, June 28, 1907, at 2.Show More In Florida, Tarter opined, “[w]e have no race problem [ ] in Brevard [C]ounty.”106 106.Id.Show More Rather, “[t]he ‘n——r’ is held in humble submission here.”107 107.Id. (racial slur censored).Show More One aspect of that “submission” was Brevard County’s law requiring that whoever wished to carry a long gun have a bond guaranteed by “two good men.”108 108.Id.Show More As Tarter explained, “[i]t’s purpose was to keep fire arms out of the nigroes hands[,] and it did all it was intended for. No nigro can get a bond accepted,” and “few ever try.”109 109.Id.Show More In Tarter’s view, such a restriction bolstered law and order. “There has never been an assault, or an insult offered a white woman by a n——r in this county,” he claimed, and “in fact, there’s practically but few cases of criminal assault ever in the state.”110 110.Id. (racial slur censored).Show More

Sources in Alabama, too, connected Black gun ownership to themes of disorder and the status of white supremacy. In 1907, Alabama State Senator Evans Hinson warned that “black belt negroes are better armed than whites.”111 111.Evans Hinson, Black Belt Negroes are Better Armed Than Whites, The Age-Herald, May 1, 1907, at 9.Show More Thus, he thought, Alabama needed a “new law regarding carrying weapons.”112 112.Id.Show More Though laws on the books regulated possession of pistols, he thought the law should also cover long guns. Otherwise, he worried that “negroes would have on hand for immediate use incomparably more improved firearms than would the whites.”113 113.Id.Show More Thus, he feared that whites might be outgunned in the event of a future “race riot.”114 114.Id.Show More Alabama newspaperman Edward Ware Barrett, owner of Birmingham’s Age-Herald,115 115.George M. Cruikshank, 2 A History of Birmingham and Its Environs: A Narrative Account of Their Historical Progress, Their People, and Their Principal Interests, 180 (1920).Show More likewise suggested that Black citizens’ gun ownership placed respectable whites under siege. “A man with a home and family,” Barrett remarked, “feels that he cannot go out of town without employing an armed squadron to protect his home against pistol toting negroes[.]”116 116.Edward Ware Barrett, Ned Brace Talks About Things At Home and Makes A Few Suggestions, The Age-Herald, Jan. 7, 1912, at 28.Show More Otherwise, he feared, they might “go out to shoot up his servants and endanger[ ] the lives of his wife and children.”117 117.Id.Show More

So what has this historical survey told us? A couple of things, we think. First, it shows that racist attitudes about Black gun ownership pervaded the post-war American South. White society, or at least those portions of it captured in the cited periodicals, thought Black gun ownership a particularly dangerous reality; one conducive to disorder and corrosive to the Southern social fabric. It was a problem, the sources tell us, in need of novel restrictions and “extreme legislation.”118 118.The Pistol Toting Negro in Evidence, The Greenville Times, Dec. 28, 1907, at 1.Show More Second, and concomitantly, it reveals that courts today should hesitate to invoke Southern gun restrictions as evidence about Southern society’s views on the right to bear arms generally. To the contrary, this evidence reflects Southern society’s specific desire to counter a particular “problem”: its disdain for Black citizens’ keeping and bearing of arms. Parts II.B and II.C, in turn, present the evidence for that observation’s logical corollaries: that Southern states did not enforce these restrictions rigorously against whites, but enforced them with alacrity against Blacks.

B. Southern States’ Under-Enforcement of Gun Control Laws
Against White Society

As noted above, Judge O’Scannlain also criticized the Young majority’s statutory survey for omitting a serious discussion of the laws’ “enforcement history.”119 119.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 844 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More The majority conceded that the question of enforcement was “a fair one.”120 120.Id.at 823.Show More Unenforced statutes may eventually fall “into desuetude,” the majority noted, rendering such legislative proscriptions “merely symbolic.”121 121.Id.Show More But after admitting that enforcement questions were “beyond the materials that [it] ha[d] seen,” the majority incongruously argued that the Southern statutes it cited were “not merely symbolic.”122 122.Id. (emphasis added).Show More Instead, it suggested that the statutes’ commonality across the South was somehow self-proving evidence of their enforcement. And the majority noted that it had assembled a few Southern cases involving weapons prosecutions, which it claimed “proves that the statutes were enforced.”123 123.Id. (first emphasis added).Show More

The majority’s leap from confessing that it had no evidence of enforcement history to its conclusion that it had “prove[n]” the statutes’ enforcement was sophistical.124 124.Id.Show More A few instances of enforcement in reported cases do not show that such laws were enforced broadly or that Southerners considered them an enforcement priority. Indeed, one scholar has labeled reasoning like the majority’s the “lonely fact” fallacy.125 125.Ilan Wurmin, Law Historians’ Fallacies, 91 N.D. L. Rev. 161, 203 (2015). Show More Having identified a few discrete historical examples, the majority then assumed without support that those data points represented general trends.

But they did not, at least according to the evidence we have uncovered. To the contrary, contemporary Southern sources consistently noted two important points. First, the carrying of concealed weapons throughout the postwar South was extremely common. And second, Southern states rarely enforced their laws against that practice. (Save for those occasions when the unfortunate defendant belonged to a racial minority; a trend we discuss in Part II.C.) So Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent was nearer the mark yet again. For the laws the majority cited often were “merely symbolic.”126 126.Young, 992 F.3d at 823.Show More

Already in 1880, for example, a Mississippi periodical observed that the state’s concealed-weapons law “[wa]s not enforced anywhere in the State.”127 127.Concealed Weapons, St. Landry Democrat, Feb. 7, 1880, at 4.Show More And it pointed out the likelihood that “the concealed weapon law will never be strictly enforced in this or any other State, unless the law should go further and give officers the right to search every man to ascertain whether he had concealed weapons on his person or not.”128 128.Id.Show More Such a law, it said, would be both “unconstitutional,” given its imposition on liberty, and “absurd,” given the resources required to enforce it.129 129.Id.Show More Likewise, Louisiana’s Meridional noted in 1878 that the state had “an act prohibiting persons from carrying concealed weapons,” but that it was “not enforced[.]”130 130.The Lafayette Advertiser, Mar. 30, 1878, at 2.Show More The author suggested that some enforcement might be wise, since “one cannot travel fifty yards from the parish seat” without meeting persons armed with concealed pistols.131 131.Id.Show More South Carolina’s Weekly Union Times sounded similar themes in 1880. It noted that while “[t]he law against carrying concealed weapons may be enforced in the towns and cities where special ordinances are passed . . . the State laws on this subject are not worth the paper they are written on, from the fact that they will never be enforced.”132 132.Sins Which the Law Cannot Reach, The Weekly Union Times, Nov. 12, 1880, at 1.Show More Predictably, “nobody [was ever] tried for the offence.”133 133.Id. Likewise, Richmond, Virginia’s Daily State Journal reported a concealed-weapons prosecution in 1872. But it noted that this was “the first case of the kind for some time.” Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapons, The Daily State Journal, Jan. 10, 1872, at 1.Show More

These themes persisted throughout the South for decades. Mississippi’s Magnolia Gazette noted in 1883 that a new weapons law might be desirable. But the column’s author doubted that “it can or will be done,” given the practical difficulties of enforcing such a statute.134 134.An Alarming State of Affairs, Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 30, 1883, at 1.Show More “The law as it exists,” the author noted, “is almost inoperative.”135 135.Id.Show More Five years later, South Carolina’s Laurens Advertiser observed that “the law in regard to carrying concealed weapons[ ] [wa]s never enforced,” given that citizens lacked any “sense of duty” to obey it.136 136.Dials, The Laurens Advertiser, May 2, 1888, at 3.Show More And in Kentucky, similar laws’ enforcement fared no better. In 1891, for instance, Kentucky Governor John Y. Brown simply stopped enforcing the state’s concealed-weapons law for several years.137 137.W.P. Walton, Semi-Weekly Interior Journal, Nov. 20, 1891, at 2.Show More

Again, it must be said, the rarity of prosecutions did not stem from the rarity of concealed carry. To the contrary, a Missouri periodical noted in 1897 that “[t]housands of the so called ‘best men’ of every community in many of the southern states carry daily the faithful revolver in the pistol pocket.”138 138.Concealed Weapons, The Age Herald, Oct. 10, 1897, at 4.Show More It was despite that fact that only “at rare intervals . . . men are prosecuted for carrying concealed weapons.”139 139.Id.Show More Indeed, prosecutions were rare not because carrying was rare, but because there was so “much looseness in the enforcement of the statutes[.]”140 140.Id.Show More

Turn-of-the-century South Carolina was no more enthusiastic about enforcing its own concealed-weapons law. The Union Times wondered in 1900 why the “law against carrying concealed weapons is not more rigidly enforced.”141 141.Carrying Concealed Weapons, The Union Times, Oct. 26, 1900, at 1.Show More It noted that there were “few convictions for violations” and that no one seemed willing to report fellow citizens for concealed carrying.142 142.Id.Show More Perhaps members of South Carolina’s legislature took heed. For a year later, The Yorkville Enquirer reported the passage of a new concealed-weapons law. But it predicted that the new law, like its predecessors, would have little practical consequence. “Other concealed weapon laws,” the paper noted, “have been indifferently enforced.”143 143.The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1.Show More Thus, “there is reason to fear this one will not fare any better.”144 144.Id.Show More That prediction proved accurate. As South Carolina’s Anderson Intelligencer noted in 1905, while the “statute books” had a new law “against the carrying of concealed weapons . . . the enforcement of it is a regular farce.”145 145.Editorial Bull’s Eyes, The Yorkville Enquirer, Oct. 10, 1905, at 1.Show More “Occasionally some poor, unfortunate fellow” was fined,146 146.Id.Contemporary court records from South Carolina also seem to confirm that the state’s concealed-weapons law was not an enforcement priority. The Watchman and Southron reported in 1903 that one South Carolina police court processed 448 arrests throughout 1902. Doings of the Police Force for 1902, The Watchman and Southron, Feb. 25, 1903, at 1. But only a paltry three of those were for carrying concealed weapons. Id.Show More but the law did little overall to deter Southerners’ prolific carriage of arms.

Enforcement also lagged in Arkansas and Alabama. Birmingham’s Age-Herald reported in 1912 that “there seems to be practically no enforcement” of “[t]he law against carrying concealed deadly weapons.”147 147.The Grand Jury’s Report, The Age-Herald, Oct. 28, 1912, at 1.Show More And Arkansas’s Daily Picayune noted in 1921 that “[t]he law against carrying concealed weapons is not enforced, as witness the courts.”148 148.A Celebration, The Daily Picayune, Jan. 8, 1921, at 1.Show More Yet, that journal remarked, there was apparently “no inclination for repeal.”149 149.Id.Show More So the law was indeed symbolic, rather than a robust proscription.150 150.Id.Show More

Indeed, this Part has shown that much the same could be said for concealed-weapons laws across the South. As the cited sources reflect, contemporary Southerners considered the laws “inoperative” and their enforcement impractical.151 151.An Alarming State of Affairs, Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 30, 1883, at 1.Show More “[I]ndifferent[ ]” enforcement had rendered the statutes “not worth the paper they [were] written on” and “a regular farce.”152 152.Sins Which the Law Cannot Reach, The Weekly Union Times, Nov. 12, 1880, at 1; The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1; Editorial Bull’s Eyes, Yorkville Enquirer, Oct. 10, 1905, at 1.Show More As a result, convictions came only at “rare intervals.”153 153.Concealed Weapons, The Age-Herald, Oct. 10, 1897, at 4.Show More And those convicted appear to have been the “unfortunate fellow[s]” who simply happened to stand out from the rest of their gun-toting countrymen.154 154.Editorial Bull’s Eyes, The Yorkville Enquirer, Oct. 10, 1905, at 1.Show More

Given these sources’ depiction of the South’s spotty gun-control regime, one might wonder whether those laws were ever seriously enforced against any segment of Southern society. The answer to that question, it turns out, is “yes.” For contemporary evidence also suggests that despite the laws’ “indifferent[ ]” enforcement as to the South’s alleged best men—its whites—the same laws quite often ensnared its Black citizens.155 155.The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1.Show More Of course, we uncovered no evidence that Blacks carried guns at a higher rate than whites in this period. Instead, sources remarked that the pistol was the Southern gentleman’s constant companion. But as Part II.C now reveals, Blacks almost certainly were punished at a much higher rate for concealed carry.

C. How Southern States Disproportionately Enforced Their Gun-Control Laws Against Racial Minorities

We now turn to the third way that the historical sources we uncovered vindicate Judge O’Scannlain. Recall how he admonished the majority to temper its enthusiasm for “the legislative scene following the Civil War” given his suspicion that such laws, though facially neutral, “sought to suppress the ability of freedmen to own guns.”156 156.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More His intuition was correct, but his critique—much like the majority opinion—lacked a key piece of evidence: the laws’ enforcement history. Without it, the majority brushed aside Judge O’Scannlain’s concerns and appointed the statutes it cited as serious evidence of Southerners’ appetite for gun control.

That was a mistake. As this Part reveals, contemporaneous evidence suggests that the Reconstruction and Jim Crow South enforced these laws “almost exclusively” against Blacks.157 157.Elections a Farce: The Republicans of South Carolina Issue a Strong Address to Congress, The Indianapolis Journal, Jan. 18, 1889, at 7.Show More That is perhaps unsurprising, given our background knowledge about that period in Southern history and the evidence of the laws’ racial motivations detailed in Part II.A. At the same time, though, it guts the Young majority’s view that racially disparate enforcement ceased after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Precisely because these laws were not equally applied to all citizens, singling out Black citizens instead, they may tell us something about a tool the postwar South used to preserve white supremacy. But they tell us almost nothing about a broad Southern consensus in favor of diluting the right to keep and bear arms.

A year after the Civil War’s end, for instance, the city of Norfolk, Virginia deployed a recently passed concealed-weapons law to disarm free Blacks. Indeed, “[u]nder a recent law of the city of Norfolk, . . . the police arrested a large number of negroes for carrying concealed weapons.”158 158.Miscellaneous News Items, Bedford Inquirer, Dec. 21, 1866, at 1.Show More The seizure was especially significant, since it was alleged “that a negro rising was planned for Christmas week[,] in which the authorities were to be overturned.”159 159.Id.Show More Later in 1904, Virginia authorities similarly suggested that they had defused a “race riot” with concealed-weapons arrests.160 160.Another Race Riot is Feared in Norfolk, The Evening Journal, Oct. 26, 1904, at 1.Show More Fearing an “outbreak by the blacks” after a lynching, authorities arrested “[m]any negroes” for weapons possession.161 161.Id.Show More These “culprits” were then “severely dealt with . . . under the Virginia law covering concealed weapons.”162 162.Id.Show More So, much like Virginia’s 1680 “negroes insurrections” law sought to suppress slave revolts with a racially explicit weapons ban, Virginia’s later, facially neutral laws were apparently thought to serve a similar purpose.163 163.Id.; see supranotes 61–65 and accompanying text.Show More

South Carolina, too, enforced its concealed-weapons law along racial lines. South Carolina Republican Ellery M. Brayton complained to the federal Congress in 1887 about how disparate enforcement infected the statute. “[T]he law against carrying concealed weapons,” he noted, “is enforced almost exclusively against negroes.”164 164.Elections a Farce: The Republicans of South Carolina Issue a Strong Address to Congress, The Indianapolis Journal, Jan. 18, 1889, at 7. Contemporary arrest records from South Carolina reflect the racial enforcement disparity. In 1905, for instance, one South Carolina court handled thirty-four concealed weapons arrests; thirty offenders were Black and just four were white. The Sinners’ Record: Annual Summary of Arrests—Charges, Convictions and Acquittals in Recorder’s Court, The Watchman and Southron, Feb. 1, 1905, at 1.Show More And even when the law was enforced against whites, their sentences vis-à-vis Black offenders were radically disparate. An 1883 periodical noted that two South Carolina offenders—one Black, one white—were both tried during the same term of court for the offense of carrying concealed weapons.165 165.Sentences of Court, The Anderson Intelligencer, Nov. 15, 1883 (quoting the Abbeville Press and Banner).Show More The white offender received the opportunity to pay a fine. But the Black offender got six months’ time at the penitentiary.166 166.Id.Show More How, the periodical wondered, could one possibly distinguish those cases?167 167.Id. After noting this race-based sentencing disparity, the original column in the Abbeville Press and Banner lamented, “Does not such discriminations [sic] against the brother in black offend our sense of justice?” Id. Yet when the same column was reprinted in The Anderson Intelligencer, the Intelligencer defended judges’ discretion to impose disparate sentences.Show More

The situation in South Carolina apparently did not improve with time. In 1891, a South Carolina judge recommended that “the law against carrying concealed weapons . . . be more rigidly enforced.”168 168.“The Easter Egg,” The Newberry Herald and News, Mar. 19, 1891, at 1.Show More The paper agreed: “[a]s it is the law is a dead letter, and only an occasional negro is brought to trial for the offense.”169 169.Id.Show More Another source, this time in 1893, also pointed out South Carolina’s enforcement disparity. Twelve Black inmates, it noted, languished “in the South Carolina penitentiary for the simple offense of carrying concealed weapons, a thing that about every white man in the state does.”170 170.Outrages on the Negro: Rev. Dr. Seaton Says that They Must be Stopped, What Prison Records Show, The Evening Star, Aug. 14, 1893, at 7.Show More But while whites did so freely, Black offenders faced hard labor in the convict-lease system.171 171.Id.Show More

Famed journalist and early civil-rights activist Ida B. Wells similarly criticized the South for its obvious enforcement hypocrisy regarding concealed weapons. In a 1900 address, she noted that “[t]here is a law in the south against carrying concealed weapons.”172 172.Ida B. Wells, Negro Lynching: Deprecated by Speakers and a Remedy Suggested, Topeka State Journal, Feb. 17, 1900, at 5. The Anti-Lynching Crusaders, Republican and Herald, Feb. 19, 1900, at 2.Show More “White men carry them with impunity,” she pointed out.173 173.Id.Show More “[B]ut if the negro is caught with a gun[,] he is fined $50 and put in the chain gang for 60 days.”174 174.Id.Show More She was incorrect only insofar as a mere 60 days’ imprisonment was apparently a light sentence for a Black offender.175 175.For instance, one 1893 survey of the rolls of a South Carolina penitentiary revealed that twelve Black prisoners were serving ten-year sentences “for the simple offense of carrying concealed weapons.” Outrages on the Negro: Rev. Dr. Seaton Says that They Must be Stopped, What Prison Records Show, The Evening Star, Aug. 14, 1893, at 7. The prisoners had been given such lengthy sentences, the source suggested, so that they could be impressed into the “lease system of convict labor” then prevalent in the South. Id.Show More

Much like Wells, periodicals across the South noted the enforcement disparity between white “Southern gentlemen” and Black offenders. As the Houston Daily Post remarked in 1902, “[t]here is one law for the ‘n——r and the Chinaman’ who tote pistols . . . and there is another law for the gentleman who arms himself[.]”176 176.The Gentleman Outlaw, Houston Daily Post, Aug., 14, 1902, at 4 (racial slur censored).Show More In other words, minorities risked severe punishment if caught with weapons. Yet “[g]entlemen of high social and commercial standing” could “walk the streets or ride the roads” while armed without question.177 177.Id.Show More Similarly, a South Carolina paper noted in 1911 that while “[t]here are laws upon the statute books against the carrying of concealed weapons, and occasionally some insignificent ‘n——r’ is haled before the courts and fined . . . but it is very rare that a white man is made to pay the penalty.”178 178.The People Alone Responsible, The Manning Times, Nov. 1, 1911, at 8 (racial slur censored).Show More A Missouri periodical, too, noted in 1903 that both Blacks and whites often carried concealed weapons. But it was Black offenders, not whites, that police made the enforcement priority. Indeed, East St. Louis had begun a “roundup of [the] lawless negro class” with “concealed weapons in their possession.”179 179.Police Start on Roundup of Lawless Negro Class, The Republic, May 11, 1903, at 5.Show More Believing that most crimes were “committed by negroes” whose concealed weapons “enabl[ed them] to commit crime quicker,” the police had arrested “a score of negroes” in recent days.180 180.Id.Show More And in Kentucky, too, there was one law for the white “gentleman” but another for the Black offender. As one writer noted in 1908, “[w]hen old Kentucky tries to convict a white lawbreaker[,] she has an awful job.”181 181.Public Ledger, October 15, 1908, at 2.Show More When a white lawyer shot at someone else, for example, “[h]e got off with a light fine for the offense.”182 182.Id.Show More “[A]nd a jury refused to fine him for carrying a pistol.”183 183.Id.Show More But “a N——r,” he noted, “would have been given the limit in half an hour.”184 184.Id. (racial slur censored).Show More

Likewise, South Carolina openly celebrated the use of its weapon laws to disarm Black citizens. In 1911, two South Carolina periodicals commended the efforts of a particular magistrate, William M. Dorroh, to seize Blacks’ firearms. The Herald and News noted that Magistrate Dorroh had “achieved State-wide mention for his fine record in disarming negroes of their concealed weapons.”185 185.Various and All About, The Herald and News, Aug. 29, 1911, at 8.Show More And The Yorkville Enquirer, too, praised Dorroh for his “fine record in the enforcement of the concealed weapons law since he has been in office.”186 186.South Carolina News, The Yorkville Enquirer, July 7, 1911, at 2.Show More But it was a “fine record” precisely because it was so biased against Blacks.187 187.Id.Show More “Thirty-eight is the number of pistols he has taken from negroes in sixty days,” the Enquirer observed.188 188.Id.Show More While it was “a large number of pistols secured at a good rate per day,” even still, “it would take Magistrate Dorroh a considerable time to disarm all the negroes” in his township.189 189.Id.Show More In the meantime, though, “he [was] being generally commended for his efforts.”190 190.Id.Show More

Perhaps a final quotation in the Atlanta Constitution, from a column penned in 1910, best captures the themes we have developed in this Part: “It has not as yet been shown that the Afro-American is more addicted to the habit of pistol-toting than his white brother, but it is evident that he is much more liable to arrest. For centuries, all over the world, it has been regarded as the prerogative of a gentleman to carry arms and a Southern gentleman knows that, in such case, no peace officer is apt to interfere with him. Indeed, one of the class, when challenged for violating the law against carrying concealed weapons remarked, very truthfully, ‘That law was made for n——rs.’”191 191.The Pistol-Toters, The Appeal, July 2, 1910, at 2 (racial slur censored).Show More

III. Why The Racially Biased Origins of Southern Gun Control Uniquely Matter After Ramos

While Part II dealt largely in original research, scholars have long made the broader point that gun control in the United States has racist origins. What has been less clear, though, is why those origins matter today. Some who support a narrow view of the Second Amendment appear to understand these laws’ biased origins yet draw no broader implications from that fact.192 192.See Spitzer, supra note 22, at 78–79.Show More Others have sought to dismiss the relevance of past racism to the present dialogue.193 193.See Frassetto, supra note 22 at 95–97 (arguing that, in Texas, it was pro-freedman, pro-civil-rights Radical Republicans who supported restrictions on the right to carry firearms).Show More In response, we argue that scholars must grapple with gun control’s racist origins—origins that “uniquely matter” since they continue to burden constitutional rights.194 194.Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1408 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see alsoBrief of Italo-American Jurists and Attorneys, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Corlett (No. 20-843) (arguing that the Court in Corlett should consider New York’s restrictive gun law in light of historical evidence reflecting the state’s efforts to single out and disarm Italians).Show More Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ramos v. Louisiana obliges them to do so.

In Ramos, the Court considered the validity of two state statutes—one from Oregon; the other from Louisiana—that permitted conviction by non-unanimous juries in felony trials.195 195.Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.Show More While non-unanimity would cause a mistrial anywhere else, in these states, it could support a sentence of life without parole. In a majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court noted as an initial matter that both states’ laws were “facially race-neutral.”196 196.Id.Show More Nothing about the allowance of a 10-to-2 verdict inherently suggested invidious discrimination. And the reasons for these states’ modern adherence to the non-unanimity rule seemed obscure.

Upon further reflection, though, the Court explained that the “origins” of those laws “are clear.”197 197.Id. (emphasis added).Show More “Louisiana first endorsed nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes at a constitutional convention in 1898,” where all the talk had concerned preserving “the supremacy of the white race.”198 198.Id.Show More Its delegates were well-aware that “overt discrimination against African-American jurors [would] violat[e] the Fourteenth Amendment.”199 199.Id.Show More So, instead, they adopted a facially neutral rule that permitted non-unanimous verdicts. But the real point was “to ensure that African-American juror service would be meaningless.”200 200.Id.Show More Even when a Black person managed to get on the jury, his vote could be overridden by his white peers. Oregon’s rule, too, could “be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute ‘the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries.’”201 201.Id.Show More None of Ramos’s litigants even disputed those points, and courts in both states had “frankly acknowledged that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of their States’ respective nonunanimity rules.”202 202.Id.Show More

So what? Previous parties, amici, and scholars had all urged the Court to treat certain other laws and precedents as “tainted” or “poisoned” for their infection with bias or bigotry.203 203.See, e.g., Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1625, 1626–30 (2013) (detailing such attempts).Show More But the Court had demurred on those past occasions. Such “extralegal” concerns, as Chief Justice Rehnquist once called them, were “not the usual stuff of Supreme Court debate,” and considering them would be a “disservice to the Court’s traditional method of adjudication.”204 204.Id. (quoting John C. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 280 (2001); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1996)).Show More

It was surprising, then, that the Ramos Court seemed to place such import on “the racist origins of Louisiana’s and Oregon’s laws.”205 205.Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405.Show More And it did so despite these states arguably having “purged” the laws’ earlier taint through subsequent reenactments. Indeed, the majority explained that given the laws’ modern implications for a fundamental right, it could not leave “an uncomfortable past unexamined.”206 206.Id. at 1401 n.44.Show More The majority’s tactic also engendered two concurrences that further endorsed its analytical move. Justice Kavanaugh was left wondering why the Court should sanction a law “that is thoroughly racist in its origins,”207 207.Id. at 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).Show More while Justice Sotomayor believed that “the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.”208 208.Id.at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).Show More

Scholars noticed the import of Ramos’s novel approach soon after. “It is not often that the Supreme Court ratifies an entirely new form of judicial argument,” noted Professor Charles Barzun.209 209.Charles Barzun, The Constitution and Genealogy, Balkinization (July 6, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-constitution-and-genealogy.html. [https://perma.cc/EH4M-B3TZ].Show More “But that may be what happened this past term.”210 210.Id.Show More The Ramos Court had elevated laws’ genealogy from an anti-modality to a new and apparently “legitimate modality.”211 211.Id.; see alsoBarzun, supra note 203, at 1631 (“My claim, in short, is that the effort to historicize or impeach a past decision is a legitimate and potentially useful means of evaluating a decision’s authority as a matter of precedent.”).Show More Still, Professor Barzun struggled to explain precisely why the Court thought genealogy relevant. Though laws may be invalid if conceived with animus, Oregon’s and Louisiana’s later reenactments seemed to have purged it. And genealogical arguments may often be logically fallacious. Indeed, logicians call it the “genetic fallacy” to “assume[ ] that a statement, position, or idea must be flawed” simply because its source happens to be flawed.212 212.Jacob E. Van Vleet, Informal Logical Fallacies 19 (2011).Show More

We think, though, that Ramos was not flawed or fallacious or, as the dissent charged, dealing in “ad hominem rhetoric.”213 213.140 S. Ct. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan, argued that the tainted “origins of the Louisiana and Oregon rules have no bearing on the broad constitutional question that the Court decides.” Id. But having “lost” in Ramos, Justice Alito switched gears two months later when the Court in Espinoza considered whether the Montana Supreme Court had violated the Free Exercise Clause when it applied the “no-aid provision” of the Montana Constitution to bar religious schools from benefiting from a state program that provided tuition assistance. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2268 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito argued that Ramos established that the Court may examine the motivation behind the passage of a statute or a state constitutional provision to smoke out illicit bigotry. Justice Alito, quoting Ramos, concluded that Montana’s no-aid provision remained “‘[t]ethered’ to its original ‘bias”’ against Catholics because the state had not “‘actually confront[ed]’ the provision’s ‘tawdry past in reenacting it.”’ Id. at 2274 (quoting 140 S. Ct. at 1410) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). Combining the opinions of Ramos and of Espinoza, six Justices—all but Justices Kagan and Barrett and Chief Justice Roberts—have endorsed and applied the genealogical taint principle.Show More Rather, it told us something important about how future courts and scholars should approach historical analysis and, ultimately, originalism. As many scholars have persuasively argued, we can think of constitutional exegesis as having a pair of key stages: interpretation and then construction.214 214.Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 65–66 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 455–56 (2013).Show More When we interpret a text, we seek to discover its communicative content—what the words meant at the time of their ratification.215 215.Solum, supra note 214, at 457.Show More When we then construe the text, we determine what legal effect we should give to that meaning.216 216.Id.Show More The clearer the text, the smaller the “construction zone.” But sometimes constitutional provisions are “general, abstract, [or] vague,” so we must resort to other heuristics of meaning when applying them “to concrete constitutional cases.”217 217.Id. at 458.Show More

One of those heuristics of meaning, of course, is historical practice.218 218.We are primarily referring here to liquidation. See The Federalist No. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (2001); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019).Show More To discern how fundamental a right really is, we might look to how people in the past viewed the right—how they exercised it and which restrictions upon it they tolerated or endorsed. But Ramos gives us a critical caveat about how we should conduct this historical research. When assessing a past restriction’s probative weight on the true scope of a constitutional guarantee, we cannot simply ignore past actors’ illegitimate and ulterior motives in enacting such restrictions. Rather, illegitimate motives tell us that past actors restricted a right not necessarily because they considered it trivial, but because they thought their impermissible motive—for instance, preservation of white supremacy—the greater priority. So ignoring historical motives (and, perhaps even more important, historical enforcement patterns) might lead us to wrongly over-value certain historical evidence in a modern constitutional calculus. Translated to the controversy before the Court in Ramos itself, concluding that historical actors did not consider jury unanimity an important right because of their longstanding decision to permit nonunanimity would be a mistake. Rather, the impermissible motives behind that historical practice gutted those restrictions’ probative weight in assessing how broad or fundamental was the burdened right.

With that context in mind, understanding Ramos’s import for the Second Amendment becomes simple. When courts—and, later this term, the Supreme Court—assess the scope of the “bear” right, they may consider historical practice relevant in that assessment. But that does not involve simply looking at old laws written on a page. Judges instead must grapple with those laws’ historical motivations and enforcement patterns. And to the extent that such analysis reveals impermissible motives and disparate enforcement, judges must discount the probative weight of that evidence accordingly. In other words, Ramos tells us that it is illegitimate to conclude that the modern “bear” right is susceptible to copious restrictions because racist Southern authorities restricted Black citizens’ past exercise of that right. Such evidence may be powerfully probative of historical racism, but its probative weight regarding history’s true verdict on the scope of the Second Amendment should be considered slim. Otherwise, courts risk laundering past racist restrictions to validate modern burdens on constitutional rights.

Conclusion

On May 10, 1865, Frederick Douglass delivered an address in New York City that advocated for a constitutional amendment to make guarantees in the Bill of Rights directly applicable to the states.219 219.“In What New Skin Will the Old Snake Come Forth?: An Address Delivered in New York, New York, on 10 May 10, 1865,” reprinted in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers 79, 83–84 (John W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991).Show More Without one, he said, state legislatures could “take from [free Blacks] the right to keep and bear arms . . . [n]otwithstanding the provision in the Constitution of the United States.”220 220.Id.Show More As we now know, the nation responded by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment. Ironically, New York today seeks to defend its “proper cause” requirement by invoking old laws of just the sort that Douglass decried. Its brief in opposition to certiorari in NYSRPA II, for instance, cited Kachalsky twenty-nine times and advanced multiple Southern gun-control statutes to argue that history supports continued restrictions on public carry.221 221.Brief of Respondents at iii, v–vi, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, 20-843 (2021), 2021 WL 723110 (citing Kachalsky and several Southern gun-control statutes).Show More Apparently, that historical evidence did not dissuade the Court from taking up the case. Nor, when it turns to the merits, should the Court reinvigorate tainted artifacts of a bygone era to burden constitutional rights in the modern one.

  1.  

Caught on Tape: Establishing the Right of Third-Party Bystanders to Secretly Record the Police

Throughout the thirty years between the televised beating of Rodney King and the videotaped murder of George Floyd, recordings of police misconduct have given a face to the perpetrators and victims of police brutality. Given the accessibility of these recordings today over social media, anyone with a smartphone can demand the nation’s attention on one of racial discrimination’s cruelest manifestations.

In spite of their utility to social movements, though, recordings of the police have occupied a legally nebulous space. Federal courts have consistently affirmed the First Amendment’s protection of individuals’ rights to publicly record the police, but they have been unclear as to whether that protection extends to secret recordings. Federal and state wiretap laws can be interpreted to make secret recordings unlawful, and courts have—until late—largely avoided deciding the question.

In December 2020, however, the First Circuit expressly held that individuals have a right to secretly record the police. Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020). In its decision, the court affirmed the value of surreptitious recordings and found that the state’s ban on producing such recordings violates individuals’ First Amendment rights. This case comment argues that courts across the country should follow the First Circuit’s model. We maintain that the production of secret recordings serves a critical First Amendment interest by providing social movements with a means to shed light on misconduct and hold power to account. Moreover, we contend that the established constitutionality of surreptitious recordings lends certainty, and therefore protection, to would-be recorders that is unavailable through other alternatives. Finally, we posit that the conventional rationales for circumscribing the right to record the police—such as preserving individuals’ right to privacy and securing public safety—cannot justify a constitutionally meaningful distinction between secret and open recordings, as the First Circuit has affirmed.

Introduction

On May 25, 2020, Darnella Frazier did an ordinary thing of extraordinary consequence—she pressed “record.”1.Joshua Nevett, George Floyd: The Personal Cost of Filming Police Brutality, BBC News (June 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52942519 [https://perma.cc/‌VC7P-C3RU].Show More Her video recording of George Floyd’s murder spread like wildfire across news and social media platforms, inspiring longstanding activists and newcomers alike to speak out against racial discrimination and police brutality.2.Audra D. S. Burch & John Eligon, Bystander Videos of George Floyd and Others Are Policing the Police, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/‌george-floyd-minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/4G2N-DVA5]. See also Eliot C. McLaughlin, How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning that Shows No Signs of Slowing Down, CNN (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/us/george-floyd-protests-different-why/index.html [https://perma.cc/D7UC-Y6AR] (highlighting that the protests following George Floyd’s death were unique in that they saw an influx of “myriad White faces”).Show More One study estimates that the June protests brought out as many as 26 million people to the streets, exceeding the crowds of any other single social movement in American history.3.Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Social Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/‌interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/6XAT-9MJE]. The 2017 Women’s March previously held this title, which saw crowds of 3 to 5 million in marches nationwide. Id.; McLaughlin, supranote 2.Show More By leveraging the ubiquity of smart phones and the broad reach of social media networks, Darnella Frazier reaffirmed that civilian bystanders like her can play a pivotal role in the public square and shine a light on police misconduct that might otherwise go unnoticed. She showed that, to paraphrase Scott Gant, we can all be journalists now.4.Scott Gant, We’re All Journalists Now: The Transformation of the Press and Reshaping of the Law in the Internet Age 6 (2007).Show More

The scope of one’s right to record the police, however, has remained somewhat unclear in federal courts. Recent developments in case law have emphasized the important First Amendment interests inherent to the production of these recordings. Federal appellate courts across the country have consistently recognized the existence of a valid First Amendment right in recording the police in public spaces.5.See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355–56 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–600, 608 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).Show More However, these decisions have not defined the scope of this right, particularly so in the context of secret recordings. Some have argued that the secret recording of police officers violates state wiretap statutes and that those responsible should be criminally sanctioned.6.SeeProject Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 819–20 (1st Cir. 2020).Show More While this theory has yet to be widely considered by federal courts, there is reason to believe they may find it persuasive.7.See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606–07, 607 n.13 (“The distinction between open and concealed recording, however, may make a difference in the intermediate-scrutiny calculus because surreptitious recording brings stronger privacy interests into play.”).Show More

In December 2020, however, the First Circuit concluded in Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins that a state may not explicitly proscribe surreptitious recordings of the police in public spaces without violating the First Amendment.8.982 F.3d at 833.Show More The case concerned a Massachusetts statute9.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2018) (‘‘Section 99’’).Show More that prohibits the secret recording of interactions between civilians and public officials.10 10.Project Veritas, a far-right non-profit organization whose methods have sparked controversy, brought a separate challenge to Section 99 that, on appeal, was consolidated with K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez’s suit against the Suffolk County District Attorney. Martin and Perez are unaffiliated with Project Veritas. Project Veritas went beyond Martin and Perez’s requested remedy by seeking to enjoin the enforcement of this statute against the secret recording of any public official. Given the broader nature of this claim, this essay will not contest whether or not the rationales justifying the court’s decision in this case should be applied to cover all such figures. However, it is worth noting that the First Circuit rejected Project Veritas’s broader argument on the grounds that it was unripe. See Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 817.Show More The plaintiffs were civil rights activists who wished to secretly record police-civilian interactions and promote accountability for misconduct.11 11.Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 1–2, Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1629) (submitted by K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez).Show More While both had previously openly recorded the police in the past, they had faced violent reprisals for doing so, and, consequently, argued that their personal safety required their future recordings be made secretly.12 12.Id. at 9–11.Show More Such fears are often warranted; individuals across the country—such as Andre James,13 13.Gary Man Arrested for Recording Police Officer, Now Considering Legal Action, NBC Chicago (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/gary-man-arrested-for-recording-police-officer-now-considering-legal-action/2319456/ [https://perma.cc/CB8J-7YBK].Show More Peter Ballance,14 14.Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC News (July 16, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=‌11179076 [https://perma.cc/E3NH-N6HJ].Show More Joe Bennett,15 15.Mayor: 3 Charged in Fraudulent Check Scheme; Internal Investigation Launched After Cops Scuffle with Man Videotaping Scene, WHAS-TV (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.whas11.com/article/news/crime/jeffersontown-officers-arrest-man-videotaping-kentucky-investigation-3-charged-check-fraud/417-a32470a8-5810-4b5e-a095-4e1105c3d331 [https://perma.cc/BJS5-L85D].Show More Sharron Tasha Ford,16 16.Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues After Mother Falsely Arrested by Boynton Beach Police Officers (June 25, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-sues-after-mother-falsely-arrested-boynton-beach-police-officers [https://perma.cc/9HU9-LB2K].Show More Gregory Rizer,17 17.Press Release, ACLU Pa., Lawsuit on Behalf of Man Arrested for Recording Police Officer Settles (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.aclupa.org/en/press-releases/lawsuit-behalf-man-arrested-recording-police-officer-settles [https://perma.cc/7DWJ-545F].Show More and Alfredo Valentin18 18.Man Arrested for Recording Police Awarded $275,000, CBS Sacramento (Nov. 29, 2017), https://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2017/11/29/man-arrested-for-recording-police-awarded-275000/ [https://perma.cc/8YNP-3SV5].Show More—have faced physical and legal reprisals following their recording of the police.

Given the critical nature of this right, we argue that the First Circuit’s holding in Project Veritas should be adopted nationally, both in the context of express prohibitions on secret recordings and its broader application to state wiretap statutes. While the Massachusetts law is unique in that it expressly prohibits secret recordings,19 19.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2018).Show More other wiretap statutes across the country do so implicitly.20 20.See infraPart I.A.Show More Under federal and state law, individuals cannot legally record an interaction without the consent of at least one party, so long as the relevant party can legitimately claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in that interaction.21 21.See id.Show More In the context of police-citizen encounters, then, these wiretap statutes imply that bystanders have no legal right to surreptitiously document the public activity of law enforcement without first making their intention to record known. We contend, as the First Circuit affirmed in Project Veritas, that such blanket prohibitions are unconstitutional when applied to surreptitious recordings of police activity.

In this piece, we argue that the First Circuit’s decision is sound, that an individual’s right to secretly record the police in public spaces is protected by the First Amendment, and thus any laws outlawing this activity are unconstitutional as applied. The First Amendment protects the rights of individuals in the United States to record and report matters of interest to the public.22 22.N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281–83 (1964).Show More We argue here that such a right must extend to bystander secret recordings too. This is a novel claim: Scholars have argued in favor of granting First Amendment protection to public23 23.SeeMargot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 167, 170–71 (2017); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 339 (2011); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 991, 997–99 (2016); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 442 (2016); Elizabeth J. Frawley, Note, No Calling Cut: The Political Right to Record Police, 17 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 287, 298 (2014).Show More and secret24 24.See Timothy D. Rodden Jr., Note, Yes, This Phone Records Audio!: The Case for Allowing Surreptitious Citizen Recordings of Public Police Encounters, 47 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 905, 926–27 (2014); Taylor Robertson, Note, Lights, Camera, Arrest: The Stage is Set for a Federal Resolution of a Citizen’s Right to Record the Police in Public, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 117, 137–39 (2014).Show More recordings of the police, and against the application of wiretap statutes to recordings from a policy perspective,25 25.See Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1639, 1667–68 (2018); Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Comment, Walking a Thin Blue Line: Balancing the Citizen’s Right to Record Police Officers Against Officer Privacy, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 183, 184 (2013); Mark Brncik, Note, A Case for Non-Enforcement of Anti-Recording Laws Against Citizen Recorders, 62 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 485, 515 (2011); Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 981, 1011 (2009).Show More but there has not yet been engagement with how the First Circuit’s opinion advances these arguments. We argue that laws implicitly or explicitly prohibiting the secret recording of law enforcement are unconstitutional as-applied, and that the assertions of privacy interests made by those depicted in the recordings, earnest though they may be, cannot justify imposing sanctions on those who seek to illuminate wrongful conduct that could otherwise go without rebuke.

Secret recordings of police misconduct are particularly consequential because, by recording the behavior of police officers in the line of duty without their knowledge, the broader public can gain access to and awareness of conduct that would otherwise go without scrutiny. With the information depicted in these recordings, we as a society can examine potential instances of misconduct and create a mechanism for accountability.26 26.The increased prevalence of citizen recordings shifts the balance of power between police officers and the communities they serve. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 Geo. L.J. 1559, 1568 (2016) (arguing that changing the video’s perspective transfers power and serves a valuable social purpose).Show More The documentation and public dissemination of evidence of police misconduct by bystanders will enable the public to fully reckon with the harms propagated by those in power and work to hold them to account in ways that extant checks on police misconduct do not.27 27.See, e.g., Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording To Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 Yale L.J. 1549, 1553–55 (2008) (arguing that citizen recording supplements existing checks against law enforcement abuses, such as the exclusionary rule and Section 1983 actions); Simonson, supra note 23,at 407–21 (explaining how copwatching can serve as a form of deterrence to, data collection of, and constitutional engagement with police misconduct).Show More

In Part I, we provide an overview of the Project Veritas decision and examine the current state of the law regarding a civilian’s right to record the public conduct of police officers. We then, in Part II, explain how the First Amendment interests underpinning a right to openly record should extend to cover the production of secret recordings and contend with opposing views, before briefly concluding.

I. The Right to Record

In Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, the First Circuit reviewed a pre-enforcement action brought by plaintiffs K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez.28 28.982 F.3d 813, 817, 820 (1st Cir. 2020), aff’gMartin v. Gross, 340 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D. Mass. 2018).Show More the First Circuit reviewed a pre-enforcement action brought by plaintiffs K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez. They had initiated this challenge under Section 1983 to enjoin the Commissioner of the Boston Police and the District Attorney for Suffolk County from enforcing “Section 99,” a Massachusetts statute that prohibits the secret recording of interactions between civilians and public officials.29 29.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2018); Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 817, 820.Show More The plaintiffs were civil rights activists who had secretly recorded—and wished to continue secretly recording—police-civilian interactions as a mechanism for accountability.30 30.Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 820. Though they could not predict for the court the particular moments at which they would need to make such recordings, the plaintiffs argued that their prior experience in openly recording police officers suggested that such moments would certainly occur. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 9, Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1629) (submitted by K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez).Show More However, given the history of active of enforcement of Section 99, Martin and Perez felt they had no safe, legal avenue forward.31 31.Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 820.Show More

Though brought in a pre-enforcement action, the issue, according to the First Circuit, required no further factual development to address the plaintiffs’ claim on the merits.32 32.Id. at 828–29. It was not necessary for the court’s review that the plaintiffs specify the particular circumstances in which they would produce future secret recording, as their challenge was limited to the production of secret recordings in public spaces, a phrase the First Circuit had itself previously used to “describe the geographic bounds of the citizen’s right to record police officers.” Id.at 827 (citing Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2011); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014)).Show More Further, the court asserted that the statute’s recent history of enforcement could credibly create a fear of future prosecution in the absence of judicial intervention, and, therefore, was ripe for review.33 33.Id. at 829–30.Show More The court then found for the plaintiffs on the merits, concluding a statute that prohibits the surreptitious recording of police officers’ conduct in public spaces could not comply with the First Amendment.34 34.Id. at 830–31, 836.Show More While this decision was limited to the particular statute at issue, we argue its implications should inform courts across the country of the impermissible application of wiretap statutes against surreptitious citizen recordings of the police.

A. Background on Federal and State Wiretap Laws

In the United States, individuals generally cannot legally record a conversation without the consent of at least one party involved, when those parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interaction. Federal law dictates that a recording is legal only so long as one of the individuals involved in the conversation or encounter agrees to be recorded; in other words, one party must consent to being recorded.35 35.18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018).Show More State laws differ as to which parties must consent in order for a recording to be legal; while most have adopted similar one-party consent laws,36 36.See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6101(a)(1) (2019).Show More a minority of states are two-party consent jurisdictions, meaning the permission of both parties is required to record.37 37.Cal. Penal Code § 632 (West 2017); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(4) (2017); Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d) (2019); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1111(1)(d)–(e) (LexisNexis 2016); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(3) (West 2019); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539c–d (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2019); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 570-A:2(I) (2017); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5704(4) (West 2020); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(1) (2019). In 2014, the Illinois Supreme Court held the state’s two-party consent statute was unconstitutional as written, as it banned the recording of conversations or situations when the parties had no reasonable expectation of privacy, thus violating the First Amendment. People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120, 127 (Ill. 2014).Show More

Of note, the legislative history of these statutes suggests that they were designed, broadly speaking, with two goals in mind: First, to provide law enforcement officials with a clearly lawful means to conduct wiretaps, often with the aim of facilitating the prosecution of organized crime, and second, to protect the privacy of citizens from the overreach of electronic surveillance.38 38.Brncik, supranote 25, at 492–93.Show More

Massachusetts state law goes further and explicitly prohibits the secret recording of non-consenting parties. Their wiretapping statute bans “the secret use of [modern electronic surveillance devices] by private individuals,” as the legislature worried their proliferation and use had placed the privacy of citizens in danger.39 39.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99(A) (2018) (“The general court further finds that the uncontrolled development and unrestricted use of modern electronic surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy of all citizens of the commonwealth.”). Notably, a recording is secret, according to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when it is made without the actual knowledge of the depicted subject, though that finding may be established by “unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Mass. 1976).Show More As interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a recording was made secretly if the recorded subject had no “actual knowledge of the recording,” though such knowledge may also be shown through “clear and unequivocal objective manifestations.”40 40.Commonwealth v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Mass. 1976). See also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Mass. 2001) (reaffirming this interpretation).Show More In practice, though, this statute also prevents bystanders from secretly recording what they perceive to be police misconduct in public spaces. In 2007, activist Peter Lowney was found in violation of this statute for recording an on-duty Boston University police sergeant during a protest.41 41.Sam Bayard, Massachusetts Wiretapping Law Strikes Again, Digit. Media L. Project (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2007/massachusetts-wiretapping-law-strikes-again [https://perma.cc/ADJ9-ZZ9Q].Show More When ordered by the police to stop filming, Lowney returned the device to his pocket but did not stop recording.42 42.Id.Show More He was convicted under the statute and received a suspended sentence of up to two years in jail, a $500 fine, and was made to remove the relevant video from the internet.43 43.Daily Free Press Admin, BU Protester Fined, Could Face Jail Time, Daily Free Press (Dec. 6, 2007), https://dailyfreepress.com/2007/12/06/bu-protester-fined-could-face-jail-time/ [https://perma.cc/MG7H-4H5X].Show More

Over recent years, the use of these state wiretap laws to penalize recordings of police-civilian interactions has been challenged repeatedly in federal court, most often when such recordings were made openly.44 44.See supra note 5.Show More Each federal court of appeal facing the issue has held the application of these statutes to public (i.e. non-secret) recording of police-citizen interactions is unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.45 45.Id.Show More Since the First Amendment protects expressive activity, it also must protect the activity required to produce or create such expression.46 46.See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming that the First Amendment protects the act of “capturing inputs that may yield expression”) (quoting Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae at 7); Kreimer, supra note 23, at 408–09 (concluding that given how, in public spaces, “pervasive image capture grants authority to a range of unofficial voices . . . [and] provides a means of holding the conduct of the powerful to account,” it must be that “the First Amendment protects the right to record images we observe as part of the right to form, reflect upon, and share our memories”).Show More The Department of Justice has also affirmed that citizens must have at least some right to record the police, as “[t]he First Amendment protects the rights of private citizens to record police officers during the public discharge of their duties.”47 47.Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02888, 2012 WL 9512053 (D. Md. filed Jan. 10, 2012); see also Justin Fenton, DOJ Urges Judge to Side with Plaintiff in Baltimore Police Taping Case, Balt. Sun (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2012-01-11-bs-md-ci-aclu-doj-videotaping-20120111-story.html [https://perma.cc/7XVA-W4SW ] (describing the case).Show More And notably, the courts have affirmed that this right cannot be limited to news reporters, but must also extend to recordings made by private individuals.48 48.Glik, 655 F.3d at 83–84 (“[T]he public’s right of access to information is coextensive with that of the press.”).Show More

This should not come as a surprise. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent has recognized the existence of a First Amendment interest in criticizing public officials,49 49.See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (“The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).Show More and in particular, police officers.50 50.City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 460–62, 467 (1987) (invalidating a city ordinance which made it illegal to interrupt an officer in the performance of his duties).Show More A necessary prerequisite to such expression is the gathering of information about these public officials “from any source by means within the law,”51 51.Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).Show More which has been construed broadly enough to include audio and video recordings.52 52.SeeFirst Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (emphasizing that First Amendment protections go “beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw”).Show More Such action helps to facilitate “the free discussion of governmental affairs,”53 53.Glik, 655 F.3d at 82(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).Show More uncover governmental abuse,54 54.Id.Show More and generally improve the government’s functioning.55 55.Id. at 83(quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).Show More

Further, while such forms of newsgathering criticism often emerge spontaneously, they also take organized forms. For example, Professor Jocelyn Simonson has highlighted the fifty-year history of “copwatching,” a civic practice in which “organized groups of local residents . . . patrol their neighborhoods, monitor police conduct, and create videos of what they see.”56 56.Simonson, supranote 23, at 408.Show More She argues that copwatching is a form of constitutional engagement, as it enables local neighborhoods to “challeng[e] the control that courts and police officers have in determining what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘suspicious’ with regard to the Fourth Amendment,” and to demand that law enforcement respect the dignity of those they encounter.57 57.Id. at 421.Show More

This right to record, though, is not without limit. Some scholars and advocates argue that countervailing factors—such as the privacy interests of the police officers and civilians depicted in the recordings—justify secret recordings’ restriction.58 58.See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).Show More Courts have long held that a person does not entirely forfeit their privacy when entering public spaces.59 59.See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (clarifying that “under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable” as an invasion of one’s right to privacy).Show More In fact, as Professor Margot Kaminski has explained, statutes that regulate recording protect legitimate privacy interests, since that which an individual does not reveal to the recorder is meant to remain private and should be protected against another’s intrusions.60 60.Kaminski, supra note 23, at 171. It should be noted, though, that privacy is a notoriously difficult value to characterize, and it often depends upon the context in which it is claimed. See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 101–70 (2008) (proposing a taxonomy of privacy interests); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1907–08 (2013) (arguing that attempts to define privacy as deriving a single overarching principle are inevitably unworkable).Show More Professor Kaminski further asserts that the distribution of such recordings—such as the posting of video and audio recordings of police misconduct on social media—implicate a second, distinct privacy interest in preserving one’s dignity from harm.61 61.Kaminski, supra note 23, at 202–03. But cf. Kreimer, supra note 23, at 404 (arguing that the primary privacy harm of recording is in its public dissemination).Show More

Police officers, however, cannot claim to have as robust expectations of privacy when acting as public officials as they might when off-duty.62 62.See, e.g.,Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001) (“[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”).Show More Some courts have emphasized that police officers shed any expectation of privacy when they act in public spaces, particularly if the conduct at issue is easily observable by members of the public.63 63.See e.g., State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“The State urges us to adopt the view that public officers performing an official function on a public thoroughfare in the presence of a third party and within the sight and hearing of passersby enjoy a privacy interest which they may assert under the statute. We reject that view as wholly without merit.”).Show More Other courts have focused on the prominent and important nature of the police officer’s position in the community to determine that they cannot expect the same kind of privacy when on-duty as a private citizen might otherwise claim.64 64.See, e.g., Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E. 2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000) (finding that a police officer is a public official for purposes of defamation claims because of “the broad powers vested in police officers and the great potential for abuse of those powers, as well as police officers[’] high visibility within and impact on a community.”).Show More Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that an individual can claim no protection under the Fourth Amendment for information consensually disclosed to a police officer.65 65.See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437–39 (1963).Show More

Other scholars claim that recording officers in public might impede the execution of important police investigations. This concern becomes most salient if the officers are acting undercover, as recording them may legitimately compromise the officer’s safety.66 66.Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2007) (highlighting the importance of protecting officer safety but nonetheless finding that the public interest in revealing officer misconduct outweighed that concern under the facts of this case).Show More In a similar vein, some fear that the threat of recording might deter members of the public from seeking assistance from or giving critically important information to the police.67 67.SeeACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611–12 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). Surveys show that a majority of police officers often suggest they are supportive of wearing body cameras. See Rich Morin, Kim Parker, Renee Stepler & Andrew Mercer, Behind the Badge, Pew Rsch. Ctr. 75 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/Police-Report_FINAL_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG6C-FTCW]. But that support does not often extend to citizen recorders, as law enforcement feel they would unduly interfere with the execution of their duties. See, e.g., Alysia Santo, Why Cops Aren’t Ready for Their Close-Up, Marshall Project (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/24/why-cops-aren-t-ready-for-their-close-up [https://perma.cc/29Y3-3ZL4] (highlighting police support for a 2015 Texas state bill that would criminalize photographing on-duty police officers).Show More For situations in which recorders hamper law enforcement’s ability to maintain public safety, though, officers have the ability to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to prevent the conduct.68 68.Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607; Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). See alsoKelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing “even insofar as it is clearly established, the right to record matters of public concern is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions”).Show More In a recent Section 1983 action, one plaintiff alleged an officer impermissibly interfered with his First Amendment right to record the police when the officer seized the plaintiff’s drone, which was flying over a car accident.69 69.Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196, 2015 WL 1296258, at *1–2 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015).Show More The court found no violation of his First Amendment rights, because despite the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining footage, the drone’s “trespass[] onto an active crime scene” hampered the police investigation.70 70.Id. at *10. The court expressly contrasted the plaintiff’s actions with the attempts by citizens to record the police using handheld devices at a distance from the ongoing investigation, like those at issue in Glikand Alvarez. Id.Show More

B. The First Circuit’s Project Veritas Decision

In December 2020, the First Circuit became the first federal court of appeals in the country to weigh in on the constitutionality of secret recordings. Judge Barron, writing for a unanimous panel, first found that the act of producing secret recordings is deserving of First Amendment protection, given the critical role such actions play in newsgathering.71 71.Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 832 (1st Cir. 2020).Show More In fact, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that secret recordings can “sometimes be a better tool for ‘gathering information about’ police officers conducting their official duties in public, and thereby facilitating ‘the free discussion of governmental affairs’ and ‘uncovering . . . abuses,’ than open recording is” because it is less likely to disrupt police operations and less likely to engender resistance from police officers.72 72.Id. at 832–33.Show More Admittedly, the production of the recording is not a form of expressive speech in the same way that Professor Jocelyn Simonson has described regarding open recordings.73 73.Simonson, supranote 23, at 435–36 (describing how organized copwatching takes “the shape of a confrontational practice that seeks change through a combination of official and grassroots channels”).Show More Nonetheless, the court argued that the secret recordings “can constitute newsgathering every bit as much as a credentialed reporter’s after-the-fact efforts to ascertain what had transpired.”74 74.Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 833.Show More

The court then affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that Section 99, like other state wiretap laws, is a “content-neutral law of general applicability.”75 75.Id. at 834 (quoting Jean v. Mass. St. Police, 492 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2007)).Show More While First Circuit precedent had not cleanly articulated what level of scrutiny should apply to such a law, the court concluded that the lower court’s evaluation under intermediate scrutiny—whether the statute “is ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest’”—was correct.76 76.Id. (quoting Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2016)).Show More

Having identified the relevant First Amendment interest at issue and the level of scrutiny to apply, the Court then revisited the two interests Section 99 was designed to realize: to “prevent[] interference with police activities and protect[] individual privacy.”77 77.Id. at 836.Show More The court conceded these qualified as important government interests but nevertheless found that an outright ban on secret recordings was not a narrowly tailored means to pursue those ends. First, any secret recording, by definition, would be produced out of plain sight and without the actual knowledge of the officer depicted.78 78.Id.Show More Accordingly, it would be hard to imagine how the recording itself could be understood to interfere with police activity.79 79.Id. at 836–37. The court did nod to Judge Posner’s concern in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting)—that the potential for secret recordings could deter confidential informants from cooperating with police officers. However, the court found it was largely without merit, given that officers meeting with informants are likely careful about the circumstances in which they do so and the defendants offered no concrete evidence of such deterrence, only conjecture. Id. at 837.Show More

The court devoted considerably more attention to the second potential government interest: protecting individual privacy. At oral argument, the District Attorney argued the relevant interest was not a freedom from being filmed, but a freedom from being filmed without notice to ensure “the vibrancy of [] public spaces” and assure citizens “they will not be unwittingly recorded.”80 80.Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 837–38.Show More While acknowledging the importance of this interest, Judge Barron countered that on-duty police officers “are expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.”81 81.Id. at 838 (quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011)).Show More To that end, the court concluded that even where a police officer might have some privacy interest in their actions, a total ban of surreptitious audio recordings is “too unqualified to be justified in the name of protecting that degree of privacy.”82 82.Id.Show More Even the privacy concerns of individuals who interact with police officers cannot justify “the blunderbuss prohibitory approach embodied in Section 99,” given the public nature of the private individual’s speech.83 83.Id. at 839. For example, the court noted the potential privacy interest in the identity of rape victims. Id. (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989)).Show More Given the critically important role that surreptitious recordings play in the ability of private individuals to gather news about police officer conduct without fear of retaliation for their actions, the statute failed intermediate scrutiny.84 84.For that reason, the court found that there was no alternative kind of recording that would serve the same function as surreptitious recordings. Their outright prohibition under Section 99 could not survive intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 839–40.Show More

Police officers, as agents of the state, are entrusted with the protection of the public safety and are authorized to exert force, including deadly force if necessary, to achieve that mission.85 85.SeeBarry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing without Permission5 (2017) (“Policing officials are granted remarkable powers. They are allowed to use force on us. And to conduct surveillance of us. . . . Possession of these powers . . .  is what defines policing, what sets it apart.”).Show More However, to render that permission legitimate, the public must be able to seek redress when its trust is abused. As Robert Post argues, this process requires that “citizens have access to the public sphere so that they can participate in the formation of public opinion” and “that governmental decision making be somehow rendered accountable to public opinion.”86 86.Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477, 482 (2011). Show More Within the context of policing, the production of recordings by citizens can play a critical role in that democratic process by broadening the scope of perspectives that informs the public’s understanding of the police.

Given the extent to which many activists, like Martin and Perez, credibly fear retribution, it may be that surreptitious recordings are the only kind that activists feel safe to produce. While recordings of law enforcement officers are often made openly, with the intention of making the officer aware they are being recorded,87 87.See, e.g.,Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2011). These kinds of tactics have consistently been used in protests over police brutality. Karen Hao, How to Turn Filming the Police into the End of Police Brutality, M.I.T. Tech. Rev. (June 10, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/10/1002913/how-to-end-police-brutality-filming-witnessing-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/LLB7-686G].Show More this is not the case for those who fear reprisals. Recordings bringing attention to the most salient examples of police brutality have often come at a heavy cost to those who created them, including through violent retaliation, intimidation, and pretextual arrest at the hands of law enforcement.88 88.Officers often render citations to civilian recorders for broadly defined and difficult to disprove charges, such as obstruction. See, e.g.,Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017). Some of the most prominent civilian recorders, like those who filmed the police killings of Freddie Gray, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Philando Castile, and Alton Sterling, have faced continued harassment at the hands of the police. Dragana Kaurin, The Price of Filming Police Violence, Vice (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en/article/evqw9z/filming-police-brutality-retaliation [https://perma.cc/9PUX-6DAG].Show More Cities have also enacted ordinances imposing sanctions on those recording public police activity if an officer determines the recording unduly interferes with their ongoing investigation.89 89.See, e.g.,Tucson, Ariz., Code art. I, §§ 11-70.3, 11-70.4 (2020) (prohibiting individuals from “physically entering crime scenes or areas immediately surrounding where such enforcement activity . . . [is] taking place” and criminalizing activity that “materially inhibits, obstructs, hinders, or delays any Police Officer . . . in the exercise of the Officer’s official duties”).Show More Under such threats, it is no wonder individuals wish to keep secret their act of recording.

And just as the ability to produce secret recordings incentivizes the “democratization of proof,”90 90.Fan, supranote 25, at 1645.Show More so too does it ensure that officers cannot hide from public scrutiny by changing their behavior when they know others may see it. Counsel for the government of Massachusetts, in the oral argument for Project Veritas, raised this very point, ironically asserting that secret recordings should be prohibited so that public officials can know when they are being recorded and censor their behavior accordingly.91 91.See Oral Argument at 14:20, Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, No. 19-1629 (1st Cir. argued Jan. 8, 2020), sub nom. Martin v. Gross, 340 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D. Mass. 2018), available at https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/67830/project-veritas-action-fund-v-rollins/ [https://perma.cc/NCP4-82GU] (“Under the statute, the principle that the legislature subscribed to . . . is the notion that people have an interest in knowing when they’re being recorded, so that they can make appropriate choices about how to conduct themselves.”).Show More We assert, however, that this is directly contrary to the public’s interest. We should not want police officers to modify how they would otherwise behave when the public is not watching. In fact, surreptitious recording is the only way we can truly know how public officials are acting when the cameras are no longer rolling. Embracing secret recording, as the First Circuit demonstrated in Project Veritas, would supplement the range of perspectives that the public can access. It would bring life to the idea that “[W]e are the police. What is done by the police is done by all of us.”92 92.Friedman, supranote 85, at 321.Show More

C. Other Circuit Precedent on Surreptitious Recordings

The First Circuit’s decision is groundbreaking, in large part, because no other federal circuit has addressed the question of surreptitious recordings so squarely. Though a variety of courts have identified a generalized right to record the police in public, none have examined the contours of this right in such great detail.93 93.SeeTurner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017) (“This right [to record the police], however, ‘is not without limitations.’ Like all speech, filming the police ‘may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.’ In this case, however, we need not decide which specific time, place, and manner restrictions would be reasonable.”) (quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011)); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to address the limits of the constitutional right to record); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court need not address surreptitious recordings or recordings of private conversations); Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (declining to address the limits of the right to film); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court had not yet interpreted whether its wiretapping statute covered private conversations); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a First Amendment right to record but not defining its scope).Show More Further, in circuits that have not considered the issue, courts have granted police officers qualified immunity for actions taken to prevent civilian recorders from documenting officers’ actions in public, or for retaliating against these recorders, so long as they were not otherwise infringing upon the recorder’s constitutional rights.94 94.For example, the Tenth Circuit recently found that four officers were entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action that alleged the officers had unconstitutionally infringed on the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to record the police in public spaces because no such right had been clearly established at the time of the purported violation. Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1023 (10th Cir. 2021). However, the court then “exercise[d] [its] discretion to bypass the constitutional question of whether such right even exists.” Id. at 1020 n.4.Show More This reality has endangered citizens’ ability to surreptitiously record the police.

Notably, the Seventh Circuit, in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, went so far as to evince explicit skepticism that the First Amendment would protect surreptitious recordings made in public spaces.95 95.See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605–07.Show More This was despite holding that private citizens have a right to produce public recordings of police-civilian interactions.96 96.Id. at 608 (enjoining the State’s Attorney from applying the Illinois wiretap statute against the ACLU and its employees who openly record law enforcement).Show More The court distinguished the public nature of the recording at issue from surreptitious recordings, suggesting that the regulation of the latter might survive intermediate scrutiny because secret recordings fail to provide adequate notice to subjects that they are being recorded.97 97.Id. at 605–06. Under this standard, courts ask whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, meaning the government must prove its interest “would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation” and that the regulation can accomplish this end without burdening “substantially more speech than is necessary.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).Show More According to the court, the secret nature of the recording could “bring[] stronger privacy interests into play.”98 98.Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001)).Show More The Seventh Circuit’s skepticism about the legality of secret recordings was, until now, the only forecast of how regulations of surreptitious recordings under state and federal wiretap statutes might be treated.

In addition, prior to the First Circuit’s decision in Project Veritas, federal courts had largely avoided questions involving the constitutionality of secret recording of the police. Federal and state courts alike often found that the act of recording does not violate state wiretap statutes, as officers cannot reasonably claim an expectation of privacy in public places.99 99.See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *19 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2010); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. Gaydula, No. CIV. A. 85-1859, 1989 WL 156343, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1989).Show More And while courts have been clear that bystanders have a right to record police-civilian interactions, they have avoided exploring whether an officer might claim a privacy interest in cases involving recordings produced by third parties by finding that the bystander recorder violated another statute while producing their recording (such that police intervention was necessary), or, conversely, that the bystander’s right to record had not been clearly established.100 100.See Bleish v. Moriarty, No.11-cv-162, 2012 WL 2752188, at *10–*12 (D.N.H. 2012) (finding a Section 1983 plaintiff’s arrest for disorderly conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the plaintiff failed to show she was arrested for exercising her First Amendment rights); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to show that the police had violated their First Amendment right to record); Gravolet v. Tassin, No.08-3646, 2009 WL 1565864, at *4 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009) (finding a Section 1983 plaintiff’s arrest while recording did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers had probable cause to arrest him for stalking and that the plaintiff failed to clearly establish his right to record).Show More That path, however, was unavailable to the First Circuit. Section 99, as described above, is unique among wiretap statutes in that it prohibits all secretly produced audio recordings, irrespective of whether the person depicted could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their recorded speech.101 101.Seesupra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.Show More As a result, the court, for the first time in the country, fully confronted the constitutionality of such a regulation.

II. Impact Beyond Boston

The implications of the First Circuit’s decision in Project Veritas will reach far outside the state of Massachusetts. While Section 99 is unique in its express prohibition of secret recordings, the underlying principle has direct consequences to other states’ wiretap laws. We argue here that, as similar First Amendment interests are at play in both public and secret contexts, constitutional protection for secret recordings should be extended across the country,102 102.Scholars have previously discussed the compelling justifications for extending constitutional protection to surreptitious recordings. See, e.g., Rodden, supra note 24, at 907.Show More as has successfully happened in the First Circuit. While the Seventh Circuit may be correct in highlighting that surreptitious recording of police might implicate different privacy interests than open recordings,103 103.Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13.Show More the distinction between them is not sufficiently meaningful, on its own, to override these important First Amendment interests. Further, solutions outside of constitutionally securing the right to secretly record the police provide insufficient protection and certainty to would-be recorders. To reach an opposite conclusion would frustrate police accountability efforts and threaten the public’s understanding of police misconduct.

A. The Contours of This Argument

The claim we make here is a limited one: The First Circuit was correct to hold that a right to record should protect bystanders who secretly record on-duty officers engaging with citizens in public spaces.104 104.There are valid, constitutionally cognizable concerns that may limit the right to secretly record police-civilian interactions, for example, in private spaces. See Kaminski, supra note 23, at 238–42. However, these distinctions are not constitutionally meaningful when comparing secret and open recordings of the police in public.Show More However, such a right is not unlimited. For example, if the making of a recording might legitimately interfere with police activities, or, per the First Circuit, lead an officer to “reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with his duties,” such recordings may be proscribed by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.105 105.Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014). But see Simonson, supranote 23, at 1563 (arguing that an officer may only prevent those acts of recording which would create a “concrete, physical impediment to a police officer or to public safety”).Show More It is admittedly more complicated to proscribe such measures in circumstances where the recording in question was made surreptitiously—but it would be correspondingly difficult to prove such secret recordings actually interfered with the officer’s exercise of their duties.106 106.See supra note 79 and accompanying text.Show More

An echo of this concern rings through in Judge Posner’s dissent in Alvarez. He argues that in some circumstances, a private citizen might want to engage a police officer in public without their interaction “being broadcast on the evening news or blogged throughout the world.”107 107.Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 611 (Posner, J., dissenting).Show More Just as the threat of civilian oversight might discourage members of the public—from the covert informant to the crime victim—from seeking out an officers’ aid, so too might a policeman’s ability to protect the public safety be diminished if he were to be constantly watching for any would-be recorders.108 108.See id. at 611–12 (Posner, J., dissenting).Show More It would follow that such an effect would be all the more pronounced where an officer, and the public with which he interacts, know that any passerby could record and publish their interaction, without either of them having ever been made the wiser.

The concern is not without merit, but it is one that can be addressed with tools officers already have at their disposal. First, they might meet with private citizens in private settings, where an officer’s privacy interest is stronger.109 109.See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 232 A.3d 747, 755–56 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2020) (holding that a no-filming condition in the lobby of a police department was a reasonable time, place, manner restriction to “ensure the safety, security and privacy of officers, informants and victims”).Show More While the public has a legitimate interest in observing the public behavior of police officers, the “Constitution itself is [not] a Freedom of Information Act.”110 110.Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (quoting Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)).Show More Thus, individuals cannot expect the government to disclose private information regarding police officer engagements, particularly if such a disclosure might “place[] their personal security, [or] that of their families, at substantial risk.”111 111.Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067–69 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the city’s release of the police personnel files, which included, among other things, officers’ home addresses, phone numbers, banking information, social security numbers, of the police officers who participated as witnesses in a criminal defense trial to defense counsel violated the officers’ due process rights by rendering them vulnerable to “private acts of vengeance”). See alsoWhalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (holding that there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy in an individual’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of highly sensitive, personal information).Show More Second, to the extent that there may exist a legitimate need to engage a civilian without public observation, there is, of course, nothing preventing an officer from establishing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to do so. In an instance in which an officer might not be sure whether or not privacy is necessary to pursue an investigatory lead or promote the public safety, reasonable preemptive measures could well be taken to prevent the interference of a surreptitious recording.112 112.See, e.g.,Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725–26 (2000) (holding that an eight-foot zone around persons entering a healthcare facility was “a valid time, place, and manner regulation”). Where the production of a secret recording would contravene such reasonable time, place, manner restrictions, the police may legitimately stop the citizen recorder’s production and dissemination of that recording. See, e.g., Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017). It should be noted, though, that Supreme Court precedent suggests that the police still may not prohibit the dissemination of such recordings by third parties. SeeBartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (“[A] stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”); see alsoJean v. Mass. St. Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that the publication of another’s surreptitiously produced recording, thereby violating Section 99, is entitled to First Amendment protection and therefore immunized the publisher from prosecution, even where the publisher “arguably participated . . . in a conspiracy to disclose the content of [an] illegally recorded oral communication”).Show More

Furthermore, regardless of whether a recording is produced openly or surreptitiously, it remains true there is not a cognizable constitutional claim to privacy in conversations between police officers and civilians. As in the case of openly made recordings, officers do not have a legitimate privacy interest in their conduct when acting in an official capacity in public spaces.113 113.See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text; see also Jesse Harlan Alderman, Before You Press Record: Unanswered Questions Surrounding the First Amendment Right to Film Public Police Activity, 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 485, 513 (2013) (explaining that “police officers qua police officers do not own a personal privacy expectation in their official acts under prevailing judicial interpretations”).Show More As a result, creating a distinction between open and surreptitious recordings lacks constitutional significance. Giving notice to those recorded does not change the public nature of the exchange or the public’s interest in them.

As discussed in Part I, though, private citizens captured in secret recordings have different privacy interests at stake than police officers.114 114.See supranotes 58–61 and accompanying text. Some have argued that any person who engages a police officer in a public space loses any reasonable expectation of privacy that they might otherwise be able to claim. See Alderman, supra note 113, at 513–14.Show More Private civilians interacting with the police might legitimately argue that surreptitious recordings violate their right to be let alone, particularly if the interaction devolves into violence or, as it has for too many, death. Some commentators have observed how the production, and subsequent viral consumption, of such videos can become exploitative and even echo the lynch mobs of years past.115 115.See Allissa V. Richardson, Why Cellphone Videos of Black People’s Deaths Should Be Considered Sacred, Like Lynching Photographs,The Conversation (May 28, 2020), https://theconversation.com/why-cellphone-videos-of-black-peoples-deaths-should-be-considered-sacred-like-lynching-photographs-139252 [https://perma.cc/XRH4-XL75].Show More Such privacy concerns extend to bystanders who happen to be captured by a recording, especially when they are engaged in personally or politically sensitive activity.116 116.Consider a recording of protestors that could expose them to criminal or civil liability. Depending on the circumstances of the conduct depicted, the protestor may have a colorable claim that the recording of their actions was an invasion of their privacy. See Thomas Germain, How to Record Video During a Protest, Consumer Reports (June 5, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/audio-video/how-to-record-video-during-a-protest/ [https://perma.cc/7BN6-QPM7].Show More

These claims, as the First Circuit found, should fail under a standard of intermediate scrutiny, as they do in the public recording context. The viability of any privacy interest underlying such claims necessarily depends on the circumstances of the interaction in question, the means of recording, and the reasonability of the party’s expectation of privacy. Scholars have presented a number of ways to determine whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable;117 117.See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as Heckling, 108 Geo. L. J. 125, 169–73 (2019); see also Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 871, 877–78 (1989) (suggesting a three-pronged analysis to adjudicate the reasonability of an individual’s claim to privacy within the context of disclosing a patient’s HIV status); Doris DelTosto Brogan, Privacy’s Place at the Table: A Reflection on Richard Turkington’s Approach to Valuing and Balancing Privacy Interests, 61 Vill. L. Rev. 437, 445, 456–64 (2016) (arguing that Professor Turkington’s framework is broadly applicable and analyzing its potential application to the NSA data sweeping program and the deployment of police body cameras as examples).Show More an underlying theme of these proposals involves determining the costs inflicted on other important social values, including the ability for the public to critique matters of public interest.118 118.See, e.g., DelTosto Brogan, supra note 117, at 443–45 (comparing such an analysis to that proposed by Judge Learned Hand to analyze whether or not a defendant acted negligently in the canonical United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).Show More Where such costs cannot be found to outweigh the value of maintaining one’s assertion of privacy, the privacy interest should give way.119 119.DelTosto Brogan, supra note 117, at 443–45.Show More Moreover, there are less restrictive means to protecting these privacy interests. When one is surreptitiously recorded, they can redress harm through a private tort action against the recorder as an invasion of their privacy, to the extent such a relevant interest exists.120 120.Among other causes of action, a plaintiff might successfully argue a recording was an undue invasion of their privacy if it created “unreasonable publicity,” so long as the matter publicized was “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “not of legitimate concern to the public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652D, 652D cmt. C (1977).Show More

And, from a pragmatic perspective, a legal distinction between open and secret recordings is not workable in a world where recording technology is ever-evolving. Today’s iPhone may well be supplanted by tomorrow’s eyeglass camera. Given the subjective nature of the inquiry of the depicted subject’s knowledge, determining whether a recording was made surreptitiously would require a court to identify the kind of recording technology of which a depicted subject was aware before even considering whether the officer understood a recording was being taken.121 121.Analogous inquiries have plagued courts. For example, the Supreme Court has previously instructed lower courts to determine whether a police officer’s use of a given piece of technology in the course of an investigation constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment by asking whether that technology was in “general public use” at the time. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001). Critics have argued that such an inquiry is inadequate because it fails to consider how “courts [are] to deal with the rapid pace of technological development in deciding whether something is in the general public use.” SeeChristopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1393, 1412–13 (2002) (furthering that “[a]dvanced technology can find its way in to the average home very quickly. When that happens . . . the courts will either have to change their stance, manipulate the meaning of the general public use doctrine, or ignore it”).Show More Even if a court could salvage a standard to apply to such situations, such a test would hardly provide the level of necessary certainty to those who hope to record police-civilian interactions without fear of retribution or legal sanction.

In short, prohibiting the secret recording of police-civilian interactions under wiretap laws constitutes a broad overreach that fails to account for the valid First Amendment interests such actions serve.122 122.See supranotes 75–84 and accompanying text.Show More Applying such laws to secret recordings leads to chilling effects felt by those fearing criminal prosecution and retaliation.123 123.See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (“The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.”).Show More To most effectively promote the First Amendment interests in bringing light to misconduct that might otherwise go unnoticed, surreptitious recordings should be granted constitutional protection.124 124.For an exploration of this argument, seegenerally Rodden, supranote 24.Show More In other words, a strong implication of the Project Veritas decision is that the application of one-party consent wiretap laws against secret recordings should be held unconstitutional.

B. The Insufficiency of Alternatives

In the alternative, some scholars argue that granting constitutional protection to secret recorders is unnecessary. To fix this social problem, police departments and prosecutors’ offices should simply commit to a policy of non-enforcement of wiretap statutes against civilian recorders.125 125.Brncik, supranote 25, at 515–19.Show More Or, instead, these entities should lead educational campaigns about the potential criminal liability associated with recording the police in public spaces, so as to protect potential violators from sanction.126 126.Id. at 520–21.Show More From this perspective, amending wiretap statutes would be too difficult, given the privacy interests implicated and the opposition such efforts would engender from groups like police unions.127 127.Id. at 514–15 (citing attempts at reform in Congress and the Mississippi legislature that were stymied, in large part, by police union opposition).Show More Instead, a policy of non-enforcement would enjoy support from such special interests (who might otherwise balk at the idea of dramatic policy change) while accomplishing the same policy ends.128 128.Id. at 516–17 (pointing out police departments that have adopted such a policy and advising prosecutors’ offices to follow suit).Show More

We agree that Congress, state legislatures, and police departments would serve the public well by implementing policies that dissuade officers from arresting or harassing those who record public police conduct. And, in the absence of other developments, such a policy choice may be warranted. However, the very conceit of this argument—that the production of these recordings implicates societal values of sufficient importance to encourage policy change129 129.Id. at 502–03 (“These recordings help to inform the public and to enrich the public debate over what is or is not abusive behavior. Video evidence is particularly valuable because videos provide the viewer . . . a credible account of the interaction.”).Show More—highlights the weakness of the position. As the First Circuit’s decision makes clear, civilians’ ability to surreptitiously record the police in public spaces implicates a critical First Amendment interest that, absent a significant and countervailing government interest, cannot be infringed by state or federal policy.130 130.Project Veritas v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 831 (1st Cir. 2020) (affirming the “particular significance of First Amendment newsgathering rights with respect to government”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).Show More The important nature of the right thereby requires that any protection granted for it be unyielding to the whims of those who may later find it inconvenient, a quality not exhibited by a policy of non-enforcement. Such a practice is only a temporary fix for a larger, structural problem and leaves individuals’ rights vulnerable to future violation. The salience of this interest necessitates constitutional protection, both inside Massachusetts and beyond.131 131.See Rodden, supranote 24, at 906–07 (advocating that the secret recording of the police be permissible under all wiretap statutes, as a discrepancy between the standards applied to secret and open recordings “gives police the ability to circumvent this right, subjects those who wish to exercise it to potential prosecution, and reduces police accountability for their actions”). The First Circuit’s decision, in many ways, serves as a model for how Rodden’s argument can be given effect nationally.Show More

Further, a policy of non-enforcement is incapable of supplying the requisite level of certainty to would-be secret recorders, in either the short or long term, to guarantee they will not face criminal penalties for their activity.132 132.For an extensive discussion on the merits and dangers of nonenforcement, see generally Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 937 (2017).Show More While a policy of non-enforcement may temporarily abate a recorder’s fear of criminal prosecution, it is neither legally binding nor free from the prospect of its future renouncement.133 133.As explored by Professor Price, whether or not one’s reliance interests would be protected under a policy of nonenforcement depends on how a particular jurisdiction would weigh that interest against the rights of executives to enforce the law. Id. at 947.Show More As a result, those interested in recording surreptitiously may be discouraged from doing so under such guidelines. It is only by recognizing the right to secretly record that the balance of power can be shifted and third-party bystanders can be empowered to shed light on police misconduct—not merely when those in power allow it. As the First Circuit acknowledged, this aim is best accomplished through a widely-recognized constitutional guarantee of the First Amendment right to secretly record the police.134 134.See supranotes 90–92 and accompanying text.Show More In this way, Project Veritas can serve as a model for how the right to record intersects with, and by and large outweighs, other political and social interests.

Conclusion

On March 3, 1991, Rodney King was brutally beaten during a routine traffic stop by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. A plumber named George Holliday—who observed the altercation from a nearby, second-story balcony—pulled out his newly-purchased Sony Handycam and hit “record.”135 135.Paul Martin Lester, Visual Ethics: A Guide for Photographers, Journalists, and Filmmakers 87 (2018); Erik Ortiz, George Holliday, Who Taped Rodney King Beating, Urges Others to Share Videos, NBC News (June 9, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/george-holliday-who-taped-rodney-king-beating-urges-others-share-n372551 [https://perma.cc/NM3F-Z9KZ].Show More

A direct line connects George Holliday to Darnella Frazier and the social movements their actions have inspired. These movements would not have been possible without bystander recording of the police.136 136.See McLaughlin, supra note 2.Show More In a recent statement marking the one year anniversary of George Floyd’s murder, Frazier put it simply: “If it weren’t for my video, the world wouldn’t have known the truth.”137 137.Hannah Knowles, Teen Speaks Out a Year After Filming George Floyd’s Death, Saying Her Video ‘Put His Murderer Away’, Wash. Post (May 25, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/25/darnella-frazier-floyd-statement/ [https://perma.cc/4XMH-A2UZ].Show More While the interactions filmed by George Holliday and Darnella Frazier graphically illustrated the real, brutal, and unauthorized tactics of law enforcement, it was the recording of these circumstances that pushed an understanding of this reality into our public consciousness.

The First Circuit’s decision in Project Veritas affirms this reality and, in response, correctly extends constitutional protection to surreptitious recorders. A legal regime that would draw unintelligible distinctions between secret and open recordings would restrict the tools available to the Fraziers and Hollidays of tomorrow. The secret recording of the police is a particularly crucial tool, as it enables the public reporting of police activity in a way that exposes police misconduct, better informs public discourse, and makes democratic redress and reform possible, free from fear of police retaliation or legal sanction. In this way, secret recordings of the police serve a valid First Amendment interest that open recordings cannot. While these recordings implicate the privacy interests of those depicted, particularly for third-party bystanders who act without notice that their words and conduct are being recorded for public observation, these interests are not sufficient to justify the prohibition of secret recordings.

The First Circuit’s decision boldly, and correctly, gives purchase to the claim that secret recordings allow us to internalize not just what police permit us to see, but what happens at the hands of law enforcement agents when cameras are off. As other courts should soon recognize, the secret recording of police by bystanders is—and must be—a First Amendment-protected right, and wiretap statutes restricting this practice must be found unconstitutional as applied. The robustness of our public reporting and, consequently, our ability to remedy police misconduct depends on it.

  1. * Aidan J. Coleman, University of Virginia School of Law, J.D. 2021; University of Virginia, M.A. (History) 2021. Katharine M. Janes, University of Virginia School of Law, J.D. 2021; University of Virginia, M.A. (History) 2021. We would like to thank Professor Frederick Schauer, William Scheffer, and Chinmayi Sharma for their helpful feedback on early drafts of this Comment. A special thanks to the editors of the Virginia Law Review—and in particular Elizabeth Adler, Tyler Demetriou, and Anna Cecile Pepper—for their insightful comments and edits.
  2. Joshua Nevett, George Floyd: The Personal Cost of Filming Police Brutality, BBC News (June 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52942519 [https://perma.cc/‌VC7P-C3RU].
  3. Audra D. S. Burch & John Eligon, Bystander Videos of George Floyd and Others Are Policing the Police, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/‌george-floyd-minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/4G2N-DVA5]. See also Eliot C. McLaughlin, How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning that Shows No Signs of Slowing Down, CNN (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/us/george-floyd-protests-different-why/index.html [https://perma.cc/D7UC-Y6AR] (highlighting that the protests following George Floyd’s death were unique in that they saw an influx of “myriad White faces”).
  4. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Social Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3
    , 2020),

    https://www.nytimes.com/‌interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/6XAT-9MJE]. The 2017 Women’s March previously held this title, which saw crowds of 3 to 5 million in marches nationwide. Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 2.

  5. Scott Gant, We’re All Journalists Now: The Transformation of the Press and Reshaping of the Law in the Internet Age
    6 (2007).

  6. See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355–56 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–600, 608 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
  7. See Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 819–20 (1st Cir. 2020).
  8. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606–07, 607 n.13 (“The distinction between open and concealed recording, however, may make a difference in the intermediate-scrutiny calculus because surreptitious recording brings stronger privacy interests into play.”).
  9. 982 F.3d at 833.
  10. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2018) (‘‘Section 99’’).
  11. Project Veritas, a far-right non-profit organization whose methods have sparked controversy, brought a separate challenge to Section 99 that, on appeal, was consolidated with K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez’s suit against the Suffolk County District Attorney. Martin and Perez are unaffiliated with Project Veritas. Project Veritas went beyond Martin and Perez’s requested remedy by seeking to enjoin the enforcement of this statute against the secret recording of any public official. Given the broader nature of this claim, this essay will not contest whether or not the rationales justifying the court’s decision in this case should be applied to cover all such figures. However, it is worth noting that the First Circuit rejected Project Veritas’s broader argument on the grounds that it was unripe. See Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 817.
  12. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 1–2, Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1629) (submitted by K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez).
  13. Id. at 9–11.
  14. Gary Man Arrested for Recording Police Officer, Now Considering Legal Action, NBC Chicago (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/gary-man-arrested-for-recording-police-officer-now-considering-legal-action/2319456/ [https://perma.cc/CB8J-7YBK].
  15. Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC News (July 16, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=‌11179076 [https://perma.cc/E3NH-N6HJ].
  16. Mayor: 3 Charged in Fraudulent Check Scheme; Internal Investigation Launched After Cops Scuffle with Man Videotaping Scene, WHAS-TV (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.whas11.com/article/news/crime/jeffersontown-officers-arrest-man-videotaping-kentucky-investigation-3-charged-check-fraud/417-a32470a8-5810-4b5e-a095-4e1105c3d331 [https://perma.cc/BJS5-L85D].
  17. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues After Mother Falsely Arrested by Boynton Beach Police Officers (June 25, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-sues-after-mother-falsely-arrested-boynton-beach-police-officers [https://perma.cc/9HU9-LB2K].
  18. Press Release, ACLU Pa., Lawsuit on Behalf of Man Arrested for Recording Police Officer Settles (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.aclupa.org/en/press-releases/lawsuit-behalf-man-arrested-recording-police-officer-settles [https://perma.cc/7DWJ-545F].
  19. Man Arrested for Recording Police Awarded $275,000, CBS Sacramento (Nov. 29, 2017), https://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2017/11/29/man-arrested-for-recording-police-awarded-275000/ [https://perma.cc/8YNP-3SV5].
  20. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2018).
  21. See infra Part I.A.
  22. See id.
  23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281–83 (1964).
  24. See Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 167, 170–71 (2017); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 339 (2011); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 991, 997–99 (2016); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 442 (2016); Elizabeth J. Frawley, Note, No Calling Cut: The Political Right to Record Police, 17 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 287, 298 (2014).
  25. See Timothy D. Rodden Jr., Note, Yes, This Phone Records Audio!: The Case for Allowing Surreptitious Citizen Recordings of Public Police Encounters, 47 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 905, 926–27 (2014); Taylor Robertson, Note, Lights, Camera, Arrest: The Stage is Set for a Federal Resolution of a Citizen’s Right to Record the Police in Public, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 117, 137–39 (2014).
  26. See Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1639, 1667–68 (2018); Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Comment, Walking a Thin Blue Line: Balancing the Citizen’s Right to Record Police Officers Against Officer Privacy, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 183, 184 (2013); Mark Brncik, Note, A Case for Non-Enforcement of Anti-Recording Laws Against Citizen Recorders, 62 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 485, 515 (2011); Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 981, 1011 (2009).
  27. The increased prevalence of citizen recordings shifts the balance of power between police officers and the communities they serve. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 Geo. L.J.
    1559, 1568 (2016) (

    arguing that changing the video’s perspective transfers power and serves a valuable social purpose).

  28. See, e.g., Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording To Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 Yale L.J. 1549, 1553–55 (2008) (arguing that citizen recording supplements existing checks against law enforcement abuses, such as the exclusionary rule and Section 1983 actions); Simonson, supra note 23,

    at 407–21 (explaining how copwatching can serve as a form of deterrence to, data collection of, and constitutional engagement with police misconduct)

    .

  29. 982 F.3d 813, 817, 820 (1st Cir. 2020), aff’g Martin v. Gross, 340 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D. Mass. 2018).
  30. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (2018); Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 817, 820.
  31. Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 820. Though they could not predict for the court the particular moments at which they would need to make such recordings, the plaintiffs argued that their prior experience in openly recording police officers suggested that such moments would certainly occur. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 9, Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1629) (submitted by K. Eric Martin and Rene Perez).
  32. Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 820.
  33. Id. at 828–29. It was not necessary for the court’s review that the plaintiffs specify the particular circumstances in which they would produce future secret recording, as their challenge was limited to the production of secret recordings in public spaces, a phrase the First Circuit had itself previously used to “describe the geographic bounds of the citizen’s right to record police officers.” Id. at 827 (citing Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2011); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014)).
  34. Id. at 829–30.
  35. Id. at 830–31, 836.
  36. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018).
  37. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6101(a)(1) (2019).
  38. Cal. Penal Code § 632 (West 2017); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(4) (2017); Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d) (2019); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1111(1)(d)–(e) (LexisNexis 2016); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(3) (West 2019); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539c–d (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2019); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 570-A:2(I) (2017); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5704(4) (West 2020); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(1) (2019). In
    2014,

    the Illinois Supreme Court held the state’s two-party consent statute was unconstitutional as written, as it banned the recording of conversations or situations when the parties had no reasonable expectation of privacy, thus violating the First Amendment. People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120, 127 (Ill. 2014).

  39. Brncik, supra note 25, at
    492–93.

  40. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99(A) (2018) (“The general court further finds that the uncontrolled development and unrestricted use of modern electronic surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy of all citizens of the commonwealth.”). Notably, a recording is secret, according to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when it is made without the actual knowledge of the depicted subject, though that finding may be established by “unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Mass. 1976).
  41. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Mass. 1976). See also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Mass. 2001) (reaffirming this interpretation).
  42. Sam Bayard, Massachusetts Wiretapping Law Strikes Again, Digit. Media L. Project (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2007/massachusetts-wiretapping-law-strikes-again [https://perma.cc/ADJ9-ZZ9Q].
  43. Id.
  44. Daily Free Press Admin, BU Protester Fined, Could Face Jail Time, Daily Free Press (Dec. 6, 2007), https://dailyfreepress.com/2007/12/06/bu-protester-fined-could-face-jail-time/ [https://perma.cc/MG7H-4H5X].
  45. See supra note 5.
  46. Id.
  47. See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming that the First Amendment protects the act of “capturing inputs that may yield expression”) (quoting Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae at 7); Kreimer, supra note 23, at 408–09 (concluding that given how, in public spaces, “pervasive image capture grants authority to a range of unofficial voices . . . [and] provides a means of holding the conduct of the powerful to account,” it must be that “the First Amendment protects the right to record images we observe as part of the right to form, reflect upon, and share our memories”).
  48. Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02888, 2012 WL 9512053 (D. Md. filed Jan. 10, 2012); see also Justin Fenton, DOJ Urges Judge to Side with Plaintiff in Baltimore Police Taping Case, Balt. Sun (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2012-01-11-bs-md-ci-aclu-doj-videotaping-20120111-story.html [https://perma.cc/7XVA-W4SW ] (describing the case).
  49. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83–84 (“[T]he public’s right of access to information is coextensive with that of the press.”).
  50. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (“The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).
  51. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 460–62, 467 (1987) (invalidating a city ordinance which made it illegal to interrupt an officer in the performance of his duties).
  52. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).
  53. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (emphasizing that First Amendment protections go “beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw”).
  54. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
  55. Id.
  56. Id. at 83 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
  57. Simonson, supra note 23, at 408.
  58. Id. at 421.
  59. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
  60. See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (clarifying that “under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable” as an invasion of one’s right to privacy).
  61. Kaminski, supra note 23, at
    171.

    It should be noted, though, that privacy is a notoriously difficult value to characterize, and it often depends upon the context in which it is claimed. See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 101–70 (2008) (proposing a taxonomy of privacy interests); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1907–08 (2013) (arguing that attempts to define privacy as deriving a single overarching principle are inevitably unworkable).

  62. Kaminski, supra note 23, at 202–03. But cf. Kreimer, supra note 23, at
    404

    (arguing that the primary privacy harm of recording is in its public dissemination).

  63. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001) (“[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”).
  64. See e.g., State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“The State urges us to adopt the view that public officers performing an official function on a public thoroughfare in the presence of a third party and within the sight and hearing of passersby enjoy a privacy interest which they may assert under the statute. We reject that view as wholly without merit.”).
  65. See, e.g., Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E. 2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000) (finding that a police officer is a public official for purposes of defamation claims because of “the broad powers vested in police officers and the great potential for abuse of those powers, as well as police officers[’] high visibility within and impact on a community.”).
  66. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437–39 (1963).
  67. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2007) (highlighting the importance of protecting officer safety but nonetheless finding that the public interest in revealing officer misconduct outweighed that concern under the facts of this case).
  68. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611–12 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). Surveys show that a majority of police officers often suggest they are supportive of wearing body cameras. See Rich Morin, Kim Parker, Renee Stepler & Andrew Mercer, Behind the Badge, Pew Rsch. Ctr. 75 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/Police-Report_FINAL_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG6C-FTCW]. But that support does not often extend to citizen recorders, as law enforcement feel they would unduly interfere with the execution of their duties. See, e.g., Alysia Santo, Why Cops Aren’t Ready for Their Close-Up, Marshall Project (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/24/why-cops-aren-t-ready-for-their-close-up [https://perma.cc/29Y3-3ZL4] (highlighting police support for a 2015 Texas state bill that would criminalize photographing on-duty police officers).
  69. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607; Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). See also Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing “even insofar as it is clearly established, the right to record matters of public concern is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions”).
  70. Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196, 2015 WL 1296258, at *1–2 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015).
  71. Id. at *10. The court expressly contrasted the plaintiff’s actions with the attempts by citizens to record the police using handheld devices at a distance from the ongoing investigation, like those at issue in Glik and Alvarez. Id.
  72. Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 832 (1st Cir. 2020).
  73. Id. at 832–33.
  74. Simonson, supra note 23, at 435–36 (describing how organized copwatching takes “the shape of a confrontational practice that seeks change through a combination of official and grassroots channels”).
  75. Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 833.
  76. Id. at 834 (quoting Jean v. Mass. St. Police, 492 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2007)).
  77. Id. (quoting Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2016)).
  78. Id. at 836.
  79. Id.
  80. Id. at 836–37. The court did nod to Judge Posner’s concern in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting)—that the potential for secret recordings could deter confidential informants from cooperating with police officers. However, the court found it was largely without merit, given that officers meeting with informants are likely careful about the circumstances in which they do so and the defendants offered no concrete evidence of such deterrence, only conjecture. Id. at 837.
  81. Project Veritas, 982 F.3d at 837–38.
  82. Id. at 838 (quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011)).
  83. Id.
  84. Id. at 839. For example, the court noted the potential privacy interest in the identity of rape victims. Id. (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989)).
  85. For that reason, the court found that there was no alternative kind of recording that would serve the same function as surreptitious recordings. Their outright prohibition under Section 99 could not survive intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 839–40.
  86. See

    Barry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing without Permission

    5 (2017) (“Policing officials are granted remarkable powers. They are allowed to use force on us. And to conduct surveillance of us. . . . Possession of these powers . . .  is what defines policing, what sets it apart.”).

  87. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477, 48
    2 (2011).

  88. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2011). These kinds of tactics have consistently been used in protests over police brutality. Karen Hao, How to Turn Filming the Police into the End of Police Brutality, M.I.T. Tech. Rev. (June 10, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/10/1002913/how-to-end-police-brutality-filming-witnessing-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/LLB7-686G].
  89. Officers often render citations to civilian recorders for broadly defined and difficult to disprove charges, such as obstruction. See, e.g., Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017). Some of the most prominent civilian recorders, like those who filmed the police killings of Freddie Gray, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Philando Castile, and Alton Sterling, have faced continued harassment at the hands of the police. Dragana Kaurin, The Price of Filming Police Violence, Vice (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en/article/evqw9z/filming-police-brutality-retaliation [https://perma.cc/9PUX-6DAG].
  90. See, e.g., Tucson, Ariz., Code art. I, §§ 11-70.3, 11-70.4 (2020) (prohibiting individuals from “physically entering crime scenes or areas immediately surrounding where such enforcement activity . . . [is] taking place” and criminalizing activity that “materially inhibits, obstructs, hinders, or delays any Police Officer . . . in the exercise of the Officer’s official duties”).
  91. Fan, supra note 25, at 1645.
  92. See Oral Argument at 14:20, Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, No. 19-1629 (1st Cir. argued Jan. 8, 2020), sub nom. Martin v. Gross, 340 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D. Mass. 2018), available at https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/67830/project-veritas-action-fund-v-rollins/ [https://perma.cc/NCP4-82GU] (“Under the statute, the principle that the legislature subscribed to . . . is the notion that people have an interest in knowing when they’re being recorded, so that they can make appropriate choices about how to conduct themselves.”).
  93. Friedman, supra note 85, at 321.
  94. See Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017) (“This right [to record the police], however, ‘is not without limitations.’ Like all speech, filming the police ‘may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.’ In this case, however, we need not decide which specific time, place, and manner restrictions would be reasonable.”) (quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011)); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to address the limits of the constitutional right to record); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court need not address surreptitious recordings or recordings of private conversations); Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (declining to address the limits of the right to film); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court had not yet interpreted whether its wiretapping statute covered private conversations); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a First Amendment right to record but not defining its scope).
  95. For example, the Tenth Circuit recently found that four officers were entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action that alleged the officers had unconstitutionally infringed on the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to record the police in public spaces because no such right had been clearly established at the time of the purported violation. Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1023 (10th Cir. 2021). However, the court then “exercise[d] [its] discretion to bypass the constitutional question of whether such right even exists.” Id. at 1020 n.4.
  96. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605–07.
  97. Id. at 608 (enjoining the State’s Attorney from applying the Illinois wiretap statute against the ACLU and its employees who openly record law enforcement).
  98. Id. at 605–06. Under this standard, courts ask whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, meaning the government must prove its interest “would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation” and that the regulation can accomplish this end without burdening “substantially more speech than is necessary.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
  99. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001)).
  100. See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *19 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2010); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. Gaydula, No. CIV. A. 85-1859, 1989 WL 156343, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1989).
  101. See Bleish v. Moriarty, No.11-cv-162, 2012 WL 2752188, at *10–*12 (D.N.H. 2012) (finding a Section 1983 plaintiff’s arrest for disorderly conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the plaintiff failed to show she was arrested for exercising her First Amendment rights); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to show that the police had violated their First Amendment right to record); Gravolet v. Tassin, No.08-3646, 2009 WL 1565864, at *4 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009) (finding a Section 1983 plaintiff’s arrest while recording did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers had probable cause to arrest him for stalking and that the plaintiff failed to clearly establish his right to record).
  102. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
  103. Scholars have previously discussed the compelling justifications for extending constitutional protection to surreptitious recordings. See, e.g., Rodden, supra note 24, at 907.
  104. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13.
  105. There are valid, constitutionally cognizable concerns that may limit the right to secretly record police-civilian interactions, for example, in private spaces. See Kaminski, supra note 23, at 238–42. However, these distinctions are not constitutionally meaningful when comparing secret and open recordings of the police in public.
  106. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014). But see Simonson, supra note 23, at 1563 (arguing that an officer may only prevent those acts of recording which would create a “concrete, physical impediment to a police officer or to public safety”).
  107. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
  108. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 611 (Posner, J., dissenting).
  109. See id. at 611–12 (Posner, J., dissenting).
  110. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 232 A.3d 747, 755–56 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2020) (holding that a no-filming condition in the lobby of a police department was a reasonable time, place, manner restriction to “ensure the safety, security and privacy of officers, informants and victims”).
  111. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (quoting Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)).
  112. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067–69 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the city’s release of the police personnel files, which included, among other things, officers’ home addresses, phone numbers, banking information, social security numbers, of the police officers who participated as witnesses in a criminal defense trial to defense counsel violated the officers’ due process rights by rendering them vulnerable to “private acts of vengeance”). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (holding that there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy in an individual’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of highly sensitive, personal information).
  113. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725–26 (2000) (holding that an eight-foot zone around persons entering a healthcare facility was “a valid time, place, and manner regulation”). Where the production of a secret recording would contravene such reasonable time, place, manner restrictions, the police may legitimately stop the citizen recorder’s production and dissemination of that recording. See, e.g., Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017). It should be noted, though, that Supreme Court precedent suggests that the police still may not prohibit the dissemination of such recordings by third parties. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (“[A] stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”); see also Jean v. Mass. St. Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that the publication of another’s surreptitiously produced recording, thereby violating Section 99, is entitled to First Amendment protection and therefore immunized the publisher from prosecution, even where the publisher “arguably participated . . . in a conspiracy to disclose the content of [an] illegally recorded oral communication”).
  114. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text; see also Jesse Harlan Alderman, Before You Press Record: Unanswered Questions Surrounding the First Amendment Right to Film Public Police Activity, 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 485, 513 (2013) (explaining that “police officers qua police officers do not own a personal privacy expectation in their official acts under prevailing judicial interpretations”).
  115. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. Some have argued that any person who engages a police officer in a public space loses any reasonable expectation of privacy that they might otherwise be able to claim. See Alderman, supra note 113, at 513–14.
  116. See Allissa V. Richardson, Why Cellphone Videos of Black People’s Deaths Should Be Considered Sacred, Like Lynching Photographs, The Conversation (May 28, 2020), https://theconversation.com/why-cellphone-videos-of-black-peoples-deaths-should-be-considered-sacred-like-lynching-photographs-139252 [https://perma.cc/XRH4-XL75].
  117. Consider a recording of protestors that could expose them to criminal or civil liability. Depending on the circumstances of the conduct depicted, the protestor may have a colorable claim that the recording of their actions was an invasion of their privacy. See Thomas Germain, How to Record Video During a Protest, Consumer Reports (June 5, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/audio-video/how-to-record-video-during-a-protest/ [https://perma.cc/7BN6-QPM7].
  118. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as Heckling, 108 Geo. L. J. 125, 169–73 (2019); see also Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 871, 877–78 (1989) (suggesting a three-pronged analysis to adjudicate the reasonability of an individual’s claim to privacy within the context of disclosing a patient’s HIV status); Doris DelTosto Brogan, Privacy’s Place at the Table: A Reflection on Richard Turkington’s Approach to Valuing and Balancing Privacy Interests, 61 Vill. L. Rev. 437, 445, 456–64 (2016) (arguing that Professor Turkington’s framework is broadly applicable and analyzing its potential application to the NSA data sweeping program and the deployment of police body cameras as examples).
  119. See, e.g., DelTosto Brogan, supra note 117, at 443–45 (comparing such an analysis to that proposed by Judge Learned Hand to analyze whether or not a defendant acted negligently in the canonical United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
  120. DelTosto Brogan, supra note 117, at 443–45.
  121. Among other causes of action, a plaintiff might successfully argue a recording was an undue invasion of their privacy if it created “unreasonable publicity,” so long as the matter publicized was “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “not of legitimate concern to the public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652D, 652D cmt. C (1977).
  122. Analogous inquiries have plagued courts. For example, the Supreme Court has previously instructed lower courts to determine whether a police officer’s use of a given piece of technology in the course of an investigation constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment by asking whether that technology was in “general public use” at the time. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001). Critics have argued that such an inquiry is inadequate because it fails to consider how “courts [are] to deal with the rapid pace of technological development in deciding whether something is in the general public use.” See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1393, 1412–13 (2002) (furthering that “[a]dvanced technology can find its way in to the average home very quickly. When that happens . . . the courts will either have to change their stance, manipulate the meaning of the general public use doctrine, or ignore it”).
  123. See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text.
  124. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (“The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.”).
  125. For an exploration of this argument, see generally Rodden, supra note 24.
  126. Brncik, supra note 25, at 515–19.
  127. Id. at 520–21.
  128. Id. at 514–15 (citing attempts at reform in Congress and the Mississippi legislature that were stymied, in large part, by police union opposition).
  129. Id. at 516–17 (pointing out police departments that have adopted such a policy and advising prosecutors’ offices to follow suit).
  130. Id. at 502–03 (“These recordings help to inform the public and to enrich the public debate over what is or is not abusive behavior. Video evidence is particularly valuable because videos provide the viewer . . . a credible account of the interaction.”).
  131. Project Veritas v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 831 (1st Cir. 2020) (affirming the “particular significance of First Amendment newsgathering rights with respect to government”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
  132. See Rodden, supra note 24, at 906–07 (advocating that the secret recording of the police be permissible under all wiretap statutes, as a discrepancy between the standards applied to secret and open recordings “gives police the ability to circumvent this right, subjects those who wish to exercise it to potential prosecution, and reduces police accountability for their actions”). The First Circuit’s decision, in many ways, serves as a model for how Rodden’s argument can be given effect nationally.
  133. For an extensive discussion on the merits and dangers of nonenforcement, see generally Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 937 (2017).
  134. As explored by Professor Price, whether or not one’s reliance interests would be protected under a policy of nonenforcement depends on how a particular jurisdiction would weigh that interest against the rights of executives to enforce the law. Id. at 947.
  135. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
  136. Paul Martin Lester, Visual Ethics: A Guide for Photographers, Journalists, and Filmmakers 87 (2018); Erik Ortiz, George Holliday, Who Taped Rodney King Beating, Urges Others to Share Videos, NBC News (June 9, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/george-holliday-who-taped-rodney-king-beating-urges-others-share-n372551 [https://perma.cc/NM3F-Z9KZ].
  137. See McLaughlin, supra note 2.
  138. Hannah Knowles, Teen Speaks Out a Year After Filming George Floyd’s Death, Saying Her Video ‘Put His Murderer Away’, Wash. Post (May 25, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/25/darnella-frazier-floyd-statement/ [https://perma.cc/4XMH-A2UZ].