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Sovereigns’ Interests and Double Jeopardy

In the 2019 case of Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine, reiterating that the Double Jeopardy Clause only bars successive or concurrent prosecutions by the same sovereign. When, therefore, a criminal defendant has violated the laws of two sovereigns by the same act, regardless of how similar those laws may be, no double jeopardy issue arises where both sovereigns prosecute the defendant independently. This Note argues that such an outcome is at odds with the Due Process Clause’s guarantee against double jeopardy and rests upon an excessively rigid formulation of prior case law. The Supreme Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence actually suggests that the dual sovereignty doctrine should only be applied in instances where each sovereign possesses a distinct interest that they alone can vindicate. This Note advances a primary-purposes test to determine when separate or concurrent prosecutions are appropriate: a second sovereign should only be permitted to prosecute a defendant for the same crime if the primary purpose of that prosecution is to vindicate a sovereign interest that the first sovereign’s prosecution would leave substantially unvindicated. Applying this test would also ease the Gamble Court’s worry that modifying the doctrine could interfere with the balance of domestic and international prosecutions. Because the United States and a foreign sovereign, as completely independent entities, could always decline to treat the exercise of the other’s jurisdiction as exclusive, each sovereign would retain an interest in prosecuting a defendant that the other sovereign could never substantially vindicate.

Introduction

In the 1969 case of Benton v. Maryland, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy, that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,”1 1.U.S. Const. amend. V.Show More formed a fundamental right that was incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause against the states.2 2.395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (“[W]e today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).Show More In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision in Palko v. Connecticut, which had held that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not incorporated against the states, inasmuch as the protection was not “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”3 3.302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).Show More In spite of Benton, however, the Supreme Court has regularly upheld one glaring exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause: the dual sovereignty doctrine.

Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a defendant may be prosecuted twice for the same crime if separate sovereigns are involved in bringing each prosecution. Although the circumstances under which two entities constitute separate sovereigns may not be clear-cut as a philosophical matter, for purposes of dual sovereignty, the Supreme Court has made clear that the states and the federal government are considered distinct sovereigns,4 4.See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132–34 (1959) (finding no double jeopardy bar to successive state and federal prosecutions as a result of the “two-sovereignty principle”); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (“The States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal Government.”).Show More as are Native American tribes.5 5.United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (holding that because the “inherent tribal authority[] to prosecute nonmember Indians” does “not amount to an exercise of federal power,” tribes are acting as “separate sovereign[s]” for Fifth Amendment purposes during such prosecutions).Show More Territories such as Puerto Rico, however, are not.6 6.Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 78 (2016) (holding that “[b]ecause the ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial power is the Federal Government . . . the Commonwealth and the United States are not separate sovereigns” for Fifth Amendment purposes).Show More A hypothetical defendant could thus be subject to all criminal jurisdictions within the United States, assuming that a jurisdictional hook connects the defendant’s conduct and each of the respective sovereigns. The possibility of these concurrent or subsequent prosecutions militates against a common-sense understanding of what the Double Jeopardy Clause would seem to require. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the dual sovereignty doctrine, and it has done so most recently in the 2019 case of Gamble v. United States.7 7.139 S. Ct. 1960, 1979–80 (2019).Show More

This Note argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine, in its current formulation as expressed in Gamble, unconstitutionally infringes upon defendants’ due process rights. First, this Note argues that a close reading of the case law upon which the Gamble Court relies implies a more flexible construction of the dual sovereignty doctrine and that the doctrine should only come into play when separate prosecutions vindicate distinct sovereign interests. Moreover, the doctrine should be reinterpreted following both the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1969 Benton decision incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause through the Due Process Clause—something for which the Court has not properly accounted. Second, this Note examines an argument by the majority relating to prosecutions by international foreign sovereigns to demonstrate that the majority misunderstands the concept of sovereignty. The majority’s reinterpretation of the dual sovereignty doctrine should not ipso facto alter the effect that foreign criminal proceedings may have on domestic ones. Finally, this Note proposes a “primary-purposes” balancing test, which would protect defendants’ due process rights against double jeopardy while simultaneously carving out a constitutionally permissible space for instances where subsequent prosecution by another sovereign may remain legitimate and desirable. This Note conducts a substantial-interest analysis8 8.This term may be familiar from choice-of-law theory, as it describes an analytical method “in which courts identify those states with interests in a particular issue before the court and then determine which of the competing states should have its law applied to the issue. The court makes that determination by identifying the state with the greatest interest in the matter.” John Bernard Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 651, 653 n.10. This Note advances a somewhat analogous argument in the Double Jeopardy context, namely: when two or more separate domestic sovereigns have jurisdiction over a matter, the sovereign whose interest is primarily at stake should proceed with the prosecution, and only when that sovereign, in its own proceeding, cannot substantially vindicate the interest of the other(s), should subsequent or concurrent prosecutions proceed without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses. Otherwise, any resemblance between this Note’s use of this term here and its use in a choice-of-law context is only coincidental.Show More with respect to the dual sovereignty doctrine and proposes a test that would resolve the applicability of the doctrine with respect to both domestic and foreign sovereigns.9 9.The Ohio Northern University Law Review published a short piece on Gamble that briefly suggested the applicability of an interest-analysis and the possible use of a balancing test in resolving the constitutional problems associated with the dual sovereignty doctrine. Alexander S. Prillaman, Student Case Notes, Gamble v. United States, 46 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 181, 192–93 (2020). This Note, however, analyzes in significantly greater detail the prior case law upon which Gamble relies, discusses the consequences of the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and examines the effects of a possible modification of the dual sovereignty doctrine vis-à-vis foreign (international) sovereign proceedings both to flesh out the possibility of a balancing test and to ground the suggestion more firmly in the broader jurisprudential principles and normative desirability of such a test.Show More

  1.  U.S. Const. amend. V. ↑
  2.  395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (“[W]e today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). ↑
  3.  302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). ↑
  4.  See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132–34 (1959) (finding no double jeopardy bar to successive state and federal prosecutions as a result of the “two-sovereignty principle”); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (“The States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal Government.”). ↑
  5.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (holding that because the “inherent tribal authority[] to prosecute nonmember Indians” does “not amount to an exercise of federal power,” tribes are acting as “separate sovereign[s]” for Fifth Amendment purposes during such prosecutions). ↑
  6.  Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 78 (2016) (holding that “[b]ecause the ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial power is the Federal Government . . . the Commonwealth and the United States are not separate sovereigns” for Fifth Amendment purposes). ↑
  7.  139 S. Ct. 1960, 1979–80 (2019). ↑
  8.  This term may be familiar from choice-of-law theory, as it describes an analytical method “in which courts identify those states with interests in a particular issue before the court and then determine which of the competing states should have its law applied to the issue. The court makes that determination by identifying the state with the greatest interest in the matter.” John Bernard Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 651, 653 n.10. This Note advances a somewhat analogous argument in the Double Jeopardy context, namely: when two or more separate domestic sovereigns have jurisdiction over a matter, the sovereign whose interest is primarily at stake should proceed with the prosecution, and only when that sovereign, in its own proceeding, cannot substantially vindicate the interest of the other(s), should subsequent or concurrent prosecutions proceed without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses. Otherwise, any resemblance between this Note’s use of this term here and its use in a choice-of-law context is only coincidental. ↑

  9.  The Ohio Northern University Law Review published a short piece on Gamble that briefly suggested the applicability of an interest-analysis and the possible use of a balancing test in resolving the constitutional problems associated with the dual sovereignty doctrine. Alexander S. Prillaman, Student Case Notes, Gamble v. United States, 46 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 181, 192–93 (2020). This Note, however, analyzes in significantly greater detail the prior case law upon which Gamble relies, discusses the consequences of the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and examines the effects of a possible modification of the dual sovereignty doctrine vis-à-vis foreign (international) sovereign proceedings both to flesh out the possibility of a balancing test and to ground the suggestion more firmly in the broader jurisprudential principles and normative desirability of such a test. ↑

Diversity by Facially Neutral Means

The decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (SFFA), invalidating the use of race in college admissions, reignites a pressing and critical question. Is the deliberate use of facially neutral means to achieve racial diversity constitutionally permissible? The problem is that current equal protection doctrine suggests conflicting answers to this question. On one hand, cases addressing the use of explicit racial classifications state clearly that the use of race is impermissible if diversity could be achieved by facially neutral means. These statements suggest that universities and others may adopt such means. On the other hand, when state actors adopt facially neutral policies that have a disparate negative impact on the basis of race or sex, these policies are impermissible if enacted specifically because they will have this effect. This part of the doctrine suggests that state actors may not adopt facially neutral means of achieving racial diversity if they do so in order to achieve this result.

This Article resolves that enduring puzzle. It does so by explaining that equal protection doctrine contains two distinct commitments: a prohibition on race-based differential treatment and a prohibition on governmental actors intending to harm. The claim that the combination of these commitments—the intent to select on the basis of race—is also forbidden rests on a mistake. Because these two doctrinal threads stem from different normative foundations, they cannot be combined. In addition, while intentions do matter within equal protection doctrine, that observation is overstated. It is only the intent to harm that is constitutionally relevant. Facially neutral policies aimed at increasing racial diversity lack an intent to harm and are therefore permissible.

Justice Kagan: So suppose that . . . there’s a 10 percent plan or something like that, and part of the justification is socioeconomic diversity and another part of the justification is we’ll also get more racial diversity in this manner. . . . Is that permissible?

Mr. Strawbridge: Well, like I said, it—it’s a different analysis when the . . . mechanism that’s chosen is not a racial classification itself, but I do think that this Court’s precedents—

Justice Kagan: Well, I guess the question is why—why is that true. A lot of our constitutional doctrine suggests that it’s not a different analysis. In other words, one way you can offend the Constitution is by using an impermissible classification. Another way you can offend the Constitution is by devising a proxy mechanism with the purpose of . . . achieving the same results that the impermissible classification would.

Mr. Strawbridge: Right.1 1.Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023) (No. 21-707).Show More

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (SFFA),2 2.143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023).Show More striking down the use of race-based classifications in university admissions, sets up an important question.3 3.The use of race in admissions was invalidated because the interests allegedly served by student body diversity are too difficult to measure and because the means adopted to achieve these ends are inapt. Id. at 2166–67. Additionally, in the Court’s view, the policies at issue rely on racial stereotypes and harm those not preferred by the policies. Id. at 2168–70. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court does not, however, explicitly overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and explicitly leaves open the question of whether the consideration of race is also impermissible in the context of admissions at the military academies. SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2166 n.4 (“This opinion also does not address the issue, in light of the potentially distinct interests that military academies may present.”).Show More May universities adopt “facially neutral”4 4.The term “facially neutral” refers to a law or policy that does not explicitly classify on protected grounds.Show More selection policies that will predictably increase racial diversity if they do so because these policies are likely to have this result?5 5.The Court in SFFA considered both a constitutional claim and a statutory claim but viewed the prohibition on race discrimination contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as equivalent to the constitutional requirements of equal protection. For this reason, the result of the constitutional analysis will also have implications for non-state actors. See SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2156 n.2 (explaining that the Court would “evaluate Harvard’s admissions program under the standards of the Equal Protection Clause” because “discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI” (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003))).Show More Such policies might include admissions guarantees by a state university to the top ten percent of each high school senior class in the state, as Justice Kagan noted in the oral argument of the University of North Carolina case,6 6.See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, SFFA, 143 S. Ct. 2141 (No. 21-707).Show More or “plus” factors for students who are first-generation college students, who attend under-resourced schools, or whose families are poor or are the descendants of enslaved people,7 7.See id. at 13, 43–45.Show More among others.

It may seem like the answer is an obvious “yes,” as Mr. Strawbridge, the lawyer for Students for Fair Admissions, initially suggested.8 8.Id. at 13. Mr. Strawbridge seems to equivocate in his answer to Justice Kagan’s question. He initially seems to say that such policies would be permissible but ultimately does say that if the university adopted the policy at least in part because it would increase diversity and would not have adopted it without this reason, then the facially neutral policy would be impermissible. Id. at 16 (“[I]f the only reason to do it is through the narrow lens of race and there is no other race-neutral justification for it that the government can come forward and demonstrate that would have led it to adopt that policy anyway, I think . . . that’s the only scenario where it would create problems under the Court’s precedent.”).Show More After all, in the affirmative action cases that predate the current decision, narrow tailoring was assessed by reference to whether race-neutral means of achieving diversity were available.9 9.See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (“We are satisfied that the Law School adequately considered race-neutral alternatives currently capable of producing a critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission.”); id. at 342 (“Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”).Show More Indeed, the Justices who dissented in those previous cases did so in part on the grounds that such alternatives were present, in their view.10 10.See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 579 U.S. 365, 426–27 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that if the University of Texas at Austin adopted race-neutral policies it could achieve diversity “without injecting race into the process”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Were the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives. . . . Other programs do exist which will be more effective in bringing about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens that our constitutional tradition has always sought. They, and not the program under review here, should be the model, even if the Court defaults by not demanding it.”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Drawing on admissions systems used at public universities in California, Florida, and Texas, the United States contends that Michigan could get student diversity in satisfaction of its compelling interest by guaranteeing admission to a fixed percentage of the top students from each high school in Michigan. . . . [T]here is nothing unconstitutional about such a practice . . . .”).Show More If the explicit use of race is not narrowly tailored to achieve the educational benefits of diversity when workable race-neutral means exist to achieve the same result, surely the deliberate use of such race-neutral means is constitutionally permissible.11 11.Judge Heytens makes precisely this argument in response to the claim that the deliberate use of race-neutral polices to increase racial diversity transforms the policy into one that is race-based. See Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 68 F.4th 864, 891 (4th Cir. 2023) (Heytens, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “it would be quite the judicial bait-and-switch to say such race-neutral efforts are also presumptively unconstitutional” after spending “decades telling school officials they must consider race-neutral methods for ensuring a diverse student body before turning to race-conscious ones”), cert. denied, No. 23-170, 2024 WL 674659 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024).Show More

And yet, scholars have long wondered about the constitutional permissibility of such policies.12 12.See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 Mich. J. Race & L. 277, 283 (2007) (arguing that “antidiscrimination laws have been [and should be] interpreted to prohibit not only facial classifications, but also neutral classifications that were adopted to serve as proxies for the facially-prohibited one”); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 493, 496 (2003) (exploring the possibility that disparate impact liability mandated by Title VII may violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection because that statute was adopted with the purpose of redressing racial inequality); Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 Geo. L.J. 2331, 2364–65, 2377 (2000) (arguing that race-neutral affirmative action may be unconstitutional if motivated by the same purposes as affirmative action that relies on racial classification). See generally Larry Alexander & Kevin Cole, Discrimination by Proxy, 14 Const. Comment. 453 (1997) (assuming that the deliberate use of a facially neutral trait to select for people with a protected trait violates the anti-discrimination principle and arguing that equal protection doctrine is internally conflicted).Show More To see the argument for this position, imagine a hypothetical case in which a university admissions program made minority race a minus rather than a plus. After being sued for race discrimination, the university stops using race explicitly in its admissions process. Instead, suppose it adopts a policy disfavoring people from particular zip codes. Further, suppose the university does so because race correlates with zip code, so the university can achieve the same result as it had by explicitly disfavoring people of particular races. If the deliberate use of zip codes to exclude Black students would be impermissible, then should the deliberate use of class rank to include Black students be treated similarly? It is precisely this logic that Justice Kagan referred to in her question to Mr. Strawbridge.

The argument for treating these hypothetical cases the same seems plausible for two reasons. First, when facially neutral policies disadvantage women or racial minorities, the Court evaluates these policies by reference to the reasons for which they were adopted. If the state chose the facially neutral policy “because of” its effect, then the policy is treated as if it contains an explicit classification.13 13.Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (emphasis added) (requiring a showing that a defendant discriminated “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” in order to impose liability). The Feeney Court upheld Massachusetts’s preference for veterans in civil service positions, despite the fact that the policy disproportionately excluded women, because the policy was not adopted in order to exclude women. Id. at 275. The clear implication of this holding is that had the policy been adopted in order to exclude women, it would be impermissible.Show More Second, when explicit classifications are used, the Court has treated the fact that the policy was well-motivated as legally insignificant, and has treated a benefit on the basis of race in the same manner as a burden.14 14.The Chief Justice emphasizes this fact in SFFA. See SFFA, 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2175 (2023) (critiquing the dissent by asserting that “[w]hile the dissent would certainly not permit university programs that discriminated against black and Latino applicants, it is perfectly willing to let the programs here continue”).Show More For example, the explicit use of race in higher education admissions must pass strict scrutiny even when the policy is adopted for benign or even laudable reasons.15 15.See id. at 2166; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978) (holding that whether a racial classification is used for benign purposes or invidious ones is not relevant and instead that classifications that “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background” all require the application of strict scrutiny).Show More Moreover, in SFFA, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that university admissions is a “zero-sum” enterprise, and so, in his view, giving a plus to some applicants necessarily functions as a minus to others.16 16.SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2169 (“A benefit provided to some applicants but not to others necessarily advantages the former group at the expense of the latter.”).Show More According to the combined logic of these two features of the doctrine, the deliberate use of class rank to select for minority applicants would seem to be constitutionally impermissible.

The Court’s opinion in SFFA itself does not directly address the question of whether universities may use race-neutral means to achieve diversity.17 17.In another case, the Chief Justice has suggested that he would find such motivation suspect. See, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s comment in Parents Involved,where he opined that “[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity,’” which suggests that he might find intending to select for people on the basis of race to also be a patently unconstitutional motivation. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732 (2007).Show More However, Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, indicated that he would find it constitutional for a university to do so: “[G]overnments and universities still ‘can, of course, act to undo the effects of past discrimination in many permissible ways that do not involve classification by race.’”18 18.SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).Show More And Justice Gorsuch noted that “Harvard could nearly replicate the current racial composition of its student body without resorting to race-based practices if it: (1) provided socioeconomically disadvantaged applicants just half of the tip it gives recruited athletes; and (2) eliminated tips for the children of donors, alumni, and faculty.”19 19.Id. at 2215 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).Show More The implication of this comment is that it would be permissible for Harvard to do so, even if it is motivated to adopt these policies to replicate the current racial composition of the class. Lastly, Justice Thomas, concurring, used language that suggests that he too would find the use of race-neutral policies to achieve a diverse student body permissible. He wrote: “Race-neutral policies may thus achieve the same benefits of racial harmony and equality without any of the burdens and strife generated by affirmative action policies.”20 20.Id. at 2206 (Thomas, J., concurring).Show More That said, none of these statements specifically address whether race-neutral policies deliberately adopted to achieve racial diversity would be constitutional.21 21.What Justice Thomas would say about such a case is especially uncertain, as other parts of his concurring opinion suggest that he finds questionable the very idea that racial diversity is important in higher education. See id. at 2207.Show More

The argument that they are not constitutional has recently gained traction. For example, it has already appeared in debates about the admissions criteria for public magnet schools.22 22.For a recent analysis, see Sonja Starr, The Magnet School Wars and the Future of Colorblindness, 76 Stan. L. Rev. 161, 163–64 (2024). Show More In Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board, a change from one facially neutral admissions policy to another at the Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology (“TJ”) was challenged on the grounds that the change was motivated by a desire to “racially balance” the school.23 23.See Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 68 F.4th 864, 871–72, 875–76 (4th Cir. 2023). Judge Rushing, dissenting, argued that a “school board’s motivation to racially balance its schools, even using the means of a facially neutral policy, must be tested under exacting judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 893 (Rushing, J., dissenting).Show More While one could interpret that claim as alleging that the School Board intended to exclude Asian students, which would be prohibited, it could also be understood as a claim that the School Board impermissibly changed its policy in order to include more Black and Latinx students. In its petition for certiorari, the petitioners fused these questions and treated these claims as equivalent.24 24.See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Coal. for TJ, No. 23-170 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2023) (styling their first reason for granting the petition in these terms: “The Use of Facially Race-Neutral Admissions Criteria to Achieve Racial Balance Presents an Unsettled Question of National Importance”).Show More To date, this argument has not succeeded,25 25.The majority opinion in Coalition for TJ does not specifically address this issue. See generally Coal. for TJ, 68 F.4th 864. In Christa McAuliffe Intermediate School PTO, Inc. v. de Blasio, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that “where the government shifts to a policy that treats applicants differently based on a factor that is designed to operate as a proxy for race, it becomes suspect.” 627 F. Supp. 3d 253, 263–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).Show More but it has not been repudiated, either.26 26.See, for example, Lewis v. Ascension Parish SchoolBoard, 662 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), in which the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s summary judgment and remanded the case in light of the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a racially discriminatory purpose and effect were present. Then-Chief Judge Jones, concurring, asserted that geographic boundaries used in student assignment are not racially neutral if adopted for the purpose of achieving racial balance in the schools. Id. at 354 (Jones, C.J., concurring) (“Streets . . . may well be racial proxies because the district or its agents apparently knew and used the racial composition of the people living on those streets to pursue racial balancing.”). Following remand to the district court, the Fifth Circuit upheld the finding of no constitutional violation without reaching the question of whether discriminatory intent was present. Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 806 F.3d 344, 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2015).Show More And, while the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in this case, its reasons for doing so are unknown.27 27.Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 23-170, 2024 WL 674659, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024). Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the denial of certiorari but did so for reasons unrelated to the question regarding what intentions are prohibited under equal protection doctrine. Id. at *1, 5 (Alito, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).Show More Perhaps the Court approved of the reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the use of facially neutral policies to increase diversity is permissible, or perhaps the Court was simply not yet ready to take this issue on.

This unresolved question comes with high stakes. If the Court decides that facially neutral policies adopted to increase racial diversity in public magnet schools are unconstitutional, many policies, both within the education context and beyond it, would also be at risk. For example, suppose a universal pre-kindergarten program is adopted in order to reduce racial disparities in educational achievement. Or suppose a city adopts a government-funded doula program in order to reduce the racial disparity in maternal death rates.28 28.See, e.g., Zeina Mohammed, Black Women Are More Likely to Die During Pregnancy. A Local Doula Program Aims to Change That, Bos. Globe (Dec. 30, 2022, 5:14 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/12/30/metro/mass-general-brighams-doula-program-aim‌s-close-racial-disparities-childbirth/; Working Together to Reduce Black Maternal Mortality, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/womens-health/features/matern‌al-mortality.html [https://perma.cc/4TR9-VV7E] (last updated Apr. 8, 2024).Show More If the intention to affect which racial group is most benefited by a policy constitutes an impermissible intent, these programs would be subject to strict scrutiny. While such policies could be adopted for alternative reasons, unrelated to the race of likely beneficiaries, if they would not have been adopted for these alternative reasons alone, then the constitutional problem remains.29 29.Where a constitutionally impermissible reason is a motivating reason for facially neutral state action, the burden shifts to the state to show that the same decision would have been reached absent the impermissible motivation. If the state is unable to do so, the facially neutral policy is subject to heightened review. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66, 270 n.21 (1977).Show More

Moreover, the implications of invalidating facially neutral policies enacted to improve racial diversity or reduce racial disparities likely apply beyond the constitutional context. Because the Court in SFFA treats the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as equivalent to the requirements of equal protection, prohibitions on the deliberate adoption of facially neutral means of achieving diversity could also extend to non-state actors receiving federal funds.30 30.See supra note 5.Show More

This Article thus addresses a pressing and critical question. To restate it in terms of the two hypothetical policies mentioned earlier, we need to know: What, if anything, distinguishes the use of class rank to include minority students from the use of zip codes to exclude them? In the following Parts, I provide a novel answer to that enduring puzzle. The answer, which I call the “Distinct Threads” approach, rests on the claim that though equal protection doctrine prohibits race-based differential treatment and prohibits actions taken with impermissible intent, these two proscriptions rest on different foundations and cannot be combined. In addition, I argue that the focus on impermissible intent is poorly understood. What the doctrine prohibits is only actions that are motivated by the harm they cause to individuals or groups. Facially neutral policies that are deliberately adopted in order to increase racial diversity neither involve race-based differential treatment, nor are they motivated by the desire to cause harm. As a result, these actions are permissible.

The argument for this solution proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the question this Article investigates and describes the three conceptually available answers. In addition, Part I describes how other scholars have analyzed the question and explains why their answers are unsatisfactory. Part II describes my proposed solution. It argues for the claim that the prohibitions contained within equal protection doctrine cannot be combined and diagnoses why the prohibition on invidious intent has been misunderstood. Part III elaborates this account, explaining why harm must be assessed objectively and describing how current doctrine supports the view that racial isolation is a harm. In addition, Part III discusses the implications of this account for our understanding of the term “race conscious” and for how courts ought to evaluate implicit bias. A brief conclusion follows.

  1.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023) (No. 21-707). ↑
  2.  143 S. Ct. 2141 (2023). ↑
  3.  The use of race in admissions was invalidated because the interests allegedly served by student body diversity are too difficult to measure and because the means adopted to achieve these ends are inapt. Id. at 2166–67. Additionally, in the Court’s view, the policies at issue rely on racial stereotypes and harm those not preferred by the policies. Id. at 2168–70. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court does not, however, explicitly overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and explicitly leaves open the question of whether the consideration of race is also impermissible in the context of admissions at the military academies. SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2166 n.4 (“This opinion also does not address the issue, in light of the potentially distinct interests that military academies may present.”). ↑
  4.  The term “facially neutral” refers to a law or policy that does not explicitly classify on protected grounds. ↑
  5.  The Court in SFFA considered both a constitutional claim and a statutory claim but viewed the prohibition on race discrimination contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as equivalent to the constitutional requirements of equal protection. For this reason, the result of the constitutional analysis will also have implications for non-state actors. See SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2156 n.2 (explaining that the Court would “evaluate Harvard’s admissions program under the standards of the Equal Protection Clause” because “discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI” (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003))). ↑
  6.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, SFFA, 143 S. Ct. 2141 (No. 21-707). ↑
  7.  See id. at 13, 43–45. ↑
  8.  Id. at 13. Mr. Strawbridge seems to equivocate in his answer to Justice Kagan’s question. He initially seems to say that such policies would be permissible but ultimately does say that if the university adopted the policy at least in part because it would increase diversity and would not have adopted it without this reason, then the facially neutral policy would be impermissible. Id. at 16 (“[I]f the only reason to do it is through the narrow lens of race and there is no other race-neutral justification for it that the government can come forward and demonstrate that would have led it to adopt that policy anyway, I think . . . that’s the only scenario where it would create problems under the Court’s precedent.”). ↑
  9.  See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (“We are satisfied that the Law School adequately considered race-neutral alternatives currently capable of producing a critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission.”); id. at 342 (“Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”). ↑
  10.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 579 U.S. 365, 426–27 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that if the University of Texas at Austin adopted race-neutral policies it could achieve diversity “without injecting race into the process”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Were the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives. . . . Other programs do exist which will be more effective in bringing about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens that our constitutional tradition has always sought. They, and not the program under review here, should be the model, even if the Court defaults by not demanding it.”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Drawing on admissions systems used at public universities in California, Florida, and Texas, the United States contends that Michigan could get student diversity in satisfaction of its compelling interest by guaranteeing admission to a fixed percentage of the top students from each high school in Michigan. . . . [T]here is nothing unconstitutional about such a practice . . . .”). ↑
  11.  Judge Heytens makes precisely this argument in response to the claim that the deliberate use of race-neutral polices to increase racial diversity transforms the policy into one that is race-based. See Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 68 F.4th 864, 891 (4th Cir. 2023) (Heytens, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “it would be quite the judicial bait-and-switch to say such race-neutral efforts are also presumptively unconstitutional” after spending “decades telling school officials they must consider race-neutral methods for ensuring a diverse student body before turning to race-conscious ones”), cert. denied, No. 23-170, 2024 WL 674659 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024). ↑
  12.  See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 Mich. J. Race
    & L

    . 277, 283 (2007) (arguing that “antidiscrimination laws have been [and should be] interpreted to prohibit not only facial classifications, but also neutral classifications that were adopted to serve as proxies for the facially-prohibited one”); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 493, 496 (2003) (exploring the possibility that disparate impact liability mandated by Title VII may violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection because that statute was adopted with the purpose of redressing racial inequality); Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 Geo. L.J. 2331, 2364–65, 2377 (2000) (arguing that race-neutral affirmative action may be unconstitutional if motivated by the same purposes as affirmative action that relies on racial classification). See generally Larry Alexander & Kevin Cole, Discrimination by Proxy, 14 Const. Comment. 453 (1997) (assuming that the deliberate use of a facially neutral trait to select for people with a protected trait violates the anti-discrimination principle and arguing that equal protection doctrine is internally conflicted). ↑

  13.  Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (emphasis added) (requiring a showing that a defendant discriminated “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” in order to impose liability). The Feeney Court upheld Massachusetts’s preference for veterans in civil service positions, despite the fact that the policy disproportionately excluded women, because the policy was not adopted in order to exclude women. Id. at 275. The clear implication of this holding is that had the policy been adopted in order to exclude women, it would be impermissible. ↑
  14.  The Chief Justice emphasizes this fact in SFFA. See SFFA, 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2175 (2023) (critiquing the dissent by asserting that “[w]hile the dissent would certainly not permit university programs that discriminated against black and Latino applicants, it is perfectly willing to let the programs here continue”). ↑
  15.  See id. at 2166; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978) (holding that whether a racial classification is used for benign purposes or invidious ones is not relevant and instead that classifications that “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background” all require the application of strict scrutiny). ↑
  16.  SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2169 (“A benefit provided to some applicants but not to others necessarily advantages the former group at the expense of the latter.”). ↑
  17.  In another case, the Chief Justice has suggested that he would find such motivation suspect. See, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s comment in Parents Involved, where he opined that “[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity,’” which suggests that he might find intending to select for people on the basis of race to also be a patently unconstitutional motivation. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732 (2007). ↑
  18.  SFFA, 143 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)). ↑
  19.  Id. at 2215 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). ↑
  20.  Id. at 2206 (Thomas, J., concurring). ↑
  21.  What Justice Thomas would say about such a case is especially uncertain, as other parts of his concurring opinion suggest that he finds questionable the very idea that racial diversity is important in higher education. See id. at 2207. ↑
  22.  For a recent analysis, see Sonja Starr, The Magnet School Wars and the Future of Colorblindness, 76 Stan. L. Rev.
    161, 163–64 (2024).

    ↑

  23.  See Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 68 F.4th 864, 871–72, 875–76 (4th Cir. 2023). Judge Rushing, dissenting, argued that a “school board’s motivation to racially balance its schools, even using the means of a facially neutral policy, must be tested under exacting judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 893 (Rushing, J., dissenting). ↑
  24.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Coal. for TJ, No. 23-170 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2023) (styling their first reason for granting the petition in these terms: “The Use of Facially Race-Neutral Admissions Criteria to Achieve Racial Balance Presents an Unsettled Question of National Importance”). ↑
  25.  The majority opinion in Coalition for TJ does not specifically address this issue. See generally Coal. for TJ, 68 F.4th 864. In Christa McAuliffe Intermediate School PTO, Inc. v. de Blasio, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that “where the government shifts to a policy that treats applicants differently based on a factor that is designed to operate as a proxy for race, it becomes suspect.” 627 F. Supp. 3d 253, 263–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). ↑
  26.  See, for example, Lewis v. Ascension Parish School Board, 662 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), in which the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s summary judgment and remanded the case in light of the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a racially discriminatory purpose and effect were present. Then-Chief Judge Jones, concurring, asserted that geographic boundaries used in student assignment are not racially neutral if adopted for the purpose of achieving racial balance in the schools. Id. at 354 (Jones, C.J., concurring) (“Streets . . . may well be racial proxies because the district or its agents apparently knew and used the racial composition of the people living on those streets to pursue racial balancing.”). Following remand to the district court, the Fifth Circuit upheld the finding of no constitutional violation without reaching the question of whether discriminatory intent was present. Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 806 F.3d 344, 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2015). ↑
  27.  Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 23-170, 2024 WL 674659, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024). Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the denial of certiorari but did so for reasons unrelated to the question regarding what intentions are prohibited under equal protection doctrine. Id. at *1, 5 (Alito, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). ↑
  28.  See, e.g., Zeina Mohammed, Black Women Are More Likely to Die During Pregnancy. A Local Doula Program Aims to Change That, Bos. Globe (Dec. 30, 2022, 5:14 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/12/30/metro/mass-general-brighams-doula-program-aim‌s-close-racial-disparities-childbirth/
    ;

    Working

    Together to Reduce Black Maternal Mortality, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/womens-health/features/matern‌al-mortality.html [https://perma.cc/4TR9-VV7E] (last updated Apr. 8, 2024). ↑

  29.  Where a constitutionally impermissible reason is a motivating reason for facially neutral state action, the burden shifts to the state to show that the same decision would have been reached absent the impermissible motivation. If the state is unable to do so, the facially neutral policy is subject to heightened review. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66, 270 n.21 (1977). ↑

  30.  See supra note 5. ↑

Frictionless Government and Foreign Relations

In an era defined by partisan rifts and government gridlock, many celebrate the rare issues that prompt bipartisan consensus. But extreme consensus should sometimes trigger concern, not celebration. We call these worrisome situations “frictionless government.” Frictionless government occurs when there is overwhelming bipartisan and bicameral consensus about a particular set of policies, as well as consensus between Congress and the President. Frictionless situations have inherent weaknesses, including the loss of inter-branch checks and balances that the constitutional Framers envisioned, the loss of partisan checks that typically flow from a “separation of parties,” the reduction of inter- and intra-agency checks within the executive branch, and an increased risk of cognitive biases, such as groupthink, that hamper wise policy-making.

Frictionless situations tend to involve foreign relations and commonly arise when the United States is attacked or otherwise finds itself in a conflict with external enemies. In such high-stakes moments, frictionless government has led to policy decisions taken with overwhelming consensus that go off the rails by sparking or escalating conflict, triggering actions by U.S. adversaries that undercut U.S. security goals, and unlawfully targeting domestic constituencies perceived to be linked to foreign adversaries. Such decisions eventually provoke substantial opposition and often repeal, but only after causing serious harms.

Celebration of unified, bipartisan action in frictionless government should not overwhelm appreciation of the risks that can result from a rush to act. This Article draws on historical examples, including the U.S. internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the conduct of the Vietnam War, and the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks, and then considers more recent actions including the U.S. response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and ongoing tensions with China. The Article ultimately argues that recognizing the perils of frictionless government early is the best way to avoid the excesses that have plagued past eras of “frictionlessness,” and it proposes ways to reintroduce productive friction back into policy-making processes, including via self-imposed actions by Congress and the executive and via external actors, such as companies, foreign governments, and state and local governments.

Introduction

The phrase “frictionless government” may seem like an oxymoron to many observers of U.S. politics today. In 2023 alone, the House twice faced steep challenges in selecting its Speaker,1 1.Lindsey McPherson, Laura Weiss & Caitlin Reilly, McCarthy Wins Speaker Election, Finally, Roll Call (Jan. 7, 2023, 1:38 AM), https://rollcall.com/2023/01/07/mccarthy-wins-spe‌aker-election-finally/ [https://perma.cc/XCN4-RAPB]; Luke Broadwater, Republicans Tap Jordan for Speaker, but Delay Vote as Holdouts Balk, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/13/us/politics/house-speaker-jordan-scalise.html.Show More and both houses together have almost failed to raise the debt ceiling2 2.Christopher M. Tuttle, Out of the Debt Ceiling Fire, but Still in the Frying Pan, Council on Foreign Rels. (June 2, 2023, 9:46 AM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/out-debt-ceiling-fire-stil‌l-frying-pan [https://perma.cc/Q7SR-BTNE].Show More and fund the government.3 3.David Wessel, What Is a Government Shutdown?, Brookings Inst. (Mar. 23, 2024), https://‌www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-a-government-shutdown-and-why-are-we-likely-to-hav‌e-another-one/#:~:text=In%20a%20surprise%2C%20Congress%20avoided,year%27s%20le‌vels%20for%2045%20days [https://perma.cc/8JBC-8LSZ].Show More Research shows that Congress is more polarized now than it has been for the past fifty years.4 4.Drew Desilver, The Polarization in Today’s Congress Has Roots That Go Back Decades, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-pol‌arization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/ [https://perma.cc/6AYT-F3‌6K].Show More Not surprisingly, referring to Congress as “broken” has become a common trope.5 5.Betsey Stevenson, Congress Is Even More Dysfunctional Than It Looks, Bloomberg Tax (Oct. 13, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/congress-is-more-dysfunctional-than-it-looks-betsey-stevenson; Peter King, I Served in the House for 28 Years. It’s Now More Dysfunctional Than Ever., The Hill (Sept. 25, 2023, 3:00 PM), https://thehill‌.com/opinion/campaign/4221898-i-served-in-the-house-for-28-years-its-now-more-dysfuncti‌onal-than-ever/; Yuval Levin, What We Can Do to Make American Politics Less Dysfunctional, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/opinion/am‌erican-politics-congress-reform.html.Show More As a result, many are skeptical that Congress can do much at all.

Yet even as Congress has struggled with this increasing polarization, it continues to enact hundreds of bills every session, including National Defense Authorization Acts (“NDAAs”), producing approximately 4 to 6 million words of new law in each Congress.6 6.Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTrack.us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill‌s/statistics [https://perma.cc/VP6N-CK2T] (last visited Oct. 4, 2024).Show More In some cases, Congress enacts these laws with large majorities voting in favor of the bills.7 7.For example, the 2024 NDAA passed the House of Representatives and the Senate with 310 and 87 yeas, respectively. Roll Call 723 | Bill Number: H.R. 2670, U.S. House of Representatives: Clerk (Dec. 14, 2023, 10:40 AM), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2023723 [https://perma.cc/‌4ASF-2KJU]; Roll Call Vote 118th Congress—1st Session, U.S. Senate (Dec. 13, 2023, 6:46 PM), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1181/v‌ote_118_1_003‌43.htm [https://perma.cc/ERZ5-Z3LR].Show More This is often true when the legislation implicates foreign relations, and especially when the United States faces a perceived external threat.8 8.See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force).Show More Where Congress passes a bill with large majorities and the President strongly supports the law, we might see this as a cause to celebrate, not hesitate. But this Article takes the counterintuitive position that for as much attention as government dysfunction engenders, certain instances of overwhelming and bipartisan consensus should also prompt concern.

This Article focuses on a particular subset of foreign policy decision-making that we term “frictionless government.” By this term, we mean to capture situations in which there is overwhelming bipartisan and bicameral consensus about a particular set of policies, as well as consensus between Congress and the executive. In such cases, the normal checks and balances that typically arise during policy-making weaken and, in some cases, disappear entirely, creating a risk of policy going off the rails. The usual tensions between congressional and executive desires disappear; the rough-and-tumble partisan interactions between Republicans and Democrats fade; and the often-contentious inter-agency negotiations inside the executive branch are streamlined. These conditions can amplify the cognitive biases that often arise in decision-making, including optimism bias, confirmation bias, and groupthink, and often result in governmental actions that spark or escalate conflict, trigger actions by U.S. adversaries that undercut U.S. security goals, and unlawfully target domestic constituencies perceived to be linked to foreign adversaries. Such policy decisions eventually come to be viewed as problematic, both legally and from a policy perspective, but only too late to avoid their costs.

Historical examples illustrate that frictionless situations tend to arise when the United States is attacked or otherwise finds itself in conflict with external enemies. Common across the historical frictionless examples that this Article identifies are laws and policies adopted with overwhelming bipartisan support from across the U.S. government that eventually come to provoke substantial opposition and often repeal. The U.S. internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the conduct of the Vietnam War, and the use of renditions and torture as part of the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks are among the most serious U.S. foreign policy mistakes of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Yet all were based on or supported by statutes that passed Congress by very wide, bipartisan margins and with the encouragement of the White House.

Not all situations of frictionless government necessarily produce poor policies. The Article highlights the response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a recent example of frictionless government that, to date, has not produced the same pathologies as past examples. But there are enough examples of serious foreign policy errors made under frictionless government that it is worth reconsidering the virtues of—and highlighting the vices of—frictionlessness. This analysis is crucial in light of current tensions between the United States and China, which are producing elements of frictionlessness in U.S. policy-making that raise cause for concern.

This Article’s goal in identifying the existence of frictionless situations is to ensure that, going forward, celebration of unified, bipartisan action in frictionless government will not overwhelm the appreciation of the risks that can result from a rush to act against perceived threats. Recognizing the perils of frictionless government is the best way to ensure that actors inside and outside government take steps to avoid replicating the excesses of past frictionless situations. Instead of being able to rely on inter-branch or inter-party checks, we will need to look elsewhere for supplemental checks on U.S. policy in these situations, to avoid groupthink and ensure that the United States is striking the right balance in national security or foreign policy settings that often have generational impacts. In some cases, Congress and the executive could choose to deliberately reintroduce some level of friction into their decision-making, to ensure that the President is presented with a wider range of options and that there are requirements to revisit policy decisions periodically. External actors may also provide useful friction in the form of litigation by affected parties, resisting or slow-rolling policy implementation, and lobbying governmental actors.

To be clear, there are sound reasons to want the United States to be able to respond quickly and effectively to very real threats to its current and future security. But even—and maybe particularly—in the face of these threats, it is to the long-term advantage of U.S. national security to ensure ongoing, iterative checks and balances on U.S. policies in this space.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines “frictionless government” and explains the inherent weaknesses of such situations, including the loss of inter-branch checks and balances that the constitutional Framers relied upon, the loss of partisan checks that typically flow from a “separation of parties,” the limiting of inter- and intra-agency checks within the executive branch, and the risk of fostering groupthink and other cognitive biases that hamper wise policy-making. Part I concludes by discussing the lifecycle of frictionless situations, especially when they arise and how they ultimately fade away, and by considering possible counterarguments to our concerns about frictionless situations. Moving from the theoretical to the practical, Part II addresses frictionless government in practice, identifying and analyzing several historical and more recent examples of frictionless situations to derive categories of pathologies that frictionlessness produces. Part III then proposes ways to reintroduce checks and balances into frictionless government situations, drawing on both friction that can be self-imposed by the political branches and friction introduced by external actors, including regulated companies, foreign governments, and state and local governments.

  1.  Lindsey McPherson, Laura Weiss & Caitlin Reilly, McCarthy Wins Speaker Election, Finally, Roll Call (Jan. 7, 2023, 1:38 AM), https://rollcall.com/2023/01/07/mccarthy-wins-spe‌aker-election-finally/ [https://perma.cc/XCN4-RAPB]; Luke Broadwater, Republicans Tap Jordan for Speaker, but Delay Vote as Holdouts Balk, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/13/us/politics/house-speaker-jordan-scalise.html. ↑
  2.  Christopher M. Tuttle, Out of the Debt Ceiling Fire, but Still in the Frying Pan, Council on Foreign Rels. (June 2, 2023, 9:46 AM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/out-debt-ceiling-fire-stil‌l-frying-pan [https://perma.cc/Q7SR-BTNE]. ↑
  3.  David Wessel, What Is a Government Shutdown?, Brookings Inst. (Mar. 23, 2024), https://‌www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-a-government-shutdown-and-why-are-we-likely-to-hav‌e-another-one/#:~:text=In%20a%20surprise%2C%20Congress%20avoided,year%27s%20le‌vels%20for%2045%20days [https://perma.cc/8JBC-8LSZ]. ↑
  4.  Drew Desilver, The Polarization in Today’s Congress Has Roots That Go Back Decades, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-pol‌arization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/ [https://perma.cc/6AYT-F3‌6K]. ↑
  5.  Betsey Stevenson, Congress Is Even More Dysfunctional Than It Looks, Bloomberg Tax (Oct. 13, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/congress-is-more-dysfunctional-than-it-looks-betsey-stevenson; Peter King, I Served in the House for 28 Years. It’s Now More Dysfunctional Than Ever., The Hill (Sept. 25, 2023, 3:00 PM), https://thehill‌.com/opinion/campaign/4221898-i-served-in-the-house-for-28-years-its-now-more-dysfuncti‌onal-than-ever/; Yuval Levin, What We Can Do to Make American Politics Less Dysfunctional, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/opinion/am‌erican-politics-congress-reform.html. ↑
  6.  Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTrack.us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill‌s/statistics [https://perma.cc/VP6N-CK2T] (last visited Oct. 4, 2024). ↑
  7.  For example, the 2024 NDAA passed the House of Representatives and the Senate with 310 and 87 yeas, respectively. Roll Call 723 | Bill Number: H.R. 2670, U.S. House of Representatives: Clerk (Dec. 14, 2023, 10:40 AM), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2023723 [https://perma.cc/‌4ASF-2KJU]; Roll Call Vote 118th Congress—1st Session, U.S. Senate (Dec. 13, 2023, 6:46 PM), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1181/v‌ote_118_1_003‌43.htm [https://perma.cc/ERZ5-Z3LR]. ↑

  8.  See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force). ↑

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