This Essay responds to Samer Saffarini’s argument that post-Loper Bright judicial scrutiny can serve as a necessary check on regulatory overreach in financial crises. While that view is intuitively appealing, this Essay contends that it places too much weight on courts and too little on Congress. Emergency powers in financial regulation are often at their most consequential when they are least constrained—and judicial review, though valuable, is no substitute for statutory design. Drawing on institutional theory and recent crises, the Essay argues that Congress should enact “legible emergency powers”: frameworks that define factual triggers, constrain the scope of agency tools, and require transparency from the moment action begins. It then extends the conversation beyond federal law, outlining complementary mechanisms—state-based and private—that may serve as failsafes when federal intervention falters. In the end, the Essay offers a design-based model for emergency governance: one that enables swift action without sacrificing legitimacy and clarity without surrendering capacity.
Introduction
For the better part of a century, the American administrative state’s power expanded largely unchecked. Agencies spent decades extending their reach “to solve the Nation’s expanding problems,” developing their own forms of quasi-legal decision-making across “thousands of orders, opinions, statements, and instructions.”1 1.Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Fed. Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1978).Show More But the old consensus—under which regulation was presumed automatically wise—has eroded.2 2.See, e.g., Ezra Klein & Derek Thompson, Abundance 8 (2025).Show More Today, concern over regulation’s stifling effects on innovation and production has reshaped both political culture and judicial doctrine.3 3.Id.Show More The political culture, for one, is increasingly less willing to defer to expert insistence that a given rule is “necessary.”4 4.See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Restoring Objectivity and Balance to Regulatory Science: A Comment on Dudley and Peacock, 24 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 101, 102 (2016) (discussing the problem of the “Scientist King”—an agency expert who is “confident that [their] expert knowledge of the evidence makes [them] the best judge of the policy based on that evidence” (emphasis added)); Cary Funk, Key Findings About Americans’ Confidence in Science and Their Views on Scientists’ Role in Society, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/02/12/key-findings-about-americans-confidence-in-science-and-their-views-on-scientists-role-in-society/ [https://perma.cc/6LTH-7AQS].Show More Courts, too, are less willing to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, for example, the Supreme Court held that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”5 5.144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024).Show More
In the realm of financial regulation, the trouble is that laws are often at their most consequential when they are least precise. Indeed, in moments of crisis, agencies like the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) turn to statutory provisions drafted for speed and flexibility—emergency authorities designed to prevent collapse before Congress can act. These powers are often vague by design: words like “unusual and exigent”6 6.Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A).Show More or “serious adverse effects”7 7.12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G).Show More substitute for clear triggers or hard constraints. And when invoked, these provisions can shift trillions of dollars, shape market expectations, and redefine the balance of power between the public and private sectors.
For decades, courts treated this ambiguity with deference. But in Loper Bright, the Court signaled that this era was over. Instead, a new era—one characterized by skepticism toward regulatory discretion, particularly in high-stakes domains like finance—was to begin. Some commentators have welcomed this shift. A recent piece by Samer R. Saffarini in the Virginia Law Review Online argues that stronger judicial review of banking and financial regulators will deter the misuse of emergency powers and reduce the long-term risk of financial instability.8 8.Samer R. Saffarini, Note, Judicial Review of Emergency Powers in Banking and Financial Regulation, 111 Va. L. Rev. Online 134, 164 (2025).Show More As the theory goes, discouraging agencies’ impulse to “cry wolf” will force them to act more cautiously, preserving market discipline and insulating the economy from moral hazard.9 9.Id.Show More
But while concerns about regulatory overreach are well taken, this new regime presents issues of its own. Courts are not designed to govern emergencies in real time, nor are they well-positioned to second-guess the economic judgments of financial regulators under stress.10 10.In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 801 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (explaining that “courts must not act as super-executives in an emergency”).Show More Relying on judicial veto power alone to discipline emergency action risks producing the opposite of what critics intend: not deliberation, but hesitation; not modesty, but paralysis. In a post-Chevron world, the legal system must offer more than skepticism.
This Essay responds to Saffarini by arguing that financial emergency powers should be restructured ex ante for legibility: statutes should define the factual triggers, scope, and duration of emergency interventions before crisis arrives. Rather than relying on courts to filter good uses from bad, Congress should clarify upfront when and how regulators may act under conditions of financial stress. Legible emergency powers reduce moral hazard, bolster accountability, and enable swift action that is both effective and democratically authorized. They advance both the long-standing rule-of-law goal of checking discretionary power and the modern institutional goal of building a state capable of responding to real systemic threats.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how emergency provisions in financial law—particularly § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act and the systemic risk exception to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act’s least-cost resolution rule—enable regulators to act quickly in times of stress, but often without clear legal or factual constraints. It argues that the core problem is not emergency power itself, but the lack of ex ante statutory design to structure its use. Part II engages with Saffarini’s argument that judicial review, especially in the wake of Loper Bright, offers a sufficient check on regulatory overreach. While judicial scrutiny may help deter opportunistic agency action, this Part contends that courts alone cannot reliably assess crisis conditions in real time and are poorly positioned to serve as gatekeepers during moments of economic uncertainty. Part III outlines a model of “legible emergency powers,” in which Congress defines emergency conditions, permissible actions, and accountability mechanisms in advance. This structure enables fast and legitimate regulatory action while preserving both democratic oversight and market discipline. Part IV, meanwhile, outlines possible alternatives to federal regulatory action that may just as effectively aid in financial crisis management. In the end, the Essay argues that clarity before crisis—rather than discretion policed after the fact—offers the soundest foundation for emergency financial governance.
- Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Fed. Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1978). ↑
- See, e.g., Ezra Klein
&
Derek Thompson, Abundance
8
(2025). ↑
- Id. ↑
- See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Restoring Objectivity and Balance to Regulatory Science: A Comment on Dudley and Peacock, 24 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 101, 102 (2016) (discussing the problem of the “Scientist King”—an agency expert who is “confident that [their] expert knowledge of the evidence makes [them] the best judge of the policy based on that evidence” (emphasis added)); Cary Funk, Key Findings About Americans’ Confidence in Science and Their Views on Scientists’ Role in Society, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/02/12/key-findings-about-americans-confidence-in-science-and-their-views-on-scientists-role-in-society/ [https://perma.cc/6LTH-7AQS]. ↑
- 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024). ↑
- Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A). ↑
- 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G). ↑
- Samer R. Saffarini, Note, Judicial Review of Emergency Powers in Banking and Financial Regulation, 111 Va. L. Rev. Online 134, 164 (2025). ↑
- Id. ↑
-
In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 801 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (explaining that “courts must not act as super-executives in an emergency”). ↑