Stephen E. Sachs

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction—but only in part. A federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution; its territorial, personal jurisdiction is not. Current doctrine notwithstanding, a federal court’s writ may run as far as Congress, within its enumerated powers, would have it go.

Today’s doctrine limits federal jurisdiction by borrowing Fourteenth Amendment principles thought to govern state courts. This borrowing blocks recoveries by injured plaintiffs, such as American victims of foreign terrorist attacks; and it’s become a font of confusion for procedure scholars, giving rise to incisive critiques of the Federal Rules.

It’s also a mistake. The Fourteenth Amendment didn’t impose new limits on state personal jurisdiction; it enabled federal enforcement of limits that already applied. Current doctrine retroactively forces the Fifth Amendment into the mold of the modern Fourteenth, transforming an expansion of federal power into a strict constraint on federal authority.

The federal courts’ territorial jurisdiction depends, in the first instance, on Congress’s powers. It may be that Congress can authorize fully global jurisdiction over any suit within Article III. If not, Congress may have ways to make better use of its jurisdictional powers at home. Either way, the existing mix of statutes and procedural rules seems fully valid. If the Constitution didn’t impose limits on Congress or on the federal courts, modern doctrine shouldn’t either.

Introduction

Everyone knows that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”¹ 1.Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).Show More But this is only half right. A federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is affirmatively limited by the Constitution. Its territorial, personal jurisdiction is not. A federal court’s writ may run as far as Congress, within its enumerated powers, would have it go.

That this view might seem unusual—even alarming—reflects profound and widespread confusion about personal jurisdiction. Under current doctrine, state-court jurisdiction is hemmed in by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,² 2.U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).Show More which requires “minimum contacts” that satisfy “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”³ 3.Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).Show More The Fifth Amendment has a Due Process Clause too,⁴ 4.U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).Show More so it’s easy to imagine similar rules for federal courts. Without Supreme Court precedent on point,⁵ 5.See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017) (“leav[ing] open the question [which restrictions] the Fifth Amendment imposes . . . on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court”); Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (declining to decide whether “a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (“We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.”).Show More the courts of appeals all agree that the Fifth Amendment requires at least the sorts of national contacts that the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a state.⁶ 6.See Double Eagle Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. MarkWest Utica EMG, L.L.C., 936 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2019); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG, 848 F.3d 1346, 1352–53, 1353 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2016), motion to recall the mandate denied, 925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 140 S. Ct. 2714 (2020); Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 443–44 (4th Cir. 2015); Klein v. Cornelius, 786 F.3d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 2015); KM Enters., Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 731 (7th Cir. 2013); Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004); Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370–71, 370 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Fed. Fountain, Inc., 165 F.3d 600, 601–02 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15 & n.3, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018) (No. 16-1071).Show More In other words, current doctrine treats the United States as a state, but larger; it takes the Fourteenth Amendment as given, and remakes the Fifth Amendment in its image.⁷ 7.See, e.g., 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068.1, at 694–95, 695 n.10 (4th ed. 2015); Chimène I. Keitner, Personal Jurisdiction and Fifth Amendment Due Process Revisited, in The Restatement and Beyond: The Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Foreign Relations Law 231, 248 (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah H. Cleveland eds., 2020); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1205, 1210 (2018) (noting that “[o]ther authors have advocated a national-contacts approach in various contexts, including . . . under the Fifth but not the Fourteenth Amendment,” and collecting citations); Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 769, 776 (2015); Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a “Substantive Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 Ind. L.J. 1191, 1216 (2000) (describing it as “generally . . . accepted” that the Fifth Amendment “requires sufficient affiliating contacts with the nation as a whole, rather than just the forum state”); Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Emory L.J. 509, 523–24 (2019).Show More

This is all backwards. The Fifth Amendment came first, and the Fourteenth was modeled on it. We need to understand how personal jurisdiction was supposed to work—before the Fourteenth Amendment—if we want to understand what the Due Process Clauses actually do.

For the first 150 years of the Republic, today’s conventional view of personal jurisdiction wasn’t so conventional. Though the early Congress refrained from exercising its full powers, the recognized doctrines of jurisdiction worked very differently for state and federal courts. The narrow limits on state jurisdiction discussed in Picquet v. Swan,⁸ 8.19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).Show More a widely cited opinion by Justice Story, were still influential a half-century later in Pennoyer v. Neff.⁹ 9.95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878); see also, e.g., Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) (endorsing Picquet’s reasoning); Warren Mfg. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co., 29 F. Cas. 294, 298 n.4 (C.C.D. Conn. 1837) (No. 17,206) (citing Picquet) (date ascribed in Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 81 n.1 (1918)); Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848) (citing Picquet); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 450 (Pa. 1844) (same).Show More Yet Picquet maintained that a federal court’s ability to have “a subject of England, or France, or Russia . . . summoned from the other end of the globe to obey our process, and submit to the judgment of our courts,” was up to Congress.¹⁰ 10.19 F. Cas. at 613.Show More If Congress wanted to exercise exorbitant jurisdiction, contrary to “principles of public law, public convenience, and immutable justice,” a federal court “would certainly be bound to follow it, and proceed upon the law.”¹¹ 11.Id. at 614–15.Show More

The contrary modern assumption, that federal and state courts face roughly the same constitutional limits, has serious practical consequences. Two circuits recently invalidated, as applied, an act of Congress authorizing jurisdiction over foreign terrorists and sponsors for attacks on Americans abroad.¹² 12.See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 923 F.3d 1115, 1118, 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (applying the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333–2334), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2713 (2020); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 335–37 (2d Cir. 2016), motion to recall the mandate denied, 925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 140 S. Ct. 2714 (2020).Show More Responding to the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, the statute specifically sought to expand Americans’ right to sue over terrorist attacks in foreign countries.¹³ 13.See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1010–11 (7th Cir. 2002).Show More But because the individual states lack jurisdiction in these cases,¹⁴ 14.See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286–89 (2014).Show More and because the attacks weren’t specifically aimed at Americans, the defendants’ U.S. contacts fell short. Congress has twice amended the statute to try different approaches, and these may yet succeed.¹⁵ 15.See Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 903, 133 Stat. 3082, 3082–83; Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-253, § 4, 132 Stat. 3183, 3184; Klieman, 140 S. Ct. 2713; Sokolow, 140 S. Ct. 2714.Show More If, though, Congress really does have power to authorize these suits—if its powers haven’t shrunk since Justice Story’s day—then the courts have no business sending the plaintiffs home empty-handed, or letting the defendants off scot-free.

The assumption that jurisdiction works the same way in state and federal court has serious theoretical consequences too. Today federal personal jurisdiction is litigated primarily under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹⁶ 16.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k).Show More But the relevant rules’ validity has been questioned since their adoption, and the skeptics have recently grown in number.¹⁷ 17.See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 7; A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 654 (2019); Patrick Woolley, Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in Regulating Personal Jurisdiction, 56 Hous. L. Rev. 565 (2019); accord Lumen N. Mulligan, Is Personal Jurisdiction Constitutionally Self-Enacting?, Jotwell (May 7, 2019), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/is-personal-jurisdiction-consti­tutionally-self-enacting/ [https://perma.cc/E8G4-NVDR].Show More Limits on state jurisdiction stem from external principles of law, principles that can’t be amended by state rules of practice and procedure. If similar limits apply to federal jurisdiction, then much current practice is unlawful. But if not—if all the federal courts really need is authorization to issue process, in a particular place and in a particular way—then the Federal Rules are still valid, and the Supreme Court can still address the issue via rulemaking.

Given the stakes, federal personal jurisdiction deserves another look. Many scholars have called for expanding federal jurisdiction through new rules or statutes,¹⁸ 18.See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 Ind. L.J. 1, 32–49 (1982); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts—Suggestions for Reform, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608, 627–35 (1954); Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1, 77–84 (2010); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 711, 712–13 (1979); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1123 (1966); Nash, supra note 7, at 557–61; Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1315–46 (2014); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 325, 329–34 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 979, 991–94 (2019).Show More or for reinterpreting present law for policy-adjacent reasons—say, because the federal government has broader interests in foreign affairs,¹⁹ 19.E.g., A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 379, 409, 415–16, 428 (1997); Ariel Winawer, Comment, Too Far from Home: Why Daimler’s “At Home” Standard Does Not Apply to Personal Jurisdiction Challenges in Anti-Terrorism Act Cases, 66 Emory L.J. 161, 185–87 (2016).Show More or because principles of reciprocity or horizontal federalism no longer apply at the federal level.²⁰ 20.E.g., Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455, 461 (2004); Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 325, 328 & n.13 (2018); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (discussing the role of “interstate federalism”).Show More Historical or formalist studies of jurisdiction tend to focus on state courts, not federal ones—and on due process, not congressional power.²¹ 21.See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 19, 24, 43–56 (1990); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have To Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1071, 1073–74, 1140–58 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 262–81; John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 591, 596–97, 616–746 (1995); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got To Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 729, 730–39 (2012); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1115–20 (1981); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1249, 1273–78, 1287–1313 (2017); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 849, 871–898 (1989); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169, 191–230 (2004); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 499, 570–89 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Part One]; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 735, 768–835 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Part Two].Show More (Justice Story’s striking discussion in Picquet, for example, has attracted virtually no scholarly interest.²² 22.As of October 3, 2020, key phrases from the opinion such as “England, or France, or Russia,” “other end of the globe,” or “proceed upon the law” yield no relevant hits in Westlaw’s Secondary Sources: Law Reviews & Journals database, aside from this author.Show More)

This Article suggests a change of course. We should stop looking for jurisdictional limits in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and start thinking about Congress’s enumerated powers instead.

The argument proceeds as follows. Jurisdictional limits have always been with us, but Fifth Amendment limits are a recent innovation. When American courts first began articulating limits on personal jurisdiction, they didn’t look to state or federal due process clauses, but to rules of general or international law that regulated the authority of separate sovereigns.²³ 23.SeeSachs, supra note 21, at 1269–87.Show More The Fourteenth Amendment changed this picture for state courts, because it enabled direct federal-question review of their jurisdictional rulings: as Pennoyer explained, “proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”²⁴ 24.Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).Show More

The picture for federal courts, however, is very different. Federal courts generally look to state laws only “in cases where they apply.”²⁵ 25.Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018).Show More Yet all valid federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land,” with “the Judges in every State . . . bound thereby.”²⁶ 26.U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.Show More A federal long-arm provision, if within Congress’s enumerated powers, establishes territorial jurisdiction to the satisfaction of the courts; the due process objection to a judgment-without-jurisdiction can never get started. The federal government can look past a state’s assertion of jurisdiction, but not the other way round.

The Article then examines what enumerated powers Congress might use to expand federal personal jurisdiction beyond what modern doctrine allows. Broad jurisdiction might be necessary and proper to carry into execution the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.²⁷ 27.See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).Show More If a foreigner manages to breach a federal duty, or if a citizen of a state has a controversy with a citizen or subject of a foreign state, those cases and controversies may be heard in federal court.²⁸ 28.See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.Show More So Congress may be within its rights to “summon[]” such defendants “from the other end of the globe to obey our process, and submit to the judgment of our courts.”²⁹ 29.Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 613 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (Story, Circuit Justice).Show More Or, if it can’t have process sent abroad, Congress might try unusual methods of serving foreign defendants here, parlaying what would ordinarily be limited jurisdiction into a general jurisdiction on any topic whatsoever.³⁰ 30.See id. at 615 (suggesting that Congress could authorize unorthodox jurisdiction predicated on service by attachment of property in the United States).Show More Either way, we should leave the Fifth Amendment to its own work. Due process may still require that defendants receive adequate notice,³¹ 31.SeeMullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950).Show More that the forum not be so burdensome as to render the proceedings a sham,³² 32.See Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.).Show More and so on. But as to the scope of the courts’ territorial jurisdiction, the Clause has nothing to say.

Finally, the Article turns to what Congress has actually done with its powers. A handful of statutes achieve universal jurisdiction through worldwide service of process, but most federal jurisdictional work is performed by the Federal Rules. And while the drafters of those Rules may not have fully understood their handiwork, its result appears to be lawful: the Rules Enabling Act’s “power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure”³³ 33.28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).Show More encompasses the power to make rules for service of process, including rules for when that process will or won’t be taken as asserting the court’s jurisdiction.

So this Article may be less revisionist than first appears. If its arguments are correct, their most immediate consequence is to preserve the status quo, including the validity of the Federal Rules. The next result is to let the federal courts exercise the full breadth of the jurisdiction Congress has already conferred. And the final implication is to put Congress back in the driver’s seat, with authority to redefine the federal courts’ reach without regard to recently invented judicial barriers. If the Court adopts new standards via rulemaking, if Congress expands federal personal jurisdiction by statute, or if the President makes a jurisdictional treaty with the Senate’s advice and consent, these policy decisions wouldn’t—and shouldn’t—be hampered by an ever-expanding vision of the Due Process Clause.³⁴ 34.Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.” (quoting 8 The Babylonian Talmud: Seder Nezikin, Tractate Aboth 76–77 (I. Epstein ed. & trans., 1935))).Show More

1. * Colin W. Brown Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. The author is grateful to William Baude, Samuel Bray, Nathan Chapman, Robin Effron, James Grimmelmann, Chimène Keitner, Richard Re, Amanda Schwoerke, Patrick Woolley, Ingrid Wuerth, Ernest Young, and the attendees of the Civil Procedure Workshop and the University of Chicago Work-in-Progress Workshop for advice and comments, and to Scotty Schenck and Siqi Wang for excellent research assistance. ↑
2. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). ↑
3.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). ↑
4. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
5. U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). ↑
6. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017) (“leav[ing] open the question [which restrictions] the Fifth Amendment imposes . . . on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court”); Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (declining to decide whether “a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (“We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.”). ↑
7. See Double Eagle Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. MarkWest Utica EMG, L.L.C., 936 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2019); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG, 848 F.3d 1346, 1352–53, 1353 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2016), motion to recall the mandate denied, 925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 140 S. Ct. 2714 (2020); Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 443–44 (4th Cir. 2015); Klein v. Cornelius, 786 F.3d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 2015); KM Enters., Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 731 (7th Cir. 2013); Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004); Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370–71, 370 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Fed. Fountain, Inc., 165 F.3d 600, 601–02 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15 & n.3, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018) (No. 16-1071). ↑
8. See, e.g., 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068.1, at 694–95, 695 n.10 (4th ed. 2015); Chimène I. Keitner, Personal Jurisdiction and Fifth Amendment Due Process Revisited, in The Restatement and Beyond: The Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Foreign Relations Law 231, 248 (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah H. Cleveland eds., 2020); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1205, 1210 (2018) (noting that “[o]ther authors have advocated a national-contacts approach in various contexts, including . . . under the Fifth but not the Fourteenth Amendment,” and collecting citations); Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 769, 776 (2015); Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a “Substantive Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 Ind. L.J. 1191, 1216 (2000) (describing it as “generally . . . accepted” that the Fifth Amendment “requires sufficient affiliating contacts with the nation as a whole, rather than just the forum state”); Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Emory L.J. 509, 523–24 (2019). ↑
9. 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134). ↑
10. 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878); see also, e.g., Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) (endorsing Picquet’s reasoning); Warren Mfg. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co., 29 F. Cas. 294, 298 n.4 (C.C.D. Conn. 1837) (No. 17,206) (citing Picquet) (date ascribed in Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 81 n.1 (1918)); Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848) (citing Picquet); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 450 (Pa. 1844) (same). ↑
11. 19 F. Cas. at 613. ↑
12. Id. at 614–15. ↑
13. See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 923 F.3d 1115, 1118, 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (applying the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333–2334), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2713 (2020); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 335–37 (2d Cir. 2016), motion to recall the mandate denied, 925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 140 S. Ct. 2714 (2020). ↑
14. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1010–11 (7th Cir. 2002). ↑
15. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286–89 (2014). ↑
16. See Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 903, 133 Stat. 3082, 3082–83; Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-253, § 4, 132 Stat. 3183, 3184; Klieman, 140 S. Ct. 2713; Sokolow, 140 S. Ct. 2714. ↑
17. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). ↑
18. See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 7; A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 654 (2019); Patrick Woolley, Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in Regulating Personal Jurisdiction, 56 Hous. L. Rev. 565 (2019); accord Lumen N. Mulligan, Is Personal Jurisdiction Constitutionally Self-Enacting?, Jotwell (May 7, 2019), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/is-personal-jurisdiction-consti­tutionally-self-enacting/ [https://perma.cc/E8G4-NVDR]. ↑
19. See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 Ind. L.J. 1, 32–49 (1982); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts—Suggestions for Reform, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608, 627–35 (1954); Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1, 77–84 (2010); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 711, 712–13 (1979); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1123 (1966); Nash, supra note 7, at 557–61; Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1315–46 (2014); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 325, 329–34 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 979, 991–94 (2019). ↑
20. E.g., A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 379, 409, 415–16, 428 (1997); Ariel Winawer, Comment, Too Far from Home: Why Daimler’s “At Home” Standard Does Not Apply to Personal Jurisdiction Challenges in Anti-Terrorism Act Cases, 66 Emory L.J. 161, 185–87 (2016). ↑
21. E.g., Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455, 461 (2004); Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 325, 328 & n.13 (2018); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (discussing the role of “interstate federalism”). ↑
22. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 19, 24, 43–56 (1990); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have To Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1071, 1073–74, 1140–58 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 262–81; John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 591, 596–97, 616–746 (1995); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got To Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 729, 730–39 (2012); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1115–20 (1981); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1249, 1273–78, 1287–1313 (2017); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 849, 871–898 (1989); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169, 191–230 (2004); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 499, 570–89 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Part One]; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 735, 768–835 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Part Two]. ↑
23. As of October 3, 2020, key phrases from the opinion such as “England, or France, or Russia,” “other end of the globe,” or “proceed upon the law” yield no relevant hits in Westlaw’s Secondary Sources: Law Reviews & Journals database, aside from this author. ↑
24. See Sachs, supra note 21, at 1269–87. ↑
25. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). ↑
26. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018). ↑
27. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. ↑
28. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”). ↑
29. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. ↑
30. Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 613 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (Story, Circuit Justice). ↑
31. See id. at 615 (suggesting that Congress could authorize unorthodox jurisdiction predicated on service by attachment of property in the United States). ↑
32. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950). ↑
33. See Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.). ↑
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018). ↑
35. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.” (quoting 8 The Babylonian Talmud: Seder Nezikin, Tractate Aboth 76–77 (I. Epstein ed. & trans., 1935))). ↑

After more than 200 years, the Full Faith and Credit Clause remains poorly understood. The Clause first issues a self-executing command (that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given”), and then gives Congress power to prescribe the manner of proof and the “Effect” of state records in other states. But if states must accord each other full faith and credit—and if nothing could be more than full—then what “Effect” could Congress give state records that they wouldn’t have already? And conversely, how could Congress in any way reduce or alter the faith and credit that is due?

This Article seeks to answer these questions in light of Congress’s early efforts, from the Founding to the 1820s, to “declare the Effect” of state records—efforts which have largely escaped the notice of current scholarship on the Clause. Together with pre-Founding documents and the decisions of influential state courts, they suggest that the Clause was not generally understood to mandate the effect of state records in other states, but rather to leave such determinations to the legislative branch. Indeed, early interpreters of the Clause attributed far less importance to its first self-executing sentence, which was often understood as a rule of evidence, and far more importance to the Congressional power to determine substantive effect. Recovering this original meaning not only saves the Clause from obscurity, but also offers opportunities for deliberation and legislative choice over the structure of our federal system.