Defining “Substantial Burdens” on Religion and Other Liberties

The U.S. Supreme Court seems poised to restore free exercise exemptions from neutral laws that burden religion. But pivotal Justices have asked how to narrow religious exemptions. This Article proposes answers with wide-ranging implications for the future—and limits—of free exercise, and for the doctrine on other liberties.

To date, courts applying exemptions from “substantial burdens” on religion have tended to narrow protections to the detriment of religious minorities. But many fear that expanding exemptions would over-protect Christians in culture-war cases.

Striking a balance will require a sound definition of “substantial burdens.” But the current, strongly pro-religion Court will not impose real limits unless it is given a way to do so that avoids forcing judges to second-guess claimants’ beliefs about what is important in religious matters. And here legal texts, history, and precedent do not shed much light.

For answers, this Article looks to how our law handles the same issue for other liberties—when legal burdens on them trigger scrutiny. It is the first article to pursue this approach, which has support in case law on other liberties. This Article offers, in the process, the most comprehensive theory to date of how other liberties guard against incidental burdens. Each liberty is shaped by what I call an “adequate alternatives” principle: a law that burdens the liberty will trigger heightened scrutiny if the law leaves no adequate alternative way to exercise that liberty. And an alternative is adequate if it lets someone realize the interests served by that liberty to the same degree, and at no greater cost. This principle can guide doctrine on those liberties in new circumstances and inform debates about which liberties to constitutionalize in the first place.

And applying the principle to define “substantial burdens” on religious liberty would resolve many issues that have vexed courts. The resulting test would urge deference to believers on religious questions but not on what “substantial” means, thus limiting this liberty. Yet the test would expand protection for religious minorities harmed by existing doctrines biased toward mainstream religions. And it would offer cogent answers to a range of cases discussed here, involving inmates, street preachers, and protesters; government contractors raising conscience claims; churches challenging zoning laws; and tribes challenging public works projects.

Introduction

Does the Free Exercise Clause entitle people to exemptions from general laws that happen to burden their religion? For decades, the U.S. Supreme Court said yes.1.See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–29 (1972).Show More Then in Employment Division v. Smith (1990),2.494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).Show More it said no. Now, in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021),3.141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).Show More five Justices have signaled a willingness to reverse Smith and say yes again.4.See id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (finding “textual and structural arguments against Smith . . . more compelling”); id. at 1883, 1926 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (calling for Smith to be overruled).Show More That would restore heightened scrutiny of—and exemptions from—neutral laws that incidentally burden religion. But two pivotal Justices in Fulton said that if and when the Court reverses Smith, it will face several questions about what should replace Smith. This Article proposes answers, with wide-ranging implications for the future—and limits—of free exercise rights. Its framework also provides a method for developing doctrines on other liberties, like speech, guns, and travel—and for telling which liberties a system ought to constitutionalize at all.

Under the pre-Smith regime, which exists now in more limited contexts under some federal and state statutes, courts would ask if a law had “placed a substantial burden” on a person’s religious exercise.5.Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).Show More If so, courts would apply heightened scrutiny, granting her an exemption from the law unless doing so would have harmed a compelling interest.6.Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404, 406–07.Show More But how to test for substantial burdens? That is, when should heightened scrutiny kick in?

This Article develops answers based on how our law handles the same issue as it arises for other constitutional liberties—when legal burdens on them are serious enough to trigger heightened scrutiny.7.See infra Section II.A.Show More Courts have developed large bodies of case law on that question. And in answering this issue for one liberty, courts have often drawn on the doctrines defining the trigger for heightened scrutiny under other liberties.8.Id.Show More Some Justices have hinted that borrowing from other liberties might be the best way to limit religious liberty, too (and one circuit has already gestured vaguely in this direction9.See, e.g.,Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (determining whether a law substantially burdens religion by asking whether it leaves open a “multitude of means” for practicing religion, echoing the “ample alternative channels of communication” test used in the same opinion to evaluate a free speech claim (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).Show More).10 10.See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882–83 (2021) (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (suggesting, based on analogies to other liberties, that free exercise protections against incidental burdens should not be categorical).Show More This method promises to provide a practical way for courts to limit religious liberty. But this Article is the first to pursue this approach—offering, in the process, the most comprehensive theory to date of how constitutional liberties in general guard against incidental burdens.

As shown below, courts have relied on what I call an adequate alternatives principle.11 11.See infra Part II.Show More This principle triggers heightened scrutiny of a law that burdens a civil liberty if the law leaves no adequate alternative means of exercising the liberty at issue. And an alternative is adequate if it allows people to pursue the interests served by that liberty to the same degree and at no greater cost.

This Article shows that applying that principle to religion offers easy-to-implement answers to several questions about the scope of religious liberty. The answers are especially timely as critics fear that if and when this particular Court reinstates free exercise exemptions, it will fail to impose sensible limits on exemptions.12 12.See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Symposium: Religious Privilege in Fulton and Beyond, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 2, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/symposium-religious-privilege-in-fulton-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/3RD3-T74T].Show More The concern not to over-protect has arisen especially in politically charged cases raising Christian claims in the “conscience wars.”13 13.See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2520 (2015).Show More These include Fulton itself, which involved a Catholic agency declining to work with same-sex couples as foster parents.14 14.Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1874–75.Show More

There and elsewhere, if courts found a “substantial burden” anytime someone claimed one, however trivial the burden in fact was, courts would be doing what skeptics of exemptions—and several Justices in Fulton15 15.Justice Barrett wrote an opinion, joined in full by Justice Kavanaugh, that indicated a willingness to revisit Smith. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Both Justices may be needed for a majority to reverse Smith since only three Justices called for reversal outright. See id. at 1883, 1926 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring). Justice Breyer joined the portion of Justice Barrett’s opinion raising questions about what would replace Smith. Id.at 1882 (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring). However, Justice Breyer himself had previously joined an opinion arguing that Smith was wrongly decided. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–45 (1997) (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).Show More—oppose: replacing Smith’s categorical denial of exemptions with “an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime,”16 16.Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring).Show More as Justice Barrett put it. This would give religious claimants carte blanche. To avoid doing so, courts must insist, as Justice Sotomayor once wrote of a statutory religious exemptions regime, that merely “thinking one’s religious beliefs are substantially burdened . . . does not make it so.”17 17.Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 966 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).Show More

But as Part I shows, a single fear has stopped the Court from setting real limits on “substantial burdens,” including in culture-war-related cases like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.18 18.Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014) (granting religious exemptions from a federal regulation requiring employers to provide insurance coverage for contraceptives).Show More The Court worried that any attempt to limit successful claims would require judges to play theologians, deciding for themselves what is true or important in religious matters.19 19.Id. at 725. The risk of forcing judges into this role also concerned the Justices in Fulton who held off on reversing Smith, see Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring), as well as the Smith Court itself, see Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990).Show More

So for any substantial burdens test to have a shot at appealing to this strongly pro-religion Court, it will have to avoid forcing judges to do theology. This Article offers a practical test that does so while still imposing real limits on religious claims in culture-war cases. But as seen in many other applications below, this test is also well-suited to “the vast majority of claims brought under” religious liberty statutes, which “have nothing to do with topics like contraception, gay rights, or abortion.”20 20.Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 874 (2019); see also Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton Hall L. Rev. 353, 384 (2018) (finding only two Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”) challenges filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the thirty-two months after the Hobby Lobby decision, neither of which involve abortion, contraception, or gay rights).Show More

The substantial burdens test proposed here also aims to avoid a second problem, which has plagued lower courts’ substantial burden doctrines: by relying on concepts drawn from mainstream religions, courts have harmed religious minorities.21 21.See infra Subsection III.D.1.Show More So for minorities and also (as seen below) inmates, the substantial burdens test has been “the most difficult doctrinal hurdle” to clear.22 22.Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1771, 1777.Show More For example, one study found that courts hearing “Muslim prisoner claims” often second-guessed the prisoners’ religious views and “summarily den[ied]” their claims.23 23.Adeel Mohammadi, Note, Sincerity, Religious Questions, and the Accommodation Claims of Muslim Prisoners, 129 Yale L.J. 1836, 1841–42, 1886 (2020).Show More Because minorities bring the majority of claims under existing statutes,24 24.Over five years in the Tenth Circuit, “half of all decisions involve[d] prisoners or asylum seekers,” and over half of the prisoners’ claims were brought by non-Christians. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 20, at 356–57, 376. Among non-prisoner and non-asylum cases, Muslims were overrepresented by a ratio of 11.86:1, Native Americans 6.78:1, Fundamentalist Mormons 5.08:1, and Hindus 3.39:1. Id. at 374.Show More refining the “substantial burdens” test would meet a pressing need whether or not Smith is reversed. That need arises in cases involving Apache Indians wearing headdresses with eagle feathers, Sikhs carrying kirpans to work, Santerían priests performing sacrifices, Black churches using inner-city spaces, Muslim prisoners growing beards, and Jewish inmates keeping kosher.25 25.John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif Girgis, Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination 10, 17 (2017).Show More This Article’s substantial burdens test aims to offer protection in such cases without over-protecting in others.

But as Part II reveals, this basic problem—developing a balanced but limited trigger for exemptions from incidental burdens—is not unique to religious liberty. Courts face the same challenge in implementing other constitutional liberties. For example, this exact issue arose regarding abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.26 26.505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).Show More In fact, it is an underappreciated fact that the changes Casey made to Roe v. Wade27 27.410 U.S. 113 (1973).Show More were entirely about limiting which incidental burdens on pre-viability abortion would require a compelling justification and which would not.28 28.It is sometimes supposed that Casey did away with Roe’s heightened scrutiny—Roe’s demand for a compelling justification for abortion laws—altogether. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 66, 95 (2013) (noting Casey “rejected Roe v. Wade’s test of strict scrutiny, adopting in its place the new and unique undue burden standard” (footnote omitted)). But, in fact, Casey did not “disturb” but rather “reaffirm[ed]” what it called Roe’s “essential holding” on when the state interest in fetal life was and was not constitutionally sufficient to support laws preventing abortion—and thus also reaffirmed, implicitly, Roe’s demand that such laws serve a compelling interest. 505 U.S. at 871, 878–79. Casey simply shrank the class of regulations that would trigger such scrutiny: not all abortion restrictions, but only those imposing an “undue burden” or prohibition. See Sherif Girgis, Misreading and Transforming Casey for Dobbs, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 331, 340 n.46 (2022). While the Court has since, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022), reversed Casey along with Roe, Casey’s framework remains a helpful guide to how our law has long addressed incidental burdens on individual liberties.Show More And Casey’s express reason for introducing this distinction into abortion law was to bring abortion in line with all other constitutional liberties, under which “not every law which makes [the liberty] more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right.”29 29.Casey, 505 U.S at 873 (plurality opinion).Show More Specifically, Casey held, only laws imposing an “undue burden” on abortion should require a compelling justification.30 30.See id. at 874.Show More And while this test was criticized as novel, its substance resembled doctrines playing the same narrowing role for other liberties.31 31.See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 Hastings L.J. 867, 894–908 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court has undertaken analyses similar to the undue burden analysis when considering liberties such as the right to marry, the right of political association, and property rights, among others); see also infra Section II.A.Show More Bringing out the resemblance here will show how to extend those other liberties’ doctrines to new circumstances—and how to fashion a well-supported substantial burdens test for religion, in the absence of textual or historical guidance for doing so.

To that end, Part II draws a principle from the laws of speech, abortion under Roe and Casey, and other liberties. These doctrines not only forbid state action that targets protected conduct, but also guard against incidental burdens from some neutral laws.32 32.See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175, 1178–79, 1202, 1209, 1223 (1996) (noting that a “floodgates concern” has led courts to limit civil liberties protections against merely incidental burdens).Show More Which? The law’s answer is guided by what I call an adequate alternatives principle. This principle triggers heightened scrutiny of a law burdening a civil liberty if the law leaves no adequate alternative means of exercising the liberty. But courts have said little on what makes an alternative “adequate.” To derive an answer, Part II extrapolates from case law and rights theory. Ultimately, the adequate alternatives principle ensures that laws curbing some liberty will leave people other ways to pursue the interests served by that liberty to the same degree, at no greater cost. This account can be used to clarify the scope of any number of liberties.

Finally, Part III applies the adequate alternatives principle to limit what will count as a “substantial burden” on religion.33 33.Other scholars have discussed the adequate alternatives principle in the context of religion but to opposite effect—arguing that because such alternatives are hard to come by in the case of religion, religious burdens should trigger stricter protection. See Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Free Exercise Under Smith and After Smith, 2020–2021 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 48–49.Show More It offers a unified resolution of dozens of cases and several unsettled questions. The cases addressed involve prisoners and death row inmates; street preachers and protesters; government contractors raising conscience claims; churches challenging zoning laws; and tribes challenging public works projects. And the general legal questions addressed in Part III, some of which were raised by Justices in Fulton, include the following: What questions judges should ask in assessing substantiality, whether to allow exemptions from “garden-variety laws,”34 34.Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted).Show More whether to treat “indirect and direct burdens on” religion differently,35 35.Id.Show More what forms of religious exercise to count in the first place, when to defer to claimants’ beliefs about a burden’s significance, and when not to defer. The test will ensure that heightened scrutiny applies only when the religious claimant really is worse off than others subject to the same law, allaying concerns about over-protecting religion. But the test will also avoid the constitutional landmines of having judges do theology or giving short shrift to less familiar, minority religious claims.

  1. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–29 (1972).
  2. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
  3. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
  4. See id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (finding “textual and structural arguments against Smith . . . more compelling”); id. at 1883, 1926 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (calling for Smith to be overruled).
  5. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
  6. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404, 406–07.
  7. See infra Section II.A.
  8. Id.
  9.  See, e.g., Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (determining whether a law substantially burdens religion by asking whether it leaves open a “multitude of means” for practicing religion, echoing the “ample alternative channels of communication” test used in the same opinion to evaluate a free speech claim (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
  10. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882–83 (2021) (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (suggesting, based on analogies to other liberties, that free exercise protections against incidental burdens should not be categorical).
  11. See infra Part II.
  12.  See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Symposium: Religious Privilege in Fulton and Beyond, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 2, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/symposium-religious-privilege-in-fulton-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/3RD3-T74T].
  13. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2520 (2015).
  14. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1874–75.
  15. Justice Barrett wrote an opinion, joined in full by Justice Kavanaugh, that indicated a willingness to revisit Smith. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Both Justices may be needed for a majority to reverse Smith since only three Justices called for reversal outright. See id. at 1883, 1926 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring). Justice Breyer joined the portion of Justice Barrett’s opinion raising questions about what would replace Smith. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring). However, Justice Breyer himself had previously joined an opinion arguing that Smith was wrongly decided. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–45 (1997) (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).
  16. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring).
  17. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 966 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
  18. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014) (granting religious exemptions from a federal regulation requiring employers to provide insurance coverage for contraceptives).
  19. Id. at 725. The risk of forcing judges into this role also concerned the Justices in Fulton who held off on reversing Smith, see Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring), as well as the Smith Court itself, see Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990).
  20. Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 874 (2019); see also Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton Hall L. Rev. 353, 384 (2018) (finding only two Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”) challenges filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the thirty-two months after the Hobby Lobby decision, neither of which involve abortion, contraception, or gay rights).
  21. See infra Subsection III.D.1.
  22. Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1771, 1777.
  23.  Adeel Mohammadi, Note, Sincerity, Religious Questions, and the Accommodation Claims of Muslim Prisoners, 129 Yale L.J. 1836, 1841–42, 1886 (2020).
  24. Over five years in the Tenth Circuit, “half of all decisions involve[d] prisoners or asylum seekers,” and over half of the prisoners’ claims were brought by non-Christians. Goodrich & Busick, supra note 20, at 356–57, 376. Among non-prisoner and non-asylum cases, Muslims were overrepresented by a ratio of 11.86:1, Native Americans 6.78:1, Fundamentalist Mormons 5.08:1, and Hindus 3.39:1. Id. at 374.
  25. John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif Girgis, Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination 10, 17 (2017).
  26. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
  27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
  28. It is sometimes supposed that Casey did away with Roe’s heightened scrutiny—Roe’s demand for a compelling justification for abortion laws—altogether. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 66, 95 (2013) (noting Casey “rejected Roe v. Wade’s test of strict scrutiny, adopting in its place the new and unique undue burden standard” (footnote omitted)). But, in fact, Casey did not “disturb” but rather “reaffirm[ed]” what it called Roe’s “essential holding” on when the state interest in fetal life was and was not constitutionally sufficient to support laws preventing abortion—and thus also reaffirmed, implicitly, Roe’s demand that such laws serve a compelling interest. 505 U.S. at 871, 878–79. Casey simply shrank the class of regulations that would trigger such scrutiny: not all abortion restrictions, but only those imposing an “undue burden” or prohibition. See Sherif Girgis, Misreading and Transforming Casey for Dobbs, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 331, 340 n.46 (2022). While the Court has since, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022), reversed Casey along with Roe, Casey’s framework remains a helpful guide to how our law has long addressed incidental burdens on individual liberties.
  29. Casey, 505 U.S at 873 (plurality opinion).
  30. See id. at 874.
  31. See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 Hastings L.J. 867, 894–908 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court has undertaken analyses similar to the undue burden analysis when considering liberties such as the right to marry, the right of political association, and property rights, among others); see also infra Section II.A.
  32. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175, 1178–79, 1202, 1209, 1223 (1996) (noting that a “floodgates concern” has led courts to limit civil liberties protections against merely incidental burdens).
  33. Other scholars have discussed the adequate alternatives principle in the context of religion but to opposite effect—arguing that because such alternatives are hard to come by in the case of religion, religious burdens should trigger stricter protection. See Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Free Exercise Under Smith and After Smith, 2020–2021 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 48–49.
  34. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Barrett, J., joined by Breyer & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
  35. Id.