Riley K. Segars

In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has largely turned to a history-based, originalist approach to the Fourth Amendment. Many scholars have been quick to laud the change, criticize the methodology, or argue their views of the historical record. But few have taken the time to catalogue what historical sources and evidence the Supreme Court has found persuasive in its originalist cases. This Note does so. It takes the Court’s originalist methodology as a given and recognizes that historical analysis has become a key part of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. So, this Note analyzes various originalist opinions of the Court to compile a set of tools that litigants should be using when arguing Fourth Amendment issues.

This Note then undertakes to apply these tools in an area where the Court has not. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court established its doctrine of apparent-authority consent. But the case was decided under a non-originalist framework. Using the Court’s preferred historical sources, this Note argues that Rodriguez’s approach to apparent-authority consent was unknown to the common law of trespass, searches, and seizures. And if apparent authority would not have excused a trespass at common law, it should not excuse a government search now. Thus, doctrine and methodology conflict regarding apparent-authority consent. In response, this Note advances a few possible ways to harmonize that inconsistency.

Introduction

In its recent Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has increasingly turned toward a theory of Fourth Amendment originalism to determine the meaning of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.¹ 1.David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1743 (2000).Show More Championed by Justice Antonin Scalia,² 2.Id.Show More Fourth Amendment originalism is based upon one fundamental principle: “The Amendment ‘must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.’”³ 3.Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2021) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012)).Show More

To figure out what that minimum degree of protection is, the Court has frequently undertaken historical surveys of the Founding-era common law of trespass, searches, and seizures.⁴ 4.See, e.g., id. at 2022–24; Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–36 (1995); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326–45 (2001).Show More Of course, the Court has recognized that common law rules are not always clear.⁵ 5.Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2022.Show More However, in the cases where the Court has found that the common law definitively declared that a certain type of search or seizure was or was not reasonable, that determination has been all but dispositive.⁶ 6.See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345 n.14.Show More In those cases, litigants can win game, set, and match by convincing the Court of their understanding of the historical legal record.

While Fourth Amendment originalism had a distinguished pedigree in the Court’s early search and seizure jurisprudence, it was largely discounted during the Warren and Burger Courts.⁷ 7.Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1740–41.Show More As such, many cases decided during the mid- to late-twentieth century were litigated on a jurisprudential rubric that differs substantially from much of the Court’s current approach to deciding Fourth Amendment questions.

This leads to a few natural questions. What tools should litigants use to argue Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases under the now-ascendant originalist framework? And how do many of the Court’s older precedents stack up in light of this revived history-based approach? Does the Founding-era common law support those decisions? Further, how should people react when it seems that current cases do not ensure that the Fourth Amendment provides “the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted”?⁸ 8.Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 411).Show More

This Note undertakes to answer these questions. While much recent originalist scholarship is quick to provide historical evidence it argues the Court should find persuasive, this Note inverts the analysis, first cataloguing the various types of sources the Court has regularly used to determine the content of the common law and then presenting them to litigants as primary tools to be used in making history-based legal arguments. Then, as a case study, this Note takes those tools and applies them to Illinois v. Rodriguez,⁹ 9.497 U.S. 177 (1990).Show More a case decided just before the Court began to shift its focus toward a history-based approach. In Rodriguez, which established the Court’s current doctrine regarding apparent-authority-consent searches, the Court held that police may constitutionally search a person’s home pursuant to consent obtained from someone who the officers reasonably, but mistakenly, believed had the requisite authority to consent.¹⁰ 10.Id. at 188–89.Show More However, using a mixture of well-known and rarely or never-before cited historical evidence, including early American and British case law, this Note argues that Rodriguez’s holding does not fit comfortably within the Founding-era common law of searches and seizures. But it proposes a few ways to reach a sort of harmony.

Thus, this Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I introduces the doctrine of consent and apparent authority. Part II examines how the Court has increasingly looked to history and the common law to determine whether a search is reasonable or not under the Fourth Amendment. Part III catalogues the common tools and methods that the Court has used to determine what the content of the Founding-era common law of searches and seizures actually was. Part IV uses those tools to argue that apparent authority would not have excused an officer’s trespass onto someone’s land, making that trespass an unreasonable search at common law. Finally, Part V discusses the possible implications that this research may have for apparent-authority-consent-search doctrine.

1.  David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1743 (2000). ↑
2.  Id. ↑
3.  Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2021) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012)). ↑
4.  See, e.g., id. at 2022–24; Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–36 (1995); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326–45 (2001). ↑
5.  Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2022. ↑
6.  See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345 n.14. ↑
7.  Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1740–41. ↑
8.  Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 411). ↑
9.  497 U.S. 177 (1990). ↑

10.  Id. at 188–89. ↑