Amanda L. Tyler

[O]f course, Korematsu was wrong . . . . But you are kidding yourself if you think the same thing will not happen again.

– Justice Antonin Scalia¹ 1.Justice Antonin Scalia, Statement at University of Hawaii School of Law (Feb. 3, 2014), quoted in Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia: Korematsu Was Wrong, but ‘You Are Kidding Yourself’ If You Think It Won’t Happen Again, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_korematsu_was_wrong_but_you_are_kidding_yourself_if_you_think_it_won [https://perma.cc/D6YQ-CRND].Show More

Introduction

In the immediate wake of the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln and just ten days after newly sworn-in President Andrew Johnson issued an order calling for a military trial of the alleged conspirators in Lincoln’s killing, the government brought the accused before a tribunal composed of nine military officers at the Old Arsenal Penitentiary in Washington, D.C.² 2.Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From the Tower of London to Guantanamo Bay 174–75 (2017) (detailing procedures and proceedings).Show More The President’s order empowered the commission to set its own rules of procedure.³ 3.Id. at 175.Show More By the ensuing rules, a majority vote of the officers could sustain a guilty verdict, a two-thirds majority vote could sustain a death sentence, and the only avenue for appeal was to seek a pardon from the President.⁴ 4.Id.Show More

Appearing for the prosecution, Representative John Bingham—who one year later would serve as primary drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment—argued that the due process guarantee set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution was “only the law of peace, not of war.”⁵ 5.Id. at 175–76.Show More “[I]n war,” he asserted, “it must be, and is, to a great extent, inoperative and disregarded.”⁶ 6.Id. at 176; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment 89–98 (2013) (detailing the arguments of Bingham and others in relation to the applicability of the U.S. Constitution in times of war).Show More

Counsel for the accused conspirators argued that they deserved a jury trial in a proper court of law. Specifically, Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson argued that fundamental liberties are “more peculiarly necessary to the security of personal liberty in war than in peace. All history tells us that war, at times, maddens the people, frenzies government, and makes both regardless of constitutional limitations of power. Individual safety, at such periods, is more in peril than at any other.”⁷ 7.Magliocca, supra note 6, at 94.Show More It followed, in his view, that only members of the United States military could be tried by a military commission. Given that the courts were open and operating in the District, he contended, the defendants were entitled to a jury trial with the full panoply of procedural protections set forth in the Bill of Rights.⁸ 8.Id.Show More

But Bingham was not finished. Bingham also cited as legal sanction for the military trials President Lincoln’s earlier declarations of martial law and suspension of habeas corpus that had followed under legislation enacted by the United States Congress in 1863.⁹ 9.Id. at 95–96.Show More More generally, during wartime, he contended, “the rights of each citizen, as secured in time of peace, must yield to the wants, interests, and necessities of the nation.”¹⁰ 10.Id. at 96.Show More

As every armchair Civil War historian knows, Bingham’s arguments prevailed on that occasion. The military commission proceeded to convict all eight defendants on various conspiracy-related charges,¹¹ 11.These included the charge of traitorously conspiring to commit murder, a crime not codified in federal law but one that had been announced by the military officers for the case at hand. Id. at 98–99.Show More sentencing four to death, three to life terms, and one to a six-year prison term.¹² 12.Id. at 99–102.Show More Days later, on July 7, 1865, the government hanged the four given capital sentences.¹³ 13.Frank J. Williams & Nicole J. Benjamin, Military Trials of Terrorists: From the Lincoln Conspirators to the Guantanamo Inmates, 39 N. Ky. L. Rev. 609, 629 (2012).Show More This happened despite the filing by one of the condemned, Mary Surratt, of an overnight habeas petition reiterating Senator Johnson’s arguments, which was thwarted by the personal intervention of President Johnson.¹⁴ 14.Tyler, supra note 2, at 177.Show More

Just one year later and with the Civil War effectively over, in Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the notion that military courts could try civilians in states “where the courts are open and their process unobstructed.”¹⁵ 15.Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 31–32, 121 (1866).Show More In so doing, the Court rebuffed the government’s argument that the Bill of Rights constituted “peace provisions” that “like all other conventional and legislative laws and enactments, are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the supreme law.”¹⁶ 16.Id. at 20 (replicating government’s argument).Show More Instead, Milligan championed the following proposition: “The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”¹⁷ 17.Id. at 120–21. For more on Milligan and the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, see Martin S. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 323, 394–457 (2018).Show More

It is an inspiring passage. But the track record over the course of American history seems to suggest otherwise. More often than not, Bingham’s arguments have prevailed when courts have reviewed government actions taken during times of war and emergency. Whether the courts expressly say the Constitution means something different in such times, or say the political branches deserve extra deference during such emergencies, or say that during such times the judiciary should stay its hand entirely, the result has been the same: For all practical purposes, the United States Constitution has meant something different in times of emergency. Whether deferring to President Lincoln’s blockade at the start of the Civil War,¹⁸ 18.The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670–71 (1863).Show More a state’s suspension of creditors’ remedies during the Great Depression,¹⁹ 19.Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 416, 447–48 (1934).Show More or President Roosevelt’s evacuation and mass incarceration of Japanese Americans in the West during World War II,²⁰ 20.See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 85–89, 104–05 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–18 (1944).Show More the Supreme Court has regularly permitted the political branches wide discretion to manage national emergencies, even in ways that would be viewed as flouting the Constitution during peacetime. All of this has been exacerbated, moreover, by the ever-expanding conceptions of war and emergency more generally.²¹ 21.See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences 5, 136 (2012) (exploring how the concept of wartime has expanded dramatically over the course of American history, particularly in the hands of politicians); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 737 (2006) (exploring similar trends). This Article sometimes refers to “wars and emergencies”; to be clear, however, this Article conceives of wars as one subset of emergencies.Show More

It follows that studying emergencies has the potential to tell us something both about the judicial role and the Constitution itself. This is because such a study implicates a range of questions, including whether the Founding document, despite expressly accounting for the potential for war and emergency, is a compact the meaning of which turns on the state of national security.²² 22.There are many wartime powers noted in the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (empowering Congress “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. cls. 12–14 (empowering Congress “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. cl. 15 (empowering Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”); id. § 9, cl. 2 (referencing the power to suspend habeas corpus).Show More That is, was Bingham correct that it means something different in times of crisis versus when the country is at peace? And what of the judicial role? Does it differ depending on such circumstances?

Although Bingham’s arguments most often have prevailed historically, there have been a handful of Supreme Court decisions, like Milligan, pushing back on the idea that the political branches deserve extensive deference to manage crises. Consider, in addition to Milligan, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), in which the Supreme Court told President Truman that he could not seize the country’s steel mills that were about to strike during the height of the Korean War.²³ 23.Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952).Show More The result is unsettled terrain, with many of the larger questions about the Constitution and judicial role in times of emergency having never been fully resolved.²⁴ 24.As explored below, Milligan and other examples of Supreme Court decisions that do not defer to the political branches have often come in the waning days of—or even after—the relevant emergency. See infra text accompanying notes 60–67.Show More Instead, well over two hundred years into our constitutional experiment, debates rage on as to the proper roles of the judiciary and our Founding document during such times.²⁵ 25.For a small selection of some of the relevant literature on point, see, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1337 (2015); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1789 (2010); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1801 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 691 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273; John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath (1993).Show More

With the COVID-19 pandemic and the extensive litigation it has spurred targeting regulation of conduct deemed dangerous to public health, there is a new chapter to add to the mix. And it is a very interesting one. In several cases, an emerging Supreme Court majority has applied increasingly rigorous scrutiny to government regulations predicated upon public health, most notably where such rules have intersected with the exercise of religion, but also in the areas of property rights and separation of powers. It has done so, moreover, often in the context of its so-called “shadow docket”²⁶ 26.I believe the term originated with William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 5 (2015). The rise of orders in such cases has been explored in detail by Stephen Vladeck. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 123, 152–53 (2019). There is a debate over the appropriateness of the term “shadow docket,” but I will employ it here given that these are cases often without full briefing and argument in which, as the cases discussed below in Part II demonstrate, the Court has sometimes rendered highly consequential rulings that are not always clearly supported by existing precedent. This Article puts to the side the debate over whether the Court should be so active in this posture and whether it should be establishing new substantive law in these cases. Nonetheless, I tend to join camp with those who are critical of the Court on both fronts. See, e.g., id. at 156–60; see also Stephen Vladeck, The Shadow Docket: How the Supreme Court Uses Stealth Rulings to Amass Power and Undermine the Republic (forthcoming 2023) (arguing that the Court’s use of the shadow docket is fundamentally inconsistent with its role in the judicial process and risks serious long-term institutional harm to the Court).Show More—its emergency application docket that fast-tracks cases to the Court without the benefit of full briefing and argument. This being said, a Court majority has also deferred to government decisions made in the context of the pandemic in several other contexts, including when reviewing abortion and prison policies.

All the same, the Court’s propensity to be so active of late invites a revival of the debates over the role of the Constitution in times of emergency and the attendant role of the judiciary during the same. On one view, the Constitution means something different during times of emergency, insofar as the political branches effectively enjoy broader discretion to manage the country through such crises. On another view—and one that has controlled in some recent COVID-19-era decisions by the Supreme Court—any emergency context should not factor into how the Court assesses the constitutionality of government action. An example of this view may be found in Justice Gorsuch’s recent opinion voting to override a governor’s order setting capacity restrictions on religious worship to halt the spread of COVID-19.²⁷ 27.S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 716 (2021).Show More There, he wrote, “[e]ven in times of crisis—perhaps especially in times of crisis—we have a duty to hold governments to the Constitution.”²⁸ 28.Id. at 718 (statement of Gorsuch, J.).Show More

This Article explores the role of judicial review during times of emergency, spanning American history up to and including the Court’s recent orders made in the context of the pandemic. It also surveys debates on either side of the competing visions of the Constitution and the judicial role during emergencies. Finally, the Article suggests that even if one has significant concerns over the processes by which the current Supreme Court has decided some of the recent pandemic cases and/or the underlying merits of the decisions rendered by the Court, there is much to welcome in recent opinions positing that emergencies do not automatically diminish the individual rights protections in the Constitution or, for that matter, the judicial role. All the same, the Article concludes by critiquing the inconsistency in the Court’s approach to its role during the pandemic. Further, it suggests that it is not so much a desire to revive the judicial role in times of emergency that is driving the searching review we have witnessed in some of the pandemic cases, but instead the proverbial tail that wags the dog. In short, many of the Justices seem far more driven by the particular merits of the cases than a consistent approach to judicial review in times of emergency. A better approach would transcend the merits of any given context to embrace a model of judicial review that remains consistent regardless of the underlying merits and, most of all, the existence—or not—of any kind of emergency.

1.  Justice Antonin Scalia, Statement at University of Hawaii School of Law (Feb. 3, 2014), quoted in Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia: Korematsu Was Wrong, but ‘You Are Kidding Yourself’ If You Think It Won’t Happen Again, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_korematsu_was_wrong_but_you_are_kidding_yourself_if_you_think_it_won [https://perma.cc/D6YQ-CRND]. ↑
2.  Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From the Tower of London to Guantanamo Bay 174–75 (2017) (detailing procedures and proceedings). ↑
3.  Id. at 175. ↑
4.  Id. ↑
5.  Id. at 175–76. ↑
6.  Id. at 176; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment 89–98 (2013) (detailing the arguments of Bingham and others in relation to the applicability of the U.S. Constitution in times of war). ↑
7.  Magliocca, supra note 6, at 94. ↑
8.  Id. ↑
9.  Id. at 95–96. ↑
10.  Id. at 96. ↑
11.  These included the charge of traitorously conspiring to commit murder, a crime not codified in federal law but one that had been announced by the military officers for the case at hand. Id. at 98–99. ↑
12.  Id. at 99–102. ↑
13.  Frank J. Williams & Nicole J. Benjamin, Military Trials of Terrorists: From the Lincoln Conspirators to the Guantanamo Inmates, 39 N. Ky. L. Rev. 609, 629 (2012). ↑
14.  Tyler, supra note 2, at 177. ↑
15.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 31–32, 121 (1866). ↑
16.  Id. at 20 (replicating government’s argument). ↑
17.  Id. at 120–21. For more on Milligan and the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, see Martin S. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 323, 394–457 (2018). ↑
18.  The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670–71 (1863). ↑
19.  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 416, 447–48 (1934). ↑
20.  See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 85–89, 104–05 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–18 (1944). ↑
21.  See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences 5, 136 (2012) (exploring how the concept of wartime has expanded dramatically over the course of American history, particularly in the hands of politicians); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 737 (2006) (exploring similar trends). This Article sometimes refers to “wars and emergencies”; to be clear, however, this Article conceives of wars as one subset of emergencies. ↑
22.  There are many wartime powers noted in the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (empowering Congress “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. cls. 12–14 (empowering Congress “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. cl. 15 (empowering Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”); id. § 9, cl. 2 (referencing the power to suspend habeas corpus). ↑
23.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952). ↑
24.  As explored below, Milligan and other examples of Supreme Court decisions that do not defer to the political branches have often come in the waning days of—or even after—the relevant emergency. See infra text accompanying notes 60–67. ↑
25.  For a small selection of some of the relevant literature on point, see, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1337 (2015); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1789 (2010); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1801 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 691 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273; John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath (1993). ↑
26.  I believe the term originated with William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 5 (2015). The rise of orders in such cases has been explored in detail by Stephen Vladeck. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 123, 152–53 (2019). There is a debate over the appropriateness of the term “shadow docket,” but I will employ it here given that these are cases often without full briefing and argument in which, as the cases discussed below in Part II demonstrate, the Court has sometimes rendered highly consequential rulings that are not always clearly supported by existing precedent. This Article puts to the side the debate over whether the Court should be so active in this posture and whether it should be establishing new substantive law in these cases. Nonetheless, I tend to join camp with those who are critical of the Court on both fronts. See, e.g., id. at 156–60; see also Stephen Vladeck, The Shadow Docket: How the Supreme Court Uses Stealth Rulings to Amass Power and Undermine the Republic (forthcoming 2023) (arguing that the Court’s use of the shadow docket is fundamentally inconsistent with its role in the judicial process and risks serious long-term institutional harm to the Court). ↑
27.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 716 (2021). ↑

28.  Id. at 718 (statement of Gorsuch, J.). ↑