Striking the Peremptory Strike: Why There Is No Freestanding Constitutional Entitlement to Peremptory Challenges

*J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 2025. Many thanks to Professor Thomas Frampton for guiding my research and writing for this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Richard Jolly for allowing me to critically engage with his scholarship and for providing valuable feedback on the piece. Finally, I am very grateful to the many members of the Virginia Law Review who worked on this Note. I would especially like to thank Charlotte Karlsen, whose insightful comments and support greatly improved this Note.Show More

The peremptory challenge—used by parties to remove prospective jurors without the need to provide a reason—has become one of the most controversial features of the modern American jury system. Despite Batson v. Kentucky’s promise to prohibit parties from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors from serving because of their race, lawyers have learned to adjust their explanations so as to avoid violating the commands of Batson. States have begun to reform their systems of challenging jurors peremptorily in response. While some states have fashioned a list of presumptively invalid race-neutral justifications for exercising peremptory challenges, one state—Arizona—went the furthest by abolishing peremptory challenges altogether. This prompted Professor Richard Jolly to write an article arguing that the complete abolition of the peremptory challenge is unconstitutional. From his review of common law history, early American practice, and the text of the Sixth Amendment, Jolly concludes that peremptory challenges are implicit in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an “impartial jury.” This Note is a direct response to Jolly’s article. It examines over a century of court precedent as well as common law history, early American practice, and the text of the Sixth Amendment to determine if there is a freestanding constitutional entitlement to peremptory challenges. The analysis in this Note reaches the opposite conclusion: the peremptory challenge is unequivocally not required by the Constitution and, as such, Arizona and any other state that decides to abolish the peremptory challenge would not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Introduction

Once hailed by William Blackstone as “a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous,”¹ 1.4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *353.Show More peremptory challenges have been deemed by modern critics as “the most undemocratic feature of our democratic trial system,”² 2.Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 156 (1989).Show More the “[l]ast [b]est [t]ool of Jim Crow,”³ 3.Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 827 (1997).Show More and “an instrument that undermines society’s evolving attempts to ensure that juries fairly represent the judgment of the community.”⁴ 4.Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369, 399 (1992).Show More Prospective jurors can be struck from the jury venire through two methods: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause allow for rejection of venire members “on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality.”⁵ 5.Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).Show More Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, are exercised “without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court’s control.”⁶ 6.Id.Show More An unlimited number of potential jurors can be challenged for cause, while only a limited number of potential jurors, as specified by statute, may be challenged peremptorily.⁷ 7.See Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the American Jury, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 785, 788 (2020).Show More And while a judge must find that a potential juror is indeed biased before approving a challenge for cause, peremptory strikes receive no such scrutiny unless subject to a Batson challenge.⁸ 8.See id. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits parties from using peremptory strikes to exclude jurors from serving because of their race. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).Show More In an ideal world, the process will end with a right “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”⁹ 9.Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).Show More: an impartial jury.

Because peremptory challenges can be employed at the complete discretion of parties and because they do not require a judge’s approval, parties frequently use them to strike potential jurors based on stereotypes that may go beyond their ability to decide a case impartially.¹⁰ 10.One study found that prosecutors in North Carolina used sixty percent of their peremptory challenges against Black jurors, who constituted only thirty-two percent of the venire, while defense attorneys used eighty-seven percent of their strikes against white jurors, who constituted sixty-eight percent of the venire. Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data From One County, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 695, 697–99 (1999). Another study that examined strikes in 390 jury trials in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, found that prosecutors struck Black prospective jurors at over three times the rate they struck white prospective jurors. Richard Bourke, Joe Hingston & Joel Devine, La. Crisis Assistance Ctr., Black Strikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office 4, 7 (2003).Show More While each party is required under Batson v. Kentucky to provide a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike if the opponent of the strike makes out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, lawyers have learned to adjust their reasons so as not to violate the commands of Batson.¹¹ 11.See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1683, 1706 (2006) (“Although Batson was an earnest attempt to root out discriminatory peremptories, Batson is so easy to circumvent that it allows a charade in the courtroom. Instead of giving race or gender as a reason for excluding jurors, lawyers can give any other reason no matter how ‘silly or superstitious.’” (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam))).Show More As one judge noted, “Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, ‘Handy Race-Neutral Explanations’ or ‘20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.’”¹² 12.People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).Show More Such race-neutral explanations can include, and have included, clothing, body language, lack of eye contact, and the way a potential juror wears their hair.¹³ 13.See Marder, supra note 11, at 1706.Show More The ease with which parties are able to avoid Batson violations led Justice Breyer to remark that “the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better organized and more systematized than ever before.”¹⁴ 14.Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Hoffman, supra note 3, at 829 (“From Reconstruction through the civil rights movement, the peremptory challenge was an incredibly efficient final racial filter.”); Equal Just. Initiative, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy 4 (2010) (“[T]here is perhaps no arena of public life . . . where racial discrimination is more widespread, apparent, and seemingly tolerated than in the selection of juries.”).Show More

The problems prompted by peremptory challenges have led scholars and practitioners alike to call for reform¹⁵ 15.See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1099 (1994); Annie Sloan, “What to Do About Batson?”: Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 233 (2020); Robert T. Prior, The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 579 (1993); Joshua Revesz, Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge, 125 Yale L.J. 2535 (2016); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination From Jury Selection, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 625 (1994); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1467 (2012); Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1075 (2011).Show More or the complete elimination of peremptory challenges,¹⁶ 16.E.g., Hoffman, supra note 3, at 810; Marder, supra note 11, at 1684; LaCrisha L.A. McAllister, Closing the Loophole: A Critical Analysis of the Peremptory Challenge and Why It Should Be Abolished, 48 S.U. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2021); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 227, 230 (1986); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 503 (1996); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”).Show More with some scholars even going so far as to suggest that peremptory challenges are unconstitutional.¹⁷ 17.See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 4, at 399 (suggesting that peremptory challenges contravene the Equal Protection Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment).Show More States have taken heed. In the span of just a few years, various states have reformed their approach to peremptory strikes to attempt to counter discrimination in the selection of juries. The reforms generally fall into two camps.

The first approach is modeled after Washington’s General Rule 37 (“GR 37”).¹⁸ 18.Wash. Ct. GR 37.Show More GR 37 identifies seven facially race-neutral justifications for a peremptory strike that have been “historically . . . associated with improper discrimination in jury selection” and makes them “presumptively invalid.”¹⁹ 19.Wash. Ct. GR 37(h).Show More Such “presumptively invalid” justifications include, inter alia, “having prior contact with law enforcement officers” and “having a close relationship with people who have been . . . arrested.”²⁰ 20.Wash. Ct. GR 37(h).Show More GR 37 differs from Batson in other key respects. For example, GR 37 does not impose an initial burden of production on one who challenges a peremptory strike,²¹ 21.See Wash. Ct. GR 37(c)–(d).Show More it places restrictions on the invocation of “[c]onduct” to justify a strike,²² 22.Wash. Ct. GR 37(i).Show More and it does not require that the challenger prove “purposeful discrimination.”²³ 23.Wash. Ct. GR 37(f).Show More Other states, including California,²⁴ 24.Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7 (West 2025).Show More New Jersey,²⁵ 25.N.J. Stat. Ann § 1:8-3A (West 2025).Show More and Connecticut,²⁶ 26.Connecticut Practice Book § 5.12 (2025).Show More have followed Washington’s lead and adopted rules similar to GR 37.

The second approach to reform has been led by Arizona. The state considered two proposals for reform: one similar to Washington’s GR 37 and one that would eliminate peremptory strikes altogether.²⁷ 27.See Thomas Ward Frampton & Brandon Charles Osowski, The End of Batson? Rulemaking, Race, and Criminal Procedure Reform, 124 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 39–41 (2024).Show More On January 1, 2022, Arizona eliminated peremptory strikes entirely,²⁸ 28.See Order Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 47(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, In re Petition to Amend Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/20/2021%20Rules/‌R-21-0020%20Final%20Rules%20Order.pdf?ver=2021-08-31-105653-157 [https://perma.cc‌/R4XA-CKFH]; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18.4–.5 (2025).Show More in part because of a widespread perception that the Washington-style reform was “too woke.”²⁹ 29.See Frampton & Osowski, supra note 27, at 44 (quoting Telephone Interview by Thomas Ward Frampton & Brandon Charles Osowski with Kevin D. Heade, Chair, Cent. Ariz. Nat’l Laws. Guild (Sept. 22, 2022)).Show More Those involved in the decision also noted multiple advantages, many of which were realized by judges in Arizona during the COVID-19 pandemic when the Arizona Supreme Court sharply limited peremptory challenges by emergency administrative order.³⁰ 30.Id. at 37–38.Show More First, they stated that the abolition of peremptory strikes would significantly increase judicial efficiency.³¹ 31.Id. at 43.Show More Voir dire can consume more time than the trial itself, often adding significant time and expense to trials and providing a significant advantage to wealthier parties.³² 32.April J. Anderson, Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners’ Trial Manuals, 16 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 5–6 (2020).Show More Second, they argued that it would eliminate the awkward “‘guesswork’ inherent in” judges’ determinations of lawyers’ motives for exercising strikes.³³ 33.See Frampton & Osowski, supra note 27, at 43 (quoting Charles W. Gurtler, Jr., Comment of the Committee on Superior Court at 3, In re Petition to Amend Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/DesktopModules/ActiveForu‌ms/viewer.aspx?portalid=0&moduleid=23621&attachmentid=9457 [https://perma.cc/EP8P-3‌NEE]).Show More Third, they noted that the abolition of peremptory strikes would eliminate other forms of discrimination outside of just racial discrimination.³⁴ 34.Id. at 43–45.Show More And fourth, they believed it would dispense with the concern that the GR 37 model would create a double standard, whereby defense counsel could use discriminatory strikes against white prospective jurors.³⁵ 35.Id. at 46.Show More

In response to Arizona’s change in jury selection procedure, Professor Richard Jolly published an article in the Vanderbilt Law Review arguing that the complete abolition of the peremptory challenge is unconstitutional.³⁶ 36.Richard Lorren Jolly, The Constitutional Right to Peremptory Challenges in Jury Selection, 77 Vand. L. Rev. 1529 (2024).Show More Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has “long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension,”³⁷ 37.Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).Show More Jolly argues that “there is overwhelming textual, historical, and traditional evidence that peremptory challenges are of federal constitutional dimension.”³⁸ 38.Jolly, supra note 36, at 1535–36.Show More From his review of such evidence, Jolly concludes that peremptory challenges are implicit in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an “impartial jury.”³⁹ 39.Id. at 1537–38 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).Show More He goes on to argue that the right to challenge peremptorily is “unquestionably secure” in the context of capital offenses and “likely extends” to all criminal cases in which the jury trial right attaches.⁴⁰ 40.Id. at 1555. While Jolly concludes that peremptory challenges are also likely secured by the Seventh Amendment in civil trials, this Note is limited to analyzing the constitutional requirements of the Sixth Amendment.Show More

Jolly’s argument has massive implications for the future of jury selection. Today, nearly one-fifth of the country lives in a jurisdiction where the Batson framework does not govern peremptory strikes,⁴¹ 41.Frampton & Osowski, supra note 27, at 3.Show More and at least eleven other states are currently considering reform.⁴² 42.See Batson Reform: State by State, Berkeley L. Death Penalty Clinic, https://www.law.be‌rkeley.edu/experiential/clinics/death-penalty-clinic/projects-and-cases/whitewashing-the-jur‌y-box-how-california-perpetuates-the-discriminatory-exclusion-of-black-and-latinx-jurors/ba‌tson-reform-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/5LQF-MLA6] (last visited Sept. 28, 2025) (showing that states considering reform include Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Utah).Show More If Jolly’s argument is correct, then Arizona and any other state that follows its lead in abolishing the peremptory challenge would be in violation of the Constitution. Given the many calls to eliminate peremptory challenges, the question of whether such challenges are required by the Constitution is one that, as Jolly correctly states, “cannot be ignored.”⁴³ 43.Jolly, supra note 36, at 1554.Show More

This Note is a direct response to Jolly’s article. Like his article, this Note examines common law history, early American practice, and the text of the Sixth Amendment to determine if there is a freestanding constitutional entitlement to peremptory challenges. It also examines over a century of case law. The analysis in this Note reaches the opposite conclusion: the peremptory challenge is unequivocally not required by the Constitution and, as such, Arizona and any other state that decides to abolish the peremptory challenge would not violate the Sixth Amendment in doing so.

To make the argument, this Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a history of the peremptory challenge both at common law and in early American practice. Part II presents over a century of case law demonstrating that an impartial jury protects against the existence of actual bias on the petit jury. Because peremptory challenges minimize the perception of bias as opposed to actual bias, such challenges fall outside the ambit of the Sixth Amendment’s safeguards. Despite clear precedent from the Supreme Court that the peremptory challenge is not of federal constitutional dimension, Jolly argues that the Court has never fully analyzed its common law history, early American practice, and the text of the Sixth Amendment. Part III does just that. It first argues that peremptory challenges cannot be considered essential to an impartial jury because although criminal defendants had a right to use peremptory challenges in capital cases at common law and in early American practice,⁴⁴ 44.See infra notes 63, 68–72 and accompanying text.Show More no such right existed in noncapital cases.⁴⁵ 45.See infra notes 161–66 and accompanying text.Show More While Jolly attempts to employ a textualist argument to claim that peremptory challenges are nevertheless secured in noncapital cases as well as capital cases, his argument ultimately fails for both textualist and logical reasons. Part III goes on to demonstrate that the modern conception of the relationship between peremptory challenges and the impartial jury requirement is historically incongruous with the original purpose, use, and procedure of the peremptory challenge. Lastly, Part IV briefly discusses the implications of freezing practice at the time of the ratification of the Sixth Amendment to determine what rights are included in the guarantee of an impartial jury, warning that such a jurisprudential approach may actually undermine the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment. Taken together, the case law, as well as historical, practical, and textual evidence, provides overwhelming proof that there is not a freestanding constitutional entitlement to peremptory challenges.

1.  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *353. ↑
2.  Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 156 (1989). ↑
3.  Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 827 (1997). ↑
4.  Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369, 399 (1992). ↑
5.  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). ↑
6.  Id. ↑
7.  See Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the American Jury, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 785, 788 (2020). ↑
8.  See id. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits parties from using peremptory strikes to exclude jurors from serving because of their race. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). ↑
9.  Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). ↑
10.  One study found that prosecutors in North Carolina used sixty percent of their peremptory challenges against Black jurors, who constituted only thirty-two percent of the venire, while defense attorneys used eighty-seven percent of their strikes against white jurors, who constituted sixty-eight percent of the venire. Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data From One County, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 695, 697–99 (1999). Another study that examined strikes in 390 jury trials in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, found that prosecutors struck Black prospective jurors at over three times the rate they struck white prospective jurors. Richard Bourke, Joe Hingston & Joel Devine, La. Crisis Assistance Ctr., Black Strikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office 4, 7 (2003). ↑
11.  See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1683, 1706 (2006) (“Although Batson was an earnest attempt to root out discriminatory peremptories, Batson is so easy to circumvent that it allows a charade in the courtroom. Instead of giving race or gender as a reason for excluding jurors, lawyers can give any other reason no matter how ‘silly or superstitious.’” (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam))). ↑
12.  People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). ↑
13.  See Marder, supra note 11, at 1706. ↑
14.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Hoffman, supra note 3, at 829 (“From Reconstruction through the civil rights movement, the peremptory challenge was an incredibly efficient final racial filter.”); Equal Just. Initiative, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy 4 (2010) (“[T]here is perhaps no arena of public life . . . where racial discrimination is more widespread, apparent, and seemingly tolerated than in the selection of juries.”). ↑
15.  See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1099 (1994); Annie Sloan, “What to Do About Batson?”: Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 233 (2020); Robert T. Prior, The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 579 (1993); Joshua Revesz, Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge, 125 Yale L.J. 2535 (2016); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination From Jury Selection, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 625 (1994); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1467 (2012); Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1075 (2011). ↑
16.  E.g., Hoffman, supra note 3, at 810; Marder, supra note 11, at 1684; LaCrisha L.A. McAllister, Closing the Loophole: A Critical Analysis of the Peremptory Challenge and Why It Should Be Abolished, 48 S.U. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2021); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 227, 230 (1986); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 503 (1996); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”). ↑
17.  See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 4, at 399 (suggesting that peremptory challenges contravene the Equal Protection Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment). ↑
18.  Wash. Ct. GR 37. ↑
19.  Wash. Ct. GR 37(h). ↑
20.  Wash. Ct. GR 37(h). ↑
21.  See Wash. Ct. GR 37(c)–(d). ↑
22.  Wash. Ct. GR 37(i). ↑
23.  Wash. Ct. GR 37(f). ↑
24.  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7 (West 2025). ↑
25.  N.J. Stat. Ann § 1:8-3A (West 2025). ↑
26.  Connecticut Practice Book § 5.12 (2025). ↑
27.  See Thomas Ward Frampton & Brandon Charles Osowski, The End of Batson? Rulemaking, Race, and Criminal Procedure Reform, 124 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 39–41 (2024). ↑
28.  See Order Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 47(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, In re Petition to Amend Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/20/2021%20Rules/‌R-21-0020%20Final%20Rules%20Order.pdf?ver=2021-08-31-105653-157 [https://perma.cc‌/R4XA-CKFH]; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18.4–.5 (2025). ↑
29.  See Frampton & Osowski, supra note 27, at 44 (quoting Telephone Interview by Thomas Ward Frampton & Brandon Charles Osowski with Kevin D. Heade, Chair, Cent. Ariz. Nat’l Laws. Guild (Sept. 22, 2022)). ↑
30.  Id. at 37–38. ↑
31.  Id. at 43. ↑
32.  April J. Anderson, Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners’ Trial Manuals, 16 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 5–6 (2020). ↑
33.  See Frampton & Osowski, supra note 27, at 43 (quoting Charles W. Gurtler, Jr., Comment of the Committee on Superior Court at 3, In re Petition to Amend Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/DesktopModules/ActiveForu‌ms/viewer.aspx?portalid=0&moduleid=23621&attachmentid=9457 [https://perma.cc/EP8P-3‌NEE]). ↑
34.  Id. at 43–45. ↑
35.  Id. at 46. ↑
36.  Richard Lorren Jolly, The Constitutional Right to Peremptory Challenges in Jury Selection, 77 Vand. L. Rev. 1529 (2024). ↑
37.  Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). ↑
38.  Jolly, supra note 36, at 1535–36. ↑
39.  Id. at 1537–38 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). ↑
40.  Id. at 1555. While Jolly concludes that peremptory challenges are also likely secured by the Seventh Amendment in civil trials, this Note is limited to analyzing the constitutional requirements of the Sixth Amendment. ↑
41.  Frampton & Osowski, supra note 27, at 3. ↑
42.  See Batson Reform: State by State, Berkeley L. Death Penalty Clinic, https://www.law.be‌rkeley.edu/experiential/clinics/death-penalty-clinic/projects-and-cases/whitewashing-the-jur‌y-box-how-california-perpetuates-the-discriminatory-exclusion-of-black-and-latinx-jurors/ba‌tson-reform-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/5LQF-MLA6] (last visited Sept. 28, 2025) (showing that states considering reform include Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Utah). ↑
43.  Jolly, supra note 36, at 1554. ↑
44.  See infra notes 63, 68–72 and accompanying text. ↑

45.  See infra notes 161–66 and accompanying text. ↑