Philosophical Inquiry and Historical Practice: A Commentary on Leiter’s “Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism”

Article — Volume 101, Issue 4

101 Va. L. Rev. 1197
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This question of meaning is the heart of historical practice, much as it is the heart of analytic philosophy, so holding this conference is not a mistake. Still, analytic philosophers (the qualifier “analytic” almost seems superfluous these days) seem to me not to like thick description. They know what things, mostly words or concepts, mean. They are just not very precise about exactly to what activities in the world these words or concepts might apply. And, unlike historians (and lawyers, I might add), they do not much like analogy as a form of understanding. The point of the philosophical activity seems to be to liberate “is” from “like” or “as.”

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  Volume 101 / Issue 4  

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