Judicial Review of Emergency Powers in Banking and Financial Regulation

*J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, expected 2026. I thank Professor Jason S. Johnston for his seminar Topics in Banking and Financial Regulation that introduced me to many of the issues discussed in this Essay. I am also grateful to the members of the Virginia Law Review Online team—in particular Nathaniel J. Glass—for their lucid critiques and guidance throughout the editorial process. Finally, thank you to my sister Serena for her input on several drafts of this Essay and for always setting a fine example for me to follow.Show More

Banking and finance are arcane industries that often elude popular understanding, so courts, Congress, and the American public have largely delegated their regulation to federal agencies with considerable decision-making autonomy, affecting trillions of public and private dollars. Some regulatory powers, however, have the potential to destabilize the financial system. Yet for forty years, courts deferred to these agencies under the Chevron doctrine.

Over the past three years, the Supreme Court of the United States has generally curtailed the administrative state’s role in policy-making by overturning Chevron and enunciating the major questions doctrine. Deference to agencies plays a special role in banking and financial regulation as open-ended emergency provisions facilitate crisis response. But on several occasions since the 2008 financial crisis, agencies have misused these powers by invoking them routinely or when an emergency is not really afoot. If these regulators “cry wolf” too often, they create perverse incentives that heighten the risk of financial turmoil.

This Essay argues that the Court’s recent skepticism toward the administrative state is a positive development for banking and financial regulation. While courts should not totally abrogate regulatory discretion in this field of law, a stronger threat of judicial review could encourage agencies to reserve emergency powers for genuine crises. This will deter them from “crying wolf” to abuse their emergency powers, promote stability and transparency in regulatory decision-making, and better prepare the country for future financial crises.

Introduction

“Let us control the money of a country and we care not who makes its laws.”¹ 1.Investigation of the Money Trust: Hearings on H.R. 314 and H.R. 356 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 62d Cong. 40 (1912) (statement of Mr. T. Cushing Daniel, author of “Daniel on Real Money”). The maxim is frequently—probably apocryphally—attributed to Mayer Amschel Rothschild (1744–1812), founder of the Rothschild banking dynasty. Id. But its sentiment—that money is more powerful than even law itself—rings true today. In 2011, just shy of one hundred years since it was spoken in a congressional hearing on regulating Wall Street, see id., a variation of the maxim appeared scrawled on a cardboard sign at the Occupy Wall Street protest. Photograph of Cardboard Sign (OWS_190b), in N.Y. Hist. Soc’y Shelby White & Leon Levy Digit. Libr., Occupy Wall Street Signs and Posters (2011), https://digitalc‌ollections.nyhistory.org/islandora/object/nyhs%3A169816 [https://perma.cc/NQA6-DRBT]. ↑Show More

The Roberts Court’s scrutiny of the administrative state escalated in June 2024 when it overturned the forty-year-old doctrine of Chevron deference² 2.Amy Howe, Supreme Court Strikes Down Chevron, Curtailing Power of Federal Agencies, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2024, 12:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/06/su‌preme-court-strikes-down-chevron-curtailing-power-of-federal-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/Y‌UF7-FASL]. “Chevron deference” refers to the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Some commentators predict the Court may soon go further in this direction by holding that broad delegations to agencies are altogether unconstitutional. Cydney Posner, Will SCOTUS Revive the Nondelegation Doctrine?, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Dec. 19, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/12/19/will-scotus-revive-the-nondeleg‌ation-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/RU5U-UQX7].Show Morein Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.³ 3.Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. 2244.Show MoreThis decision reaffirmed the Court’s skeptical stance on executive agencies in line with its decisions in Biden v. Nebraska⁴ 4.143 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2023) (characterizing the Secretary of Education’s interpretation of the HEROES Act as an attempt to “rewrite that statute from the ground up”).Show Morein 2023 and West Virginia v. EPA⁵ 5.142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614 (2022) (rejecting the Environmental Protection Agency’s “newly uncovered” interpretation that would have “conveniently enabled it to enact a program” that Congress had rejected).Show Morethe year before. Many legal commentators join Justice Kagan, who wrote a foreboding dissent in Loper Bright, in predicting that Chevron’s overturn will disrupt the legal system for the worse.⁶ 6.See, e.g., Michael M. Epstein, Agency Deference After Loper: Expertise as a Casualty of a War Against the “Administrative State,” 89 Brook. L. Rev. 871 (2024); see also Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2295 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In one fell swoop, the majority today gives itself exclusive power over every open issue—no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden—involving the meaning of regulatory law.”).Show MoreAnd they may well be right. But for at least one area of the law—banking and financial regulation—Chevron’s demise is a positive development.⁷ 7.For an argument that Chevron helped cause the 2008 financial crisis by letting regulators expand “the business of banking,” see Todd Phillips, Chevron and Banking Law: What’s Good for the Goose Isn’t Good for the Gander, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (May 2, 2024), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-and-banking-law-whats-good-for-the-goose-isnt-good‌-for-the-gander/ [https://perma.cc/G7KN-PJJW].Show More

Principal regulators in this field include the Federal Reserve (“Fed”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC” or “Corporation”), and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC” or “Council”). Congress granted these agencies elaborate statutory mandates aimed at safeguarding the stability of the United States financial system. Since the 2008 financial crisis, however, regulators have exploited broad provisions buried in these mandates to take risky and unprecedented action. But the Supreme Court’s new stance on the administrative state may halt that trend.

This Essay argues that stronger judicial review of banking and financial regulators will make the financial system sounder by encouraging wiser use of regulatory tools. Part I discusses why excessive agency involvement poses risks to the financial system, primarily by creating moral hazard. Part II covers three statutory provisions regulators questionably invoked during and after the 2008 financial crisis to justify more frequent intervention. Part III examines some judicial levers the Supreme Court has pulled to limit agency discretion in other contexts, and it predicts how and when the Court may use them to check banking and financial regulators in the future.

1.  Investigation of the Money Trust: Hearings on H.R. 314 and H.R. 356 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 62d Cong. 40 (1912) (statement of Mr. T. Cushing Daniel, author of “Daniel on Real Money”). The maxim is frequently—probably apocryphally—attributed to Mayer Amschel Rothschild (1744–1812), founder of the Rothschild banking dynasty. Id. But its sentiment—that money is more powerful than even law itself—rings true today. In 2011, just shy of one hundred years since it was spoken in a congressional hearing on regulating Wall Street, see id., a variation of the maxim appeared scrawled on a cardboard sign at the Occupy Wall Street protest. Photograph of Cardboard Sign (OWS_190b), in N.Y. Hist. Soc’y Shelby White & Leon Levy Digit. Libr., Occupy Wall Street Signs and Posters (2011), https://digitalc‌ollections.nyhistory.org/islandora/object/nyhs%3A169816 [https://perma.cc/NQA6-DRBT]. ↑
2.  Amy Howe, Supreme Court Strikes Down Chevron, Curtailing Power of Federal Agencies, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2024, 12:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/06/su‌preme-court-strikes-down-chevron-curtailing-power-of-federal-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/Y‌UF7-FASL]. “Chevron deference” refers to the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Some commentators predict the Court may soon go further in this direction by holding that broad delegations to agencies are altogether unconstitutional. Cydney Posner, Will SCOTUS Revive the Nondelegation Doctrine?, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Dec. 19, 2024), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/12/19/will-scotus-revive-the-nondeleg‌ation-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/RU5U-UQX7]. ↑
3.  Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. 2244. ↑
4.  143 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2023) (characterizing the Secretary of Education’s interpretation of the HEROES Act as an attempt to “rewrite that statute from the ground up”). ↑
5.  142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614 (2022) (rejecting the Environmental Protection Agency’s “newly uncovered” interpretation that would have “conveniently enabled it to enact a program” that Congress had rejected). ↑
6.  See, e.g., Michael M. Epstein, Agency Deference After Loper: Expertise as a Casualty of a War Against the “Administrative State,” 89 Brook. L. Rev. 871 (2024); see also Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2295 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In one fell swoop, the majority today gives itself exclusive power over every open issue—no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden—involving the meaning of regulatory law.”). ↑

7.  For an argument that Chevron helped cause the 2008 financial crisis by letting regulators expand “the business of banking,” see Todd Phillips, Chevron and Banking Law: What’s Good for the Goose Isn’t Good for the Gander, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (May 2, 2024), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-and-banking-law-whats-good-for-the-goose-isnt-good‌-for-the-gander/ [https://perma.cc/G7KN-PJJW]. ↑