Life or Death: Employing State Constitutional Principles of Proportionality to Combat the Extreme Sentencing of Emerging Adults

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, when facing criminal punishment, juvenile offenders must be treated differently from adults. Because those under the age of eighteen lack maturity, have heightened vulnerability to external influence, and possess a unique capacity for rehabilitation, the imposition of extreme sentences—including the death penalty, mandatory life without parole, and discretionary life without parole for non-homicide offenses—is disproportionate and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

Emerging neuroscientific research strongly indicates that the immaturity, impressionability, and corrigibility of juveniles are also characteristics of emerging adults, defined here as individuals ages eighteen through twenty. Courts, however, have consistently resisted extending Federal Eighth Amendment protections to this demographic. This Note therefore proposes challenging the extreme sentencing of emerging adults under state, instead of federal, constitutional law. All fifty states prohibit cruel and/or unusual punishment, or its equivalent, in their state constitution. Further, recent litigation in Washington and Illinois demonstrates how successful challenges to disproportionate emerging-adult sentencing under state constitutional law can be achieved. This Note advocates that litigants launch facial challenges, in particular, under state constitutional provisions as a desirable mechanism for change.

Introduction

In 2015, Jonas David Nelson was convicted of first-degree murder for the premeditated shooting of his father.1.Nelson v. State, 947 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2518 (2021).Show More On the day of the offense, Mr. Nelson was eighteen years and one week old.2.Id.Show More He was subsequently sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, in accordance with Minnesota law.3.Id. at 34.Show More Despite the fact that the record was “replete with evidence of [Mr.] Nelson’s cognitive and social delays and years of psychological and emotional abuse,”4.Id. at 40.Show More the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld his mandatory-life-without-parole sentence on both direct appeal and upon request for postconviction relief.5.Id. at 34, 40.Show More As powerfully noted by Justice Chutich in dissent, Mr. Nelson was given “the functional equivalent of a death sentence, without any consideration of him, his personality, his upbringing, or his psychological attributes, solely because the offense occurred seven days after his eighteenth birthday.”6.Id.at 41 (Chutich, J., dissenting).Show More

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, when facing criminal punishment, juvenile offenders—i.e., those under the age of eighteen—must be treated differently from adults.7.See, e.g.,Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (describing the “differences between juvenile and adult offenders” as “marked and well understood” and thus holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders).Show More Juveniles lack maturity, have heightened vulnerability to external influence, and possess a unique capacity for rehabilitation.8.SeeinfraPart I.Show More Given this reality, the imposition of extreme sentences—including the death penalty, mandatory life without parole (“LWOP”), and discretionary LWOP for non-homicide offenses—on juveniles in criminal court is disproportionate and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.9.The Supreme Court has held that sentencing a juvenile to death, Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75, as well as imposing discretionary LWOP for non-homicide offenses, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), and mandatory LWOP for any offense, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.Show More But these constitutional protections cease to exist the day one turns eighteen. Despite referring to Mr. Nelson’s case as “extremely tragic,” the Minnesota Supreme Court felt bound to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent that “clearly limited [Eighth Amendment protection] to juvenile offenders under the age of 18 at the time of the offense.”10 10.Nelson, 947 N.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added).Show More Had Mr. Nelson been eight days younger, the mandatory LWOP sentence that he received would have been unconstitutional as applied to him.

Emerging neuroscientific research, however, strongly indicates that the hallmark characteristics of youth—immaturity, impressionability, and corrigibility—are present in individuals older than eighteen, too.11 11.See infra Subsection II.B.1.Show More Cognitive development continues well into a young person’s twenties, and society recognizes the relative immaturity of this demographic through prohibitions on activities such as drinking and firearm possession.12 12.SeeElizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie & Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 645 (2016); Karen U. Lindell & Katrina L. Goodjoint, Juv. L. Ctr., Rethinking Justice for Emerging Adults: Spotlight on the Great Lakes Region 1112 (2020), https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2020-09/JLC-Emerging-Adults-9-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8GG-PBR9].Show More As a consequence, the proportionality considerations relevant for those under eighteen are arguably as compelling for “emerging adults”—defined here as those ages eighteen, nineteen, and twenty—as they are for juveniles. Despite this reality, emerging adults have not been granted protection against the harshest of criminal sentences under the Federal Constitution, and claims of disproportionality under the Eighth Amendment have been universally quashed.13 13.See infra Part III.Show More Given the current composition of the Supreme Court, seeking federal constitutional protection against disproportionately harsh sentences for emerging adults seems futile.14 14.See infra Part III.Show More The more effective realm for such advocacy, this Note posits, is in the states.

This Note proposes that advocates redirect focus and challenge the extreme sentencing of emerging adults as disproportionate under state, instead of federal, constitutional law. All fifty states prohibit cruel and/or unusual punishment, or its equivalent, in their state constitutions.15 15.See infraSection IV.A.Show More Further, many have interpreted these clauses to be broader and more protective than the Federal Eighth Amendment.16 16.See infra Section IV.A.Show More Attention should therefore be directed toward challenging extreme sentences for emerging adults under these provisions.

Recent litigation in Washington and Illinois illustrates how this can be achieved. In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court held that imposing mandatory-LWOP sentences on those ages eighteen through twenty violates the state’s constitutional provision against cruel punishment.17 17.See infra Section IV.B.Show More Over the last few years, Illinois state courts have also struck down the harshest criminal sentences as applied to emerging adults, holding that they violate the state constitution’s proportionate penalties clause.18 18.See infra Section IV.C.Show More Challenging emerging-adult sentencing in these ways is a promising strategy for future advocacy efforts across the country.

The contributions of this Note are threefold. First, while theories about emerging adulthood have existed for two decades, they have only recently been argued in court.19 19.SeeJeffrey J. Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 Am. Psych. 469, 469 (2000).Show More This Note comprehensively surveys recent cases from both state and federal courts and synthesizes the arguments that have—and have not—been successful, a notable contribution to the literature. Second, academics and scholars have advocated generally for the consideration of proportionality in sentencing20 20.See, e.g., Jim Staihar, Proportionality and Punishment, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1209, 1222–23 (2015) (arguing that those who commit more serious crimes deserve more severe punishments).Show More and explored how state constitutional provisions could be utilized to further such aims.21 21.See, e.g., Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 241, 273–74 (2012) (discussing how state judiciaries could engage in proportionality review under state constitutional law).Show More However, none have applied these principles to the extreme sentencing of emerging adults, and this Note will be the first to advocate for such a path forward nationwide. Finally, the power of state constitutional law is significantly underappreciated in academic literature,22 22.SeeGary S. Gildin & Jamison E. Colburn, Introduction: State Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 115 Pa. St. L. Rev. 779, 781 (2011) (“State constitutional law is a vibrant, albeit still underappreciated, area of legal study.”); Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 39, 64 (2008) (encouraging “litigators, courts, and scholars to be less ‘Fed-centric’”).Show More despite the fact that it has profound and direct impact on those prosecuted in state courts across the nation. This Note contributes to the academic conversation by explaining how state constitutional law can be used as a powerful tool to inspire positive, tangible change, helping advocates structure their thinking and supplying them with arguments for state court practice.

This argument proceeds in five Parts. Part I considers proportionality as a philosophical concept, documenting its use in federal constitutional law to date, and reviews the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to juveniles. Part II explains why the Supreme Court has remained faithful to the age of eighteen as a cutoff for constitutional protection against extreme sentencing but challenges the justifications provided by the Court in light of modern developments in neuroscience and social science. Part III surveys the failed efforts to gain federal constitutional protection for emerging adults, and Part IV explains why the most effective route forward for emerging adult justice will instead be under state constitutional law, highlighting Washington and Illinois as case studies of success. Part V recommends that litigants seek facial, as opposed to as-applied, protection of emerging adults and addresses counterarguments to that proposal.

  1. Nelson v. State, 947 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2518 (2021).
  2. Id.
  3. Id. at 34.
  4. Id. at 40.
  5. Id. at 34, 40.
  6. Id. at 41 (Chutich, J., dissenting).
  7.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (describing the “differences between juvenile and adult offenders” as “marked and well understood” and thus holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders).
  8. See infra Part I.
  9. The Supreme Court has held that sentencing a juvenile to death, Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75, as well as imposing discretionary LWOP for non-homicide offenses, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), and mandatory LWOP for any offense, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
  10. Nelson, 947 N.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added).
  11. See infra Subsection II.B.1.
  12. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie & Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 645 (2016); Karen U. Lindell & Katrina L. Goodjoint, Juv. L. Ctr., Rethinking Justice for Emerging Adults: Spotlight on the Great Lakes Region
    11–12 (2020),

    https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2020-09/JLC-Emerging-Adults-9-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8GG-PBR9]

    .

  13. See infra Part III.
  14. See infra Part III.
  15. See infra Section IV.A.
  16. See infra Section IV.A.
  17. See infra Section IV.B.
  18. See infra Section IV.C.
  19. See Jeffrey J. Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 Am. Psych. 469, 469 (2000).
  20. See, e.g., Jim Staihar, Proportionality and Punishment, 100 Iowa L. Rev.
    1209, 1222–23 (2015) (

    arguing that those who commit more serious crimes deserve more severe punishments)

    .

  21. See, e.g., Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 241, 273
    –7

    4 (2012) (discussing how state judiciaries could engage in proportionality review under state constitutional law).

  22. See Gary S. Gildin & Jamison E. Colburn, Introduction: State Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 115 Pa. St. L. Rev. 779, 781 (2011) (“State constitutional law is a vibrant, albeit still underappreciated, area of legal study.”); Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L.

    39

    , 64 (2008) (encouraging “litigators, courts, and scholars to be less ‘Fed-centric’”).

Incorporation, Fundamental Rights, and the Grand Jury: Hurtado v. California Reconsidered

The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Instead, it has selectively incorporated against the states those rights that it deems to be fundamental. However, only two enumerated rights remain that the Court has affirmatively labeled non-fundamental. It is doctrinally puzzling why the Fourteenth Amendment should be understood to stop just short of total incorporation.

Of the last unincorporated rights, only one relates to criminal procedure: the Grand Jury Clause, which guarantees the right to be indicted by a grand jury before prosecution for a felony. The Court declined to incorporate the Grand Jury Clause in 1884 in Hurtado v. California, and this Note argues that Hurtado should be overturned. After analyzing the incorporation caselaw from the Roberts Court, an area in which the Court has been active, this Note argues that Hurtado is doctrinally incompatible with the modern approach to fundamental rights. Despite the internal inconsistencies in the doctrine, which this Note identifies, applying the modern incorporation framework to the Grand Jury Clause shows that the right to indictment is a fundamental one.

Finally, this Note argues that Hurtado can be overturned consistent with principles of stare decisis. Indeed, this Note makes a novel but striking finding—Hurtado likely does not carry precedential force as an incorporation case at all. This Note shows that Hurtado was argued and decided as a procedural due process case. Because the Court’s incorporation doctrine turns on substantive rather than procedural due process, Hurtado did not decide the relevant legal question at all for incorporation purposes.

Introduction

“[F]or so tender is the law of England of the lives of the subjects, that no man can be convicted at the suit of the king of any capital offence, unless by the unanimous voice of twenty-four of his equals and neighbours: that is, by twelve at least of the grand jury, in the first place, assenting to the accusation: and afterwards by the whole petit jury, of twelve more, finding him guilty, upon his trial.”1.4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 306 (London, 16th ed. 1825).Show More

In at least one corner of constitutional law, the Supreme Court makes explicit value judgments about which constitutional rights are important and which are not. Under the Court’s longstanding incorporation precedents, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only secures “fundamental” rights against violation by the states. States remain free to ignore or abridge rights in the Bill of Rights that the Court deems non-fundamental.

At one time, the Supreme Court believed that nearly all of the Bill of Rights was non-fundamental, but after a flurry of incorporation cases from the Roberts Court, only two affirmatively non-fundamental rights remain: the Seventh Amendment’s right to a civil jury and the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grand jury’s indictment as a prerequisite to prosecution for capital or infamous crimes.2.Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (civil jury right); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (grand jury right). While the Supreme Court has never considered the fundamentality of the Third Amendment, the one circuit to consider the question found that it is fundamental. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982).Show More This Note is concerned with the latter. In 1884, in Hurtado v. California, the Supreme Court held that it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process when the State of California tried, convicted, and sentenced a man to death without an indictment. This Note offers a long-overdue reconsideration of Hurtado and argues that the right to indictment is a fundamental one that should bind the states—no longer should states be able to prosecute by information at the whim of a lone prosecutor.

This reevaluation of Hurtado comes at a time when the Supreme Court itself is pondering the future of Hurtado. Dissenting from the Court’s recent decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, which incorporated the requirement of a unanimous jury for criminal convictions, Justice Alito warned that the Court’s holding there threatened the validity of Hurtado.3.Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1435 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).Show More This Note is the first since Ramos to take Justice Alito’s comments seriously by analyzing the validity of Hurtado both on its own terms and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent incorporation precedents.4.See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights after McDonald v. Chicago, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 159, 187 (2012) (assessing all unincorporated rights post-McDonald but before Timbs or Ramos) [hereinafter Thomas, Nonincorporation]; F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 163, 175 (2019) (arguing before Timbs and Ramos that jury-related rights should not be incorporated because of federalism concerns). Only Professor Thomas’s piece makes the affirmative case for incorporation of the Grand Jury Clause, but it does so only briefly, and it does not undertake the necessary analysis done here with the benefit of hindsight from more recent decisions.Show More It finds that Hurtado is a flawed, misunderstood precedent that cannot be maintained in light of current doctrine.

In addition, this Note also contributes to the literature by uncovering hitherto unnoticed inconsistencies among the Roberts Court’s incorporation cases. While these cases seem conceptually unified, careful examination shows that they differ from one another in subtle but important methodological aspects.

A word of clarification. This Note takes a purely doctrinal approach. It is not concerned with the well-trodden issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate rights against the states as an originalist matter. Nor does it take any stance on whether incorporation is properly accomplished via the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It accepts as a matter of settled precedent that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates at least some rights and that it does so through substantive due process. Finally, while there is a voluminous literature both critiquing and defending the grand jury as an institution, that, too, is beyond the scope of this Note and is only considered so far as the Court’s doctrine makes such functionalist assessments of constitutional rights relevant.

The argument proceeds as follows. Part I briefly outlines the contours of the right to grand jury indictment in order to clarify what is at stake in the incorporation debate. Part II traces the arc of the Supreme Court’s incorporation doctrine and then analyzes the modern caselaw, noting differences in how the cases apply the incorporation framework. Part III turns to Hurtado itself, critiquing the opinion and explaining its important role in the development of criminal procedure among the states. Part IV applies the modern incorporation framework to the Grand Jury Clause and finds that it is a fundamental right protected by substantive due process. Finally, Part V argues that Hurtado can be overturned consistent with stare decisis principles. In fact, it is entirely possible that stare decisis does not attach to Hurtado at all under the modern incorporation doctrine because Hurtado determined only that procedural due process does not guarantee the right to indictment—the holding did not implicate substantive due process.

  1. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 306 (London, 16th ed. 1825).
  2. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (civil jury right); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (grand jury right). While the Supreme Court has never considered the fundamentality of the Third Amendment, the one circuit to consider the question found that it is fundamental. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982).
  3. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1435 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
  4. See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights after McDonald v. Chicago, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 159, 187 (2012) (assessing all unincorporated rights post-McDonald but before Timbs or Ramos) [hereinafter Thomas, Nonincorporation]; F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 163, 175 (2019) (arguing before Timbs and Ramos that jury-related rights should not be incorporated because of federalism concerns). Only Professor Thomas’s piece makes the affirmative case for incorporation of the Grand Jury Clause, but it does so only briefly, and it does not undertake the necessary analysis done here with the benefit of hindsight from more recent decisions.

A Third-Party Beneficiary Theory of Corporate Liability for Labor Violations in International Supply Chains

Large multinational corporations (“MNCs”) profit off their suppliers’ maintenance of sweatshop conditions in developing countries. Although some companies have responded to reputational pressure by taking nominal steps to improve working conditions, such as enacting supplier codes of conduct, those efforts have not led to significant change. Because voluntary efforts have thus far been ineffective, victims have pursued domestic litigation against MNCs to compensate their losses and encourage future reform. In the recent case of Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court cut off one popular avenue for such suits, the Alien Tort Statute, leaving plaintiffs with little ability to sue under federal law. State law tort claims, however, are a strong alternative. Plaintiffs can argue, and indeed have argued in one federal circuit court case, that MNCs have undertaken a duty of care to them as third-party beneficiaries of their supplier codes of conduct. This Note argues that plaintiffs making this claim should point to analogous cases in construction law, where courts have often found that design professionals overseeing a construction site have a duty of care towards their contractors’ employees. In analyzing construction law cases, this Note draws out five factors that have influenced courts to find liability. Future plaintiffs suing for labor violations should use these factors to show that MNCs owed them a duty of care under their supplier codes of conduct and may therefore be held liable for labor rights violations in their international supply chains.

Introduction

Shiuli Begum was working as a sewing machine operator in Bangladesh when a massive crack appeared in the wall of the factory where she was employed.1.Dana Thomas, Why Won’t We Learn from the Survivors of the Rana Plaza Disaster?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/style/survivors-of-rana-plaza-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/D93X-LHE8].Show More An engineer called to the site that afternoon recommended that the building be immediately condemned, but managers ordered the employees to report back to work the following morning.2.Id.Show More Shortly after the shift started on April 24, 2013, the Rana Plaza garment factory collapsed, trapping Ms. Begum under concrete for over sixteen hours until her neighbors helped pry her out with iron pipes.3.Id.Show More Ms. Begum suffered damage to her hips and spinal column and was rendered infertile and unable to work.4.Id.Show More She received “a bit of financial assistance from nonprofits” but nothing from the clothing brands for which she sewed.5.Id.Show More In all, over 1,100 people died in the Rana Plaza factory collapse that day, and 2,500 more were injured.6.Rana Plaza: Bangladesh Jails Owner of Factory Building that Collapsed in 2013 for Corruption, ABC News (Aug. 29, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-29/rana-plaza-owner-of-collapsed-bangladesh-building-jailed/8854240 [https://perma.cc/U6​ST-ZCW5].Show More However, victims of the 2013 collapse have yet to receive justice from the Bangladeshi court system—a court sentenced the factory’s owner to three years in prison in 2017 for illegal earnings,7.Id.Show More but resolution of the charges against eighteen others involved in factory management has met repeated delays.8.Rana Plaza Court Case Postponed in Bangladesh, Al Jazeera (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/8/23/rana-plaza-court-case-postponed-in-bangladesh [https://perma.cc/HB6Y-DMXN].Show More

Several prominent American companies, including Walmart, J.C. Penney, and The Children’s Place, have previously been linked to suppliers producing goods in Rana Plaza at the time of the disaster.9.Clare O’Connor, These Retailers Involved in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Have Yet to Compensate Victims, Forbes (Apr. 26, 2014, 5:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/c​lareoconnor/2014/04/26/these-retailers-involved-in-bangladesh-factory-disaster-have-yet-to-compensate-victims/?sh=489c7609211b [https://perma.cc/FS9L-2FEB].Show More These companies, like many others, have achieved tremendous cost savings through their contracts with suppliers in developing countries, where labor costs and regulatory burdens are low. However, profiting off unsafe and unjust factory conditions has also made large multinational corporations (“MNCs”) a popular target of domestic litigation aiming to secure compensation for victimized employees like Shiuli Begum.10 10.For an overview of cases using different legal strategies to sue MNCs for labor violations, see Ramona L. Lampley, Mitigating Risk, Eradicating Slavery, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 1707 (2019).Show More There is a great deal at stake in the outcome of these lawsuits. Besides the normative argument that these corporations collect unjust profits, there is the practical reality that MNCs are currently in the best position to take responsibility for poor labor practices in their supply chains. As the Rana Plaza example illustrates, victimized workers in developing countries often cannot rely on their own court systems to hold direct offenders accountable, making suits against MNCs one of the only options for legal redress. MNCs also have greater incentives and more resources to bring about better treatment of workers because the companies are usually better known and more financially reliant on maintaining good reputations than their suppliers.11 11.See Andrew Herman, Note, Reassessing the Role of Supplier Codes of Conduct: Closing the Gap Between Aspirations and Reality, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 445, 450 (2012) (describing how MNCs have adopted supplier codes of conduct in response to activist pressure).Show More

Because the United States largely lacks other legal mechanisms to incentivize MNCs to perform supply chain due diligence,12 12.By contrast, some European countries have mandatory due diligence legislation. For example, the French and Dutch parliaments adopted legislation in 2017 that would require companies to investigate and report on human rights violations in their supply chains. Sharan Burrow, Eliminating Modern Slavery: Due Diligence and the Rule of Law, Bus. & Hum. Rts. Res. Ctr. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/​eliminating-modern-slavery-due-diligence-and-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/5LTK-4UVK].Show More there is a large body of literature analyzing the potential for lawsuits to compensate victims and encourage reform. Much of this literature has focused on federal claims under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”),13 13.See, e.g., Jennifer M. Green, The Rule of Law at a Crossroad: Enforcing Corporate Responsibility in International Investment Through the Alien Tort Statute, 35 U. Pa. J. Int’l L.1085, 1086, 1108–09 (2014); Lampley, supra note 10, at 1729–45; Debra Cohen Maryanov, Comment, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 397, 417–18 (2010); Laura Ezell, Note, Human Trafficking in Multinational Supply Chains: A Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty to Monitor and Eliminate Human Trafficking Violations, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 499, 512–25 (2016); David Shea Bettwy, Drones, Private Military Companies and the Alien Tort Statute: The Looming Frontier of International Tort Liability, 47 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 1 (2016).Show More though the recent Supreme Court case Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe throws the former category’s viability into question by holding that “general corporate activity” in the United States does not create a sufficient nexus to impose liability for aiding and abetting forced labor abroad.14 14.141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021).Show More Due to obstacles in bringing successful claims under federal law, a growing number of scholars have moved on to consider the viability of state tort and contract-based claims.15 15.See, e.g., Allie Robbins, Outsourcing Beneficiaries: Contract and Tort Strategies for Improving Conditions in the Global Garment Industry, 80 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 369, 372 (2018); Alexandra Reeve, Within Reach: A New Strategy for Regulating American Corporations That Commit Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 387, 388–90; Lampley, supranote 10, at 1708, 1750; Joe Phillips & Suk-Jun Lim, Their Brothers’ Keeper: Global Buyers and the Legal Duty to Protect Suppliers’ Employees, 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 333, 334–35 (2009); Maryanov, supra note 13, at 429–36.Show More

This Note contributes to the existing literature on state tort law claims by suggesting a novel legal strategy through which plaintiffs could better plead the existence of a duty on the part of MNCs to monitor their suppliers, thus far an insurmountable barrier in the few attempted cases. In one U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, the plaintiffs argued that supplier codes of conduct, which many MNCs have imposed on the entities comprising their supply chain, can give rise to liability through third-party beneficiary theory.16 16.Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2009).Show More This Note will extend that theory, arguing that the case was wrongly decided and that construction law can serve as a helpful model for plaintiffs going forward. There is a limited amount of scholarship on the potential applicability of common law doctrines regarding general contractors in the construction context to MNCs in the supply chain context.17 17.See Maryanov, supra note 13, at 431–32; Lampley, supranote 10, at 1713–14 (noting that worker-plaintiffs have unsuccessfully analogized themselves to independent contractors when trying to establish that they were owed a duty by employer-defendants); Phillips & Lim, supranote 15, at 364–65 (explaining the contemplated categorization of buyer-companies as “general contractors” owing a duty to “independent contractor” employees of suppliers in claims where the buyer allegedly “retained sufficient control over jobsite health and safety”).Show More However, this Note is the first to closely analyze the doctrine of third-party beneficiary theory as applied to architects and engineers in construction law and use it as a model to distill factors that are applicable to the MNC context.

Part I begins with an explanation of how economic forces, reputational harms, and technological developments have converged to make supply chain management cheaper, easier, and more important for MNCs who rely on a geographically disparate supply chain. This Part also discusses the history of supplier codes of conduct, the principal method by which companies currently attempt to mitigate harms in their supply chain. Part II provides greater background on different litigation strategies to hold MNCs accountable for labor violations, beginning with federal claims and their limitations before examining state claims. After establishing the primary procedural requirements for foreign workers to bring a case in state court, Part III then explains how construction law cases using third-party beneficiary theory are closely analogous to supply chains. In construction law cases, courts have generally focused on five factors to guide their analysis of whether a design professional—such as an architect or engineer—owed a duty to contractors’ employees. These factors include foreseeability, contract specificity, actual practice of supervision, ability to stop work, and actual knowledge of safety issues. Part IV applies those five factors to a current supplier code of conduct, providing a model for future plaintiffs to advocate a totality of the circumstances analysis based on those factors. This Part also addresses counterarguments. Finally, this Note concludes with a summary of how plaintiffs should approach third-party beneficiary claims in the future.

  1. Dana Thomas, Why Won’t We Learn from the Survivors of the Rana Plaza Disaster?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/style/survivors-of-rana-plaza-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/D93X-LHE8].
  2. Id.
  3. Id.
  4. Id.
  5. Id.
  6.  Rana Plaza: Bangladesh Jails Owner of Factory Building that Collapsed in 2013 for Corruption, ABC News (Aug. 29, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-29/rana-plaza-owner-of-collapsed-bangladesh-building-jailed/8854240 [https://perma.cc/U6​ST-ZCW5].
  7. Id.
  8.  Rana Plaza Court Case Postponed in Bangladesh, Al Jazeera (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/8/23/rana-plaza-court-case-postponed-in-bangladesh [https://perma.cc/HB6Y-DMXN].
  9. Clare O’Connor, These Retailers Involved in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Have Yet to Compensate Victims, Forbes (Apr. 26, 2014, 5:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/c​lareoconnor/2014/04/26/these-retailers-involved-in-bangladesh-factory-disaster-have-yet-to-compensate-victims/?sh=489c7609211b [https://perma.cc/FS9L-2FEB].
  10. For an overview of cases using different legal strategies to sue MNCs for labor violations, see Ramona L. Lampley, Mitigating Risk, Eradicating Slavery, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 1707 (2019).
  11. See Andrew Herman, Note, Reassessing the Role of Supplier Codes of Conduct: Closing the Gap Between Aspirations and Reality, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 445, 450 (2012) (describing how MNCs have adopted supplier codes of conduct in response to activist pressure).
  12. By contrast, some European countries have mandatory due diligence legislation. For example, the French and Dutch parliaments adopted legislation in 2017 that would require companies to investigate and report on human rights violations in their supply chains. Sharan Burrow, Eliminating Modern Slavery: Due Diligence and the Rule of Law, Bus. & Hum. Rts. Res. Ctr. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/​eliminating-modern-slavery-due-diligence-and-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/5LTK-4UVK].
  13. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Green, The Rule of Law at a Crossroad: Enforcing Corporate Responsibility in International Investment Through the Alien Tort Statute, 35 U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

    1085, 1086, 1108–09 (2014); Lampley, supra note 10, at 1729–45; Debra Cohen Maryanov, Comment, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 397, 417–18 (2010); Laura Ezell, Note, Human Trafficking in Multinational Supply Chains: A Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty to Monitor and Eliminate Human Trafficking Violations, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 499, 512–25 (2016); David Shea Bettwy, Drones, Private Military Companies and the Alien Tort Statute: The Looming Frontier of International Tort Liability, 47 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 1 (2016).

  14. 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021).
  15. See, e.g., Allie Robbins, Outsourcing Beneficiaries: Contract and Tort Strategies for Improving Conditions in the Global Garment Industry, 80 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 369, 372 (2018); Alexandra Reeve, Within Reach: A New Strategy for Regulating American Corporations That Commit Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 387, 388–90; Lampley, supra note 10, at 1708, 1750; Joe Phillips & Suk-Jun Lim, Their Brothers’ Keeper: Global Buyers and the Legal Duty to Protect Suppliers’ Employees, 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 333, 334–35 (2009); Maryanov, supra note 13, at 429–36.
  16. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2009).
  17. See Maryanov, supra note 13, at 431–32; Lampley, supra note 10, at 1713–14 (noting that worker-plaintiffs have unsuccessfully analogized themselves to independent contractors when trying to establish that they were owed a duty by employer-defendants); Phillips & Lim, supra note 15, at 364–65 (explaining the contemplated categorization of buyer-companies as “general contractors” owing a duty to “independent contractor” employees of suppliers in claims where the buyer allegedly “retained sufficient control over jobsite health and safety”).