Parties or Not?: The Status of Absent Class Members in Rule 23 Class Actions

When should absent class members—individuals who are bound by and share in a class recovery but who are not active participants in the litigation—be treated as “parties” in Rule 23 class actions? This simple question has confused courts and litigants almost since the initial conception of the class action device. In 1983, then-Professor Diane Wood introduced the joinder and representational models to classify approaches to this question in her now-seminal article. The joinder model treats absent class members as parties to the litigation at all times, while the representational model presumes only the named plaintiffs are parties to the case itself. At various moments, the Supreme Court has expressed exclusive support for the representational approach, exclusive support for the joinder approach, and a preference for a balanced approach which treats absent class members as parties for some procedural issues if not for others. Through the lens of the joinder and representational models, this Note clarifies the decisions courts are making when assessing the procedural rights of absent class members, and ultimately suggests that the status of absent class members should depend on the procedural right being asserted.

Introduction

When a lawsuit proceeds as a class action, how should we think about the “absent” members of the class—people who might share in the relief that the court awards, and who are also at risk of being bound by an adverse judgment, but who are not named and are not actively participating in the suit? In a classic 1983 article, then-Professor (now Judge) Diane Wood argued that courts had unknowingly been using two different approaches, which she called the “joinder” model and the “representational” model.1.Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 459, 459. Judge Wood now serves as a senior judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.Show More Broadly, the joinder model treats all members of the class as full parties to the litigation, whether or not they are named and actively participating.2.Id.Show More On that view, the court would need to consider the absent members of the class when answering threshold questions about jurisdiction or venue, and the absent members of the class would also have all the rights and obligations of parties as the case proceeds.3.Id.Show More By contrast, the representational model treats only the named members of the class as parties to the litigation for procedural purposes; the named members are considered to be representing absent class members throughout the litigation, but the absent class members whom they represent are not actually parties to the case.4.Id.at 460.Show More

For a simplified example of the distinction, imagine a plaintiff class action in which the named plaintiffs are all citizens of State A, but some of the absent class members are citizens of State B. If the defendant is a citizen of State B, then whether the suit qualifies for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) depends on whether the absent class members are regarded as additional plaintiffs. The joinder model would deny diversity jurisdiction in this case because some of the plaintiffs are citizens of the same state as the defendant, while the representational model would grant diversity jurisdiction (assuming that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied) because the representational model is only concerned with the named parties.

The models can produce equally stark differences on questions that might arise as the suit proceeds. For example, in a major consumer protection lawsuit against the at-home exercise company Peloton, the joinder model would permit the district court to allow all forms of discovery against its, at the time, estimated 3.1 million subscribers to the platform,5.Lauren Thomas, Peloton Thinks It Can Grow to 100 Million Subscribers. Here’s How, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/15/peloton-thinks-it-can-grow-to-100-million-subscribers-heres-how.html [https://perma.cc/D2VF-3FZ4].Show More while the representational model would only permit interrogatories or requests for admission to be levied against the named class members.6.Cf. Fishon v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 336 F.R.D. 67, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (permitting limited deposition of absent putative class members). Some discovery devices, such as requests for admissions and interrogatories, can only be directed at parties to the lawsuit. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (requests for admissions). Parties can aim other discovery mechanisms, such as depositions or subpoenas at parties and non-parties alike. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (oral depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (subpoenas).Show More Or, the joinder model would require all absent class members to consent to adjudication by a magistrate rather than a district court judge, while the representational model would only require the named plaintiffs to consent.7.See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that unnamed class members are not parties for purposes of consenting to adjudication by a magistrate judge).Show More These different treatments for absent class members can have major practical impacts on class action litigation in whether suits can be brought in federal court and, when they are, what absent class members are required to do.

Judge Wood herself advocated for using the representational model. In her view, applying that model across the board would best promote two goals of class actions: to provide efficiency for litigants and to act as a “private attorney-general” enforcement mechanism.8.Wood Hutchinson, supranote 1, at 480.Show More Since the publication of her article, however, the Supreme Court has struck different notes.9.Even before Judge Wood’s article, Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper noted that “[t]he status of unnamed members of an uncertified class has always been difficult to define accurately.” 445 U.S. 326, 343 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Roper, Justice Stevens suggested that absent parties be conceived of as parties for some procedural purposes even if they are not for others. Id. Justice Powell’s dissent strongly disagreed with this statement, arguing that Justice Stevens cited no authority to support his position and provided no explanation “as to how a court is to determine when these unidentified ‘parties’ are present.” Id.at 358 n.21 (Powell, J., dissenting). This Note attempts to propose a solution to Justice Powell’s concern.Show More For example, in Martin v. Wilks, the Supreme Court presumed the representational model applied, labeling the class action as a “certain limited circumstance[]” where “a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party.”10 10.490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (agreeing with this characterization of class actions).Show More By contrast, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. described the class action as a straightforward “joinder” device that “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.”11 11.559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) (plurality opinion).Show More And, in 2002, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Devlin v. Scardelletti asserted that “[n]onnamed class members . . . may be parties for some purposes and not for others.”12 12.536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002). One might find it curious that Justice Scalia wrote the dissent in Devlin arguing for a representational approach as he would later write the majority opinion in Shady Grove, which called a class action a species of “traditional joinder.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408. In dissent, he wrote that the majority’s decision to permit both the joinder and the representational model “abandons the bright-line rule that only those persons named as such are parties to a judgment, in favor of a vague inquiry ‘based on context.’” Devlin, 536 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).Show More

How courts should characterize absent class members bears on many continuing controversies. For example, after the Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,13 13.137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).Show More most lower courts have followed Devlin’s approach to confirm that, even if absent class members are parties for some purposes, they are not parties necessary to determine whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.14 14.See, e.g., Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447–48 (7th Cir. 2020); Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Not all courts have interpreted Bristol-Myers Squibb in this way. For more, see infra Subsection II.A.2.Show More As recently as June 2021, however, the Court seemed to follow Justice Scalia’s characterization of the class as a “joinder” device when it concluded that all absent class members need to demonstrate standing in order to recover damages.15 15.TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207–08 (2021). Notably, the Court reserved judgment on “whether every class member must demonstrate standing before a court certifies a class.” Id. at 2208 n.4. For further discussion on this question, and whether this actually implicates the representational model, see infraSubsection II.A.3.Show More It follows that under what circumstances absent class members should be considered parties remains a live issue almost forty years after Judge Wood’s initial article. The Court itself has not offered consistent guidance on the status of absent class members, and its recent decisions on personal jurisdiction and standing have acutely raised these questions for lower courts.16 16.SeeinfraSubsection II.A.2 (personal jurisdiction); infra Subsection II.A.3 (standing).Show More The time is right to both clarify the choice lower courts will be making in these determinations and to suggest a new path forward considering the changes from the past forty years.

This Note identifies the contours of the question for various procedural doctrines, and, ultimately, suggests that Devlin’s approach of considering absent class members as parties for some purposes but not for others is preferable to a strict joinder or representational approach. Judge Wood’s article, which advocated for a more rule-like approach to the representational model, focused primarily on the jurisdiction and justiciability doctrines that govern absent class members’ access to federal courts.17 17.See Wood Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 478 (“The characteristics that would lead a court to treat a class action as a glorified joinder device or as a true representational action are different. Those characteristics are ‘procedural’ in this sense: They establish one’s right to sue in a federal court on the substantive claim, rather than in a state court.”).Show More When broadening the scope of procedural doctrines that affect absent class members during litigation, such as discovery or counterclaims, this Note contends that a more balanced approach would better vindicate the efficiency and private attorney general functions of the class action device. Writing now with the benefit of Devlin’s statement that absent class members may be treated differently for different purposes, a less rule-like approach is not only preferable but possible.

Part I of this Note explains in detail the differences between the representational and joinder models and Judge Wood’s reasons for expressing a preference for the representational model. Part II surveys post-1983 doctrine in certain procedural issues implicating the joinder and representational models in class actions. While, for the most part, courts have continued to use the representational model to conceive of absent class members, there are some areas in which Congress and the courts have shifted towards a more joinder-based approach. Part III evaluates why Devlin’s approach of treating absent class members differently based on context is preferable to following the representational model in all areas. Ultimately, it suggests that the joinder model is valuable for some litigation conduct but that the representational model continues to be a valuable way to conceive of access to federal courts for class action procedures.

  1.  Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983
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    459, 459. Judge Wood now serves as a senior judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

  2.  Id.
  3.  Id.
  4.  Id. at 460.
  5.  Lauren Thomas, Peloton Thinks It Can Grow to 100 Million Subscribers. Here’s How, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/15/peloton-thinks-it-can-grow-to-100-million-subscribers-heres-how.html [https://perma.cc/D2VF-3FZ4].
  6.  Cf. Fishon v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 336 F.R.D. 67, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (permitting limited deposition of absent putative class members). Some discovery devices, such as requests for admissions and interrogatories, can only be directed at parties to the lawsuit. See, e.g.,
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  7.  See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that unnamed class members are not parties for purposes of consenting to adjudication by a magistrate judge).
  8.  Wood Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 480.
  9.  Even before Judge Wood’s article, Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper noted that “[t]he status of unnamed members of an uncertified class has always been difficult to define accurately.” 445 U.S. 326, 343 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Roper, Justice Stevens suggested that absent parties be conceived of as parties for some procedural purposes even if they are not for others. Id. Justice Powell’s dissent strongly disagreed with this statement, arguing that Justice Stevens cited no authority to support his position and provided no explanation “as to how a court is to determine when these unidentified ‘parties’ are present.” Id. at 358 n.21 (Powell, J., dissenting). This Note attempts to propose a solution to Justice Powell’s concern.
  10.  490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (agreeing with this characterization of class actions).
  11.  559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) (plurality opinion).
  12.  536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002). One might find it curious that Justice Scalia wrote the dissent in Devlin arguing for a representational approach as he would later write the majority opinion in Shady Grove, which called a class action a species of “traditional joinder.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408. In dissent, he wrote that the majority’s decision to permit both the joinder and the representational model “abandons the bright-line rule that only those persons named as such are parties to a judgment, in favor of a vague inquiry ‘based on context.’” Devlin, 536 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
  13.  137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
  14.  See, e.g., Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447–48 (7th Cir. 2020); Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Not all courts have interpreted Bristol-Myers Squibb in this way. For more, see infra Subsection II.A.2.
  15.  TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207–08 (2021). Notably, the Court reserved judgment on “whether every class member must demonstrate standing before a court certifies a class.” Id. at 2208 n.4. For further discussion on this question, and whether this actually implicates the representational model, see infra Subsection II.A.3.
  16.  See infra Subsection II.A.2 (personal jurisdiction); infra Subsection II.A.3 (standing).
  17.  See Wood Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 478 (“The characteristics that would lead a court to treat a class action as a glorified joinder device or as a true representational action are different. Those characteristics are ‘procedural’ in this sense: They establish one’s right to sue in a federal court on the substantive claim, rather than in a state court.”).

Harmonizing Federal Immunities

When a federal employee is charged with a state crime based on conduct that was within their official responsibilities, the United States Constitution protects them from prosecution through Supremacy Clause immunity. This immunity was developed by the Supreme Court in a small set of cases from around the turn of the twentieth century, but no Supreme Court cases have mentioned it since. Generally, as lower courts have construed it, it is a highly protective standard. This Note questions that standard by attempting to re-align Supremacy Clause immunity with another federal immunity that also derives from the Supremacy Clause: federal tax immunity. Until the mid-twentieth century, federal tax immunity cases protected the federal government from almost any state-tax-related burdens, even indirect ones. But in 1937, the Supreme Court abruptly changed course and overruled a century of its previous precedents. As a result, federal tax immunity today has only a shadow of its previous force. In relating these two immunities to each other, this Note aims to shine light on Supremacy Clause immunity as a doctrine based on an outdated conception of the role of federal courts in our federalist system. It ties the Court’s shift in federal tax immunity to a broader philosophical transformation that also appeared in other doctrines, like those governing the application of the Tenth Amendment and preemption. And it shows that Supremacy Clause immunity as it currently stands is the sour note in an otherwise consistent harmony of federalist relationships.

Introduction

In two disconnected and hypothetical1.Only partially hypothetical, one is in Idaho. SeeIdaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 2001).Show More locations, two government officers in performance of their duties run afoul of a state criminal law. One is an FBI sniper who takes an arguably unjustified shot at a fleeing man and kills an innocent bystander. The other is a state police officer who, facing the same situation, makes the same tragic error. Both officers are charged with a crime: involuntary manslaughter. Assuming all relevant facts are parallel between the two scenarios, does the law dictate that the state police officer should stand trial while the federal officer is held to be immune from prosecution? More generally, given the structure of our federalist system and the text, purpose, and history of the United States Constitution, how often should it be the case that a federal officer is immune from state criminal prosecution despite the fact that a state officer would be held to be culpable for doing the very same thing?

Courts tell us that this question is answered by the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.2.U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).Show More But the Supreme Court has not been generous with its guidance. The concept of federal officer immunity from state criminal prosecution was first explored in In re Neagle,3.135 U.S. 1, 62 (1890).Show More but although that case is memorable for its remarkably dramatic set of facts,4.See id.at 45 (“As [the former Chief Justice] was about leaving the room, . . . he succeeded in drawing a bowie-knife, when his arms were seized by a deputy marshal and others present to prevent him from using it, and they were able to wrench it from him only after a severe struggle.”).Show More it is well over a century old and offers little in the way of specifics. After an initially rapid development, Supremacy Clause immunity has remained entirely untouched by the Supreme Court since 1920, and it has arisen in lower federal courts only sporadically during that intervening century. Though no clear legal standard has emerged, the doctrine has generally been construed to offer sweeping immunity to federal employees who commit state crimes, as long as their actions bore some relationship to their federal duties.5.The standard that has developed in lower courts is discussed in Subsection I.B, infra.Show More

Despite its infrequent appearance in federal courts, Supremacy Clause immunity may have unexpected contemporary significance. Scholars have pointed out that the historical periods when it is most likely to arise are times when there are strong political tensions between state and federal governments.6.See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2232 (2003) (stating that Supremacy Clause immunity tends to arise “around historical moments of significant friction between the federal government and the States”).Show More In areas as disparate as electoral policy,7.Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, A Voting Rights Push, as States Make Voting Harder, N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/11/us/politics/biden-voting-rights-state-laws.html [https://perma.cc/39MC-2PR7] (describing that eighteen states are passing laws containing “a host of new voting restrictions” while Democrats in Congress try to pass a bill prohibiting state laws with those very types of restrictions).Show More public health,8.See Nancy J. Knauer, The COVID-19 Pandemic and Federalism: Who Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 8 (2020) (arguing that the current federal-state collaborative approach to pandemic response “left the federal government ill-prepared to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic because of conflicting priorities”); James G. Hodge, Jr., Federal vs. State Powers in Rush to Reopen Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, Just Sec. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69880/federal-vs-state-powers-in-rush-to-reopen-amid-corona‌virus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/62LX-4B2G] (“[T]he novel coronavirus is exposing a deep rift in American federalism as federal and state governments vie for primacy in remedying the nation’s ills.”).Show More immigration,9.SeeArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (holding, in a suit filed by the United States seeking an injunction against the enforcement of Arizona law, that the law providing for state enforcement of federal immigration policy was preempted).Show More and law enforcement,10 10.Compare H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021) (limiting defense of qualified immunity in suits against law enforcement officers), with Iowa Code § 670.4A (2023) (reinforcing defense of qualified immunity as a matter of Iowa state law).Show More now is such a time. It is thus unsurprising that a federal circuit court was recently presented with a Supremacy Clause immunity claim in a case that evokes the broader public debate about immunity from suit for law enforcement officers.11 11.See Virginia v. Amaya, No. 1:21-cr-91, 2021 WL 4942808 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2021), appeal dismissed, 2022 WL 1259877 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022). The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case after a newly elected attorney general ceased pursuing the appeal. Tom Jackman, Va. Attorney General Miyares Ends Prosecution of U.S. Park Police Officers in Ghaisar Case, Wash. Post (Apr. 22, 2022, 7:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/04/‌22/ghaisar-case-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/89CT-6YD2].Show More And any abstract conjecture about the doctrine’s relevance is cemented by ongoing conversations about Georgia’s potential prosecution of former President Trump for attempting to illegally influence vote counts in the aftermath of the 2020 election, and the possibility that he will invoke Supremacy Clause immunity.12 12.SeeNorman Eisen et al., Fulton County, Georgia’s Trump Investigation: An Analysis of the Reported Facts and Applicable Law 216–52 (2022).Show More That prosecution, were it to occur, would also provide the most likely avenue for Supremacy Clause immunity to finally reappear in the Supreme Court.

This Note approaches Supremacy Clause immunity from a novel perspective. Others have compared it to qualified immunity and preemption,13 13.Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2241.Show More but no one has attempted to untangle the relationship between Supremacy Clause immunity and federal tax immunity, a doctrine based on the same clause of the Constitution and which serves the same purpose: protecting the functioning of the federal government from state obstruction. Since the seminal case McCulloch v. Maryland,14 14.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 395 (1819).Show More the Court has spoken relatively frequently about federal tax immunity,15 15.See, e.g., Graves v. New Yorkex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) (stating that federal immunity from state taxation extends to corporations owned and controlled by the government).Show More and the doctrine it has expounded provides helpful illumination for contemporary attempts to understand the scope of Supremacy Clause immunity. The comparison yields a surprising conclusion: viewed in light of federal tax immunity, the approach that lower courts have been taking to Supremacy Clause immunity appears decidedly anachronistic. In fact, Supremacy Clause immunity as it currently exists is entirely inconsistent with the understanding of the Supremacy Clause that underlies every related constitutional doctrine. Neagle arose at a time when the Court’s perception of its own power to override state laws was at its zenith.16 16.SeeStephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 801 (1994) (characterizing the turn of the century as a “double shift in the direction of enhanced federal power” based on the Court’s overturning state laws as either preempted or unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause).Show More But in the last century, that has changed. As a result, the Court’s analysis of federal tax immunity has shifted dramatically, as has the doctrine of preemption.

These concurrent shifts demonstrate the Supreme Court’s adoption of a theory of government called “process federalism,”17 17.SeeWilliam Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 139, 147–48 (1998); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1350 (2001).Show More which was proposed by Professor Herbert Wechsler in a highly influential mid-century Article.18 18.Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 546 (1954).Show More Wechsler’s analysis focused on the judiciary’s role in protecting states from the federal government, for example by invalidating federal actions as infringing on the powers of the states.19 19.Id.at 558–60.Show More He argued that the judiciary’s role in this area was limited.20 20.Id. at 560.Show More In his view, if the matter were left to Congress, states’ interests would naturally be accommodated based on their role in Congress’s structure and composition.21 21.Id.at 547.Show More Other scholars later related Wechsler’s theory to doctrines that pointed in the other direction, and concluded that courts should also decline to invalidate state action as obstructing the federal government without explicit congressional direction.22 22.Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 695, 712–13 (1976).Show More Otherwise the judiciary is inclined to be overprotective of the federal government and deaf to states’ concerns.

Jurisprudential shifts in both federal tax immunity and preemption reveal the Supreme Court’s wholesale embrace of this state-protective spin on process federalism. In each of these areas the Court previously nullified state action on a constitutional basis whenever it perceived a conflict between federal and state interests. But it now only invalidates the state law if it perceives congressional intent to do so.23 23.See discussion infra Section III.B.Show More Supremacy Clause immunity has escaped this treatment, and as it currently stands, it remains irreconcilable with the theoretical underpinnings of other Supremacy Clause-derived doctrines. In cases where federal officers claim Supremacy Clause immunity, federal judges still routinely refuse to enforce state criminal law based only on their own perceptions of conflict between federal and state interests, and without any reference to congressional intent. The legal standard these cases apply is no longer consistent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Supremacy Clause generally, even if it is reasonably derived from the scarce text of the Court’s century-old Supremacy Clause immunity cases.

This Note proceeds in four parts to propose a new approach to evaluating claims of Supremacy Clause immunity. Part I charts the origin of Supremacy Clause immunity in a string of turn-of-the-century Supreme Court cases and its subsequent development in circuit courts. Part II rejects an approach to Supremacy Clause immunity that has grown in influence in more recent cases and which has engendered some scholarly support: defining Supremacy Clause immunity through analogy to qualified immunity. Part III argues that a more appropriate comparison can be made to a closely analogous doctrine, federal tax immunity, and it describes the development of that doctrine and establishes its relationship to process federalism. Finally, Part IV applies the analysis to Supremacy Clause immunity and explores some of its implications.

  1. Only partially hypothetical, one is in Idaho. See Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 2001).
  2. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
  3. 135 U.S. 1, 62 (1890).
  4. See id. at 45 (“As [the former Chief Justice] was about leaving the room, . . . he succeeded in drawing a bowie-knife, when his arms were seized by a deputy marshal and others present to prevent him from using it, and they were able to wrench it from him only after a severe struggle.”).
  5. The standard that has developed in lower courts is discussed in Subsection I.B, infra.
  6. See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2232 (2003) (stating that Supremacy Clause immunity tends to arise “around historical moments of significant friction between the federal government and the States”).
  7. Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, A Voting Rights Push, as States Make Voting Harder, N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/11/us/politics/biden-voting-rights-state-laws.html [https://perma.cc/39MC-2PR7] (describing that eighteen states are passing laws containing “a host of new voting restrictions” while Democrats in Congress try to pass a bill prohibiting state laws with those very types of restrictions).
  8.  See Nancy J. Knauer, The COVID-19 Pandemic and Federalism: Who Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 8 (2020) (arguing that the current federal-state collaborative approach to pandemic response “left the federal government ill-prepared to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic because of conflicting priorities”); James G. Hodge, Jr., Federal vs. State Powers in Rush to Reopen Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, Just Sec. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69880/federal-vs-state-powers-in-rush-to-reopen-amid-corona‌virus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/62LX-4B2G] (“[T]he novel coronavirus is exposing a deep rift in American federalism as federal and state governments vie for primacy in remedying the nation’s ills.”).
  9.  See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (holding, in a suit filed by the United States seeking an injunction against the enforcement of Arizona law, that the law providing for state enforcement of federal immigration policy was preempted).
  10.  Compare H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021) (limiting defense of qualified immunity in suits against law enforcement officers), with Iowa Code § 670.4A (2023) (reinforcing defense of qualified immunity as a matter of Iowa state law).
  11.  See Virginia v. Amaya, No. 1:21-cr-91, 2021 WL 4942808 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2021), appeal dismissed, 2022 WL 1259877 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022). The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case after a newly elected attorney general ceased pursuing the appeal. Tom Jackman, Va. Attorney General Miyares Ends Prosecution of U.S. Park Police Officers in Ghaisar Case, Wash. Post (Apr. 22, 2022, 7:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/04/‌22/ghaisar-case-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/89CT-6YD2].
  12. See Norman Eisen et al., Fulton County, Georgia’s Trump Investigation: An Analysis of the Reported Facts and Applicable Law 216–52 (2022).
  13. Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2241.
  14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 395 (1819).
  15. See, e.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) (stating that federal immunity from state taxation extends to corporations owned and controlled by the government).
  16. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 801 (1994) (characterizing the turn of the century as a “double shift in the direction of enhanced federal power” based on the Court’s overturning state laws as either preempted or unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause).
  17. See William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
    139

    , 147–48 (1998); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1350 (2001).

  18. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 546 (1954).
  19. Id. at 558–60.
  20. Id. at 560.
  21. Id. at 547.
  22.  Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 695, 712–13 (1976).
  23. See discussion infra Section III.B.

Searching for a Meaning: The Enigmatic Interpretation of Virginia’s Statutory Ban on Warrantless Searches

The modern U.S. Supreme Court tells us that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. That proposition flows logically enough from the Amendment’s text and helps explain why there are so many situations in which law enforcement does not need to obtain a warrant before conducting a Fourth Amendment search. Individuals in Virginia, however, are protected not only by the Fourth Amendment but also under state law. And Section 19.2-59 of the Code of Virginia contains a ban on searches without a warrant, subject only to exceptions in the enforcement of game and marine fisheries laws—rather, that is what Section 19.2-59 seems to say it contains. In practice, the Supreme Court of Virginia has for decades interpreted the statute to provide the same protections as the Fourth Amendment, despite the stark differences between the two texts.

This Note’s first contribution is to explore that discrepancy. It documents how Section 19.2-59 was first passed during the Prohibition Era as part of a backlash to overly intrusive searches by law enforcement agents. It reveals that the Supreme Court of Virginia was originally willing to credit the statute’s plain meaning and interpret it as offering broader protections against unreasonable searches than the common law. In the middle of the twentieth century, however, the court began to misread those early cases, leading to the current understanding of the law that is divorced from its plain meaning. The history of Section 19.2-59 thus raises difficult questions of statutory interpretation. This Note’s second contribution is to identify those questions and begin articulating what the contemporary meaning of Section 19.2-59 should be.

Introduction

“Because we can only administer the law as it is written, the interpretative principle that precedes all others is that ‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says . . .’.”1.Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 876 S.E.2d 349, 358 (Va. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Coalter v. Bargamin, 37 S.E. 779, 781 (Va. 1901); and then quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)).Show More

Kenneth Wilson was pulled over as he drove through Chesterfield County, Virginia, on the evening of March 29, 2019.2.Wilson v. Painter, No. 3:20cv645, 2020 WL 7497801, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2020).Show More The officer who commenced the stop did not initially give any reason for doing so. But after running Wilson’s license and registration, he ordered Wilson to step out of his car.3.Id. at *2.Show More Wilson responded by asking why he had been pulled over. The officer told Wilson that his headlight was out and opened the driver-side door. Wilson remained seated. The officer quickly repeated the order three more times, but Wilson did not budge. Then, without warning, the officer punched Wilson in the face and yanked him out of the car.4.Id.Show More

Once Wilson was restrained, the officer informed him that he had ordered Wilson to exit the vehicle due to the smell of marijuana.5.Id.Show More Wilson was patted down and escorted away. The officer then searched his car and found marijuana. In subsequent criminal proceedings, the Chesterfield County General District Court ordered that the drugs be suppressed.6.Id.Show More

Wilson sued the officer under both federal and state law seeking half a million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. In considering the officer’s motion to dismiss, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted that one of the state law claims was for “unlawful search in violation of Virginia Code § 19.2-59.”7.Id.Show More The court did not take long to resolve the claim, simply noting that it “rel[ies] on the absence of probable cause” and citing to a 1968 Supreme Court of Virginia case in support of the proposition.8.Id. at *8 (citing Carter v. Commonwealth, 163 S.E.2d 589, 592 (Va. 1968)).Show More In Wilson’s case, the court reasoned, the smell of marijuana gave the officer probable cause that there was contraband in the vehicle. The Section 19.2-59 claim was accordingly dismissed.9.Id. at *8–9. Wilson did not challenge the court’s dismissal of the § 19.2-59 claim on appeal. Wilson v. Painter, No. 21-1083, 2021 WL 5851070, at *1 n.1 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2021) (per curiam).Show More

At first glance, the decision appears unremarkable. Yet it is notable for what the court did not do: consider the text of Section 19.2-59 of the Code of Virginia. If it had, the court would have needed to concede that the provision says nothing about probable cause. Instead, Section 19.2-59 seems to plainly prohibit the type of warrantless search that Wilson’s car was subject to. The statute starts with a simple command:

No officer of the law or any other person shall search any place, thing or person, except by virtue of and under a warrant issued by a proper officer.10 10.Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-59 (2022). The rest of the statute reads:Any officer or other person searching any place, thing or person otherwise than by virtue of and under a search warrant, shall be guilty of malfeasance in office. Any officer or person violating the provisions of this section shall be liable to any person aggrieved thereby in both compensatory and punitive damages. Any officer found guilty of a second offense under this section shall, upon conviction thereof, immediately forfeit his office, and such finding shall be deemed to create a vacancy in such office to be filled according to law.Provided, however, that any officer empowered to enforce the game laws or marine fisheries laws as set forth in Title 28.2 may without a search warrant enter for the purpose of enforcing such laws, any freight yard or room, passenger depot, baggage room or warehouse, storage room or warehouse, train, baggage car, passenger car, express car, Pullman car or freight car of any common carrier, or any boat, automobile or other vehicle; but nothing in this proviso contained shall be construed to permit a search of any occupied berth or compartment on any passenger car or boat or any baggage, bag, trunk, box or other closed container without a search warrant.Id.Show More

That general prohibition is subject to an exception allowing for the warrantless searches of vehicles—but only when such searches are carried out in the enforcement of Virginia’s game or marine fisheries laws.11 11.Id.Show More The limited exception seems to further Wilson’s case, giving rise to a negative inference that warrantless automobile searches in all other contexts are prohibited.12 12.See Miller & Rhoads Bldg., L.L.C. v. City of Richmond, 790 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. 2016) (“In interpreting statutory language, we have consistently applied the time-honored principle expressiouniusestexclusioalterius . . . . Under this maxim, when a legislative enactment limits the manner in which something may be done, the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be done another way.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).Show More

The perfunctory treatment Section 19.2-59 received in Kenneth Wilson’s case is not unusual. In fact, Section 19.2-59 and its seemingly near-total ban on warrantless searches have gone almost entirely overlooked both in practice and in the literature. In practice, the statute is interpreted to offer the same protections as the Fourth Amendment,13 13.The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. Const. amend. IV.Show More despite the fact that the Amendment allows for a large portion of law enforcement searches to occur without a warrant.14 14.See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.1(b) (6th ed. 2020) (providing an overview of the instances in which police are permitted to conduct a search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, including the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, consent searches, inventory searches, and searches incident to arrest); Ronald Jay Allen, Joseph L. Hoffmann, Debra A. Livingston, Andrew D. Leipold & Tracey L. Meares, Criminal Procedure: Investigation and Right to Counsel 435, 467 (4th ed. 2020) (“Taken individually, these exceptions may seem narrow enough. Cumulatively, the exceptions may be the rule—and warrants the real exception.”).Show More Section 19.2-59 is also understood to create a cause of action against law enforcement officers akin to that found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.15 15.See infra Subsection I.B.2.Show More In the literature, the statute’s origins, development, and interpretation by courts have never been explored.16 16.A review of the secondary sources citing § 19.2-59 on Westlaw and Lexis+ reveals a smattering of treatises and journal articles that mention the statute. That literature has given only cursory consideration to the law. See, e.g., Robert S. Claiborne, Jr., Comment, Commonwealth and Constitution, 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 415, 423, 423 n.38 (2013) (calling it “troubling” that § 19.2-59 “does not plainly impose the same Fourth Amendment requirements, but Virginia courts have construed [it] to do so”); John L. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 35.6 (4th ed. 2008) (“This statute was enacted in response to public outcry during the Prohibition Era and has been consistently held to be coextensive with the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).Show More

This Note seeks to change that. Part I summarizes the current state of the law on illegal searches in Virginia under the Fourth Amendment, Section 10 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights,17 17.Section 10 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights is the search-and-seizure provision in the Virginia Constitution. It reads:That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.Va. Const. art. I, § 10.Show More and Section 19.2-59. Part II explores the history of Section 19.2-59.18 18.Although § 19.2-59 did not obtain its current place in the Code of Virginia until 1975, see Act of Mar. 22, 1975, ch. 495, 1975 Va. Acts 846, 856–57, this Note refers to earlier versions of the provision as “Section 19.2-59” for clarity.Show More It reveals the statute was originally enacted in 1920 as part of a larger bill meant to rein in the searches of state prohibition officers. Although the statute has been amended several times since, much of its substance remains the same as it was in 1920. Part III first analyzes how the Supreme Court of Virginia19 19.The modern-day Supreme Court of Virginia was known as the “Supreme Court of Appeals” until 1970. 2 A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia 704 (1974). For clarity, this Note refers to the court by its current name when referencing decisions of the pre-1970 court.Show More interpreted Section 19.2-59 in the years immediately following its enactment. It then documents how, in the latter half of the century, the court misread those earlier cases, leading to the current application of the statute that departs not only from its text, but also from how it was originally understood by courts. Finally, Part IV makes a preliminary attempt at answering several questions raised by the analysis in Parts II and III.

  1. Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 876 S.E.2d 349, 358 (Va. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Coalter v. Bargamin, 37 S.E. 779, 781 (Va. 1901); and then quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)).
  2. Wilson v. Painter, No. 3:20cv645, 2020 WL 7497801, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2020).
  3. Id. at *2.
  4. Id.
  5. Id.
  6. Id.
  7. Id.
  8. Id. at *8 (citing Carter v. Commonwealth, 163 S.E.2d 589, 592 (Va. 1968)).
  9. Id. at *8–9. Wilson did not challenge the court’s dismissal of the § 19.2-59 claim on appeal. Wilson v. Painter, No. 21-1083, 2021 WL 5851070, at *1 n.1 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2021) (per curiam).
  10. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-59 (2022). The rest of the statute reads:Any officer or other person searching any place, thing or person otherwise than by virtue of and under a search warrant, shall be guilty of malfeasance in office. Any officer or person violating the provisions of this section shall be liable to any person aggrieved thereby in both compensatory and punitive damages. Any officer found guilty of a second offense under this section shall, upon conviction thereof, immediately forfeit his office, and such finding shall be deemed to create a vacancy in such office to be filled according to law.Provided, however, that any officer empowered to enforce the game laws or marine fisheries laws as set forth in Title 28.2 may without a search warrant enter for the purpose of enforcing such laws, any freight yard or room, passenger depot, baggage room or warehouse, storage room or warehouse, train, baggage car, passenger car, express car, Pullman car or freight car of any common carrier, or any boat, automobile or other vehicle; but nothing in this proviso contained shall be construed to permit a search of any occupied berth or compartment on any passenger car or boat or any baggage, bag, trunk, box or other closed container without a search warrant.

    Id.

  11. Id.
  12. See Miller & Rhoads Bldg., L.L.C. v. City of Richmond, 790 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. 2016) (“In interpreting statutory language, we have consistently applied the time-honored principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius . . . . Under this maxim, when a legislative enactment limits the manner in which something may be done, the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be done another way.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
  13. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. Const. amend. IV.
  14. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.1(b) (6th ed. 2020) (providing an overview of the instances in which police are permitted to conduct a search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, including the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, consent searches, inventory searches, and searches incident to arrest); Ronald Jay Allen, Joseph L. Hoffmann, Debra A. Livingston, Andrew D. Leipold & Tracey L. Meares, Criminal Procedure: Investigation and Right to Counsel 435, 467 (4th ed. 2020) (“Taken individually, these exceptions may seem narrow enough. Cumulatively, the exceptions may be the rule—and warrants the real exception.”).
  15. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
  16.  A review of the secondary sources citing § 19.2-59 on Westlaw and Lexis+ reveals a smattering of treatises and journal articles that mention the statute. That literature has given only cursory consideration to the law. See, e.g., Robert S. Claiborne, Jr., Comment, Commonwealth and Constitution, 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 415, 423, 423 n.38 (2013) (calling it “troubling” that § 19.2-59 “does not plainly impose the same Fourth Amendment requirements, but Virginia courts have construed [it] to do so”); John L. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 35.6 (4th ed. 2008) (“This statute was enacted in response to public outcry during the Prohibition Era and has been consistently held to be coextensive with the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
  17. Section 10 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights is the search-and-seizure provision in the Virginia Constitution. It reads:That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.Va. Const. art. I, § 10.
  18. Although § 19.2-59 did not obtain its current place in the Code of Virginia until 1975, see Act of Mar. 22, 1975, ch. 495, 1975 Va. Acts 846, 856–57, this Note refers to earlier versions of the provision as “Section 19.2-59” for clarity.
  19. The modern-day Supreme Court of Virginia was known as the “Supreme Court of Appeals” until 1970. 2 A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia 704 (1974). For clarity, this Note refers to the court by its current name when referencing decisions of the pre-1970 court.