Note

Who’s In and Who’s Out: Congressional Power Over Individuals Under the Indian Commerce Clause

For over two hundred years, Congress has enjoyed plenary power over Indian affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause. This Clause has allowed preferential treatment for Native Americans to bypass strict scrutiny despite the evolution of modern race law. But in late 2015, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) published new regulations requiring courts to follow a strict set of procedures that ensure Native American children will be placed with tribe-affiliated families. This sparked immediate backlash. Adoption agencies argue that the BIA’s new regulations impose undue burdens on Native American children because of their race. This litigation has profound implications for the continued existence of modern Indian law, which rests on the assumption that government regulations affecting Native Americans is a “political”—not “racial”—classification. So far, current scholarship has failed to foresee or respond to these equality-based attacks. 

This Note proposes a new response, and a new interpretation of Congress’s powers under the Indian Commerce Clause. It focuses on the word “Indian” in Article I to argue that the Constitution contains a latent ambiguity highlighted by the BIA’s rulemaking. It proposes that the term “Indian” refers to an individual’s political, social, and cultural connections rather than their ethnic heritage. This novel interpretation accords with historical practice, the evolution of judicial precedent, and intra-textual analysis of the Constitution. The effect of this interpretation is to recognize a previously unarticulated constitutional limit on Congress’s power to regulate individual Native Americans, granting the ultimate recognition of tribal citizenship to the eligible individual. 

 

Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the Constitutional Right to Martyrdom

Since the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted to preserve and define civil rights. When states fail to protect the rights of minority groups, the courts step in by creating constitutional safeguards for minorities, juveniles, and religious objectors. In the context of juvenile rights, the Supreme Court has consistently relied on scientific data to define the rights attributed to people under the age of majority. Since the greater psychological community has accepted that a minor’s cognitive abilities reach a state of maturity around age sixteen, the Supreme Court may be poised to clear up a century-old controversy regarding a minor’s right of self-determination. This Note explores whether a minor can exercise her First Amendment Free Exercise rights to make medical treatment choices.

The Fox Searchlight Signal: Why Fox Searchlight Marks the Beginning of the End for Preferential Treatment of Unpaid Internships at Nonprofits

While the Department of Labor has said that unpaid internships at charitable nonprofits are “generally permissible,” Fox Searchlight signals that charitable nonprofits can no longer rely on Fact Sheet #71 for protection. The Labor Department is only entitled to Skidmore deference for this document, and its assertion of protection in Fact Sheet #71 contains no justification for the sweeping exception that it announces. The Fact Sheet is therefore unlikely to persuade courts that the Labor Department’s stance is correct.

This Note predicts that arguments for preferential treatment of nonprofits proffered by authors such as Tucci, Bianci, and Harthill will fail in the courts. This Note stands alone in forecasting massive liability for the 40% of unpaid internships hosted by charitable nonprofits in the United States today. Once a nonprofit or an employee is covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the clear intent of Congress as articulated by the Court (as well as the Department of Labor in the context of the volunteer exception) is to draw exceptions to coverage as narrowly as possible. On top of these textual and precedent-based arguments, plaintiffs have strong public policy arguments that the continued existence of the exception encourages inefficiency, distorts the labor market, creates uncertainty, and privileges whites and elite institutions at the expense of racial and ethnic minorities. At the very least, interns at charitable nonprofits should no longer have to fend for themselves in a completely unregulated market. This Note recommends that charitable nonprofits curtail their unpaid internship programs and calls on the Labor Department to withdraw its unsupported guidance in Fact Sheet #71. It would be as easy as deleting a footnote.

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