Note

Jettisoning “Jurisdictional”: Asserting the Substantive Nature of Supremacy Clause Immunity

Under the doctrine of Supremacy Clause immunity, federal officers generally cannot be prosecuted for state crimes committed while carrying out their duties. This much is well established. What has escaped the notice of the courts, however, is the nature of the immunity. Though they refer to it as “jurisdictional,” it is in fact substantive.

This is no small error. There is a difference between substantive and jurisdictional immunities, yet the current characterization of Supremacy Clause immunity glosses over it. And this distinction runs even deeper: Substantive immunities go to the merits of a case, which in turn relate to the legislature’s power to enact laws. Jurisdictional immunities, by contrast, implicate only a court’s power to rule on the merits.

The extent of this mischaracterization has been missed because it is so deeply seated. There are three contributors to this problem: the Supreme Court’s once-expansive conception of jurisdiction, the lack of a unifying theory of immunities, and the nature of Supremacy Clause immunity’s founding cases.

This mischaracterization presents fundamental semantic difficulties, as well as four practical risks of harm to the parties. First, a court may incorrectly raise the immunity sua sponte. Second, a court may improperly refuse to consider matters of equity or fairness in determining whether the immunity applies. Third, a court may unduly revisit a state judgment on the immunity’s applicability. Finally, double jeopardy would not protect the officer should a court dismiss the prosecution based on Supremacy Clause immunity.

In Defense of the Secular Purpose Status Quo

The secular purpose rule, one prong of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, requires that government action be justified by a primary, genuine secular purpose. Government actions supported only by religious beliefs, therefore, are unconstitutional. A debate about the morality of the secular purpose rule has emerged, with the main arguments tending to view religious beliefs as either permissible or impermissible. This Note argues that rather than decide purely for or against the secular purpose rule, courts should maintain the current status quo, which is underenforcement of the rule.

To justify this approach to resolving the secular purpose debate, this Note analyzes common arguments made for and against the rule, and distills each argument to its core animating political value. The arguments against the secular purpose rule are motivated by the value of political access, while arguments for the secular purpose rule are motivated by the value of political legitimacy. Underenforcement creates equilibrium between these political values.

Some may worry that underenforcement will change the underlying meaning of the secular purpose rule. But a constitutional requirement can retain its full meaning and be legally binding even if underenforced. Another possible objection is that underenforcement would be tantamount to nonenforcement. To respond to that objection, this Note attempts to canalize underenforcement by marking out situations in which the secular purpose rule should be fully enforced. When, for example, underenforcement would allow discrimination against vulnerable groups, the secular purpose rule should be enforced. 

Overcoming Overcorrection: Towards Holistic Military Sexual Assault Reform

This Note brings a different perspective by analyzing the issue of military sexual assault from the often-ignored perspective of defendants, arguing that the military justice system, which once failed victims, is now failing the accused. Besides defense attorneys arguing on behalf of their clients, few have taken this position, and those who have discussed these issues have not provided a sustained discussion of potential reforms. Viewing this emotional issue from the perspective of a defendant is not intended to undermine, doubt, or discount victims or the larger problem of sexual assault in both the military and our broader society. Rather, the goal of this Note is to add a new perspective in the hope of spurring more durable, lasting, and balanced reforms. This Note synthesizes problems within the military justice system that, when considered in isolation, may seem insignificant compared to the broader problem of sexual assault. However, when considered in concert, the picture is clear: The military justice system remains deeply broken, but it is not beyond repair. As such, this Note then presents a series of reforms that would ensure a fairer, more stable military justice system for both victims and defendants.

This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will serve as an overview of the military justice system. A familiarity with the unique features of the military justice system and the court-martial process is vital to understanding these issues. Part I will also analyze some of the procedural changes that have been made in response to the sexual assault epidemic. Part II will summarize the doctrine of unlawful command influence (“UCI”) and examine how it applies to sexual assault in the military. Part III will look more closely at the content of SAPR trainings, which all service members and civilian employees attend on a regular basis, and consider the potential unintended consequences of this training on the military justice system. Finally, Part IV will evaluate the reform proposals put forth by Senator Gillibrand and Senator McCaskill and offer an alternative model that would facilitate a system of justice that is fair to both victims and the accused by placing the disposition of traditional crimes in the hands of independent prosecutors while leaving military-specific crimes in the hands of commanders.

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