Note

“Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform in County Law Enforcement

Most state constitutions require that counties have an elected sheriff who serves as the county’s chief law enforcement officer. The sheriff’s office is over a thousand years old and today has strong cultural associations with independence and populism. Ironically, however, the sheriff’s office has not been studied in the legal literature on policing as an entity separate and distinct from municipal police departments. This Note attempts to remedy that deficiency by identifying the unique pathologies of the American sheriff and proposing dramatic reforms to county law enforcement.

Although his elected status creates a perception that the sheriff is a local county officer, this Note argues that this perception is inaccurate because the sheriff is independent of the county and is actually, in many important ways, an agent of the state. The sheriff’s hybrid state-and-local status creates misalignments between different levels of government that obstruct efforts to hold the sheriff accountable.

County law enforcement is in need of reform. This Note argues that elections are not functioning as an effective accountability mechanism and that county government must be given power to act as a check on county law enforcement. This Note further argues that, although the sheriff in his current form is emphatically not the officer for the job, the county is actually the best level of government at which to provide policing. This Note discusses the merits of two models of achieving consolidation of policing to the county level, with insights gleaned from America’s experiences with sheriffs.

Waiving the Ministerial Exception

The ministerial exception provides that discrimination law does not apply to claims arising out of the employment relationship between religious institutions and their ministerial employees. While the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC suggested that this exception could be waived, others have argued otherwise. The pushback flows from a structural understanding of the Establishment Clause, which holds that the First Amendment creates a structural barrier between the separate sovereigns of church and state. On this understanding, the ministerial exception is simply a recognition of the fact that there are some areas in which the state has no power. But this is an incomplete analysis of waiver.

A complete analysis of waiver has both doctrinal and theoretical consequences. Doctrinally, a viable concept of waiver can change the litigation behavior of parties. Theoretically, waiver exposes a flaw in conceptions of church sovereignty. The commentary fails to fully define what it means to be a sovereign, ignoring the fact that some sovereigns, such as states, can waive their immunity.

This Note seeks to present a comprehensive theory for the waivability of the ministerial exception. This theory confronts the exception on all three of its theoretical footings: as part of the structural restraint imposed by the Establishment Clause, as part of the right to church autonomy extended by the Establishment Clause, and as part of a church’s right to shape its own faith protected by the Free Exercise Clause.

A Cost-Benefit Analysis–Based Interpretation of Reciprocity Under Clean Air Act Section 115(c)

Section 115 of the Clean Air Act provides for the regulation of international pollutants, and has been considered as a potential source of authority for regulating greenhouse gas emissions. In order to trigger the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate under Section 115, EPA’s Administrator must determine that the relevant foreign countries have given the United States “essentially the same rights” as Section 115 gives those countries. This Note proposes a novel interpretation of this reciprocity requirement based on cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”). On this CBA-based interpretation, the reciprocity requirement is satisfied where the benefits that the United States receives from all countries’ emission reductions outweigh the costs of reducing its own emissions.

The CBA-based interpretation is consistent with trends in administrative law toward requiring agencies to consider the costs and benefits of regulation, and with a plausible reading of Section 115 as giving foreign countries the right to mutually beneficial emission reductions. The CBA-based interpretation also has legal and policy advantages: it may help avert challenges to regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under Section 115 based on the major questions doctrine, it may show that climate regulation is cost justified based on domestic climate benefits even if ancillary benefits and foreign benefits are not considered, and it may represent a rational strategy for approaching international environmental negotiations that could lead to an efficient outcome in the case of climate change if adopted by all parties.

This Note illustrates the CBA-based interpretation of reciprocity by applying it to the United States’ pledge under the Paris Climate Agreement.

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