Note

An Alternative to Constraining Judges with Constitutional Theories: The Internal Goods Approach

Concerns about judges using their own personal moral beliefs in deciding cases, the difficulty in weighing competing moral principles in America’s liberal and pluralist society, and concerns about judges reaching an opinion under only the guise of principled reasoning all motivate constitutional theories that “constrain” judges. Under a “constraint approach,” constitutional theories try to limit the appropriate set of outcomes a judge may reach, the appropriate justifications judges may use in reaching a decision, or both. By drawing on the works of Alasdair MacIntyre and Ronald Dworkin, this Note introduces an alternative solution to resolving those problems—the “internal goods approach.” Under the internal goods approach, success in judging is measured by the extent to which judges prioritize “internal goods.” Purposefully described at a high level of generality, a judge prioritizing internal goods engages in legal reasoning and examines and applies principles required by the institutional nature of law when confronted with difficult cases. A critical requirement for this approach to respond to the aforementioned concerns motivating constraint is that a judge exercises judicial virtues. This Note argues that not only does the constraint approach not resolve these concerns, but that the internal goods approach better resolves them. And rather than merely criticizing an outcome as “activist,” the internal goods approach provides a more meaningful basis upon which to evaluate constitutional theories by evaluating their account of the internal goods. This Note also provides a detailed account of judicial virtues which serve as a concrete and practical basis for evaluating judges.

Introduction

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the United States Supreme Court considered whether “Washington’s prohibition against ‘caus[ing]’ or ‘aid[ing]’ a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”1 1.521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997) (alterations in original).Show MoreThe Court, in reaching its conclusion that it does not,2 2.Id. at 706.Show Moreoutlined a framework for answering that question. This framework requires a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest”3 3.Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).Show Moreand also considers whether the asserted rights are “objectively[] ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”4 4.Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).Show More

The Glucksberg majority characterized this methodology as “restrained.”5 5.Id. at 721.Show MoreImportantly, the constraining nature of this methodology was described as an advantage. By constraining judges to examine only deeply rooted traditions and history, the methodology “rein[s] in” the judge’s “subjective elements,” and judges can avoid the “complex balancing of competing interests in every case.”6 6.Id. at 722.Show MoreThis interest in constraint is not limited to Glucksberg; rather, it represents a core focus of judges,7 7.See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 3 (1971).Show More academics,8 8.Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 Emory L.J. 1195, 1197 n.1 (2009) (“[T]he terms ‘judicial activist’ and ‘judicial activism’ appeared in 3,815 law review articles during the 1990s and in 1,817 more articles between 2000 and 2004.”).Show Moreand the public.9 9.Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.1 (2011) (“Between May 26, 2009, the day then-Judge Sotomayor was nominated to join the Court, and May 29, 2009, LexisNexis indicates there were 309 items using the term ‘judicial activism’ or variations thereof in articles about then-Judge Sotomayor.”).Show More

This Note is motivated by the question of whether the interest in constraint the Glucksberg Court had is justified: Should judges care about the constraining nature of methodologies? Particularly, this Note analyzes this question in the context of constitutional adjudication, an area where an interest in constraint is particularly of interest.10 10.Limiting the scope of analysis to constitutional questions also greatly simplifies it. Some issues specific to statutory interpretation, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality, are only tangential to the issue of judicial constraint. And other tools of statutory interpretation, like deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations, involve other complex issues outside the scope of this Note. While these canons of interpretation may implicate constitutional questions, this Note is concerned more generally with the sorts of issues raised by cases like Glucksberg.Show More

Consider a very simple example. Suppose there are two theories for interpreting the Constitution: Theory A says that the Constitution will always be interpreted against the plaintiff’s interest, and Theory B says that the Constitution will always be interpreted against the defendant’s interest. Loosely speaking, these theories will be equally constraining. We, of course, intuitively have an understanding that neither Theory A nor B is an attractive interpretive theory. But in this understanding, we appeal to standards other than the degree of constraint allowed by the theories. This simple example implicates a rich area of legal philosophy and has practical implications for how judges approach constitutional decision-making. Importantly, it raises questions about whether a less constrained Theory C can be better than a more constrained constitutional theory.

Part I of this Note critically surveys different definitions of constraint and judicial activism introduced in legal scholarship. In doing so, it should provide clarity to the rest of the arguments. I argue that constraint should not be understood as judges merely limiting judicial review, at least in the context of this Note. Rather, to implicate a more substantive area of controversy, the degree of judicial review should be just one part of the definition of constraint. Further, the question about how much constraint should matter is distinct from the debate between standard-like and rule-like approaches. A rule-like approach can still confer discretion to a judge,11 11.See infra Section I.C.Show Moreindicating that we cannot simply say that the degree to which a constitutional theory constrains a judge is a determination of how rule-like the theory is. The most helpful way to understand “constraint” is by understanding that a constraint can be justification-oriented, results-oriented, or both.

Likewise, Part II of this Note explores the different justifications for constraining judges. I begin by looking at the desire to avoid moral judgments in reaching a decision in a particular case. There are two distinct concerns here. First, there is good reason to constrain judges from imposing their own personal moral beliefs on decisions in disregard for constitutional principles. Second, there may be good reasons to prevent judges from having to weigh competing moral principles when deciding cases given the difficulty of resolving those moral debates. I will also introduce, by way of example of instrumentalist judges, the concern that judges can be motivated by reaching an outcome that they personally desire under the guise of principled reasoning. By identifying these concerns, we can ask whether constraint imposed by a constitutional theory is in fact a good means to resolve them.

Part III of this Note introduces an alternative to the constraint model for guiding judging. Drawing on the works of Professors Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre, I argue that judging itself can be conceptualized as a “practice” with “external goods” and “internal goods.” While I later describe what these concepts mean in more detail, an introduction here is helpful. Judging as a practice means that judges can evaluate their success at judging based on internal institutional standards, or in MacIntyre’s words, internal goods. MacIntyre’s chess analogy provides a helpful introduction to the definition of internal goods.12 12.This example comes from Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 188–89 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 3d ed. 2007) (1981).Show MoreConsider a child playing chess who does not particularly enjoy it, but whose teacher rewards them with candy for playing. That child certainly values chess, as they get candy for playing. But, given their recent entry into the world of chess and the fact that they are motivated by the candy, the child has no appreciation for flawlessly pulling off a particular chess strategy or gaining a greater understanding of chess strategy. Here, an external good of chess is the candy reward because while the child can get candy from playing chess, they can also get candy from their violin teacher or their parents. An internal good of the game of chess—flawlessly pulling off a particular chess strategy, for example—is different, as one cannot obtain that from anything other than playing chess.

This Note argues that, like chess, judging is a practice with internal and external goods relevant to the context of judging. I purposefully define these internal goods loosely and describe broadly how a judge may practically implement these standards. Throughout the rest of this Note, I refer to this alternative model as the “internal goods approach,” in contrast to the “constraint approach.”13 13.The constraint approach simply tells judges to conform all their decision-making to the constraint imposed by their constitutional theory. For an example, see the discussion of originalism in Section I.B, infra.Show MoreUnlike Ronald Dworkin’s related account, I introduce an account of virtue ethics and relate it to the practice of judging. Virtue ethics, a concept that is inherently linked to “practices” according to Alasdair MacIntyre, has been an area of great interest to legal scholars. The discussion of virtues not only provides a complete theoretical account to the internal goods approach, but it also introduces concrete and practical ways for judges to implement the internal goods approach. By introducing the internal goods approach, I hope to contribute a useful theoretical model for understanding the act of judging to the field of legal scholarship.14 14.Scholars have applied MacIntyre’s ideas of practices and internal goods to different contexts. See, e.g., Mark Retter, Internal Goods to Legal Practice: Reclaiming Fuller with MacIntyre, 4 U. Coll. London J.L. & Juris. 1, 8–10 (2015) (discussing MacIntyre in the context of Professor Lon L. Fuller’s attack on legal positivism). See generally Howard Lesnick, The Practice of Teaching, the Practice of Law: What Does It Mean to Practice Responsibly?, 29 Pace L. Rev. 29 (2008) (introducing MacIntyre’s concepts to lawyering and legal education); Matthew Sinnicks, Practices, Governance, and Politics: Applying MacIntyre’s Ethics to Business, 24 Bus. Ethics Q. 229 (2014) (questioning whether MacIntyre’s work can be applied to corporate governance).Show More

Part IV of this Note then compares these two approaches and concludes that the internal goods approach is superior to the constraint approach based on the concerns I outline in Part II. The first set of arguments deals with the constraint approach alone. The constraint approach does not minimize the concerns outlined earlier because difficult normative and moral questions are necessary for both deciding between theories of constraint and justifying the constraint itself. Further, at least in some cases, relying on the constraint approach could lead judges astray by failing to consider the institutional rights described in Part III. While both the internal goods and the constraint approaches still face the problem of dealing with difficult and highly contestable moral debates, the internal goods approach minimizes this concern. This is true even though there is only a “thin account” of the internal goods of judging.15 15.Describing the internal goods approach as a “thin account” means that the internal goods approach can apply to judges irrespective of the substantive details of their constitutional theory. For example, a judge may think that post-ratification practices are particularly probative of the meaning of constitutional provisions while another judge disagrees. A “thin account” of internal goods means that both judges can operate under the internal goods approach even though they disagree substantively about certain aspects of how to interpret the Constitution. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, 34 Metaphilosophy 178, 183 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence] (using the term “thin” in a similar manner).Show More

In justifying these conclusions, I begin by walking through how a judge following the internal goods approach decides a difficult case. The decision-making process a judge engages in following this approach demonstrates the benefits of introducing the ideas of practices, internal goods, and virtues. The internal goods approach provides a more meaningful way to evaluate judging than relying on constraint alone. Importantly, even though the process of ascertaining the internal goods of judging is contestable and difficult, the virtues provide a sort of procedural check to ensure that judges are properly engaging in this inquiry. Finally, the internal goods approach better accounts for instrumentalist judging concerns than the constraint approach does.

  1.  521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997) (alterations in original). ↑
  2.  Id. at 706. ↑
  3.  Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). ↑
  4.  Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). ↑
  5.  Id. at 721. ↑
  6.  Id. at 722. ↑
  7.  See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 3 (1971). ↑
  8.  Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 Emory L.J. 1195, 1197 n.1 (2009) (“[T]he terms ‘judicial activist’ and ‘judicial activism’ appeared in 3,815 law review articles during the 1990s and in 1,817 more articles between 2000 and 2004.”). ↑
  9.  Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.1 (2011) (“Between May 26, 2009, the day then-Judge Sotomayor was nominated to join the Court, and May 29, 2009, LexisNexis indicates there were 309 items using the term ‘judicial activism’ or variations thereof in articles about then-Judge Sotomayor.”). ↑
  10.  Limiting the scope of analysis to constitutional questions also greatly simplifies it. Some issues specific to statutory interpretation, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality, are only tangential to the issue of judicial constraint. And other tools of statutory interpretation, like deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations, involve other complex issues outside the scope of this Note. While these canons of interpretation may implicate constitutional questions, this Note is concerned more generally with the sorts of issues raised by cases like Glucksberg. ↑
  11.  See infra Section I.C. ↑
  12.  This example comes from Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 188–89 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 3d ed. 2007) (1981). ↑
  13.  The constraint approach simply tells judges to conform all their decision-making to the constraint imposed by their constitutional theory. For an example, see the discussion of originalism in Section I.B, infra. ↑
  14.  Scholars have applied MacIntyre’s ideas of practices and internal goods to different contexts. See, e.g., Mark Retter, Internal Goods to Legal Practice: Reclaiming Fuller with MacIntyre, 4 U. Coll. London J.L. & Juris. 1, 8–10 (2015) (discussing MacIntyre in the context of Professor Lon L. Fuller’s attack on legal positivism). See generally Howard Lesnick, The Practice of Teaching, the Practice of Law: What Does It Mean to Practice Responsibly?, 29 Pace L. Rev. 29 (2008) (introducing MacIntyre’s concepts to lawyering and legal education); Matthew Sinnicks, Practices, Governance, and Politics: Applying MacIntyre’s Ethics to Business, 24 Bus. Ethics Q. 229 (2014) (questioning whether MacIntyre’s work can be applied to corporate governance). ↑

  15.  Describing the internal goods approach as a “thin account” means that the internal goods approach can apply to judges irrespective of the substantive details of their constitutional theory. For example, a judge may think that post-ratification practices are particularly probative of the meaning of constitutional provisions while another judge disagrees. A “thin account” of internal goods means that both judges can operate under the internal goods approach even though they disagree substantively about certain aspects of how to interpret the Constitution. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, 34 Metaphilosophy 178, 183 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence] (using the term “thin” in a similar manner). ↑

Partisan Emergencies

Executive emergency powers are tantalizingly effective. They allow presidents to bypass congressional gridlock, do away with procedural safeguards, and act decisively with minimal oversight. But there is a risk that these exceptional powers may become a norm of domestic governance. This Note theorizes a problem of “partisan emergencies,” declared by a president despite significant disagreement about the factual existence of an emergency. One example is President Trump’s declaration of an emergency after Congress refused to fund his border wall. Other examples stem from Democrats calling on President Biden to declare an emergency to address issues like climate change and reproductive health. Congress, initially relying on a legislative veto to terminate such declarations, must now muster a supermajority if it disagrees with them. At the heart of the scheme is the National Emergencies Act, outlining how a president can declare a “national emergency” and what powers he unlocks by doing so without imposing a definition of the term. This Note surveys the judiciary’s recent treatment of emergency powers, positing that while courts are willing to engage in means-ends review about how an executive uses emergency powers, they are not willing to engage in the factual question of whether an emergency exists at all. This Note then argues that the judiciary must be willing to engage with this question to effectively rein in dubious invocations of emergency power. To do so, the courts should treat the term “national emergency” as one capable of statutory interpretation, rather than one posing an intractable political question.

“[J]udicial deference in an emergency or a crisis does not mean wholesale judicial abdication.”1 1.Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 74 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).Show More

Introduction

With partisan feuds at a high and congressional functionality at a low,2 2.Aaron Zitner, U.S. Grapples with Political Gridlock as Crises Mount, Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 2023, 8:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-grapples-with-political-gridlock-as-crises-mount-be179aca.Show Moreit is tempting for presidents to rely heavily on executive power to implement their policy agendas. An effective way to do so is by declaring a national emergency, allowing a president to “trigger[] executive powers or relax[] otherwise applicable requirements or restrictions.”3 3.Jennifer K. Elsea, Jay B. Sykes, Joanna R. Lampe, Kevin M. Lewis & Bryan L. Adkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/p‌df/R/R46379 [https://perma.cc/V4KS-CMPV].Show MoreOne scholar describes declaring a national emergency as a “master key” that unlocks a treasure trove containing nearly 150 additional grants of statutory power.4 4.Mark P. Nevitt, Is Climate Change a National Emergency?, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 591, 616 (2021).Show MorePresident Trump relied on the declaration of a national emergency to secure funding for a southern border wall after Congress refused to grant it.5 5.Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019).Show MoreIn subsequent years, some Democrats called on President Biden to declare a national emergency to circumvent congressional inaction on climate change, while others looked to emergency powers as a means of protecting abortion access in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.6 6.Tarini Parti, Biden Is Pressed to Declare Emergencies After Climate, Abortion Setbacks, Wall St. J. (July 20, 2022, 4:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-faces-pressure-to-d‌eclare-emergencies-after-climate-abortion-setbacks-11658318400; Myah Ward, Biden Faces Calls to Declare Climate Emergency as He Heads to Maui, Politico (Aug. 20, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/20/biden-climate-emergency-hawaii-00111973 [https://perma.cc/P8ZH-6BTS].Show MoreIndeed, President Biden did rely on the COVID-19 emergency declaration in his attempt to address the student loan debt crisis, before the Supreme Court rejected this use of power in Biden v. Nebraska.7 7.143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023).Show More

Presidential use of emergency power is not new. While the executive lacks explicit emergency authority under the Constitution,8 8.Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1391 (2013) (describing how Article II does not confer emergency authority, but instead creates an “impotent” executive who relies on statutory delegations of power).Show Morestatutory emergency powers have existed since the founding of the nation.9 9.See Examining Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 3 (2022) [hereinafter Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director, Liberty and National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice) (stating that “since the founding of the nation, Congress has been the primary source of the president’s emergency powers”).Show MoreThese powers are important and perhaps even essential for responding to complex crises in the modern age. And, in many ways, presidents have exercised restraint in their use of the broad swath of powers that are available to them—at least when it comes to domestic policy.10 10.See generally Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act, Brennan Ctr. for Just., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/declared-nat‌ional-emergencies-under-national-emergencies-act [https://perma.cc/Q32Y-J2VD] (last updated Mar. 14, 2025) (listing declared emergencies of which the vast majority have been in the international or foreign affairs context).Show MoreOf the eighty-seven states of national emergency that have been declared in the past forty-five-year period, all but eight were issued to impose economic sanctions on foreign actors under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) or related sanctions laws.11 11.Id.Show MoreBut recent trends signal a risk that these exceptional powers may become a go-to strategy of domestic governance, particularly with the rise of what this Note conceptualizes as “partisan emergencies.”12 12.See Amy L. Stein, Domestic Emergency Pretexts, 98 Ind. L.J. 479, 479 (2023) (discussing the use of “questionable domestic emergencies to achieve unrelated policy goals”).Show More

The term “partisan emergency” refers to situations when presidents unilaterally declare an emergency despite significant disagreement along party lines over the most fundamental factual question: whether an emergency exists at all. President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency to fund the border wall, in the face of congressional opposition, marked a clear example of this. So too would any invocation of emergency powers to protect abortion access. These differ from the more traditional crises such as wars, pandemics, natural disasters, or other physical attacks on American interests, although the scope of even these traditional emergencies is not closed off from this debate.13 13.Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (involving parties’ dispute over what constitutes war and who gets to decide the existence of it).Show MoreIndeed the COVID-19 pandemic, at a certain point, could be categorized as a partisan emergency.14 14.J. Clinton, J. Cohen, J. Lapinski & M. Trussler, Partisan Pandemic: How Partisanship and Public Health Concerns Affect Individuals’ Social Mobility During COVID-19,Sci. Advances,Jan. 6, 2021, at 1, 1.Show MoreRecent decisions offer insight into the current philosophy of judicial review in times of crisis15 15.See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Judicial Review in Times of Emergency: From the Founding Through the COVID-19 Pandemic, 109 Va. L. Rev. 489 (2023) (tracing the philosophy of judicial review over time with a helpful discussion on the recent pandemic years).Show Morebut leave open questions regarding the proper role for courts in policing executive overreach. The current discussion surrounding the issue of emergency declarations focuses exclusively on the need for Congress to step in.16 16.Congress has introduced bipartisan legislation to change the National Emergency Act to give it more teeth in limiting emergency declarations, but nothing has passed both houses to date. See, e.g., Limiting Emergency Powers Act of 2023, H.R. 121, 118th Cong.; ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. (2019). A Senate hearing in May 2024 saw experts testify on the need for changes to the current statutory scheme. Restoring Congressional Oversight Over Emergency Powers: Exploring Options to Reform the National Emergencies Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 118th Cong. (2024) [hereinafter Restoring Congressional Oversight Hearing]. Academic scholarship also centers on changes to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., GianCarlo Canaparo & Paul J. Larkin, Heritage Found., The Constitution and Emergencies: Regulating Presidential Emergency Declarations 3 (2023); Samuel Weitzman, Back to Good: Restoring the National Emergencies Act, 54 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 365, 405 (2021); Stein, supra note 12, at 515.Show MoreThis Note provides an alternative ground to limit executive power in the event Congress is unable or unwilling to rise to the occasion, outlining why and how a court should approach the task of interpreting the term “national emergency” as used in the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”).

This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a high-level overview of emergency powers under the NEA and discusses why Congress is currently ill-equipped to respond to abuses of national emergency declarations. Part II turns to three distinct questions that courts can ask when reviewing an executive declaration of national emergency.17 17.This analytical framework mirrors that proposed in an amicus brief filed in Biden v. Nebraska. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Protect Democracy Project in Support of Respondents, Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) (Nos. 22-506 & 22-535).Show MoreFirst, courts can ask whether an emergency existed at the time of invocation or whether it persisted at the time of the use of executive power. Second, courts can ask whether the means the executive used to respond to an emergency violate any constitutional restrictions, notably in the separation of powers or First Amendment realms. Finally, courts can ask whether the executive invoked emergency powers as a pretext to deal with an unrelated social problem. This Note argues that while courts have recently been more comfortable with and willing to ask the second question, they have shied away from asking the first and third questions—often invoking the political question doctrine to avoid them.18 18.See infra Part II.Show MoreWith this taxonomy in mind, Part III then advances the argument that being able to meaningfully engage with the factual existence of an emergency will be an important tool if Congress remains unable to rein in an active executive who invokes emergency powers for partisan reasons.

  1.  Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 74 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). ↑
  2.  Aaron Zitner, U.S. Grapples with Political Gridlock as Crises Mount, Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 2023, 8:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-grapples-with-political-gridlock-as-crises-mount-be179aca. ↑
  3.  Jennifer K. Elsea, Jay B. Sykes, Joanna R. Lampe, Kevin M. Lewis & Bryan L. Adkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/p‌df/R/R46379 [https://perma.cc/V4KS-CMPV]. ↑
  4.  Mark P. Nevitt, Is Climate Change a National Emergency?, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev
    . 591, 616 (2021).

    ↑

  5.  Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). ↑
  6.  Tarini Parti, Biden Is Pressed to Declare Emergencies After Climate, Abortion Setbacks, Wall St. J. (July 20, 2022, 4:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-faces-pressure-to-d‌eclare-emergencies-after-climate-abortion-setbacks-11658318400; Myah Ward, Biden Faces Calls to Declare Climate Emergency as He Heads to Maui, Politico (Aug. 20, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/20/biden-climate-emergency-hawaii-00111973 [https://perma.cc/P8ZH-6BTS]. ↑
  7.  143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023). ↑
  8.  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 Va. L. Rev.

    1361, 1391 (2013) (describing how Article II does not confer emergency authority, but instead creates an “impotent” executive who relies on statutory delegations of power). ↑

  9.  See Examining Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 3 (2022) [hereinafter Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director, Liberty and National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice) (stating that “since the founding of the nation, Congress has been the primary source of the president’s emergency powers”). ↑
  10.  See generally Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act, Brennan Ctr. for Just., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/declared-nat‌ional-emergencies-under-national-emergencies-act [https://perma.cc/Q32Y-J2VD] (last updated Mar. 14, 2025) (listing declared emergencies of which the vast majority have been in the international or foreign affairs context). ↑
  11.  Id. ↑
  12.  See Amy L. Stein, Domestic Emergency Pretexts, 98 Ind. L.J. 479, 479 (2023) (discussing the use of “questionable domestic emergencies to achieve unrelated policy goals”). ↑
  13.  Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (involving parties’ dispute over what constitutes war and who gets to decide the existence of it). ↑
  14.  J. Clinton, J. Cohen, J. Lapinski & M. Trussler, Partisan Pandemic: How Partisanship and Public Health Concerns Affect Individuals’ Social Mobility During COVID-19, Sci. Advances,

    Jan. 6,

    2021

    , at 1, 1

    .

    ↑

  15.  See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Judicial Review in Times of Emergency: From the Founding Through the COVID-19 Pandemic, 109 Va. L. Rev.
    489 (2023) (

    tracing the philosophy of judicial review over time with a helpful discussion on the recent pandemic years)

    .

    ↑

  16.  Congress has introduced bipartisan legislation to change the National Emergency Act to give it more teeth in limiting emergency declarations, but nothing has passed both houses to date. See, e.g., Limiting Emergency Powers Act of 2023, H.R. 121, 118th Cong.; ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. (2019). A Senate hearing in May 2024 saw experts testify on the need for changes to the current statutory scheme. Restoring Congressional Oversight Over Emergency Powers: Exploring Options to Reform the National Emergencies Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 118th Cong. (2024) [hereinafter Restoring Congressional Oversight Hearing]. Academic scholarship also centers on changes to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., GianCarlo Canaparo & Paul J. Larkin, Heritage Found
    .,

    The Constitution and Emergencies: Regulating Presidential Emergency Declarations 3 (

    2023);

    Samuel Weitzman, Back to Good: Restoring the National Emergencies Act, 54 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs.

    365, 405 (2021);

    Stein, supra note 12, at 515. ↑

  17.  This analytical framework mirrors that proposed in an amicus brief filed in Biden v. Nebraska. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Protect Democracy Project in Support of Respondents, Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) (Nos. 22-506 & 22-535). ↑

  18.  See infra Part II. ↑

Constraining Legislative Expulsion

Every U.S. legislature, from the U.S. Congress to all fifty state legislatures, possesses the constitutional power to expel a member, a power that originated in English Parliament. As recently illustrated by the expulsions of two Tennessee legislators, however, this power may conflict with other constitutional rights of legislators and their constituents. This Note explores the tension between the constitutional power to expel and the constitutional rights of legislators and their constituents. In doing this, the Note responds to gaps in legal scholarship surrounding expulsion’s historical, legal, and theoretical dimensions. Most significantly, scholars have not comprehensively examined state constitutional powers of expulsion. While historical practice and precedent suggest that some bases for expulsion are unconstitutional, courts—whether ruling on the merits or eschewing political questions—have upheld legislative expulsions in almost every case. The Note argues that this dynamic is evidence of a right-remedy gap that threatens the vindication of constitutional rights. Given significant barriers to judicial relief, this Note argues that legislatures must reform their powers of expulsion—voluntarily or in response to citizen advocacy. Additionally, litigants should test a narrow avenue left open by recent Supreme Court precedent. With one-party supermajorities near their most numerous in modern American history, making expulsion more feasible, reform is urgently needed to prevent irremediable constitutional violations and to uphold the integrity of the democratic process.

Introduction

On the morning of March 27, 2023, a shooter killed three nine-year-old children and three staff members at the Covenant School in Nashville, Tennessee.1 1.Cries for Covenant: Deadly Mass Shooting Hits Nashville, The Tennessean (May 18, 2023, 11:59 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/in-depth/news/2023/05/18/cries-for-covenan‌t‌-dea‌d‌ly-mass-shooting-hits-nashville/70204202007/ [https://perma.cc/ULP3-H9B8].Show More In the months following, parents of the victims,2 2.Emily Cochrane, The Covenant Parents Aren’t Going to Keep Quiet on Guns, N.Y. Times (Dec. 26, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/us/politics/nashville-school-shooting-covenant-parents.html.Show More thousands of Nashville-area students,3 3.Marta W. Aldrich, Nashville Students Rally for Tougher Gun Laws, As Governor Seeks Armed Guards for Every School, Chalkbeat (Apr. 3, 2023, 7:12 PM), https://www.chalkbeat.‌org/tennessee/2023/4/3/23668031/nashville-school-shooting-walkout-march-lives-capitol-pr‌otest-gun-safety/ [https://perma.cc/LPL3-2JJM].Show More and a sizeable, bipartisan coalition of Tennesseans4 4.Vanderbilt Poll: State Legislature’s Approval Remains Low; Bipartisan Support for Abortion Exceptions, Gun Safety Laws; More, Vanderbilt Univ. (Dec. 14, 2023, 6:00 AM), https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2023/12/14/vanderbilt-poll-tennessee-december-2023/ [https://pe‌rma.cc‌/5Y9U-N4S2].Show More expressed support for various gun reforms intended to prevent another attack. After a special session devoted to such reforms, all major legislative proposals failed in Tennessee’s General Assembly, with only modest bills aimed at mental health and security resources passing.5 5.Emily Cochrane, Tennessee Session Ends in Chaos, With No Action on Gun Control, N.Y. Times (Aug. 29, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/29/us/politics/tennessee-special-s‌ession-gun-control.html.Show More Amidst this painfully familiar pattern of American political history, something unprecedented occurred. Days after the shooting, Tennessee Representatives Gloria Johnson, Justin Jones, and Justin Pearson gathered in the heart of the Tennessee House chamber from 10:49 AM until 11:42 AM and “shouted, pounded on the podium, led chants with citizens in the gallery, and generally engaged in disorderly and disruptive conduct, including refusing to leave the well, sitting on the podium, and utilizing a sign displaying a political message” to advocate for gun law reforms.6 6.H.R. 65, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2023); see also Melissa Alonso & Dakin Andone, Tennessee House Republicans Take Steps to Remove Democratic Lawmakers After They Joined Gun Control Protest, CNN (Apr. 4, 2023, 10:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com‌/2023/04/04/us/tennessee-reps-expulsion-gun-control/index.html [https://perma.cc/WNQ5-S‌GRW] (noting Representative Sam McKenzie’s view that this “political retribution is unconstitutional”).Show More Representatives Jones and Pearson also “used a bullhorn to amplify their protestations.”7 7.Tenn. H.R. 65.Show More For these acts, House Republicans filed three nearly identical resolutions to remove the Democratic lawmakers from office.8 8.Id.; H.R. 64, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2023); H.R. 63, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2023); Alonso & Andone, supra note 6. Only the representatives’ names, pronouns, legislative districts, and home counties differ among the three resolutions, along with the resolutions’ sponsors.Show More

After six hours of proceedings on the House floor, the legislature voted to expel Representatives Jones (72-25) and Pearson (69-26), both of whom are Black men under the age of thirty, while voting not to expel Representative Johnson (65-30), who is a white woman in her sixties.9 9.Adam Friedman, ‘An Abomination:’ TN House Expels Two Dems Over Gun Protest, Despite Removal Looking Temporary, Tenn. Lookout (Apr. 7, 2023, 8:56 AM), https://tennes‌seelookout.com/2023/04/07/an-abomination-tn-house-expels-two-dems-over-gun-protest-de‌spite-removal-looking-temporary/ [https://perma.cc/GUW9-TD3K]; Tenn. Gen. Assemb., HR 0065, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HR0065&g‌a‌=‌113 [https://perma.cc/7E27-GUMJ] (last visited Jan. 7, 2025) (Rep. Jones); Tenn. Gen. Assemb., HR 0063, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HR0‌063&GA=113 [https://perma.cc/RC4C-AEY4] (last visited Jan. 7, 2025) (Rep. Pearson); Tenn. Gen. Assemb., HR 0064, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?B‌ill‌Nu‌mber=HR0064&ga=112 [https://perma.cc/A5CW-CR2V] (last visited Jan. 7, 2025) (Rep. Johnson); Representative Justin J. Pearson, Tenn. Gen. Assemb., https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/‌a‌p‌p‌s/legislatorinfo/member.aspx?district=h86 [https://perma.cc/3QKK-6A8U] (last visited Oct. 11, 2024).Show More Apart from recognizing Representatives Jones’s and Pearson’s use of a bullhorn, the expulsion resolutions did not distinguish among the legislators’ alleged conduct.10 10.Tenn. H.R. 65; Tenn. H.R. 64; Tenn. H.R. 63.Show More During his expulsion hearing, Representative Pearson stated: “I take full accountability and responsibility for my actions . . . [but] there was in no world or way that I thought that would lead to us being expelled from this House that we got elected into by our constituents. . . . That is antidemocratic.”11 11.Tennessee House of Representatives, House Floor Session 21st Legislative Day—April 6, 2023, YouTube (Apr. 6, 2023) (statement of Rep. Pearson), at 9:21:00–9:21:36, https://www.youtube.com/live/ZZK–_x3gIU?t=3089‌4s [https://perma.cc/KMJ2-4249].Show More President Joe Biden called Pearson’s expulsion “shocking” and “undemocratic.”12 12.Chris Megerian, Aamer Madhani & Josh Boak, Biden Thanks ‘Tennessee Three’ for ‘Standing Up,’ Associated Press (Apr. 24, 2023, 6:07 PM), https://apnews.com/article/biden-tennessee-three-lawmakers-pearson-jones-johnson-bb74e4bdb9628d53d64d13acf004248c; cf.Editorial, The Tennessee Bullhorn Isn’t Democracy, Wall St. J. (Apr. 19, 2023, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tennessee-justin-jones-justin-pearson-bullhorn‌-biden-white-house-chuck-schumer-gun-control-b9a4d4f5 (arguing that the conduct of the Tennessee Three was sufficiently disruptive to justify expulsion).Show More

When asked why he voted to expel Representatives Pearson and Jones but flipped his vote in favor of Representative Johnson, one House Republican explained:

I’m an attorney, and Ms. Johnson was the only representative that showed up with legal counsel. And their legal counsel made an opening statement, pointing out deficiencies in the resolution that had been filed that we were voting on. And once those deficiencies were pointed out, in my view as an attorney, then it was incumbent upon the debate to present evidence to correct that and to establish clearly what it was that Ms. Johnson did to rise to the level of expulsion. I just don’t think that we established that during the debate.13 13.Erika Ryan, Patrick Jarenwattananon & Mary Louise Kelly, Tennessee GOP Rep. Barrett on Why He Voted to Expel Two Colleagues But Not the Third, NPR (Apr. 7, 2023, 5:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2023/04/07/1168728769/tennessee-gop-rep-barrett-on-why-he-voted-to-expel-two-colleagues-but-not-the-th [https://perma.cc/K7R9-VTZY]; see also Tenn. H.R. 64 (proposed resolution expelling Rep. Johnson).Show More

In a leaked tape recording of the House Republicans’ caucus meeting after the expulsion votes, Representative Jason Zachary said: “I don’t want to hear why there wasn’t preponderance of the evidence as an attorney—I need to know why you flipped your vote at the last minute.”14 14.Cheyanne M. Daniels, Leaked Audio Shows Tennessee GOP Infighting Over Expulsion of Black Lawmakers, The Hill (Apr. 14, 2023, 3:59 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/3951196-leaked-audio-shows-tennessee-gop-infighting-over-expulsion-of-black-law‌makers/.Show More

Following their expulsions, Representatives Pearson and Jones were reinstated to their seats within a week.15 15.Bill Chappell & Katie Riordan, Both Black Tennessee Lawmakers Have Been Reinstated After Being Expelled by GOP, NPR(Apr. 12, 2023, 2:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/202‌3/0‌4‌/‌12/1169444850/justin-pea‌rson-vote-memphis-tennessee-house [https://perma.cc/BAZ4-BG‌4M].Show More Despite their prompt returns, the expulsions temporarily nullified roughly 10,000 combined votes cast for the representatives, were projected to incur taxpayer expenses exceeding $475,000, and disrupted Representatives Pearson’s and Jones’s committee assignments.16 16.Sam Stockard, Special Elections for Three Seats Could Hit $570,000, Tenn. Lookout (Apr. 27, 2023, 10:35 AM), https://tennesseelookout.com/2023/04/27/special-elections-for-three-seats-could-hit-570000/ [https://perma.cc/SFL5-6ANK]; see infra note 186 (indicating that Representatives Jones and Pearson earned 9,831 combined votes); see also Nadine Yousif, Brandon Drenon & Melisa Goh, Lawmakers Expelled: What to Know About the ‘Tennessee Three,’ BBC (Apr. 7, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65182502 [https://‌perma.‌cc/WZ35-PAQL].Show More Only Representative Jones raised constitutional challenges to the General Assembly’s actions, though his suit remains in a preliminary posture as of early 2025.17 17.Jones v. Sexton, No. 23-cv-01033, 2024 WL 4631658, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2024).Show More

The U.S. Constitution18 18.U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.Show More and every state constitution19 19.Although Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota lack constitutional expulsion provisions, courts have interpreted other provisions to impliedly confer the power to expel. See Hiss v. Bartlett, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 468 (1855); Horton v. McLaughlin, 821 A.2d 947 (N.H. 2003); Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010); Alexander v. Pharr, 103 S.E. 8 (N.C. 1920); Gray v. Gienapp, 2007 SD 12, 727 N.W.2d 808; see also infra Appendix: State Constitutional Expulsion Provisions.Show More empower legislatures to remove duly elected members, temporarily depriving constituents of their democratic representation. American legislatures have rarely exercised this power.20 20.Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45078, Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice 4, 9 (2023).Show More When they have, legislators have been puzzled by expulsion’s obscurity and its inherent constitutional tensions.21 21.See, e.g., Investigation of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy: Hearings on S.R. 187 Before the Subcomm. on Privileges & Elections of the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 82d Cong. 62 (1952) [hereinafter McCarthy Hearing] (statement of Sen. William Benton) (explaining that the Senate “is not an investigating body” and identifying the need for “procedure, in the form of a committee” to pursue expulsion charges); see also, e.g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 969–70 (1862) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) (debating the procedure and scope of expulsion with other Senators).Show More Even against such sparse precedent, the Tennessee legislature’s 2023 expulsion votes raised new constitutional questions that were previously relegated to hypotheticals22 22.Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 695 F. Supp. 2d 80, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing “hypothetical worst-case scenarios of the misuse of the expulsion power to discriminate against racial, ethnic, and political minorities”), aff’d, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Expulsion of House Member for Conduct Pre-Dating Election, Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 19-20, at 5 (2019) (observing that “the equal protection guarantees of Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions would prevent racially discriminatory expulsion decisions”).Show More and dicta,23 23.Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1263–64 (2022) (reserving the question of a First Amendment retaliation claim in the context of legislative expulsion).Show More provoking a national reckoning with an unfamiliar legislative power. That reckoning continued months later with the historic removal of Congressman George Santos for his financial misdeeds.24 24.Michael Gold & Grace Ashford, George Santos Is Kicked Out of Congress in a Historic Vote, N.Y. Times (Dec. 1, 2023), http://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/nyregion/santos-expu‌lsion-vote-congress.html; H.R. Res. 878, 118th Cong., 169 Cong. Rec. H6062–63 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2023) (enacted).Show More Urgent questions that implicate democratic principles of representation, due process, and free expression remain unresolved. What constitutional rules govern expulsion proceedings? Are there any constraints on a legislature’s expulsion power when the grounds for expulsion implicate constitutional rights?

Despite the urgency of these foundational questions, expulsion scholarship has remained frozen in time. As recently as 2022, the Supreme Court cited as authoritative a 1978 article on expulsion’s early history—a study authored nearly fifty years ago without the benefit of digital archival research.25 25.See Dorian Bowman & Judith Farris Bowman, Article I, Section 5: Congress’ Power to Expel—An Exercise in Self-Restraint, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. 1071 (1978); Wilson, 142 S. Ct. at 1259 (citing Bowman & Bowman, supra); Garvey, supra note 20, at 3 n.22.Show More Recent federal cases have explored the boundaries of expulsion law, yet they have not been scrutinized by the Congressional Research Service—a key resource for legislators.26 26.See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 20, at 5–7 (discussing predominately early to mid-twentieth century case law).Show More Scholars have also examined the federal expulsion power in isolation, despite the fact that most expulsions arise under state constitutions rather than under the U.S. Constitution.27 27.See, e.g., id.;Robyn Sanders & Andrew Garber, The Unconstitutional Expulsion of Legislators, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (May 25, 2023), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/‌research-reports/unconstitutional-expulsion-legislators [https://perma.cc/6ZX4-9RWQ].Show More Scholarship has yet to comprehensively examine state expulsion powers even while the Supreme Court has emphasized the centrality of state law in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization28 28.142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242, 2256 (2022).Show More and Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson.29 29.142 S. Ct. 522, 537–38 (2021).Show More In short, legal scholarship offered precious little in response to the Tennessee Three and the incident’s constitutional questions.

This Note offers a modern synthesis of expulsion’s historical, legal, and theoretical dimensions. Part I retraces the historical roots of expulsion from English Parliament through the Founding Era, uncovering previously unexamined perspectives on expulsion from James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Abigail Adams.30 30.The author is unaware of any expulsion scholarship to date that examines James Madison’s reflections on French expulsion, Alexander Hamilton’s proposal to abolish expulsion, Abigail Adams’s reflections on partisan expulsion, or various Anti-Federalist concerns about the Constitution’s expulsion power. See infra notes 58, 61, 65, 66, 67, 87 and accompanying text.Show More With the advent of digital archival tools, these Founding Era sources enrich our understanding and recontextualize Dorian and Judith F. Bowman’s 1978 account. This Part also provides a comprehensive analysis of state expulsion provisions, filling a gap in the literature and highlighting the importance of state-level practices where most expulsions occur.31 31.See infra notes 70, 72–74 and accompanying text; Appendix: State Constitutional Expulsion Provisions.Show More

Part II surveys judicial review of expulsions, including recent federal case law examining constitutional challenges to expulsion (and similar procedures).32 32.Most notably, this includes Houston Community College System v. Wilson,142 S. Ct. 1253 (2022). The author is unaware of expulsion scholarship evaluating other recent federal opinions such as Hernandez v. Oregon Legislature, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (D. Or. 2021), or Shooter v. Arizona, 4 F.4th 955 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 898 (2022).Show More This Part demonstrates that judicial review is ill-equipped to address the sort of constitutional issues raised by the Tennessee Three, exposing a gap between constitutional rights and judicial remedies for their violation that requires further scholarly attention.33 33.See infra note 178 and accompanying text.Show More Part III proposes specific reforms to prevent antidemocratic abuses of the expulsion power, including legislative amendments and claims-making in the First Amendment retaliation context, which appears ripe for challenge following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Houston Community College System v. Wilson.34 34.142 S. Ct. 1253.Show More

While this Note does not purport to definitively resolve all the complex constitutional questions surrounding expulsion, it takes a critical step forward by offering historical insights, exposing current legal deficiencies, and charting a path for future research and reform efforts. Taken as a whole, this Note calls attention to an understudied topic of foundational importance to American democracy. Expulsion matters because it has the potential to censor the political process, alter legislative outcomes, and deprive citizens of democratic representation. Although the mine-run of expulsions involving criminal convictions may not appear facially unconstitutional, the Tennessee Three incident suggests that when constitutional issues do emerge in the expulsion context, they raise significant right-remedy gaps.35 35.See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87 (1999) (discussing this term and the shortfall between the goals of rights and the realities of implemented remedies).Show More Without additional guardrails to uphold the constitutional rights of legislators and their constituents, the expulsion power may be exploited for antidemocratic purposes. That risk of exploitation appears even greater today, when one-party supermajorities are near their most numerous in modern American history, making expulsion more feasible.36 36.See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.Show More

  1.  Cries for Covenant: Deadly Mass Shooting Hits Nashville, The Tennessean (May 18, 2023, 11:59 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/in-depth/news/2023/05/18/cries-for-covenan‌t‌-dea‌d‌ly-mass-shooting-hits-nashville/70204202007/ [https://perma.cc/ULP3-H9B8]. ↑
  2.  Emily Cochrane, The Covenant Parents Aren’t Going to Keep Quiet on Guns, N.Y. Times (Dec. 26, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/us/politics/nashville-school-shooting-covenant-parents.html. ↑
  3.  Marta W. Aldrich, Nashville Students Rally for Tougher Gun Laws, As Governor Seeks Armed Guards for Every School, Chalkbeat (Apr. 3, 2023, 7:12 PM), https://www.chalkbeat.‌org/tennessee/2023/4/3/23668031/nashville-school-shooting-walkout-march-lives-capitol-pr‌otest-gun-safety/ [https://perma.cc/LPL3-2JJM]. ↑
  4.  Vanderbilt Poll: State Legislature’s Approval Remains Low; Bipartisan Support for Abortion Exceptions, Gun Safety Laws; More, Vanderbilt Univ. (Dec. 14, 2023, 6:00 AM), https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2023/12/14/vanderbilt-poll-tennessee-december-2023/ [https://pe‌rma.cc‌/5Y9U-N4S2]. ↑
  5.  Emily Cochrane, Tennessee Session Ends in Chaos, With No Action on Gun Control, N.Y. Times (Aug. 29, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/29/us/politics/tennessee-special-s‌ession-gun-control.html. ↑
  6.  H.R. 65, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2023); see also Melissa Alonso & Dakin Andone, Tennessee House Republicans Take Steps to Remove Democratic Lawmakers After They Joined Gun Control Protest, CNN (Apr. 4, 2023, 10:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com‌/2023/04/04/us/tennessee-reps-expulsion-gun-control/index.html [https://perma.cc/WNQ5-S‌GRW] (noting Representative Sam McKenzie’s view that this “political retribution is unconstitutional”). ↑
  7.  Tenn. H.R. 65. ↑
  8.  Id.; H.R. 64, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2023); H.R. 63, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2023); Alonso & Andone, supra note 6. Only the representatives’ names, pronouns, legislative districts, and home counties differ among the three resolutions, along with the resolutions’ sponsors. ↑
  9.  Adam Friedman, ‘An Abomination:’ TN House Expels Two Dems Over Gun Protest, Despite Removal Looking Temporary, Tenn. Lookout (Apr. 7, 2023, 8:56 AM), https://tennes‌seelookout.com/2023/04/07/an-abomination-tn-house-expels-two-dems-over-gun-protest-de‌spite-removal-looking-temporary/ [https://perma.cc/GUW9-TD3K]; Tenn. Gen. Assemb., HR 0065, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HR0065&g‌a‌=‌113 [https://perma.cc/7E27-GUMJ] (last visited Jan. 7, 2025) (Rep. Jones); Tenn. Gen. Assemb., HR 0063, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HR0‌063&GA=113 [https://perma.cc/RC4C-AEY4] (last visited Jan. 7, 2025) (Rep. Pearson); Tenn. Gen. Assemb., HR 0064, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?B‌ill‌Nu‌mber=HR0064&ga=112 [https://perma.cc/A5CW-CR2V] (last visited Jan. 7, 2025) (Rep. Johnson); Representative Justin J. Pearson, Tenn. Gen. Assemb., https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/‌a‌p‌p‌s/legislatorinfo/member.aspx?district=h86 [https://perma.cc/3QKK-6A8U] (last visited Oct. 11, 2024). ↑
  10.  Tenn. H.R. 65; Tenn. H.R. 64; Tenn. H.R. 63. ↑
  11.  Tennessee House of Representatives, House Floor Session 21st Legislative Day—April 6, 2023, YouTube (Apr. 6, 2023) (statement of Rep. Pearson), at 9:21:00–9:21:36, https://www.youtube.com/live/ZZK–_x3gIU?t=3089‌4s [https://perma.cc/KMJ2-4249]. ↑
  12.  Chris Megerian, Aamer Madhani & Josh Boak, Biden Thanks ‘Tennessee Three’ for ‘Standing Up,’ Associated Press (Apr. 24, 2023, 6:07 PM), https://apnews.com/article/biden-tennessee-three-lawmakers-pearson-jones-johnson-bb74e4bdb9628d53d64d13acf004248c; cf. Editorial, The Tennessee Bullhorn Isn’t Democracy, Wall St. J. (Apr. 19, 2023, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tennessee-justin-jones-justin-pearson-bullhorn‌-biden-white-house-chuck-schumer-gun-control-b9a4d4f5 (arguing that the conduct of the Tennessee Three was sufficiently disruptive to justify expulsion). ↑
  13.  Erika Ryan, Patrick Jarenwattananon & Mary Louise Kelly, Tennessee GOP Rep. Barrett on Why He Voted to Expel Two Colleagues But Not the Third, NPR (Apr. 7, 2023, 5:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2023/04/07/1168728769/tennessee-gop-rep-barrett-on-why-he-voted-to-expel-two-colleagues-but-not-the-th [https://perma.cc/K7R9-VTZY]; see also Tenn. H.R. 64 (proposed resolution expelling Rep. Johnson). ↑
  14.  Cheyanne M. Daniels, Leaked Audio Shows Tennessee GOP Infighting Over Expulsion of Black Lawmakers, The Hill (Apr. 14, 2023, 3:59 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/3951196-leaked-audio-shows-tennessee-gop-infighting-over-expulsion-of-black-law‌makers/. ↑
  15.  Bill Chappell & Katie Riordan, Both Black Tennessee Lawmakers Have Been Reinstated After Being Expelled by GOP,
    NPR

    (Apr. 12, 2023, 2:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/202‌3/0‌4‌/‌12/1169444850/justin-pea‌rson-vote-memphis-tennessee-house [https://perma.cc/BAZ4-BG‌4M]. ↑

  16.  Sam Stockard, Special Elections for Three Seats Could Hit $570,000, Tenn. Lookout (Apr. 27, 2023, 10:35 AM), https://tennesseelookout.com/2023/04/27/special-elections-for-three-seats-could-hit-570000/ [https://perma.cc/SFL5-6ANK]; see infra note 186 (indicating that Representatives Jones and Pearson earned 9,831 combined votes); see also Nadine Yousif, Brandon Drenon & Melisa Goh, Lawmakers Expelled: What to Know About the ‘Tennessee Three,’ BBC (Apr. 7, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65182502 [https://‌perma.‌cc/WZ35-PAQL]. ↑
  17.  Jones v. Sexton, No. 23-cv-01033, 2024 WL 4631658, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2024). ↑
  18.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. ↑
  19.  Although Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota lack constitutional expulsion provisions, courts have interpreted other provisions to impliedly confer the power to expel. See Hiss v. Bartlett, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 468 (1855); Horton v. McLaughlin, 821 A.2d 947 (N.H. 2003); Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010); Alexander v. Pharr, 103 S.E. 8 (N.C. 1920); Gray v. Gienapp, 2007 SD 12, 727 N.W.2d 808; see also infra Appendix: State Constitutional Expulsion Provisions. ↑
  20.  Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
    R45078

    , Expulsion of Members of Congress: Legal Authority and Historical Practice

    4, 9

    (2023). ↑

  21.  See, e.g., Investigation of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy: Hearings on S.R. 187 Before the Subcomm. on Privileges & Elections of the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 82d Cong. 62 (1952) [hereinafter McCarthy Hearing] (statement of Sen. William Benton) (explaining that the Senate “is not an investigating body” and identifying the need for “procedure, in the form of a committee” to pursue expulsion charges); see also, e.g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 969–70 (1862) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) (debating the procedure and scope of expulsion with other Senators). ↑
  22.  Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 695 F. Supp. 2d 80, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing “hypothetical worst-case scenarios of the misuse of the expulsion power to discriminate against racial, ethnic, and political minorities”), aff’d, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Expulsion of House Member for Conduct Pre-Dating Election, Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 19-20, at 5 (2019) (observing that “the equal protection guarantees of Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions would prevent racially discriminatory expulsion decisions”). ↑
  23.  Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1263–64 (2022) (reserving the question of a First Amendment retaliation claim in the context of legislative expulsion). ↑
  24.  Michael Gold & Grace Ashford, George Santos Is Kicked Out of Congress in a Historic Vote, N.Y. Times (Dec. 1, 2023), http://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/nyregion/santos-expu‌lsion-vote-congress.html; H.R. Res. 878, 118th Cong., 169 Cong. Rec. H6062–63 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2023) (enacted). ↑
  25.  See Dorian Bowman & Judith Farris Bowman, Article I, Section 5: Congress’ Power to Expel—An Exercise in Self-Restraint, 29 Syracuse L. Rev
    .

    1071 (1978); Wilson, 142 S. Ct. at 1259 (citing Bowman & Bowman, supra); Garvey, supra note 20, at 3 n.22. ↑

  26.  See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 20, at 5–7 (discussing predominately early to mid-twentieth century case law). ↑
  27.  See, e.g., id.; Robyn Sanders & Andrew Garber, The Unconstitutional Expulsion of Legislators, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (May 25, 2023), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/‌research-reports/unconstitutional-expulsion-legislators [https://perma.cc/6ZX4-9RWQ]. ↑
  28.  142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242, 2256 (2022). ↑
  29.  142 S. Ct. 522, 537–38 (2021). ↑
  30.  The author is unaware of any expulsion scholarship to date that examines James Madison’s reflections on French expulsion, Alexander Hamilton’s proposal to abolish expulsion, Abigail Adams’s reflections on partisan expulsion, or various Anti-Federalist concerns about the Constitution’s expulsion power. See infra notes 58, 61, 65, 66, 67, 87 and accompanying text. ↑
  31.  See infra notes 70, 72–74 and accompanying text; Appendix: State Constitutional Expulsion Provisions. ↑
  32.  Most notably, this includes Houston Community College System v. Wilson, 142 S. Ct. 1253 (2022). The author is unaware of expulsion scholarship evaluating other recent federal opinions such as Hernandez v. Oregon Legislature, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (D. Or. 2021), or Shooter v. Arizona, 4 F.4th 955 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 898 (2022). ↑
  33.  See infra note 178 and accompanying text. ↑
  34.  142 S. Ct. 1253. ↑
  35.  See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87 (1999) (discussing this term and the shortfall between the goals of rights and the realities of implemented remedies). ↑

  36.  See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. ↑

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