The President Told Me To: The Public Authority Defense in the Trump Era

After hundreds were charged in connection with the events of January 6, 2021, several defendants argued they were only doing what President Trump told them to. More specifically, they raised the public authority defense as articulated in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s Watergate-era case United States v. Barker. The defense involves a claim that an individual was authorized to engage in otherwise unlawful activity by a government official. But the D.C. Circuit was split on whether the government official in question must have the authority to make such an authorization, or if the defendant’s belief in the official’s apparent authority would suffice. The D.C. Circuit never clarified the standard, and now that President Trump has pardoned the January 6 defendants, the court is once again unable to do so. Nevertheless, the January 6 case is a prime test to determine the proper standard, and this is the prime time to do so, given the possibility of future prosecutions of current Trump Administration associates who may want to claim reliance on President Trump’s direction.

This Note makes four contributions: First, it describes the public authority defense case law, beginning with the actual-versus-apparent authority debate in Barker and its progeny. Second, this Note argues that the actual authority standard is correct based on existing law and policy. Third, it applies the actual and apparent authority standards to the January 6 case, illustrating how only the actual authority standard provides a workable rule. This conclusion makes clear that the public authority defense must fail for the January 6 defendants, but not for the reason courts thought. Fourth, this Note elucidates additional implications for the public authority defense and for those President Trump directs to take unlawful action during his second term. Ultimately, individuals cannot rely on a president’s orders to escape criminal culpability.

Introduction

President Trump’s approach to his second administration is best captured in his own tweet: “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.”1.Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Feb. 15, 2025, 1:32 PM), https://x.com/realDo‌naldTrump/status/1890831570535055759 [https://perma.cc/Z9L5-VV6V].Show More Newly emboldened in his second term by broad criminal immunity,2.See Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2327 (2024). The president is also immune from civil liability for official actions taken while in office. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).Show More President Trump has made clear with his words that he believes he is above the law and will act accordingly. It is less clear, however, what happens to those the President instructs to undertake unlawful action at his behest.3.The Trump opinion only addressed the president, and it relied on the president’s unique position to hold that he is entitled to immunity. See Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. at 2327, 2330–31. Furthermore, absolute presidential immunity from civil suit does not extend to the president’s aides, so it is unlikely that criminal immunity would. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808–13 (1982).Show More Perhaps these individuals have an affirmative defense: that the President told them to act unlawfully, and by virtue of his position as President of the United States, he legally authorized their otherwise criminal conduct. This defense is not merely hypothetical; it was raised by several of the individuals charged for their involvement with the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Although the January 6 rioters have all received pardons,4.Proclamation No. 10,887, 90 Fed. Reg. 8331 (Jan. 29, 2025).Show More revisiting their cases is a vital exercise to understand how such a defense works in anticipation of similar prosecutions that may arise from conduct engaged in during President Trump’s second term.

Throughout the various January 6 legal proceedings, several defendants pointed to President Trump’s incendiary language to argue that he ordered them to “stop the steal.”5.See infra notes 92–93.Show More During the presidential debate back in September 2020, in response to a question about whether he would condemn the far-right militia group the Proud Boys, President Trump told the group to “stand back and stand by.”6.Kathleen Ronayne & Michael Kunzelman, Trump to Far-Right Extremists: ‘Stand Back and Stand By,’ AP News (Sept. 30, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1d‌b0f [https://perma.cc/LR78-FCNV].Show More In the months leading up to January 6, he repeatedly espoused the claim that the presidential election was stolen from him.7.H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 195, 213–16 (2022).Show More On the evening before the attack, President Trump again emphasized the election had been stolen and that his supporters had to do something to stop President-elect Joe Biden from taking office.8.Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:05 PM), https://x.com/realDon‌aldTrump/status/1346578706437963777 [https://perma.cc/TK9L-UAP6].Show More Finally, in a speech at the rally on the National Mall on January 6, 2021, just before the attack on the Capitol began, he made the following remarks:

Our country has had enough. We will not take it anymore and that’s what this is all about. And to use a favorite term that all of you people really came up with: We will stop the steal. . . . And fraud breaks up everything, doesn’t it? When you catch somebody in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very different rules. . . . And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore. . . . So we’re going to . . . walk down Pennsylvania Avenue. . . . And we’re going to the Capitol, and we’re going to try and give . . . them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country. So let’s walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.9.Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot, AP News (Jan. 13, 2021, 9:11 PM) [hereinafter Trump January 6 Speech Transcript], https://apnews.com/article/electio‌n-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27. President Trump was impeached for inciting insurrection based in part on this language. H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong., at 3 (2021). Incitement does not necessarily equate to authorization, but the fact that this language was considered incitement by Congress nonetheless helps explain the effect President Trump’s words had on his supporters.Show More

Defendants used this language to argue that President Trump legally authorized their break-in of the Capitol Building. For example, defendant and Proud Boys member William Chrestman argued the following in a motion requesting release on bail:

Trump’s incitement and enablement of this insurrectionary riot weighs heavily against the weight of the evidence prong, because the mob was given explicit permission and encouragement by the former President to do what they did. The American head of state directed a specific action; the Due Process Clause says that those who obeyed him have a viable defense against criminal liability.10 10.Detention Memorandum at 11, United States v. Chrestman, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Kan. 2021) (No. 21-mj-08023) [hereinafter Detention Memorandum, Chrestman].Show More

Similarly, defendant Alexander Sheppard argued the following in his response to the government’s motion in limine:

Never before in our nation’s history has a sitting United States President, alongside other prominent elected officials, invited, encouraged, and condoned the public to engage in criminal conduct. . . . [T]he federal government now opposes Mr. Sheppard’s right to present a viable defense.11 11.Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Notice of Public Authority Defense at 3–4, United States v. Sheppard, No. 21-cr-00203, 2022 WL 17978837 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2022) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Opposition, Sheppard].Show More

This is the public authority defense. As described by the Department of Justice, such a defense is available where a government official authorized the defendant to engage in otherwise unlawful conduct.12 12.U.S. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Res. Manual § 2055, https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/crimi‌nal-resource-manual-2055-public-authority-defense [https://perma.cc/85ZN-SK34].Show More This defense has its origins in a Watergate-era case, United States v. Barker.13 13.546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).Show More There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial court should have allowed the defendants to raise the defense that they broke into a psychiatrist’s office to steal information about the person who leaked the Pentagon Papers only because a White House official told them to.14 14.Id. at 943, 954 (Wilkey, J.).Show More But the judges disagreed on how the defense should work. Judge Robert Merhige wrote that the defense required that the defendant receive authorization from someone who had the actual authority to make such an authorization.15 15.Id. at 955 (Merhige, J.).Show More Judge Malcolm Wilkey wrote separately that the defendant’s belief in the official’s apparent authority would suffice.16 16.Id. at 949 (Wilkey, J.).Show More That split has never been resolved.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decided that the public authority defense was unavailable in the January 6 cases.17 17.United States v. Chrestman, 525 F. Supp. 3d 14, 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2021).Show More While that conclusion is correct, the court’s reasoning is unpersuasive. The court did not clarify the correct standard for the defense and failed to wrestle with the factual comparisons to Barker.18 18.See infra Section I.C.Show More To foreshadow, the court concluded that the public authority defense fails because President Trump never gave an affirmative authorization; however, Barker and its progeny do not impose such a strict requirement.19 19.Infra Section I.C.Show More Engaging with the public authority defense case law reveals that the defense fails for the January 6 defendants not because President Trump never authorized their conduct, but because the President does not have the power to do so.

This Note is the first to give an in-depth treatment to the public authority defense case law, apply it to the January 6 defendants, and use this application to argue for the correct standard for the defense.20 20.The literature that addresses the public authority defense largely focuses instead on the related defense of entrapment by estoppel. See generally, e.g., John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1997). But see generally Matthew Babb & Lauren Emmerich, Official Misrepresentations of the Law and Fairness, 17 Crim. L. & Phil. 83 (2023) (addressing both the entrapment by estoppel and public authority defense). A law review article from 1978 by attorney Stephen Kristovich addressed the apparent-versus-actual authority debate in Barker in its immediate wake and argued for the actual authority standard, but it did not have the benefit of analyzing the decades of case law following Barker. See generally Stephen M. Kristovich, United States v. Barker: Misapplication of the Reliance on an Official Interpretation of the Law Defense, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1978). Professor Alfredo Garcia explored the applicability of the public authority defense to a military officer turned January 6 defendant and concluded the public authority defense could not justify the January 6 conduct, but he neither established the precise contours of the defense nor explained why the elements laid out in either Barker opinion were not met. See generally Alfredo Garcia, The Public Authority Defense, January 6, 2021, and the Following Orders Defense: A Juxtaposition, in Human Flourishing: The End of Law 955 (W. Michael Reisman & Roza Pati eds., 2023). This Note pulls all the cases and doctrines together to argue for one articulation of the public authority defense using the January 6 test case to do so.Show More Part I explores the public authority defense case law, beginning with the diverging opinions in United States v. Barker that created the debate between actual and apparent authority. Part I then looks to other courts of appeals to draw out more precise contours of the defense. Part I concludes by examining how the January 6 defendants used this defense and why it was rejected.

Part II argues that the actual authority standard is the proper test for the public authority defense based on the weight of circuit-level authority, comparisons to the related doctrines of entrapment by estoppel and superior orders in military law, and public policy concerns. Part III then uses the January 6 defendants as a test case to further establish that only the actual authority standard produces a workable rule and legitimate outcome. This conclusion makes clear that the D.C. District Court had the right answer that the public authority defense should fail for the January 6 defendants, but for the wrong reason.

Part IV addresses implications of the January 6 case. First, the case draws out an additional limit on the defense beyond the actual authority standard, such that it should not work where there is a broad, public authorization. Second, the case suggests that the public authority defense is limited to specific factual circumstances and that Barker itself might be an exception rather than the rule. In conclusion, it is clear that in the event of future prosecutions of Trump Administration officials and associates, a defense that President Trump authorized their conduct is likely to fail.

  1.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Feb. 15, 2025, 1:32 PM), https://x.com/realDo‌naldTrump/status/1890831570535055759 [https://perma.cc/Z9L5-VV6V].
  2.  See Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2327 (2024). The president is also immune from civil liability for official actions taken while in office. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
  3.  The Trump opinion only addressed the president, and it relied on the president’s unique position to hold that he is entitled to immunity. See Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. at 2327, 2330–31. Furthermore, absolute presidential immunity from civil suit does not extend to the president’s aides, so it is unlikely that criminal immunity would. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808–13 (1982).
  4.  Proclamation No. 10,887, 90 Fed. Reg. 8331 (Jan. 29, 2025).
  5.  See infra notes 92–93.
  6.  Kathleen Ronayne & Michael Kunzelman, Trump to Far-Right Extremists: ‘Stand Back and Stand By,’ AP News (Sept. 30, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1d‌b0f [https://perma.cc/LR78-FCNV].
  7.  H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 195, 213–16 (2022).
  8.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), X (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:05 PM), https://x.com/realDon‌aldTrump/status/1346578706437963777 [https://perma.cc/TK9L-UAP6].
  9.  Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot, AP News (Jan. 13, 2021, 9:11 PM) [hereinafter Trump January 6 Speech Transcript], https://apnews.com/article/electio‌n-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27. President Trump was impeached for inciting insurrection based in part on this language. H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong., at 3 (2021). Incitement does not necessarily equate to authorization, but the fact that this language was considered incitement by Congress nonetheless helps explain the effect President Trump’s words had on his supporters.
  10.  Detention Memorandum at 11, United States v. Chrestman, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Kan. 2021) (No. 21-mj-08023) [hereinafter Detention Memorandum, Chrestman].
  11.  Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Notice of Public Authority Defense at 3–4, United States v. Sheppard, No. 21-cr-00203, 2022 WL 17978837 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2022) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Opposition, Sheppard].
  12.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Res. Manual § 2055, https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/crimi‌nal-resource-manual-2055-public-authority-defense [https://perma.cc/85ZN-SK34].
  13.  546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
  14.  Id. at 943, 954 (Wilkey, J.).
  15.  Id. at 955 (Merhige, J.).
  16.  Id. at 949 (Wilkey, J.).
  17.  United States v. Chrestman, 525 F. Supp. 3d 14, 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2021).
  18.  See infra Section I.C.
  19.  Infra Section I.C.
  20.  The literature that addresses the public authority defense largely focuses instead on the related defense of entrapment by estoppel. See generally, e.g., John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1997). But see generally Matthew Babb & Lauren Emmerich, Official Misrepresentations of the Law and Fairness, 17 Crim. L. & Phil. 83 (2023) (addressing both the entrapment by estoppel and public authority defense). A law review article from 1978 by attorney Stephen Kristovich addressed the apparent-versus-actual authority debate in Barker in its immediate wake and argued for the actual authority standard, but it did not have the benefit of analyzing the decades of case law following Barker. See generally Stephen M. Kristovich, United States v. Barker: Misapplication of the Reliance on an Official Interpretation of the Law Defense, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1978). Professor Alfredo Garcia explored the applicability of the public authority defense to a military officer turned January 6 defendant and concluded the public authority defense could not justify the January 6 conduct, but he neither established the precise contours of the defense nor explained why the elements laid out in either Barker opinion were not met. See generally Alfredo Garcia, The Public Authority Defense, January 6, 2021, and the Following Orders Defense: A Juxtaposition, in Human Flourishing: The End of Law 955 (W. Michael Reisman & Roza Pati eds., 2023). This Note pulls all the cases and doctrines together to argue for one articulation of the public authority defense using the January 6 test case to do so.

The Association Game: Applying Noscitur a Sociis and Ejusdem Generis

The Supreme Court has applied noscitur a sociis, often called the associated words canon, in many notable decisions—including the recent Fischer v. United States. This canon has a longstanding history in American jurisprudence, but interpreters face challenges in finding a common theme among words or phrases and supporting it with surrounding context. And some scholars argue judges can use noscitur to bring in external policy preferences and ideological beliefs. This Note proposes several steps to guide the use of noscitur and, by extension, its cousin ejusdem generis, including the clear identification of an association and multiple common themes and principles for transparent contextual analysis. These steps can shield judges from the appearance of guesswork or ideologically influenced decisions and encourage more accurate results by providing a clear roadmap of these canons’ proper application. They may also bring interpreters of all methodologies closer to their interpretive goals.

Introduction

What do the words “bud,” “mate,” “pal,” and “partner” have in common? According to the New York Times Connections puzzle on August 15, 2024, the answer is . . . nothing.1.Wyna Liu, Connections No. 431, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/‌games/connections/2024-08-15.Show More Connections, a fairly recent addition to the Times’s growing portfolio of games, asks readers to sort sixteen different words or phrases into four categories of four.2.SeeJoyann Jeffrey,Connections Is the NYT’s New Wordle Alternative. Here’s How to Play, Today (Aug. 29, 2023, 10:30 AM), https://www.today.com/popculture/connections-nyt-puzzle-how-to-play-rcna102300. The New York Times crossword has entertained readers since the early 1940s. David W. Dunlap, Birth of the Crossword, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2022), https:/‌/www.nytimes.com/2022/12/17/insider/first-crossword.html. In recent years, the Times has added several different puzzles to go along with the crossword, including Connections. N.Y. Times Co., Games, https://www.nytco.com/products/games/ [https://perma.cc/85CZ-75KW] (last visited Mar. 28, 2025).Show More The puzzle relies on tricking readers with a number of different possible categories. For instance, in that August 15 scenario, “PARTNER” and “MATE” actually went with “COMPLEMENT” and “MATCH” under the common theme “OTHER HALF.”3.See Liu, supra note 1.Show More “BUD” connected with “NATTY,” “SIERRA,” and “STELLA” under “BEERS, FAMILIARLY.” “PAL” fell into “WORDS AFTER ‘PAY’” with “DIRT,” “CHECK,” and “PHONE.”4.Id. The final category was “BREADTH,” featuring “EXTENT,” “RANGE,” “REACH,” and “SCOPE.” Id.Show More

The Connections example shows that identifying a common theme among words can be a difficult process—even an impossible one—without context. Unless you knew the rules of the game, you probably would struggle to arrive at the desired common themes. And you would also find it difficult to explain your thought process to a friend without telling them that you need four categories of four.

Courts face a similar struggle in many cases of legal interpretation. They often must interpret a word or phrase as part of a list or grouping, and sometimes the meaning of that word or phrase is not immediately obvious. That is where the tool of noscitur a sociis comes in. Noscitur a sociis literally translates from Latin to “it is known by its associates.”5.Noscitur a sociis, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). This Note usually refers to the canon simply as noscitur and to its relative ejusdem generis as ejusdem.Show More In essence, associated words or phrases around the target word or phrase can influence its meaning.6.Id.Show More

Take the Connections puzzle for a simple example. If you found a list in a sentence that read “BUD, MATE, PAL, or PARTNER,” you would probably assume that “BUD” referred to “buddy.”7.See Bud, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bud [https://pe‌rma.cc/Q4DQ-CLS5] (last visited Mar. 28, 2025).Show More But if the list instead read “BUD, NATTY, SIERRA, or STELLA,” you would likely think that “BUD” referred to the short name for a Budweiser. In neither instance would you think that “BUD” meant the beginnings of a flower on a plant (an otherwise perfectly acceptable meaning).8.Id.Show More Thus, the context of associated words influences the meaning of the target word.

Legal interpreters often face much more difficult instances of association. And unlike the small stakes of winning the Connections game, judges’ decisions can affect people’s lives, freedom, and finances. Those affected by judicial opinions deserve frank, thorough, and well-reasoned decisions. So, if those decisions in part come down to the application of noscitur—to most, an unfamiliar Latin phrase—interpreters ought to explain exactly how they used it and exactly how it informed their conclusions.

In addition, to use noscitur effectively, a court must thoroughly investigate the definitions of key words and conduct enough legwork to arrive at an accurate conclusion. It might be tempting for an interpreter to look at a group of words or phrases and claim, without much explanation, to have found the common theme. The answer is often not so simple. And in some recent instances, courts have failed to explain their application of noscitur with sufficient clarity to prove that their purported common theme is the best interpretation.9.See, e.g., infra notes 161–67, 262–68 and accompanying text.Show More

Perhaps this stems from a lack of documentation about noscitur. Existing literature, aside from major casebooks, has not provided much help for interpreters seeking advice on applying the canon.10 10.See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation 117–20 (2d ed. 2024).Show More Apart from the well-known handbook Reading Law by Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan Garner, no article has yet centered on guidelines for courts using noscitur.11 11.See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). For instance, a search of the HeinOnline Law Journal Library on November 30, 2024, for “noscitur” in the title of pieces revealed only two articles, neither of which took this tack. See generally David A. Schlesinger, Chevron Unlatined: The Inapplicability of the Canon Noscitur a Sociis Under Prong One of the Chevron Framework, 5 N.Y.U. Env’t L.J. 638 (1996) (discussing why noscitur should not be used under prong one of the Chevron doctrine); Keegan P. Dennis, Noscitur a Sociis: We Will Never Be the Same, 47 S. Ill. U. L.J. 485 (2023) (reflecting on attending law school during the COVID-19 pandemic).Show More Even Reading Law spends a mere four pages on noscitur as compared to fifteen on a subset of the canon, ejusdem generis.12 12.Scalia & Garner, supra note 11, at 195–98, 199–213.Show More So the general principles underlying noscitur have not received the treatment they deserve.

This Note seeks to fill that gap by presenting a model for courts planning to employ the noscitur canon—and by extension its relative ejusdem—in legal interpretation.13 13.I often refer to these canons together as the “association canons.” Since ejusdem also relies on finding a common theme among words or phrases, this Note’s conclusions apply to both canons. But there are several unique aspects of ejusdem that require further discussion throughout.Show More Part I highlights the history and importance of the canon and its use in the notable recent case Fischer v. United States, which concerned a law applied to defendants in the January 6 riot.14 14.144 S. Ct. 2176, 2181–82 (2024).Show More Part II dives into concerns with noscitur’s application. Several notable scholars have argued that it may open the door to the influence of policy preferences or ideology.15 15.See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.Show More And the principle behind noscitur naturally implies several difficulties: the presence of multiple potential common traits, an undefined trigger, and a possible deviation from dictionary meaning. Part III then answers these concerns, building a model for applying noscitur. This model strongly encourages courts to explain the canon’s use in detail, including its relationship with the ordinary meaning of each word or phrase involved. It urges interpreters to be thorough, since a more detailed explanation wards off possible accusations of ideological influence. Part IV then revisits Fischer with this model in mind, examining the majority and dissenting opinions and their relationship with the model. It concludes that Fischer did not apply the association canons in the traditional way, and that the Court missed an opportunity to do so.

  1.  Wyna Liu, Connections No. 431, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/‌games/connections/2024-08-15.
  2.  See Joyann Jeffrey, Connections Is the NYT’s New Wordle Alternative. Here’s How to Play, Today (Aug. 29, 2023, 10:30 AM), https://www.today.com/popculture/connections-nyt-puzzle-how-to-play-rcna102300. The New York Times crossword has entertained readers since the early 1940s. David W. Dunlap, Birth of the Crossword,
    N.Y.

    Times (Dec. 17, 2022), https:/‌/www.nytimes.com/2022/12/17/insider/first-crossword.html. In recent years, the Times has added several different puzzles to go along with the crossword, including Connections.

    N.Y.

    Times Co

    .,

    Games, https://www.nytco.com/products/games/ [https://perma.cc/85CZ-75KW] (last visited Mar. 28, 2025).

  3.  See Liu, supra note 1.
  4.  Id. The final category was “BREADTH,” featuring “EXTENT,” “RANGE,” “REACH,” and “SCOPE.” Id.
  5.  Noscitur a sociis, Black’s Law Dictionary

    (12th ed. 2024). This Note usually refers to the canon simply as noscitur and to its relative ejusdem generis as ejusdem.

  6.  Id.
  7.  See Bud, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bud [https://pe‌rma.cc/Q4DQ-CLS5] (last visited Mar. 28, 2025).
  8.  Id.
  9.  See, e.g., infra notes 161–67, 262–68 and accompanying text.
  10.  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation 117–20 (2d ed. 2024).
  11.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). For instance, a search of the HeinOnline Law Journal Library on November 30, 2024, for “noscitur” in the title of pieces revealed only two articles, neither of which took this tack. See generally David A. Schlesinger, Chevron Unlatined: The Inapplicability of the Canon Noscitur a Sociis Under Prong One of the Chevron Framework, 5 N.Y.U. Env’t L.J
    .

    638 (1996) (discussing why noscitur should not be used under prong one of the Chevron doctrine); Keegan P. Dennis, Noscitur a Sociis: We Will Never Be the Same, 47 S. Ill. U. L.J

    .

    485 (2023) (reflecting on attending law school during the COVID-19 pandemic).

  12.  Scalia & Garner, supra note 11, at 195–98, 199–213.
  13.  I often refer to these canons together as the “association canons.” Since ejusdem also relies on finding a common theme among words or phrases, this Note’s conclusions apply to both canons. But there are several unique aspects of ejusdem that require further discussion throughout.
  14.  144 S. Ct. 2176, 2181–82 (2024).
  15.  See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.

The Right Thing in the Wrong Place? Unstable Dicta and Aesthetics’ Gradual Incursion Into the Traditional Police Power Justifications

Aesthetic regulation is fast becoming a pervasive feature of many cities’ and states’ zoning regimes. While aesthetics are often used in conjunction with other justifications for zoning—itself an exercise of the well-recognized but somewhat nebulously defined police power—the constitutional basis for aesthetics’ use as the sole justification for zoning decisions has not been closely examined by courts or academics. Over the past seventy years, the Supreme Court has steadily bolstered the legitimacy of solely aesthetic zoning by suggesting that it should be included among the other traditional police power justifications. Though most of the cases falling within this doctrinal trend look to dicta from the well-known Berman v. Parker for support, their approaches have largely failed to critically engage with the Berman Court’s justifications for aesthetic regulation. Current scholarship also takes the genesis of this doctrine for granted, appearing more interested in examining the conflicts that arise when aesthetic regulation brushes up against other areas of the law, such as the First Amendment’s guarantee of free expression or the disproportionate impacts that aesthetic regulation and restrictive zoning have on certain communities, than in examining the doctrine’s origins. This Note attempts to probe the instability of this growing doctrine’s foundations by examining solely aesthetic regulation’s complicated historicity and constitutionality. Ultimately, this Note suggests that recent trends indicate a new willingness by the Supreme Court to reexamine troubled dicta and tackle head-on the question of whether aesthetics may stand on their own as a legitimate justification for exercises of the police power.

“A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”1.Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).Show More

Introduction

This Note discusses aesthetic regulation’s entry into the traditional justifications for exercises of the police power, which include the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the populace.2.See id. at 395 (“[B]efore the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be said] that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” (first citing Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1917); and then citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30–31 (1905))). Over one hundred years earlier, William Blackstone described the police power as the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *162.Show More Though it is not contested that aesthetics may be part of a valid justification for regulatory exercises of the police power, especially when combined with one of the traditional justifications just listed, a more difficult question arises when one asks whether aesthetics alone may serve as a valid justification for exercises of this power, such as zoning.

As the slightly oxymoronic “gradual incursion” may suggest,3.Incursion, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/incursion_n?tab=‌meaning_and_use (last visited Mar. 6, 2025) (“A hostile inroad or invasion; esp. one of sudden and hasty character; a sudden attack.” (emphasis added)).Show More the history of aesthetics’ entry into the pantheon of police powers was a convoluted one—at least before now-famous dicta in Berman v. Parker abruptly ushered aesthetics into the company of its police power predecessors.4.To be discussed in greater depth in Part II, these dicta in context state that [t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (emphasis added) (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952)).Show More While widespread acceptance of this dicta over the past seventy years has led to steadily increasing support for aesthetics alone as a valid justification for exercises of the police power,5.See discussion infra Section II.C; infra Part III.Show More this Note examines how the Supreme Court’s treatment of this question has scarcely yielded definitive answers, and how largely uncritical interpretations of this dicta and the history behind it have produced a doctrine that is troubled and persistent in equal measure. In other words, this Note explores how aesthetic zoning—a sly cousin to the traditional justifications for exercises of the police power, developed largely through dicta rather than on its own merits—could be aptly described as a “right thing in the wrong place.”6.Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.Show More

Property rights were never absolutely free from government regulation, even before much of the doctrine concerning police powers had fully developed. Rather than being hyper-focused on the triumph of the individual over the encroaching powers of the State, early American states often subordinated individual rights to the pursuit of the common welfare.7.See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 470 (1998). For the proposition that the public good took precedence over individual concerns throughout the eighteenth century, Professor Poindexter cites to John Jay’s 1790 Charge to the Grand Juries that “‘civil liberty consists, not in a right to every man to do just what he pleases,’ but only to do that which ‘the equal and constitutional laws of the county admit to be consistent with the public good.’” Id. at 470 n.177 (quoting Barry Alan Shain, The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought 32 (1994)).Show More Two common law maxims, salus populi suprema est lex (“the welfare of the people is the supreme law”) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“use your own right so as to not injure the right of others”), were pillars of American jurists’ vision of a well-regulated society and promoted a multitude of government restrictions on property rights.8.See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 42, 47 (1996).Show More The Supreme Court recognized the common law tradition of police power regulation as early as 1824 when Chief Justice Marshall declared that “[t]he right to use all property, must be subject to modification by municipal law. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non l[a]edas, is a fundamental maxim. It belongs exclusively to the local State Legislatures, to determine how a man may use his own, without injuring his neighbour.”9.Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 53–54 (1824).Show More Other cases from this period also recognized limitations on property rights and offered sweeping, absolute statements in support of such regulation. For example, an early Massachusetts case stated that

[a]ll property in this commonwealth . . . [is] held subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment . . . as the legislature . . . may think necessary and expedient.10 10.Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851); see also Novak, supra note 8, at 21 (arguing that Alger was “firmly entrenched in the intellectual, political, and legal traditions of nineteenth-century America”).Show More

The police power has long been thought of as a living, evolving concept, unburdened by strict rules or specific criteria.11 11.See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (“The term ‘police power’ connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of ‘reasonableness,’ this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria.”); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1011 n.78 (1997) (stating that “[n]either property nor police power is an absolute right; each evolves contextually and over time”).Show More Indeed, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court stated that “while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.”12 12.272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).Show More Thus, neither the brief, pre-twentieth-century review above, nor the more in-depth historical review to follow in Part II, is meant to suggest that even if aesthetics alone were historically a suspect candidate for the police power, they can never be a valid justification. Rather, the question is whether aesthetics, either alone or in combination with the other traditional justifications for exercises of the police power, are properly included in the category of “the general welfare” considering the latter’s broad judicial recognition at the time the doctrine was first being formed. Put differently, are aesthetics—then or now—a compelling enough contribution to the people’s welfare to justify diminutions in property rights?

Despite extensive study of the practical consequences of urban renewal programs and aesthetic regulation,13 13.See, e.g., Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, Comment. (Apr. 1965), https://‌www.commentary.org/articles/herbert-gans/the-failure-of-urban-renewal/ [https://perma.cc/P‌49G-MENC] (noting the displacement caused by urban renewal programs); Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability, 823 Cato Inst. Pol’y Analysis, Oct. 18, 2017, at 1, 1–2, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/zoning-land-use-plan‌ning-housing-affordability [https://perma.cc/UZM4-CGRU] (concluding that the rise in aesthetic regulations has caused many cities to face housing affordability challenges).Show More and strong scholarly censure of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Clause to justify economic regulation and urban renewal programs in decisions like Berman and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,14 14.For a few representative works discussing the Supreme Court’s Public Use Clause jurisprudence, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 178–79 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the public use standard in Berman did not fall under traditional conceptions of the public use requirement and that its necessity argument merely belied the “state’s desire to transfer property between private parties”); Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 136 (1993) (arguing that “the term ‘public use’ has recently been interpreted as broadly as possible” in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)).Show More few authors have turned their attention specifically toward aesthetic regulation’s suspect historicity and constitutionality. This Note attempts to fill that analytical gap by examining the development of aesthetic regulation within the police powers doctrine from the pre-Berman era to the present, post-Berman age. It proceeds in four parts: Part I provides a brief grounding in the real-world impacts that aesthetic regulation has on the ongoing housing availability and affordability crisis as a form of restrictive zoning. Part II examines the development of aesthetics as a possible addition to the traditional police power justifications, dividing the inquiry into three distinct periods. The first period, discussed in Section II.A, focuses on early doctrinal trends in what this author terms the “pre-Berman period.” It posits that although courts initially found aesthetically motivated regulation inimical to proper exercises of the police power, the Supreme Court became comfortable accepting post hoc aesthetic justifications for exercises of the police power when the highest court of a state would do so. This tentative comfort was far from universally accepted, however, as other courts during this time insisted that exercises of the police power were to be reserved for necessitous circumstances, holding that such necessity did not include cities’ desire to regulate property to achieve aesthetic goals.

The second period, discussed in Section II.B, focuses on two decisions that ushered aesthetics further into the family of police power justifications, Euclid15 15.272 U.S. at 388.Show More and Berman.16 16.348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).Show More While these cases have been used by the Supreme Court to justify the constitutionality of aesthetic regulation and to hint at the possible constitutionality of purely aesthetic zoning (though such a case has not yet reached the Court), a close reading of Euclid and Berman suggests that aesthetic zoning was to be used in only a very narrow set of circumstances. Section II.C discusses Berman’s progeny and examines how extensively its dicta have been distorted as more cases involving aesthetic regulation have reached the Court. Part III briefly discusses trends at the state level toward an acceptance of aesthetic and purely aesthetic regulation. Finally, Part IV examines recent trends in the Supreme Court that may suggest an awakening to the faltering legal foundations of aesthetics as a valid police power justification.

  1.  Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
  2.  See id. at 395 (“[B]efore the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be said] that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” (first citing Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1917); and then citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30–31 (1905))). Over one hundred years earlier, William Blackstone described the police power as

    the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.

    4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *162.

  3.  Incursion, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/incursion_n?tab=‌meaning_and_use (last visited Mar. 6, 2025) (“A hostile inroad or invasion; esp. one of sudden and hasty character; a sudden attack.” (emphasis added)).
  4.  To be discussed in greater depth in Part II, these dicta in context state that

    [t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.

    Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (emphasis added) (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952)).

  5.  See discussion infra Section II.C; infra Part III.
  6.  Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
  7.  See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 470 (1998). For the proposition that the public good took precedence over individual concerns throughout the eighteenth century, Professor Poindexter cites to John Jay’s 1790 Charge to the Grand Juries that “‘civil liberty consists, not in a right to every man to do just what he pleases,’ but only to do that which ‘the equal and constitutional laws of the county admit to be consistent with the public good.’” Id. at 470 n.177 (quoting Barry Alan Shain, The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought 32 (1994)).
  8.  See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 42, 47 (1996).
  9.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 53–54 (1824).
  10.  Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851); see also Novak, supra note 8, at 21 (arguing that Alger was “firmly entrenched in the intellectual, political, and legal traditions of nineteenth-century America”).
  11.  See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (“The term ‘police power’ connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of ‘reasonableness,’ this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria.”); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1011 n.78 (1997) (stating that “[n]either property nor police power is an absolute right; each evolves contextually and over time”).
  12.  272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
  13.  See, e.g., Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, Comment. (Apr. 1965), https://‌www.commentary.org/articles/herbert-gans/the-failure-of-urban-renewal/ [https://perma.cc/P‌49G-MENC] (noting the displacement caused by urban renewal programs); Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability, 823 Cato Inst. Pol’y Analysis, Oct. 18, 2017, at 1, 1–2, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/zoning-land-use-plan‌ning-housing-affordability [https://perma.cc/UZM4-CGRU] (concluding that the rise in aesthetic regulations has caused many cities to face housing affordability challenges).
  14.  For a few representative works discussing the Supreme Court’s Public Use Clause jurisprudence, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent

    Domain 178–79 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the public use standard in Berman did not fall under traditional conceptions of the public use requirement and that its necessity argument merely belied the “state’s desire to transfer property between private parties”); Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property

    136 (1993) (arguing that “the term ‘public use’ has recently been interpreted as broadly as possible” in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)).

  15.  272 U.S. at 388.
  16.  348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).