The doctrine of fair use was originally intended to facilitate those socially optimal uses of copyrighted material that would otherwise constitute infringement. Yet the application of the law has become so unpredictable that would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the doctrine with any significant level of confidence. Moreover, the doctrine provides no defense for those seeking to make fair uses of material protected by anti-circumvention measures. As a result, artists working in media both new and old are unable to derive from copyrighted works the full value to which the public is entitled. In this Essay, we propose a solution to the uncertainty and unpredictability that plague the doctrine: non-exclusive safe harbors that define minimum levels of copying as per se fair uses. These bright-line rules would provide the clarity needed to facilitate countless productive uses that are currently being chilled. Furthermore, by providing an ex ante test for identifying uses as fair, these safe harbors provide a framework for salvaging fair use in the digital age.
Essay
Delegation Really Running Riot
Conventional delegations—statutes delegating Article I, section 8 authority—are familiar enough and have spawned a large literature regarding their constitutionality. We wish to shift the focus to delegation of other powers. Starting from the assumption that conventional delegations are constitutional, we ask whether Congress may delegate other congressional powers, such as those found in Articles II, III, and IV. For instance, we consider whether Congress may delegate the power to admit states and to propose amendments to the Constitution. We also consider whether Congress may delegate cameral authority, such as the House’s ability to impeach and the Senate’s ability to confirm nominations. Finally, we address whether the Congress may delegate powers to other entities and in the process circumvent or evade powers granted to other branches. We conclude that if one accepts the constitutionality of conventional delegations, one must likewise accept the constitutionality of all manner of unconventional delegations. If the Necessary and Proper clause permits the making of laws outside of the Article I, section 7 process, it likewise permits the approval of treaties outside the Article II, section 2 process. And the same is true for the other unconventional delegations we discuss here. In this way, the delegation of cameral and bicameral power can be a means for “altering,” or at least evading, the structural Constitution’s most notable features.