In an earlier article titled The Executive Power of Removal, we contended that Article II gives the President a constitutional power to remove executive officers, at least those who are presidentially appointed. In this Essay, we expand on, and reply to a critique of, that article. We discuss the meaning of the clause vesting “executive Power” in the President and the clause authorizing Congress to make laws “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the powers of the federal government. We contend that the former vests authority to remove in the President and the latter does not allow Congress to treat that allocation of authority as a default. We discuss how constitutional developments in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—specifically, a 1784 report authored by the Council of Censors—support our understanding of the federal Constitution’s text and structure. We also discuss early practice under the federal Constitution—specifically, high-profile instances where presidents removed executive subordinates without Senate participation. These sources and episodes, along with those we discussed in our previous article, support the conclusion that the Constitution confers on the President the authority to remove presidentially appointed executive officers.
Introduction
Does the President have a constitutional power to remove executive branch subordinates? In a recent article entitled The Executive Power of Removal, we joined the Supreme Court in defending the proposition that Article II of the Constitution gives the President authority to remove executive officers, at least those who are presidentially appointed. Without such a power, it is hard to see how the President could exert control—on behalf of an electoral coalition—over the vast American bureaucracy. Without such a power, it is easy to see how a temporary coalition could entrench long-term control over the bureaucracy by creating an officer insulated from presidential control through, for example, the conferral of statutory life tenure with removal only by impeachment. The Constitution’s conferral of removal authority on the President thus has a deep and important connection to the concept that electoral majorities should be able to control the executive branch. In our previous article, we focused on historical sources that had embraced the perspective that the President has just such a power of removal.
In this Essay, we reply to a critique of that article—Removal Rehashed by Professors Andrea Katz and Noah Rosenblum. We part ways with their analysis in several significant respects. But despite our disagreements, we are grateful for the chance to sharpen our own thinking on these issues. Just as the hammer and the anvil forge the metal, so too in the realm of intellectual discovery the critic forces the author to refine arguments that would otherwise remain untested. In that spirit, we offer this reply. We continue to believe that, although our theory is not the only one possible, it best fits text, structure, history, and early practice, and is therefore preferable to the alternatives.
In contrast to our views, Katz and Rosenblum reject altogether the notion that the Constitution confers a removal power on the President. Starting from that perspective, they advise that readers “will find little new” in our article—a refrain they repeat so many times and so fixatedly that it takes on the air of a government official advising a passerby to “move on; nothing to see here!” To be sure, if one starts from the premise, as Katz and Rosenblum do, that it is “intellectually indefensible” to believe that Article II grants a presidential removal authority, then we agree: there is nothing to see here. But for those who are more open-minded about one of the most significant (and historically, most debated) questions of the separation of powers, read on. For as we explain below, Katz and Rosenblum misdescribe several of our arguments and several of the underlying sources. The case for a presidential removal power is stronger than they are willing to acknowledge.
Consider, for example, one of Katz and Rosenblum’s claims about the historical pedigree of the President’s removal authority. They contend that “[t]he historian might wonder why th[e] argument [for an executive power of removal,] if once so widespread, disappeared so quickly.” To support their claim that the argument for a removal power “disappeared so quickly,” Katz and Rosenblum rely on a quotation from a 1916 book by Frank Goodnow providing that courts “have held that [the Vesting Clause] has little if any legal effect, and that for the most part it is to be explained by the powers which are later specifically mentioned.” But Katz and Rosenblum’s use of this quotation does not properly characterize Goodnow. Two pages after the quoted language, Goodnow explained that the “practice” with respect to removal is “that the President has the power to remove arbitrarily almost all civil officers of the United States, not judges. This power has been recognized as belonging to the President as a part of the executive power granted to him.” Rather than demonstrating the “disappearance” of an “executive power of removal,” Goodnow’s 1916 book demonstrates how into the twentieth century, it was widely recognized that Article II conferred removal power on the President. Professor Goodnow once remembered what some modern historians have forgotten.
As we discuss below, this is not the only occasion where we part ways with Katz and Rosenblum’s characterization of our article or the underlying sources. Specifically, they spend a significant portion of their response on the question of removal under the Pennsylvania Constitution—claiming, for example, that “Pennsylvania’s charter made no mention of executive removal” and that a 1784 report by Pennsylvania’s Council of Censors “probably means nearly the opposite” of our characterization of it. Respectfully, we disagree. Katz and Rosenblum fail to recognize that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained at an early date that, despite the Pennsylvania Constitution’s silence, “it has been generally supposed, that the power of removal rested with the Governor, except in those cases where the tenure, was during good behavior.” And they bury in a footnote a concession that a passage in the Censors’ Report “might be read to suggest that the Censors believed removal was ‘an executive power’ and so support Bamzai and Prakash’s argument.” As we explain at length below, their concession is appropriate; the Censors’ Report supports our position. And the early history of gubernatorial removal in Pennsylvania is itself a fascinating case study with parallels to federal removal practice.
In addition, Katz and Rosenblum claim we were mistaken to rely on data from a study by the political scientist Carl Fish to show how often presidents removed executive subordinates in the early Republic. They claim that many such removals occurred on appointment of a successor, because for positions requiring Senate advice and consent, “removal was incident to appointment: the appointment and confirmation of someone new removed the previous officeholder.” But leaving to one side that nothing in our claim turns on Fish’s precise number of removals (which we did not even cite), we explain below that, in high-profile instances, presidents removed executive subordinates without Senate participation. Katz and Rosenblum’s theory of removal-by-appointment fails to explain such removals. And as demonstrated by the at-pleasure commissions conferred on executive branch officials, along with statements by executive branch officers, it was certainly the view of many that presidents could unilaterally remove.
Our Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we set forth the analytical framework for a presidential removal power. At the risk of “rehashing”—which we now understand to be strictly verboten—we rely upon some of the same material we previously surfaced in The Executive Power of Removal. In Part II, we turn to a significant state-law antecedent to the federal Constitution—removal in the context of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This portion of the Essay introduces “new” sources and arguments from one State that might have played a role in the drafting of the federal Constitution. In Part III, we address the role of early federal practice. Finally, in Part IV, we address some overarching methodological points.