The recently published article, Immigration’s Family Values by Professor Kerry Abrams and R. Kent Piacenti, and the forthcoming Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Citizenship, and Immigration Courts by Kari Hong examine how, when, and why immigration law uses a different definition of family than the one used in state courts. Despite their differences, in conversation, these two pieces highlight how the Department of Homeland Security likely is either following misguided policies or pursuing improper objectives when creating a federal family law. Crimmigration (Crim Imm) scholarship successfully identified the ways in which the (purported) civil proceedings of immigration law needed the extra constitutional protections found in criminal law. In analogous ways, Famigration (Fam Imm) calls on scholars to engage in the similar project of scrutinizing existing immigration practices through the lens of family law. In doing so, a more systematized approach may introduce constitutional protections, resolve federal and state law conflicts, and formulate more universal, idealized concepts into the technocratic scheme of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
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Noel Canning and Remedial Obligation Under the Constitution
There is a pervasive assumption that the Supreme Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Noel Canning has rendered void the decisions of the Board during the period when it lacked a quorum because a majority of its members held their posts through unconstitutional recess appointments. The assumption is unfounded. The question of remedy for the wrong identified in Noel Canning should not be decided in the air; it should be decided contextually, as one involving whether and how to provide relief to parties affected by a wholly concluded constitutional violation, in a manner that is akin to harmless- and plain-error review.
Consciously Decoupling: A Response to Professors Barry, Hatfield, and Kominers
On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership represents a compelling addition to the still burgeoning discussion of the bifurcation of voting rights and ownership interests. The practice of decoupling the long-fused voting rights of shareholders from their underlying economic interests has become all too common with the explosive growth of financial derivatives. Decoupling challenges assumptions embedded in our capital markets, tests our system of corporate governance, and strains a regulatory regime based on disclosure.
This short Response attempts to persuade the reader that decoupling is, by its very nature, more upsetting to the natural order than the authors concede. And, its persistence threatens the predictability and stability of the overall market. Regardless of whether a “core outcome model” suggested by the authors becomes generally accepted, any desirable regulatory framework must begin with an ironclad mandate for full and fair disclosure not easily side-stepped by derivatives. In addition, focus on a desirable explanatory model should not siphon attention from efforts underway to improve the quality and depth of the information available to market participants.