Act-Sampling Bias and the Shrouding of Repeat Offending

A college president needs to know how many sexual assaults on her campus are caused by repeat offenders. If repeat offenders are responsible for most sexual assaults, the institutional response should focus on identifying and removing perpetrators. But how many offenders are repeat offenders? Ideally, we would find all offenders and then see how many are repeat offenders. Short of this, we could observe a random sample of offenders. But in real life, we observe a sample of sexual assaults, not a sample of offenders.

In this paper, we explain how drawing naive conclusions from “act sampling”—sampling people’s actions instead of sampling the population—can make us grossly underestimate the proportion of repeat actors. We call this “act-sampling bias.” This bias is especially severe when the sample of known acts is small, as in sexual assault, which is among the least likely of crimes to be reported.[1] In general, act sampling can bias our conclusions in unexpected ways. For example, if we use act sampling to collect a set of people, and then these people truthfully report whether they are repeat actors, we can overestimate the proportion of repeat actors.

Again, say that you are a university president and a recent undergraduate survey suggests that only 10 percent of students who are sexually assaulted make a formal complaint. Last year, your committee on sexual misconduct received 100 formal complaints for non-consensual “sexual contact involving physical force or incapacitation,”[2] but, given the under-reporting of sexual assault, you figure that during this time period there were likely a total of 1,000 assaults. Among the perpetrators in these 100 complaints, only five were found to have assaulted more than one person. The vast majority of offenders, 95 out of 100, were only accused by a single person.

It seems that only 5 percent of the school’s offenders are repeat offenders. But this conclusion is strikingly inaccurate. The proportion of offenders who are repeat offenders is probably much closer to 100 percent than 5 percent, and the vast majority of sexual offenders at your school may in fact be repeat offenders.

I. Shrouding the Prevalence of Repeat Offending

A low reporting rate shrouds the prevalence of repeat offending. Recall that the probability that a given assault is reported is 10 percent, or 0.10. If the probabilities that survivors report are independent of each other,[3] the probability that an offender who assaults two people will be reported by both is 0.10 times 0.10, or just 1 percent. The probability that an offender who assaults two survivors is not reported by either is 0.90 times 0.90, or 81 percent. The probability that an offender who assaults two survivors is reported by just one is the remaining probability, 18 percent.[4] So the vast majority of reported two-time offenders will only be accused once. Or put another way, if all offenders committed exactly two offenses, then with a 10 percent reporting rate, we should expect that only 5.3 percent (1% / (1% + 18%)) of reported offenders would be accused twice. In this example (with 10 percent reporting), even when every offender is a repeat offender, only 5.3 percent of reported offenders will appear to be repeat offenders.

We have built a widget, available below,[5] that allows you to see just how large the shrouding effect will be in particular settings. Just plug in the number of repeat offenders in the population and the number of offenses they each commit, the number of non-repeat offenders, and the probability than any offense will be reported, and then click the “randomize” button. The widget will then tell you the prevalence of repeat offenders in the general population as well as in the subpopulation of reported offenders. For example, if there are 10 repeat offenders who each offend twice, 10 non-repeat offenders, and there is a 10 percent chance that offenses will be reported, then even though half the offenders are repeat offenders, only 3.4 percent of reported offenders are accused twice.

These examples dramatize how an under-reporting problem can disproportionately distort the appearance of repeat offending. When less than 50 percent of assaults are reported, we should expect that the prevalence of repeat offending in the general population is radically larger than the share of repeat offending seen in the reported cases. The following table lets us work backward from the sample of reported offenses to estimate the proportion of repeat offenders in the whole population. The values in the middle of the table are the expected proportion of offenders who are accused twice among reported offenders. If at your university, you believe that about 30 percent of sexual assaults are reported and find that about 11 percent of reported offenders are reported twice, then you should infer that about 50 percent of offenders in the entire population are repeat offenders.

[[{“fid”:”757″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

Table 1: The proportion of repeat offenders among reported cases as a function of the proportion of repeat offenders in the entire population and the probability that a given assault is reported (assuming repeat offenders assault 2 times).

These examples are based on the assumption that people who are assaulted by repeat offenders have the same probability of reporting as people who are assaulted by non-repeat offenders.[6] This might not be the case; it is possible that repeat offenders assault people who they think are less likely to file a formal complaint, for example. In any case, the tendency of many schools to keep investigations of (and even sanctions for) sexual misconduct private will keep potential complainants in the dark about whether another complaint has already been filed against a particular offender.

Indeed, the shrouding of repeat offending may reinforce the reluctance of some survivors to report. If survivors think that reports of sexual assault are more likely to be taken seriously if corroborated by another independent report accusing the same person, then they, like the college president, might also infer from the sample of reported cases that there is a relatively small chance that their accused was a repeat offender. Thus, the shrouding effect decreases the probability that an assault is reported, which in turn further worsens the shrouding effect, in a negative feedback loop.

The foregoing estimates are also based on an assumption that all repeat offenders offend exactly twice. The shrouding effect becomes less pronounced as the average number of offenses committed by repeat offenders increases. For example, with a 10 percent reporting rate, if all offenders are repeat offenders who each offend three times, then there is a 10.3 percent chance that reported offenders will be reported at least twice (instead of the 5.3 percent chance when the repeat offenders committed just two offenses). We have created an Excel spreadsheet, available below,[7] where you can vary the assumptions of the proportion of the offending population that commits one, two, three, or four offenses and see the resulting expected proportion of repeat offenders among the subgroup that are reported.

Schools should take into account the shrouding of repeat offenders when devising their reporting protocols. Survivors of sexual assault are at times reluctant to be the first person to bring a complaint that will launch an investigation against the person who attacked them.[8] If many survivors are attacked by repeat offenders, a reporting mechanism like Callisto, which allows survivors to deposit secure, time-stamped descriptions of their attack into encrypted escrow and also allows survivors to choose to automatically alert authorities if and when a second accusation is made against the same person, can powerfully respond to first-mover reluctance.[9] With a program like Callisto, survivors are assured that their claim will indirectly be corroborated by another person’s claim.[10]

II. Act-Sampling Bias

Decades of research have shown that it is common for people to make predictions based on how representative something is rather than how likely it is.[11] An oft-cited example of this bias is a study in which participants were presented with the hypothetical of a 31-year old woman, Linda, who is “single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.”[12] When presented with the question whether it is more likely that Linda “is a bank teller” or “a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement,” a majority of participants said it was more probable that “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” even though any person who is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement automatically also falls into the category of being a bank teller.[13]

Our example regarding sexual assault statistics points to a similar kind of error. People mistakenly tend to think that the proportion of repeat offenders in a sample of offenses indicates the proportion of repeat offenders in the entire population. As noted above, we call this “act-sampling bias” because it results from people incorrectly making a conclusion based on the proportion in a sample of acts, instead of a sample of people. This leads them to incorrectly conclude that if in a sample of offenses, only 5.3 percent are from repeat offenders, then only 5.3 percent of the offenders in the entire population are repeat offenders.

We are misled because of the disproportionate absence of repeat offenders in the sample relative to the population. For a one-time offender to appear in the sample, he has to be reported only once. For a two-time offender to appear in the sample as a two-time offender, he has to be reported twice, which is much less likely. Put another way, a one-time offender “escapes” the sample if one survivor does not report. A two-time offender “escapes” appearing in the sample as a two-time offender if either one of two survivors does not report.

In other contexts, extrapolating from the sample to the population is warranted. For example, if 52 percent of a representative sample of U.S. voters support Hillary Clinton, it is appropriate to infer that within a small margin of error, about 52 percent of the true voting population is in support of Clinton.[14] However, when sampling is based on people’s actions, then the very process of sampling disproportionately affects the likelihood that people who take that action will appear in the sample.

What we are calling the “act-sampling bias” joins a host of previously recognized representativeness “fallacies,” including the base rate, conjunction, disjunction, regression, and gamblers’ fallacies, that can lead to false inference.[15] The act-sampling bias occurs whenever sampling is tied to the actions of the subjects instead of to the subjects themselves. Sampling on the basis of the act instead of the actor distorts the representativeness of the sample based on how often the subject engages in the activity.

For example, imagine that McDonalds is interested in learning what proportion of high school students visit its restaurants more than once a week. If it went to high schools and surveyed a random 10 percent of students, the sample should capture one-time visitors and multiple-time visitors with no bias. If instead, McDonald’s went to its restaurants at different times and randomly sampled, by noting who was present, 10 percent of the high school patrons eating at the restaurant, then the proportion of subjects who appeared repeatedly in the sample would, as in our sexual assault example, understate the proportion of multiple visitors in the population.

Similarly, act sampling combined with self-reports about repeated actions can overstate the seeming prevalence of repeated action. Imagine that half of McDonald’s high school patrons visit once a week and half visit twice a week. If McDonald’s surveys 10 percent of its high-school patrons eating at the restaurant and they each report truthfully whether they eat there more than once a week, then the sample response is likely to be biased upward: 10 percent of one-time visitors will be sampled, but 19 percent of the two-time visitors will be sampled, because two-time visitors have roughly twice the chance of being sampled.[16] This act-based sample would suggest that approximately two-thirds of McDonald’s high school patrons are two-time visitors even though their actual population prevalence is only one-half.[17]

Published studies at times fail to account for the ways in which act-sampling bias positively or negatively distorts estimates of reoffending. For example, the long-standing concern of “undetected recidivism” among sex offenders might be at least partially explained by act-sampling bias.[18] If only a fraction of sex offenses are successfully prosecuted, then among those who seem to be one-time offenders–based solely on their convicted offenses–many will be offenders who offended before or after the convicted offense.

Other studies which combine act sampling with offender surveys are at risk of overstating the repeat offending rate. For example, Weinrott and Saylor report that in their sample of institutionalized sex offenders, the median offender reported assaulting six different people.[19] But the authors make no allowances for the prospect of a positive bias in the self-reported statistics drawn from act sampling. The subjects in this sample came to be institutionalized because they had been convicted of at least one offense or act. But as in the previous example of truthful self-reports following the act sampling of McDonald’s patrons, there is probably a disproportionately higher prevalence of repeat offenders in this sample than in the true population.[20]

The criminal justice system is replete with other examples of act-sampling bias. Imagine, for instance, a series of police speed traps that occur at quasi-random times and places on a stretch of the local interstate. Because sampling is based on the act of speeding, the sample of people caught speeding will tend to understate the prevalence of repeat speeders in the general population.

These examples show that act-sampling bias is not limited to sexual assault reporting. When a sample is based upon a subject’s acts instead of the subjects themselves, then the sample will systematically understate the prevalence of repeat actors in the population. Representative act sampling will produce an unrepresentative pool of subjects. We need to take the additional step of working back from the sampling percentage and the proportion of repeat actors in the sample, as in Table 1 above, to produce informed conclusions about how many offenders are repeat offenders in a society.

 

 


[1]David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct, Westat, at iv (2015) [hereinafter AAU Survey], (noting that a relatively small percentage of the most serious offenses are reported) https://perma.cc/5BX7-GQPU; Nat’ Inst. Just., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Measuring Frequency (Oct. 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/ZTD8-U9GT.

[2]AAU Survey, supra note 1, at ix.

[3]If an initial report is made public, the probability of other reports against the same accused may be much higher than initial probability (and hence not independent).

[4]More generally, when the reporting rate is p, we have:

 [[{“fid”:”758″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

[5]Act-Sampling Bias Widget, http://chwe.net/repeat/

[6]And as noted above, it also assumes that each survivor of a repeat offender has an independent and equal probability of reporting.

[7]Act-Sampling Bias Spreadsheet, http://chwe.net/repeat/censoringbias.xlsx. The excel spreadsheet downloads automatically.

[8]Ian Ayres, Meet Callisto, the Tinder-like Platform that Aims to Fight Sexual Assault, Wash. Post (Oct. 9, 2015),

[9]Project Callisto, https://www.projectcallisto.org.

[10]Ayres, supra note 8.

[11]Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 153, 153 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 84, 84–89 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter “Tversky & Kahneman, Judgments”].

[12]Tversky & Kahneman, Judgments, supra note 11, at 84, 91–93.

[13]Id.; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 Psychol. Rev. 293, 297 (1983) (providing another description of the representative bias).

[14]When drawing inferences regarding the population from a representative sample, sampling weights are usually used by social scientists to adjust for the probability of an individual or a household being sampled from the population. These weights, therefore, account for the degree of the representativeness of the sample when extrapolating from the sample. For a review of the construction and use of sampling weights to draw inferences for the true population, see Paul P. Biemer & Sharon L. Christ, Constructing The Survey Weights, in Sampling of Populations: Methods and Applications 489, 489–94 (Paul S. Levy & Stanley Lemeshow eds., 2008); Danny Pfeffermann, The Role of Sampling Weights When Modeling Survey Data, 61 Int’l Stat. Rev. 317, 329–34 (1993).

[15]Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making 141, 141–62 (Dirk Wendt & Charles Vlek eds., 4th ed. 1973).

[16]One percent of the two-time visitors will be sampled twice (0.10 x 0.10 = 1%), 81 percent of the two-timers will be sampled zero times (0.9 x 0.9 = 81%), and the remaining 18 percent of the two-time goers (100% – 1% – 81%) will be sampled once. Thus, 19 percent of all two-time visitors will be sampled (1% + 18%).

[17]We have 19% / (19% + 10%) = 65.52%. Hence, 65.52 percent of the sample will consist of two-time goers even though only 50 percent of the true population consists of two-time goers.

[18]A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 Crime & Delinq. 450, 450–51, 453 (1982).

[19]Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. Interpersonal Violence 286, 291 (1991).

[20]Cf. Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. Interpersonal Violence 3, 21–23 (1987) (noting that self-reported number of offenses was significantly greater than the number of convictions and that many sex crimes are not reported). 

The Rule of Recognition in Reconstruction: A Review of Secession on Trial: The Treason Prosecution of Jefferson Davis, By Cynthia Nicoletti

Introduction

In this book,[1] Professor Cynthia Nicoletti demonstrates, through an examination of the historical record that leaves no stone unturned, that secession remained an open question after the Civil War. Victory in the Civil War had established de facto Union authority over the former Confederate states, and had made the illegality of secession a foregone conclusion, at least in the eyes of almost all observers today.[2] Perceptions differed at the time, however, over the legal implications of military victory, and many prominent politicians, lawyers, and judges could not figure out how to translate de facto Union authority into the de jure illegality of secession.[3] Legal theory at the time did not have the resources to absorb the implications of “trial by battle” as a necessary element of the rule of law.

Nicoletti recounts all this in a dramatic account of the treason prosecution of Confederate President Jefferson Davis that proceeds simultaneously at two extremes: practical tactics in litigation and high principles of constitutional law. Delay, deception, and encoded communications with his client formed the core of Charles O’Conor’s strategy in defending Davis. Nicoletti brings O’Conor back to life as one of the leading lawyers of his generation, who nevertheless held irredeemably racist and secessionist views.

These views drew him to the defense of Davis, which he managed brilliantly, and, because of concerns about leaks to the prosecution, executed almost single-handedly.[4] Putting O’Conor’s reactionary politics to one side, his success in preventing the trial and conviction of the last leading Confederate to be apprehended by Union forces deserves grudging admiration for his skills as an advocate.

O’Conor did not lack for worthy opponents in the Davis litigation. William Evarts and Richard Henry Dana, among other leading attorneys, handled the prosecution and the political negotiations that attended the prosecution, such as the crucial decision to try Davis before the federal court in Richmond instead of before a military commission.[5] Issues such as those led directly to a multitude of constitutional questions, from technical questions about the proper venue for Davis’s trial to the fundamental question of the legality of secession.

Evarts and Dana were up to the task of addressing these momentous issues—Dana had argued The Prize Cases,[6] which also concerned the status of the Confederate states during the Civil War—but they were trapped by the prospect that a jury in Richmond would acquit Davis on the ground, avowed or not, that he did not commit treason because secession was legal. They feared a jury would find Davis could not have committed treason against the United States because he did not “owe allegiance” to the United States after his home state, Mississippi, seceded from the Union.

At the level of constitutional principle, Nicoletti engages with the dilemma the lawyers faced in attempting to reconcile the rule of law with the verdict of the Civil War. Modern lawyers and legal theorists do not find this dilemma as intense as their predecessors in Reconstruction did. It might just be that the distance of time has foreshortened our view, collapsing the years of constitutional uncertainty between General Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Courthouse and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Texas v. White that “[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”[7] The resolution of the great question of secession through “trial by battle” seems to amount to simple, unproblematic realism today. Nicoletti dispels any such anachronistic attribution of views prevalent today to actors a century and a half ago—they were deeply troubled that the settlement of the question of secession by the outcome of the Civil War “destabilized the rule of law in the United States.”[8]

Yet her book raises a nagging doubt. Maybe the lawyers and legal theorists then were wrong in insisting upon an irreconcilable conflict between the rule of law and trial by battle. They did not fully appreciate how the first is possible only because of the second: the rule of law presupposes a legal system embedded in and dependent upon social facts and political structure.        In particular, the dominant modern form of legal positivism, derived from the work of Professor H.L.A. Hart, places a social “rule of recognition” at the foundation of any legal system and makes it the basis from which all other legal norms, including constitutional principles, are derived.[9] Although Hart’s view has been revised by later positivists, two central tenets of his theory have remained intact: first, that law has its foundation in customary practice; and second, that customary practice consists (1) in prevailing acceptance of the rule of recognition by government officials and (2) in obedience to the resulting regime of legal rules by the population at large.’’[10]

Variations on modern positivism, including some made by Hart himself, differ over how much the rule of recognition incorporates morality, what the precise content of the rule of recognition is, and how it identifies the other rules in a legal system.[11] Nevertheless, any of these variations has the same implications for the legal dilemma of secession after the Civil War: if the war changed the rule of recognition to take secession off the table, then constitutional doctrine had to change accordingly. The question is how changes in the rule of recognition altered constitutional law.

Some of the light cast by modern legal positivism on this issue might reflect harshly on the rule of recognition itself and, specifically, how well it identifies the other rules in a legal system.[12] Nevertheless, these problems pale in comparison to the problems with the reasoning in Texas v. White. The opinion, handed down by the Supreme Court in 1868, does not contain much in the way of reasoning to support its resounding pronouncement of “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”[13] It relies on the Articles of Confederation to support the premise that the Union originally was declared to be “permanent”[14] and then was made “more perfect” by the Preamble to the Constitution.[15] The opinion simply ignores the fact that the Constitution took effect contrary to the terms of the Articles, which required unanimity among the states for any amendment,[16] because the Constitution required approval of only nine of the original thirteen states to supersede the Articles.[17] The Court’s own reasoning calls attention to the fact that the Union in the Articles was not permanent at all, but expired with the ratification of the Constitution. This solecism might have been forgiven in a political speech, as it was when Lincoln made virtually the same argument in his First Inaugural Address.[18] But it deeply mars any judicial opinion attempting to restate the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

Dissatisfaction with this flawed reasoning has led many commentators, both then and now, to seek better reasoning.[19] This effort has not been successful. Appealing simply to the verdict of “trial by battle,” without articulating its consequences for legal doctrine, begs the question: how can the fact of military victory change the principles upon which the rule of law relies?

Appealing only to the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment ignores the problematic process by which they were adopted. The Amendments were approved by sessions of Congress that did not seat legislators from the former Confederate states and that forced those states to ratify the amendments as a condition of regaining their seats. Apart from the obviously coercive nature of this process, it also denied the former Confederate states equal status as states in the Union.

On the dominant Republican view in Reconstruction, the former Confederate states had always remained in the Union and yet because of attempted secession could be denied equal participation in approving the new Amendments to the Constitution.[20] Although the process of proposing and ratifying those Amendments nominally conformed to Article V of the Constitution, it depended upon coercion exercised against the former Confederate states. An alternative view that conceives of the Confederate states as “conquered provinces,” equivalent to the territory of conquered foreign nations, presupposes that those states were successful in leaving the Union. This view justifies Military Reconstruction but at the cost of abandoning the Union’s opposition to secession throughout the Civil War.[21] Holding to the view that Confederate states committed “state suicide” leads to a similar contradiction with Republican principles—that those states and their votes had to be counted in the ratification of the Reconstruction amendments. Without being readmitted to the Union, how could states that discontinued their existence be counted in the ratification process?

Modern commentators have fared no better than their predecessors in the nineteenth century in trying to cut the Gordian knot of the status of the former Confederate states. Some revert simply to the acceptance of “trial by battle” as the agent of constitutional change.[22] But even accepting this premise, this explanation leaves out any account of precisely how military victory and political coercion led to constitutional change. What was the mechanism by which events outside the legal system could result in changes in legal doctrine within it? So, too, the attempt by Professor Bruce Ackerman to assimilate political and legal developments in Reconstruction to a process analogous to constitutional amendment leaves out how the particular decisive event he identifies—President Andrew Johnson’s resounding loss in the congressional election of 1866—could be analogized to approval by two-thirds of each house in Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states.[23] To be sure, the election of 1866 set the stage for ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified before the election, and under similarly coercive terms. At the time, only a few of the Confederate states were represented in Congress and those who were not represented were forced to ratify the amendment as a condition of regaining their seats.[24]

Three features of that era demand explanation: first, why the illegality of state secession became a foregone conclusion without being articulated in a canonical source of law; second, why it took nearly four years for this conclusion to become accepted in formal law; and third, why the opinion that accomplished this acceptance, Texas v. White, did so in such poorly reasoned fashion.

The answers to these questions from a legal positivist perspective follow directly from the central role of the rule of recognition as a social practice. First, a social practice has an inchoate, uncertain character, far divorced from the artificial certainty of legal doctrine. Second, it takes some time to resolve uncertainty in the rule of recognition by changing legal doctrine. This requires a mixed process that gradually moves from a social practice distinct from law to rules accepted and articulated by the officials of a legal system, primarily judges, but other officials and citizens as well. And third, an opinion accepting changes in the rule of recognition succeeds only by success—by its acceptance going forward rather than its justification looking backward. Such a prospective take on Texas v. White does far more to explain its efficacy than a retrospective analysis of the unstable reasoning offered in the opinion itself. This essay proceeds in three parts corresponding to these three questions and the answers to them.

I. The Rule of Recognition as a Social Practice

Ever since its publication over 50 years ago, The Concept of Law has dominated discussions in Anglo-American jurisprudence, as much in renewing the tradition of legal positivism as in generating disputes over it. That discussion has focused largely on the rule of recognition as the basis for a legal system in social fact rather than in freestanding natural law. For Hart, “the rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact.”[25] The fact of the rule’s existence breaks down into two components: first, that “the laws which are valid by the system’s tests of validity are obeyed by the bulk of the population,” and second, that there is “a unified or shared official acceptance of the rule of recognition.”[26] Debate has swirled over each of these elements, and as noted earlier, also over whether the content of the rule of recognition does or must incorporate moral standards and values.[27]

The factual nature of the rule of recognition has largely escaped controversy, however. Even those who assign a large role to political morality in identifying the valid laws of a legal system maintain that the ultimate test for validity depends, at least in part, on the social fact of an existing practice.[28] Only strict natural law theorists and followers of Professor Hans Kelsen give no role at all to social practices at the foundation of a legal system. Kelsen, in particular, reduces the role of the rule of recognition to a mere presupposition, which need not be accepted by anyone; it need only serve as a hypothetical “basic norm” that would provide a test for validity for all the other norms in a legal system if it were accepted.[29]

Strict natural law theorists make law depend upon the requirements of morality, again, whether or not they are actually accepted in a society.[30] Virtually all other philosophers agree with Hart in assigning a factual dimension to the rule of recognition or its equivalent.[31] They make the other norms of a legal system dependent upon a matter of social fact, and as social fact changes, so do the legal norms that it recognizes as valid.

If the legal theorists are right in following Hart, then they have provided a ready explanation for a conundrum that has troubled constitutional theorists, especially in accounting for the questionable process that led to the ratification of the Reconstruction amendments. They can get around the problems posed by the process of ratification of the Reconstruction amendments, and the related difficulties with the opinion in Texas v. White, simply by categorizing the fundamental changes in the American constitutional structure wrought by the Civil War and Reconstruction as resolving a dispute over the rule of recognition—the social practices of American society—not changes in constitutional law alone.

Before the war, secession could be supported by the compact theory of the Union, which gave the states the right to secede in the same way that an independent nation could withdraw from a treaty. The opposing nationalist theory derived the powers of the Union directly from the people, independent of the states and their continued allegiance. The Civil War resolved this dispute over state power under the rule of recognition, and constitutional law had to change accordingly.

Some might object that the Constitution is, by its own terms, the rule of recognition of the American legal system. It does declare itself in Article VI to be “the supreme Law of the Land,”[32] but that provision more plausibly makes the Constitution supreme over other conventional sources of law than transforms it into a rule of recognition. The latter alternative would beg the question where the authority for Article VI (and the rest of the Constitution) comes from. The widely accepted answer to that question rests the original Constitution on a delegation of power from the people acting through state conventions.[33] The Tenth Amendment accepts this point in reserving the “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, . . . to the States respectively, or to the people.”[34] This basic principle of American federalism requires that the Constitution cannot be the whole of the rule of recognition. But if it is only part, then it must be reconciled with the other elements of the rule of recognition, leading to the conclusion that some superior source of law reconciles all the constitutional and non-constitutional elements of the rule of recognition. The incompleteness of the Constitution takes on other forms as well, most obviously in leaving open fundamental questions of interpretation, like the legality of secession.

For these reasons (among others that could be multiplied), most constitutional theorists treat the fundamental law in a legal system as a political act, which cannot be judged by the ordinary standards of legal validity.[35] In this respect they agree with Hart in treating the existence of the rule of recognition as a social fact (albeit by another name). Nor do they disagree with Hart’s analysis of this social fact as a combination of acceptance by public officials and compliance with the resulting regime by the people as a whole. Most theorists view constitutional law as embedded in and derived from social practice with superior authority over standard sources of legal doctrine.[36] Where they might balk is in resorting to the rule of recognition, or its equivalent, to decide hard questions of constitutional law. “Here,” Hart maintains, “all that succeeds is success.”[37] Appealing to the rule of recognition might offer an all-too-easy way around the text of the Constitution, established precedent, and other standard sources of law.

Such an evasion of orthodox legal reasoning appears all the more problematic because of the amorphous nature of the rule of recognition. Attempts to formulate the rule of recognition for the American legal system, even in schematic form, have foundered over the difficulty of capturing the dividing line between the powers reserved to the states and the people and those delegated to the federal government. The rule of recognition, as noted earlier, must provide for both.[38] The search, however, for the canonical form of the rule of recognition underestimates the degree to which it is generated by social practice. Just as isolated instances of customary law can be identified and debated in the absence of a comprehensive account of their source, the same could be true of the rule of recognition. In the case of secession, we could say that the rule of recognition left open the legality of secession in antebellum law and that it was altered after the Civil War to close off this question.

Some might still object that this claim cannot be fully understood or analyzed apart from a complete restatement of the rule of recognition. Yet desirable as a comprehensive account of the rule of recognition might be, it is not strictly necessary. The crucial features of the rule of recognition for one question might have little to do with its features bearing on another. Insofar as it legitimizes judicial review, for instance, the rule of recognition has little to say about how that power should be exercised to determine the legality of secession. In fact, the real problems arise from the translation of the rule, based on custom and practice, into the formalities of legal doctrine. This process, as we shall see in the next section, involves both the need for official acceptance of the rule and drawing out the implications of the rule for ordinary sources of law, such as the decision in Texas v. White.

II. Resolving Disputes Over the Rule of Recognition

Hart characterized the rule of recognition as one that imposed a duty on government officials to follow the lawmaking process and the sources of law that it identified.[39] Scholars have subsequently questioned whether duty alone can fill the gap between the rule of recognition and legal doctrine, arguing that legal power to change the law must also be conferred on government officials to give the legal system the flexibility it needs as a union of primary rules of conduct and secondary rules of change.[40] However this debate is resolved, it does point to the need to draw out the implications of the rule of recognition for conventional sources of law, if only to confirm that government officials actually accept the rule. If they did not, then the changed rule would not meet the first of the two conditions for its existence. Legal officials, and particularly judges, signal their acceptance of the rule through official statements of legal doctrine.

The process of clarifying the rule of recognition therefore becomes intertwined with changes in the law authorized by the rule. Whether this process proves to be successful is, so to speak, a mixed question of law and fact. Clarifying the rule of recognition without any consequences for ordinary sources of law would be entirely pointless. It would not support any new understanding of the rules of the legal system.

Even without Texas v. White, the illegality of secession plainly was presupposed by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring congressional approval of any pardon to former government officials who “engaged in insurrection or rebellion” against the United States,[41] and invalidating “any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States.”[42] Changes in the rule of recognition, or clarification of its terms, must become manifest in standard sources of law, even if judges and other public officials do not candidly articulate exactly how, or why, the rule has changed.

It follows that the standard sources do not provide a completely sound foundation for judicial decisions resolving disputes over the rule of recognition. If they did, the dispute would only be over a subordinate source of law derived from the rule of recognition. In Reconstruction, existing constitutional provisions and constitutional decisions did not even provide a completely sound foundation for the Reconstruction Amendments, as demonstrated by the irregularities in the process of adopting those Amendments.[43] Justification for a decision clarifying the rule of recognition, as Hart emphasized, must look forward to acceptance rather than backward towards preexisting sources of law.[44] If the prospective and retrospective views generally coincided, there would be no dispute over the rule to be resolved. Presenting a prospective resolution as the result of a retrospective justification, as judicial opinions commonly do, cannot be taken as confirmation that no change in the rule to clarify its terms occurred. On the contrary, the rhetoric of continuity with the past often has been employed to promote acceptance of changes going forward.[45]

The susceptibility of judges to this rhetorical strategy explains the notorious gaps in the reasoning in Texas v. White. Foremost among them is the glaring inconsistency between relying on the Articles of Confederation, which established a “perpetual union” and required a unanimous vote among the states for amendment,[46] and the Constitution, which declared a “more perfect Union,”[47] but required ratification by only nine states to go into effect (and similarly required ratification of subsequent amendments by only three quarters of the states).[48] Other defects can be added, such as the reliance on the Preamble to the Constitution for the phrase “more perfect Union” instead of some operative provision in the Constitution.[49] Many commentators have also criticized the opinion for distinguishing between the existence of a state and the existence of a government “competent to represent the State in its relations with the National Government.”[50] This distinction raises the possibility that a state can continue to exist without an appropriate government, and indeed, this is how the Court characterized the status of Texas during the Civil War. In name, it remained a state in the Union, but without the rights and powers of the states not in rebellion. “All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were suspended.”[51] Yet if Texas could remain a state without a lawful government, presumably it could remain a state without any government at all—even if it descended into anarchy. This reasoning presses far beyond the usual understanding of a “state” as an organized government exercising sovereignty over identified territory and the population within it.[52] The Court just deletes the element of a government from the ordinary conception of a state.

These familiar objections to the reasoning in Texas v. White did nothing, however, to impair the authority of the opinion’s pronouncement on the indestructibility of the states and the union. Nor should they have. We should not expect airtight arguments for changes in the law that jettison potentially valid legal arguments based on previously accepted legal authority. If the Civil War made the illegality of secession a foregone conclusion, then it effectively erased the previous basis for secession in accepted legal sources. It swept those arguments off the table, so much so that the Court in Texas v. White asserted it need not address the legality of secession “at length.”[53] Likewise, the defendants’ argument turned “entirely upon the validity of the possession of the bonds” by the third-party purchaser.[54] The Court did not focus upon the question of secession, largely because it could not—because any significant dispute over the rule of recognition, by definition, opens up a gap with preexisting law and erodes the reliability of preexisting legal sources. Those sources that do not support the resolution of the dispute simply are ignored or misconstrued. The Court employed both strategies in Texas v. White.

The compact theory of the Constitution, in which the states entered into it as sovereigns with the right to withdraw, simply received no attention from the Court. Yet if the outcome of the Civil War swept such arguments off the table, it left on the table many of the components of the antebellum constitutional order, especially the continued sovereignty of the states. For reasons mentioned earlier, state sovereignty could not easily be reconciled with the exigencies of Reconstruction.

That became clear as the Supreme Court repeatedly refused to decide the merits of the legality of secession or the constitutionality of Reconstruction. Those cases, like the high-profile prosecution of Jefferson Davis, created the risk of detracting from rather than adding to acceptance of the consequences of Union victory. However those cases were decided, they would either give a victory to southern opponents of Reconstruction or diminish northern support by departing from the rule of law. Instead the Court settled for a series of opaque rulings whose meaning and significance are still debated today.[55] By contrast, Texas v. White sent a much clearer signal, even if it was based on much weaker legal reasoning.

III. Consequences as Justification

As Nicoletti documents in detail, critics of the opinion in Texas v. White, beginning with Justice Grier’s dissent, attributed the defects in the opinion to the Court’s failure to candidly acknowledge the verdict of trial by battle.[56] The opinion did not, on this view, make a virtue of necessity by admitting that it could not find the resources for its decision in existing legal doctrine, but instead showed its willingness to have its virtue all too easily compromised.

The Court papered over gaps in the law in a semblance of conventional legal reasoning. It did not admit that it was changing legal doctrine, apparently out of fear that candor would impede its success in accomplishing any change.[57] On this view, simply characterizing the Court’s reasoning in modern positivist terms as resolving a dispute over the rule of recognition does little to dispel doubts about it.

A sustained analysis under the rule of recognition, however, leads to the opposite conclusion: that the rule of law, so far from being inconsistent with trial by battle, depended upon it as the foundation for a new constitutional settlement. On this interpretation, the opinion in Texas v. White implicitly acknowledged the changed social and political context of constitutional law after the Civil War and promoted acceptance of that change as a necessary element of altering the rule of recognition and drawing out its implications for legal doctrine.

The widely criticized[58] deficiencies in the opinion result from a retrospective look at its basis in conventional legal sources, when a correct appreciation of the decision requires a prospective examination of its consequences. Relying on the Articles of Confederation hardly supports interpretation of the Constitution, when it was the latter that unceremoniously displaced the former. An attempt to clarify the rule of recognition must be aimed at securing widespread official acceptance and popular obedience, which is what actually resulted from Texas v. White. The opinion was itself part of the process of changing the rule. Despite objections to its reasoning, it elicited no widespread reaction that prevented it from becoming the canonical statement of state and national sovereignty.[59]

The absence of objections partly resulted from the relative obscurity of the merits of the dispute, which concerned the rights of private individuals who had purchased United States bonds from Texas during the Civil War.[60] That issue would have been of interest to investors who held government bonds and who might have been seriously worried about their rights to bonds that they purchased on the open market. The holding on this issue put indirect purchasers of bonds in the position of those who had purchased their bonds directly from Texas, because the bonds had become due during the Civil War. These holders were plainly on notice that the bonds were sold to finance the secessionist government of Texas and that the sale could be invalidated for that reason.

During the War, according to the Court, the secessionist government lacked the authority to sell bonds in furtherance of the Confederate war effort.[61] But the Court reasoned that because the bonds were then mature, the indirect purchasers could not invoke the good faith purchaser rule that typically protected other holders of negotiable instruments; they could not insulate their indirect purchases from the invalidity of the initial direct purchase sale of the bonds from Texas.[62]

All this sounds—and is—highly convoluted and it bears only a distant relationship to the jurisdictional holding that Texas, through its reconstructed government, could invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[63] Strictly speaking, the jurisdictional holding did not require the Court to opine on the existence of “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” The Court could simply have held that, regardless of the status of Texas during the Civil War, it had the status of a state by reason of its reconstructed government after the war. It was only then that Texas brought this case against the bondholders. That conclusion was entirely consistent with the holding on the merits that the secessionist government of Texas lacked authority to sell the bonds in furtherance of the Confederate war effort.

Curiously, however, the holding that relegated good faith purchasers to the status of direct purchasers was subject to “grave doubt” within six years and explicitly overruled ten years later.[64] Undermining the good-faith purchaser rule evidently caused greater concern than rejecting the arguments for secession in a poorly reasoned dictum. The survival of the dictum seems to have resulted from the obscurity of the merits. Participants in the market for United States bonds no doubt worried more about erosion of the good-faith purchaser rule than the illegality of secession.

The immediate implications of the case soon became divorced from the dictum on secession, which has since had a successful career as an established principle of constitutional law.[65] Doubts about the logic of the opinion, although voiced repeatedly over the years, never led to questions about the validity of the dictum, which soon acquired a life of its own.

The afterlife of Texas v. White conforms quite closely to Hart’s account of how resolution of uncertainty in the rule of recognition takes hold and becomes integral to a legal system. It does not, however, indicate that the process is instantaneous or free from the contingencies characteristic of any significant change in the law.

Reducing uncertainty in the rule of recognition as a social practice by altering determinate legal rules requires more than logical deduction. The guiding force of the rule of recognition might become ever more attenuated as the needed changes reach ever further into the intricacies of the legal system. At such a distance, it might not guide judges to the dispositive sources in standard legal sources. The rule of recognition does not operate as simply or as directly as Hart’s original account of the rule suggests.[66] Although emphasized by critics of Hart, the complexity of the rule of recognition does not detract from the central insight behind the rule: that it locates the ultimate authority of law in social and political facts. Those facts, although distinct from legal doctrine, nevertheless depend upon it because it constitutes the means for gaining official acceptance and popular obedience to changes in the rule of recognition, which are the conditions for its continued existence.

The interdependence of the rule of recognition and the legal rules derived from it enhances, rather than detracts from, the role of decisions based directly on the rule of recognition without the benefit of intermediate sources of ordinary law. Such decisions do not simply draw out the implications of a clarified rule of recognition; they also promote acceptance of the changes implicit in clarifying the rule.

This dual role does more than excuse the weak reasoning in Texas v. White. It also explains the overt political appeal in the opinion, most obviously in adopting the argument for perpetual union from Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address.[67] That address constitutes the canonical statement of the mainstream Republican justification for fighting the Civil War. The opinion departs from the First Inaugural Address, as it had to do, in referring to state sovereignty only in the most abstract way. In a vain effort to avert the Civil War, Lincoln much more specifically conceded state sovereignty over slavery.[68] That concession disappeared as the Civil War turned into a war of emancipation in addition to one to preserve the Union. After the war, Chief Justice Chase could refer to state sovereignty only in an abstract and conclusory reference to “indestructible States.”[69]

The balance struck in the opinion between “an indestructible Union” and “indestructible States” appears to modern eyes to be a nearly inscrutable reference to all the issues of federalism that have animated constitutional law and politics in this country. At the time, however, it solidified the status of the Reconstruction amendments, which presupposed that the former Confederate states continued to be states in the Union. Yet it did not cast doubt upon Military Reconstruction, so long as the federal occupation of the South did not purport to destroy the southern states.[70] The dictum allowed the Court to continue to equivocate and evade the constitutionality of Reconstruction, which was essential to exacting compliance in the South with the new regime established by the victory of the North. Mixed though the results of Reconstruction were,[71] it would not have achieved even limited success if it had been declared unconstitutional. The abstract compromise formulated in Texas v. White was an offer that neither side could wholly refuse.

Another feature of the opinion that turns vice into virtue is the seemingly illogical distinction between a state and its government. The Court ruled in favor of a partially reconstructed southern government, reasoning that its efforts to return to normal relations with the Union were enough to allow it invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction.[72] Moreover, those same efforts distinguished it from the prior secessionist government, whose acts in selling the bonds were invalid because they were in aid of the Confederate war effort. Although the basis for the distinction in political and legal theory might be elusive, its impact in Texas v. White was tangible and immediate. It allowed the State to prevail on both the jurisdictional issue and on the merits,[73] and in the process defused any practical objection to the decision. By 1868, most of the former Confederate states were deemed entitled to representation in Congress although four, including Texas, were readmitted in 1870.[74]

In this respect, and in several others, the decision in Texas v. White bears an uncanny resemblance to Marbury v. Madison.[75] Just as President Jefferson could not object to the assertion of the power of judicial review in the earlier case, because his position had prevailed on the merits,[76] so too, the former Confederate states could not object to the result in the later case. Likewise, both decisions turned on the arcane issue of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, most of whose power lies in its appellate jurisdiction.[77] And both decisions twisted the original jurisdiction around from a straightforward reading of the statute, in Marbury v. Madison, purporting to confer such jurisdiction, and of the Constitution, in Texas v. White, in conferring jurisdiction over claims by the states. A state, according to the decision, could take advantage of this jurisdiction sometimes and sometimes not—depending on the relations between its government and the Union—even though it always remained a state. The Court remained equivocal about the exact dimensions of the original jurisdiction.

The ad hoc reasoning in Texas v. White nevertheless formed the basis for a durable resolution of the tensions between state and national sovereignty after the Civil War.[78] No one, with the exception of bondholders who were denied the right to invoke the good-faith purchaser rule for negotiable instruments, had anything to complain about. And even those bondholders succeeded in having that part of the decision overruled within two decades.[79] An inconspicuous case on the sale of United States bonds might appear to be an unlikely vehicle for clarifying fundamental law, but only if judged solely by the standards of conventional legal reasoning based on existing sources of law. Judged by the prospective standards of fostering acceptance and obedience to the changed legal order, on the other hand, Texas v. White offered an auspicious occasion to make this change official.

Conclusion

Was the decision in Texas v. White deliberate, inevitable, or lucky? Giving Chief Justice Chase the benefit of the doubt, we might find the choice of this case to declare the indestructibility of the Union to be an act of inspired statesmanship. Or, given the widespread belief, then and now, that the illegality of secession was the verdict of the Civil War, we might find it inevitable that the Supreme Court would come to the same conclusion. Or we might say that the confluence of events and actions, both inside the law and outside it, made the outcome highly contingent. Perhaps Grier’s dissent had been as likely to become the law as Chase’s majority opinion.

Nicoletti does not make a choice among these alternatives, although the first accords with her general suspicion of Chase’s motives,[80] especially in light of his ambition to become president.[81] Indeed, his near quotation of Lincoln’s First Inaugural in Texas v. White might have betrayed an ambition to deliver his own inaugural address. The Court had, after all, heard a number of cases in which it could have ruled on the legality of secession. One of them, Ex parte McCardle,[82] was handed down the same day as Texas v. White, with another majority opinion written by Chase. The Court also delayed the decision in Ex parte McCardle and confined its holding to a narrow jurisdictional issue.[83] The Court employed the same tactic a year later in Ex parte Yerger,[84] in yet another opinion by Chase. Those delaying tactics cleared the way for deciding the legality of secession with a grand dictum in an otherwise inconspicuous case. In this context, ironically enough, Chase’s opinion in Texas v. White becomes, as in Marbury v. Madison, an astute manipulation of political cross-current, ostensibly to carry out the “duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”[85]

Of course, no matter how opportunistic we find Chase to be, circumstances had to favor his strategy, both in presenting him with the issue of the legality of secession and in generating a promising case in which to resolve it. If Union victory in the Civil War made the illegality of secession a fait accompli, then it was a legal principle simply waiting to be recognized in legal doctrine.

On the other hand, exactly how it would be recognized depended upon the vicissitudes of the shifting politics and judicial decisions in Reconstruction. Even Chase could not control the cases brought before the Supreme Court, which at the time lacked the discretion inherent in the writ of certiorari.[86] If we accept the need for the legal system to adjust to a change in the rule of recognition, as almost all legal theorists do in some form today, all the crucial features of that adjustment cannot be deduced as a matter of first principles. At times like Reconstruction, it is exactly those principles that remain open to reconsideration and revision.

Other times present other challenges and some might draw implications from Texas v. White for constitutional controversies in other eras. Few such cases, however, would present the stark contrast, asserted at the time, between “trial by battle” and “the rule of law.” Appeal to the rule of recognition dissolves this contrast, or so I have argued. Whether it could facilitate reconciliation between social practices and legal doctrine in other circumstances remains an open question. Hart himself thought that judicial decisions resolving disputes over the rule of recognition were few and far between.[87] If they became common, the rule of recognition would tend to supplant standard sources of law in hard cases, diminishing its value as a foundation for law rather than the law itself. Invoking it in the extraordinary circumstances of Texas v. White poses few such risks. Despite all the criticism that the opinion has received, it has not been attacked as an instance of judicial overreaching.[88]

Professor Nicoletti has done a great service in forcefully reminding us of the live controversy that the decision effectively put to rest. The illegality of secession today, at the distance of a century and a half, might appear to be a foregone conclusion, but this conclusion is more a matter of hindsight than insight into the actors at the time and their motives. An uneasy lesson of her book is that the familiar and seemingly realist assumption that law depends on politics has disturbing implications, not just for legal theory but for the law itself, whenever it is put to the test.

 

 


[1]Cynthia Nicoletti, Secession on Trial: The Treason Prosecution of Jefferson Davis (2017).

[2]See id. at 3 & n.7.

[3]Id. at 84–120 (discussing the Civil War as a trial by battle).

[4]Id. at 69.

[5]Id. at 39–49, 225–29.

[6]67 U.S. 635, 650 (1862).

[7]Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. 227, 237 (1868).

[8]Nicoletti, supra note 1, at 120.

[9]H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 100–10 (3d ed. 2012).

[10]Id. at 116–17.

[11]See Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma, Introduction to The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution xiii, xviii–xxii (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).

[12]See Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Rule of Recognition (And Does It Exist)?, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, supra note 11, at 235–68.

[13]White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 237.

[14]Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XIII.

[15]U.S. Const. pmbl. The phrase “perpetual union” also appears in the title of the Articles of Confederation: “Articles of confederation and perpetual union between the states of . . . .” Articles of Confederation of 1781, pmbl.

[16]See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XIII.

[17]U.S. Const. art. VII.

[18]See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 262, 264–65 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

[19]See Nicoletti, supra note 1, at 3 & n.7; Mark R. Killenbeck, Political Facts, Legal Fictions, in Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought 223, 223–24, 236–38 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016); Sanford Levinson, The 21st Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate, or Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled With?, in Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought 10, 38–39 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016); see also Nicoletti, supra note 1, at 120.

[20]Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 99–119 (1998).

[21]See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 375, 419–57 (2001).

[22]See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

[23]See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 209–10.

[24]Harrison, supra note 21, at 407–08.

[25]Hart, supra note 9, at 110.

[26]Id. at 114–15.

[27]Id. at xxxviii–xliv (introduction by Leslie Green).

[28]Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 62–65 (1986).

[29]Hart, supra note 9, at 292–93.

[30]Id. at 186–88.

[31]See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.

[32]U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

[33]Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution 415–16 (2016).

[34]U.S. Const. amend. X.

[35]See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

[36]See Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law 79–89 (2015) (also emphasizing the role of force in gaining acceptance of the rule of recognition).

[37]Hart, supra note 9, at 153.

[38]See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, supra note 11, at 23–25.

[39]Hart, supra note 9, at 100–02.

[40]Stephen Perry, Where Have All the Powers Gone? Hartian Rules of Recognition, Noncognitivism, and the Constitutional and Jurisprudential Foundations of Law, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, supra note 11, at 295–297. See generally id. at 295–326.

[41]U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.

[42]Id. § 4.

[43]See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.

[44]Hart, supra note 9, at 272.

[45]Id. at 273–75.

[46]Articles of Confederation of 1781, pmbl. & art. XIII.

[47]U.S. Const. pmbl.

[48]U.S. Const. art. V.

[49]See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 n.3 (2008).

[50]Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. 227, 238 (1868).

[51]Id.

[52]See id. at 236. But see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).

[53]White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 237.

[54]Id. at 229.

[55]See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 515 (1868) (no appellate jurisdiction); Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1868) (only jurisdictional issue addressed); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 77 (1867) (no jurisdiction in equity over political question); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866) (no jurisdiction in equity to enjoin discretionary acts of the president).

[56]See supra note 3 and accompanying text; White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 241–42 (Grier, J., dissenting).

[57]See White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 237­–38.

[58]See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1992, 2040–43 (2003) (“However significant its contribution to sectional reconciliation, the fiction of Texas v. White posed a basic paradox for Reconstruction . . . .”).

[59]See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“In Chief Justice Chase’s much–quoted words, ‘the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.’” (quoting White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 237)).

[60]White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 227–28.

[61]Id. at 239–40.

[62]Id. at 239–41.

[63]Id. at 238–39.

[64]Vermilye & Co. v. Adams Express Co., 88 U.S. 138, 145 (1874) (expressing “grave doubt” about the holding relegating good faith purchasers to direct purchasers); Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476, 495–96 (1885) (overruling Texas v. White on the good faith purchaser question except where the title is acquired with notice of the defect of title or under similar circumstances).

[65]See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290–91 (1885); Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415, 418 (1880); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 461–62 (1878). Recent decisions on federalism continue to rely upon Texas v. White. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (equal sovereignty of states under the Constitution); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (states retained inviolable sovereignty under the Constitution); Kohlhaas v. State Office of Lieutenant Governor, 147 P.3d 714, 718–20 (Alaska 2006) (secession not proper subject for referendum).

[66]See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 245–50.

[67]See Lincoln, supra note 18, at 264–65.

[68]Id. at 265–66.

[69]White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 237.

[70]Id. at 237–38.

[71]See generally Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877, at 602–12 (1988) (discussing mixed results of reconstruction).

[72]White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 239.

[73]Id. at 239, 241.

[74]Harrison, supra note 21, at 408 (noting that Virginia, Mississippi, and Georgia did not regain their seats in Congress until 1870).

[75]5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

[76]Id. at 162, 173.

[77]Id. at 173–76; White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. at 237, 241.

[78]See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.

[79]Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476, 495–96 (1885).

[80]Nicoletti, supra note 1, at 194–95.

[81]Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase and Constitutional Politics, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 459, 460, 478–79 (1997) (reviewing John Niven, Salmon P. Chase: A Biography (1995)).

[82]74 U.S. 506, 506–09 (1868) (discussing application of writ of habeas corpus).

[83]See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 226–27.

[84]75 U.S. 85, 104–06 (1868).

[85]Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.

[86]Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1928) (“The remedy proposed by the Supreme Court and adopted by Congress was a transference of numerous classes of cases from obligatory review by appeal or writ of error to discretionary review by certiorari.”).

[87]Hart, supra note 9, at 153–54.

[88]New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (endorsing Texas v. White as one of several decisions which recognized the independent existence of both the states and the United States).

Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments

Introduction

By any measure, the Antiquities Act of 1906 has a remarkable legacy. Under the Antiquities Act, 16 presidents have proclaimed 157 national monuments, protecting a diverse range of historic, archaeological, cultural, and geologic resources.[1] Many of these monuments, including such iconic places as the Grand Canyon, Zion, Olympic, and Acadia, have been expanded and redesignated by Congress as national parks.

While the designation of national monuments is often celebrated, it has on occasion sparked local opposition, and led to calls for a President to abolish or shrink a national monument that a predecessor proclaimed.[2] This article examines the Antiquities Act and other statutes, concluding that the President lacks the legal authority to abolish or diminish national monuments. Instead, these powers are reserved to Congress.

I. The Authority to Abolish National Monuments

The Property Clause of the Constitution vests in Congress the “[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting [public property].”[3] The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently reviewed this power in the context of public lands management and found it to be “without limitations.”[4] Congress can, however, delegate power to the President or other members of the executive branch so long as it sets out an intelligible principle to guide the exercise of executive discretion.[5]

Congress did exactly this when it enacted the Antiquities Act and delegated to the President the power to “declare by public proclamation” national monuments.[6] At the same time, Congress did not, in the Antiquities Act or otherwise, delegate to the President the authority to modify or revoke the designation of monuments. Further, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) makes it clear that the President does not have any implied authority to do so, but rather that Congress reserved for itself the power to modify or revoke monument designations.[7]

A. The Antiquities Act does not grant authority to revoke a monument designation

The United States owns about one third of our nation’s lands.[8] These lands, which exist throughout the country but are concentrated in the western United States, are managed by federal agencies for a wide range of purposes such as preservation, outdoor recreation, mineral and timber extraction, and ranching. Homestead, mining, and other laws transferred ownership rights over large areas of federal lands to private parties. At the same time, vast tracts of land remain in public ownership, and these lands contain a rich assortment of natural, historical, and cultural resources.

Over its long history, Congress has “withdrawn,” or exempted, some federal public lands from statutes that allow for resource extraction and development, and “reserved” them for particular uses, including for preservation and resource conservation.[9] Congress has also, in several instances, delegated to the executive branch the authority to set aside lands for particular types of protection. The Antiquities Act of 1906 is one such delegation.

The core of the Antiquities Act is both simple and narrow. It reads, in part:

[T]he President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected . . . .[10]

The narrow authority granted to the President to reserve land[11] under the Antiquities Act stands in marked contrast to contemporaneous laws that delegated much broader executive authority to designate, repeal, or modify other types of federal reservations of public lands. For example, the Pickett Act of 1910 allowed the President to withdraw public lands from “settlement, location, sale, or entry” and reserve these lands for a wide range of specified purposes “until revoked by him or an Act of Congress.”[12] Likewise, the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 authorized the President “to modify any Executive order that has been or may hereafter be made establishing any forest reserve, and by such modification may reduce the area or change the boundary lines of such reserve, or may vacate altogether any order creating such reserve.”[13]

Unlike the Pickett Act and the Forest Service Organic Administration Act, the Antiquities Act withholds authority from the President to change or revoke a national monument designation. That authority remains with Congress under the Property Clause.

This interpretation of the President’s authority finds support in the single authoritative executive branch source interpreting the scope of Presidential power to revoke monuments designated under the Antiquities Act: a 1938 opinion by Attorney General Homer Cummings.[14] President Franklin D. Roosevelt had specifically asked Cummings through the Secretary of the Interior whether the Antiquities Act authorized the President to revoke the Castle Pinckney National Monument. In his opinion, Cummings compared the language noted above from the Pickett Act and the Forest Service Organic Act with the language in the Antiquities Act, and concluded unequivocally that the Antiquities Act “does not authorize [the President] to abolish [national monuments] after they have been established.”[15]

B. FLPMA clarifies that only Congress can revoke or downsize a national monument

In 1976, Congress enacted FLPMA.[16] FLPMA governs the management of federal public lands lacking any specific designation as a national park, national forest, national wildlife refuge, or other specialized unit. The text, structure, and legislative history of FLPMA confirm the conclusion of Attorney General Cummings that the President does not possess the authority to revoke or downsize a monument designation.

FLPMA codified federal policy to retain—rather than dispose of—the remaining federal public lands,[17] provided for specific procedures for land-use planning on those lands, and consolidated the wide-ranging legal authorities relating to the uses of those lands.[18] Prior to FLPMA’s enactment, delegations of executive authority to withdraw public lands from development or resource extraction were dispersed among federal statutes, including the Pickett Act and the Forest Service Organic Act. Moreover, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., the Supreme Court held that the President enjoyed an implied power to withdraw public lands as might be necessary to protect the public interest, at least in the absence of direct statutory authority or prohibition.[19]

FLPMA consolidated and streamlined the President’s withdrawal power. It repealed the Pickett Act, along with most other executive authority for withdrawing lands—with the notable exception of the Antiquities Act.[20] In place of these prior withdrawal authorities, FLPMA included a new provision—section 204—that authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to make, modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance with the provisions and limitations of this section.”[21]

FLPMA left unchanged the President’s authority to create national monuments under the Antiquities Act, and included language confirming that Congress alone may modify or abolish monuments. Subsection 204(j) of FLPMA somewhat curiously states that “[t]he Secretary [of Interior] shall not . . . modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under [the Antiquities Act]. . . .”[22] Because only the President, and not the Secretary of the Interior, has authority to proclaim national monuments, Congress’s reference to the Secretary’s authority under the Antiquities Act is anomalous and, as explained further below, may be the result of a drafting error. Nonetheless, this language reinforces the most plausible reading of the text of the Antiquities Act: that it deliberately provides for one-way designation authority. The President may act to create a national monument, but only Congress can modify or revoke that action.

An examination of FLPMA’s legislative history removes any doubt that section 204(j) was intended to reserve to Congress the exclusive authority to modify or revoke national monuments. FLPMA’s restriction of executive withdrawal powers originated in the House version of the legislation.[23] Skepticism in the House towards executive withdrawal authority dated back to the 1970 report of the Public Lands Law Review Commission (PLLRC), a Congressionally-created special committee tasked with recommending a complete overhaul of the public land laws. The PLLRC report called on Congress to repeal all existing withdrawal powers, including the power to create national monuments under the Antiquities Act.[24] The Commission suggested replacing this authority with a comprehensive withdrawal process run by the Secretary of the Interior and closely supervised by Congress.[25]

The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs’ Subcommittee on Public Lands largely followed this recommendation by including Section 204 in its draft of FLPMA.[26] Complementing this section, the bill presented to and passed by the House included a provision—ultimately enacted as Section 704(a) of FLPMA—that repealed the Pickett Act and other extant laws allowing executive withdrawals, as well as the implied executive authority to withdraw public lands that the Supreme Court had recognized in Midwest Oil.[27]

Consistent with this approach, the Subcommittee on Public Lands drafted Section 204(j) in order to constrain executive branch discretion in the context of national monuments. The Subcommittee frequently discussed the issue during its detailed markup sessions in 1975 and early 1976 on its version of the bill that would eventually become FLPMA.[28]

At an early markup session in May 1975, some subcommittee members, under the mistaken impression that the Secretary of the Interior created national monuments, expressed concerns that some future Secretary might modify or revoke them.[29] The Subcommittee therefore began shaping the bill to eliminate any possibility of unilateral executive power to modify or revoke monuments, while maintaining the existing power to create monuments.[30]

Once the Subcommittee’s misunderstanding about Secretarial authority to designate monuments became apparent, the Subcommittee also proposed shifting the authority to create national monuments from the President to the Secretary, in the pattern of consolidating withdrawal authority in Section 204.[31] The first version of what later became Section 204(j) of FLPMA was drafted after this discussion, as was a provision that would have amended the Antiquities Act to transfer designation authority from the President to the Secretary of the Interior.[32] The Ford Administration appeared to object generally to constraining executive power to withdraw public lands.[33] As part of the subsequent changes to the draft legislation, the Subcommittee dropped the provision that would have transferred monument designation authority from the President to the Secretary.[34]

Nonetheless, the Subcommittee retained Section 204(j). Pairing Section 204(j) with the proposed transfer of monument designation power strongly suggests that the language of Section 204(j) was not an effort to constrain (non-existent) Secretarial authority to modify or revoke national monuments while retaining Presidential authority to do so. Instead, it was part of an overall plan to constrain and systematize all executive branch withdrawal power, and reserve to Congress the powers to modify or rescind monument designations.[35] The House Committee’s Report on the bill makes clear that this provision was designed to prevent any unilateral executive modification or revocation of national monuments. In describing Section 204 of the bill as it was presented for debate on the House floor, the Report explains:

With certain exceptions, [the bill] will repeal all existing law relating to executive authority to create, modify, and terminate withdrawals and reservations. It would reserve to the Congress the authority to create, modify, and terminate withdrawals for national parks, national forests, the Wilderness System, Indian reservations, certain defense withdrawals, and withdrawals for National Wild and Scenic Rivers, National Trails, and for other “national” recreation units, such as National Recreation Areas and National Seashores. It would also specifically reserve to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act and for modification and revocation of withdrawals adding lands to the National Wildlife Refuge System. These provisions will insure that the integrity of the great national resource management systems will remain under the control of the Congress.[36]

Thus, notwithstanding the anomalous reference to the Secretary in Section 204(j), Congress explicitly stated its intention to reserve for itself the authority to modify or revoke national monuments.[37] The plain language of this report, combined with other statements in the legislative history and the process by which Congress created Section 204(j), make clear that Congress’ intent was to constrain all executive branch power to modify or revoke national monuments, not just Secretarial authority.

In light of the text of the Antiquities Act, the contrasting language in other statutes at the turn of the 20th century, and the changes to federal land management law in FLPMA, the Antiquities Act must be construed to limit the President’s authority to proclaiming national monuments on federal lands. Only Congress can modify or revoke such proclamations.

II. Authority for Shrinking National Monuments or Removing Restrictive Terms

If the President cannot abolish a national monument because Congress did not delegate that authority to the President, it follows that the President also lacks the power to downsize or loosen the protections afforded to a monument. This conclusion is reinforced by the use of the phrase “modify and revoke” in Section 204(j) of FLPMA to describe prohibited actions.[38] Moreover, while the Antiquities Act limits national monuments to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected,”[39] that language does not grant the President the authority to second-guess the judgments made by previous Presidents regarding the area or level of protection needed to protect the objects identified in an Antiquities Act proclamation.

A. Presidents lack legal authority to shrink national monuments

Over the first several decades of the Antiquities Act’s existence, various Presidents reduced the size of various monuments that their predecessors had designated. Most of these actions were relatively minor, although the decision by President Woodrow Wilson to dramatically reduce the size of the Mount Olympus National Monument, which is described briefly below, was both significant and controversial.[40] Importantly though, no Presidential decision to reduce the size of a national monument has ever been tested in court, and so no court has ever ruled on the legality of such an action. Moreover, all such actions occurred before 1976 when FLPMA became law. As the language and legislative history of FLPMA make clear, Congress has quite intentionally reserved to itself “the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act.”[41]

In his 1938 opinion, Attorney General Cummings acknowledged the history of modifications to national monuments, noting that “the President from time to time has diminished the area of national monuments established under the Antiquities Act by removing or excluding lands therefrom.”[42] The opinion, however, does not directly address whether these actions were legal, and does not analyze this issue, other than to reference the language from the Antiquities Act that limits monuments to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.”[43]

The Interior Department’s Solicitors did review several presidential attempts to shrink monuments, but reached inconsistent conclusions. In 1915, the Solicitor examined President Woodrow Wilson’s proposal to shrink the Mount Olympus National Monument, which President Theodore Roosevelt had designated in 1909.[44] Without addressing the core legal issue of whether the President had authority to change the monument status of lands designated by a prior President, the Solicitor expressed the opinion that lands removed from the monument would revert to national forest (rather than unreserved public domain) because they had previously been national forest lands.[45]

In the end, President Wilson did downsize the Mount Olympus National Monument by more than 313,000 acres, nearly cutting it in half.[46] Despite an outcry from the conservation community, Wilson’s decision went unchallenged in court.[47]

In 1924, for the first time, the Solicitor squarely confronted the issue of whether a President has the authority to reduce the size of a national monument, concluding that the President lacked this authority. The Solicitor considered whether the President could reduce the size of the Gran Quivira[48] and Chaco Canyon National Monuments.[49] Relying on a 1921 Attorney General’s opinion involving “public land reserved for lighthouse purposes,” the Solicitor concluded that the President was not authorized to restore lands to the public domain that had been previously set aside as part of a national monument.[50] The Solicitor confirmed this position in a subsequent decision issued in 1932.[51]

Subsequently, in 1935, the Interior Solicitor reversed the agency’s position, but this time on somewhat narrow grounds.[52] This opinion relied heavily on the implied authority of the President to make and modify withdrawals that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in United States v. Midwest Oil Co.[53] The argument that Midwest Oil imbues the President with implied authority to modify or abolish national monuments is problematic, however, for at least three reasons. First, as described previously, Congress enjoys plenary authority over our public lands under the Constitution, and the President’s authority to proclaim a national monument derives solely from the delegation of that power to the President under the Antiquities Act.[54] But the Antiquities Act grants the President only the power to reserve land, not to modify or revoke such reservations. Such actions, therefore, are beyond the scope of Congress’ delegation. Second, the Midwest Oil decision relied heavily on the perception that Presidential action was necessary to protect the public interest by preventing public lands from exploitation for private gain. Construing the law to allow a President to open lands to private exploitation protects no such interest. Finally, and as noted previously, Congress expressly overruled Midwest Oil when it enacted FLPMA in 1976.[55] Thus, even if those earlier, pre-FLPMA monument modifications might arguably have been supported by implied presidential authority, that implied authority is no longer available to justify the shrinking of national monuments following the passage of FLPMA.[56]

Some critics of national monument designations have argued that a President can downsize a national monument by demonstrating that the area reserved does not represent the “smallest area compatible” with the protection of the resources and sites identified in the monument proclamation.[57] But allowing a President to second-guess the judgment of a predecessor as to the amount of land needed to protect the objects identified in a proclamation is fraught with peril because it essentially denies the first President the power that Congress granted to proclaim monuments. If that were the law, then nothing would stop a President from deciding that the objects identified by a prior President were themselves not worthy of protection. Congress clearly intended the one-way power to reserve lands as national monuments to avoid this danger. Moreover, the fact that national monuments often encompass large landscapes, which are themselves denoted as the objects warranting protection, is not a cause for concern because the courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have consistently upheld the use of the Antiquities Act to protect such landscapes as “objects of historic or scientific interest.”[58] Courts have upheld two prominent examples of landscape level monuments under these broad interpretations: the Grand Canyon,[59] designated less than two years after the Antiquities Act’s passage; and the Giant Sequoia National Monument, created in 2000.[60]

It is conceivable, of course, that a revised proclamation might be needed to correct a mistake or to clarify a legal description in the original proclamation, as occurred very early on when President Taft proclaimed the Navajo National Monument and subsequently issued a second proclamation clarifying what had been an extremely ambiguous legal description.[61] But the clear restriction on modifying or revoking a national monument designation—cemented by FLPMA—indicates that a President cannot simply revisit a predecessor’s decision about how much public land should be protected.

B. Removing protections that apply on national monuments would be an unlawful modification

A related issue is whether a President can modify a national monument proclamation by removing some or all of the protections applied to the monument area, such as limitations on livestock grazing, mineral leasing, or mining claims location. Plainly, these are types of “modifications.” As discussed above, Congress’s use of the phrase “modify and revoke” to describe prohibited actions demonstrates that the same legal principles apply here as would apply to an attempt to abolish a monument.[62] More generally, if a President lacks the authority to abolish or downsize a monument, it would also suggest a lack of presidential authority to remove any restrictions imposed by a predecessor. Moreover, to the extent that a claim of presidential authority rests on an argument that the President can shrink a monument to conform to the “smallest area compatible” language of the Antiquities Act, that argument would be inapplicable to an effort to remove restrictive language from a predecessor’s national monument proclamation.[63]

Aside from these legal arguments, construing the Antiquities Act as providing one-way Presidential designation authority is consistent with the fundamental goal of the statute. Faced with a concern that historical, archaeological, and natural or scenic resources could be damaged or lost, Congress purposefully devised a delegation to the President to act quickly to ensure the preservation of objects of historic and scientific interest on public lands before they are looted or compromised by incompatible land uses, such as the location of mining claims. Once the President has determined that these objects are worthy of protection, no future President should be able to undermine that choice. That is a decision that Congress lawfully reserved for itself under the terms of the Antiquities Act, a point that Congress reinforced in the text and legislative history of FLPMA.

Conclusion

Our conclusion, based on analysis of the text of the Antiquities Act and other statutes, legislative history, and prior legal opinions, is that the President lacks the authority to abolish or downsize a monument, or otherwise weaken the protections afforded by a national monument proclamation declared by a predecessor. Moreover, while we believe this to be the correct reading of the law from the time of enactment of the Antiquities Act in 1906, the enactment of FLPMA in 1976 removes any doubt as to whether Congress intended to reserve for itself the power to revoke or modify national monument proclamations, because Congress stated so explicitly.

Presidents may retain some authority to clarify a proclamation that contains an ambiguous legal description or a mistake of fact.[64] Where expert opinions differ, however, courts should defer to the choices made by the President proclaiming the monument and the relevant objects designated for protection. Otherwise, a future President could undermine the one-way conservation authority afforded the President under the Antiquities Act and the congressional decision to reserve for itself the authority to abolish or modify national monuments.

The remarkable success of the Antiquities Act in preserving many of our nation’s most iconic places is perhaps best captured by the fact that Congress has never repealed any significant monument designation.[65] Instead, in many instances, Congress has expanded national monuments and redesignated them as national parks.[66] For more than 100 years, Presidents from Teddy Roosevelt to Barack Obama have used the Antiquities Act to protect our historical, scientific, and cultural heritage, often at the very moment when these resources were at risk of exploitation. That is the enduring legacy of this extraordinary law. And it remains our best hope for preserving our public land resources well into the future.

 


*Mark Squillace, Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Eric Biber, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Nicholas S. Bryner, Emmett/Frankel Fellow in Environmental Law and Policy, University of California, Los Angeles; Sean B. Hecht, Professor of Policy and Practice & Co-Executive Director, Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, University of California, Los Angeles. The authors express thanks to Emma Hamilton for research assistance.

[1]See Nat’l Parks Conservation Association, Monuments Protected Under the Antiquities Act (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.npca.org/resources/2658-monuments-protected-under-the-antiquities-act.

[2]On April 26, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order calling for the Secretary of the Interior to review certain national monument designations made since 1996. Exec. Order No. 13,792, Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (2017), https://perma.cc/CA3A-QEEQ. The Order encompasses Antiquities Act designations since 1996 over 100,000 acres in size or “where the Secretary determines that the designation or expansion was made without adequate public outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders[.]” Id. at § 2(a). The Order asks the Secretary to make “recommendations for . . . Presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other actions consistent with law as the Secretary may consider appropriate to carry out the policy” described in the Order. Id. at § 2(d)-(e). The limits of presidential authority to abolish or diminish monuments has been the subject of prior analysis, including a report published by the Congressional Research Service in November 2016 and an analysis by the law firm Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer. Alexandra M. Wyatt, Cong. Research Serv., R44687, Antiquities Act: Scope of Authority for Modification of National Monuments (2016), https://perma.cc/RCT9-UJ8N; Robert Rosenbaum et al., Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, The President Has No Power Unilaterally to Abolish or Materially Change a National Monument Designation Under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (May 3, 2017), https://www.npca.org/resources/3197-legal-analysis-of-presidential-ability-to-revoke-national-monuments.

[3]U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

[4]See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294–295 (1958).

[5]J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The Supreme Court has also made clear that any delegation of legislative power must be construed narrowly to avoid constitutional problems. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).

[6]54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).

[7]See infra Section I.A.

[8]See Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation’s Land 19 (1970).

[9]See, e.g., The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (2012) (“[E]ffective January 1, 1984, the minerals in lands designated. . . as wilderness are withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under the mining laws and from disposition under all laws pertaining to mineral leasing. . . .”); The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1280(b) (2012) (“The minerals in any Federal lands which constitute the bed or bank or are situated within one-quarter mile of the bank of any river which is listed [for study as wild and scenic] are hereby withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under the mining laws. . . .”).

[10]Antiquities Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (prior to 2014 amendment). The language of the Antiquities Act was edited and re-codified in 2014 at 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)-(b) with the stated intent of “conform[ing] to the understood policy, intent, and purpose of Congress in the original enactments[.]” Pub. L. No. 113-287, §§ 2-3, 128 Stat. 3094, 3259 (2014) (codified at 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)-(b)).

[11]In an opinion dated September 15, 2000, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice found that the authority to reserve federal land under the Antiquities Act encompassed the authority to proclaim a national monument in the territorial sea—3-12 nautical miles from the shore—or the exclusive economic zone—12-200 nautical miles from the shore. Administration of Coral Reef Resources in the Northwest Hawaiian Islands, 24 Op. O.L.C. 183, 183–85 (Sept. 15, 2000), https://perma.cc/E8J8-EDL3.

[12]Pickett Act, Pub. L. No. 303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976) (emphasis added).

[13]Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006)) (emphasis added).

[14]Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185 (1938).

[15]Id. at 185–86 (1938).

[16]Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified primarily at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782 (2012)) [hereinafter “FLPMA”].

[17]See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012).

[18]Land use planning is specifically provided for under § 202 of FLPMA. Id. at § 1712. Additional public land use management authority is found at § 302 of FLPMA, which, among other things, requires the Secretary of the Interior to “take any action necessary to prevent the unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.” Id. at § 1732(b).

[19]236 U.S. 459, 491 (1915). Midwest Oil involved withdrawals by President Taft of certain public lands from the operation of federal laws that allowed private parties to locate mining claims on public lands and thereby acquire vested rights to the minerals found there. The Secretary of the Interior recommended the withdrawals after receiving a report from the Director of the Geological Survey describing the alarming rate at which federal oil lands were being claimed by private parties. Noting the government’s own need for petroleum resources to support its military, the report lamented that “the Government will be obliged to repurchase the very oil that it has practically given away . . . .” Id. at 466–67 (quotation marks omitted).

[20]FLPMA, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976). The authority to create or modify forest reserves was repealed in 1907 for six specific states before its repeal was extended to all states in FLPMA Section 704(a). 34 Stat. 1269, 1271 (1907).

[21]43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (2012) (emphasis added).

[22]Id. at § 1714(j). The provision reads in its entirety as follows, with emphasis on the part relating to the Antiquities Act:

The Secretary shall not make, modify, or revoke any withdrawal created by Act of Congress; make a withdrawal which can be made only by Act of Congress; modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under [the Antiquities Act]; or modify, or revoke any withdrawal which added lands to the National Wildlife Refuge System prior to October 21, 1976, or which thereafter adds lands to that System under the terms of this Act. Nothing in this Act is intended to modify or change any provision of the Act of February 27, 1976 (90 Stat. 199; 16 U.S.C. 668dd(a)).

Id. The reference in the first clause prohibiting the Secretary from “mak[ing]” a withdrawal “created by [an] Act of Congress” does not make sense because the Secretary cannot logically “make” a withdrawal already created by Congress. But it also is not relevant to the Antiquities Act since national monuments are created by the President, not Congress. Id. The second clause likewise addresses withdrawals made by Congress. The third clause is the only one that specifically addresses the Antiquities Act; it makes clear that the Secretary cannot modify or revoke national monuments. The final operative clause likewise prohibits the Secretary from revoking or modifying withdrawals, in that case involving National Wildlife Refuges.

[23]See H.R. 13777, 94th Cong. § 604(b) (1976). The Senate bill contained no restrictions on executive withdrawal power. See S. 577, 94th Cong. (1975).

[24]See Public Land Law Review Commission, supra note 8, at 2, 54–57.

[25]Id. at 56–57.

[26]H.R. 13777, 94th Cong. § 204 (1976).

[27]See id. at § 604(b) (1976). See also Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 491.

[28]The subcommittee’s hearings and markups focused on H.R. 5224, which eventually passed the full Committee in April 1976. An amended version was reintroduced as a clean bill, H.R. 13777, which was approved by the House and sent to the conference committee. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163, at 33 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6207 (1976) (describing replacement of H.R. 5224 with H.R. 13777 by committee).

[29]See H.R. 5224, et al., Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1975: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 88–93 (May 6, 1975) [hereinafter May 6 Hearing]. Later statements by subcommittee members indicate that their understanding was that the Secretary had delegated authority to propose the creation of monuments, but that they were ultimately proclaimed by the President. H.R. 5224 & H.R. 5622: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 184 (June 6, 1975) [hereinafter June 6 Hearing].

[30]May 6 Hearing, supra note 29, at 91 (statement of Rep. Melcher):

I would say that it would be better for us if, in presenting this bill to the House, for that matter in full committee, if we made it clear that the Secretary and perhaps also make it part of the bill somewhere, that he can not revoke a national monument.

See also id. at 93 (statement of committee staff member Irving Senzel: “So we could put in here that—we can put in the statement that he cannot revoke national monuments once created.”); H.R. 5224 & H.R. 5622: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 176 (June 6, 1975) (statement of committee staff member Irving Senzel: “In accordance with the decision made the last time, there is a section added in there that provides that no modification or revocation of national monuments can be made except by act of Congress.”).

[31]See June 6 Hearing, supra note 29, at 183–85.

[32]See Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1975 Print No. 2: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 23–24 (Sept. 8, 1975) (prohibiting the Secretary from modifying or revoking a national monument). Id. at 92 (amending the Antiquities Act by substituting “Secretary of the Interior” for “President of the United States”).

[33]See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163, at 41–42, 52 (May 15, 1976). The comments from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior from November 21, 1975, on Subcommittee Print No. 2 listed the proposed changes to withdrawal authority as one of the reasons for the Administration’s opposition to that version of the bill, noting that under it, “the proposed . . . Act would be the only basis for withdrawal authority.” Id. at 52.

[34]See See Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1975 Print No. 4: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs 94th Cong. (March 16, 1976).

[35]See id. at 30.

[36]H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163, at 9 (May 15, 1976) (emphasis added). Floor debates in the House do not contain any record of discussing this particular issue, and the Conference Report on FLPMA, later in 1976, did not specifically address it.

[37]The most plausible interpretation of the reference to the Secretary in the text is that there was a drafting error on the part of the Subcommittee in failing to update the reference in Section 204(j) when it dropped the parallel language transferring monument designation authority from the President to the Secretary. The only other plausible interpretation of Section 204(j) is that the provision was designed to make clear that Section 204(a), which authorizes the Secretary to modify or revoke withdrawals, was not intended to grant new authority to the Secretary over national monuments. Under this reading, the reference to the Secretary in Section 204(j) would not be anomalous but would serve the specific purpose of restricting the scope of Section 204(a). But whether the reference to the Secretary in Section 204(j) was a drafting error, or simply a clarification about the limits of the Secretary’s power under Section 204(a) does not really matter because either interpretation is consistent with the conclusion that Congress intended to reserve for itself the power to modify or revoke national monuments. FLPMA’s legislative history strongly reinforces this point. See supra notes 29–36.

[38]FLPMA, § 204(j), 90 Stat. 2743, 2754 (1976).

[39]54 U.S.C. § 320301(b).

[40]See Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 473, 561–64 (2003).

[41]H.R. Rep. 94-1163, at 9 (emphasis added). 43 U.S.C. 1714(j) (“The Secretary shall not. . . modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under [the Antiquities Act].”) (emphasis added).

[42]Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 188 (1938).

[43]Id. at 188 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b)). See also Wyatt, supra note 2, at 5. Much like the Attorney General’s 1938 Opinion, the CRS report acknowledges that “there is precedent for Presidents to reduce the size of national monuments. . .”, and that “[s]uch actions are presumably based on the determination that the areas to be excluded represent the President’s judgment as to ‘the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.’” Id. But also like the Attorney General’s Opinion, the report never actually analyzes the legal issue in depth and it does not address the particular question as to whether FLPMA might have resolved or clarified the issue against allowing presidential modifications. Id.

[44]Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247 (1909) (creating Mount Olympus National Monument); see also Squillace, supra note 40, at 562–63 (discussing the review of President Wilson’s proposal).

[45]U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor’s Opinion of April 20, 1915, at 4–6. The University of Colorado Law Library has established a permanent, online database that includes the four unpublished Solicitor’s Opinions cited in this article. That database is available at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/research-data/4/.

[46]Proclamation No. 1293, 39 Stat. 1726 (1915); Squillace, supra note 40, at 562.

[47]See Squillace, supra note 40, at 563–64.

[48]Proclamation No. 959, 36 Stat. 2503 (1909) (creating Gran Quivira National Monument).

[49]Proclamation No. 740, 35 Stat. 2119 (1907) (creating Chaco Canyon National Monument).

[50]U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor’s Opinion of June 3, 1924, M-12501 (citing 32 Op. Att’y Gen 438 (1921)). In language that anticipated the later 1938 opinion, this 1921 Attorney General’s opinion concluded that “[t]he power to thus reserve public lands and appropriate them . . . does not necessarily include the power to either restore them to the general public domain or transfer them to another department.” Disposition of Abandoned Lighthouse Sites, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 488, 488–91 (1921) (quoting Camp Hancock–Transfer to Dept. of Agriculture, 28 Op. Att’y Gen. 143, 144 (1921)). The Solicitor’s 1924 opinion on Gran Quivara and Chaco Canyon might be distinguished from the 1915 opinion on Mount Olympus National Monument, on the grounds that the earlier opinion had specifically supported the modification of the monument because the lands would not be restored to the public domain, but would rather be reclassified as national forests. Solicitor’s Opinion of April 20, 1915, supra note 45, at 6. The legal argument against the modification of monument proclamations, however, has never rested on whether the lands would be restored to the public domain or revert to another reservation or designation.

[51]U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor’s Opinion of May 16, 1932, M-27025 (opinion regarding Death Valley National Monument).

[52]U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor’s Opinion of January 30, 1935, M-27657 (upholding the validity of the reduction of Mount Olympus National Monument since no interdepartmental transfer). See also National Monuments, 60 Interior Dec. 9, 9–10 (July 21, 1947) (solicitor opinion reaffirming the 1935 opinion).

[53]U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor’s Opinion of January 30, 1935, M-27657; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 483 (1915).

[54]See, supra Part I.

[55]FLPMA, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976). While the text of Section 704(a) specifically mentions the power of the President “to make withdrawals,” given the clear intent of Congress in FLPMA to reduce executive withdrawal power, the section is best understood as also repealing any inherent Presidential power recognized in Midwest Oil to modify or revoke withdrawals as well.

[56]This repeal removes any presumption of inherent Presidential authority to withdraw public lands or modify past withdrawals. As noted above, such authority, if any, must derive from an express delegation from the Congress. In this way, the power of the President or any executive branch agency over public lands is unlike the inherent power of the President to issue, amend, or repeal executive orders or the inherent power of the Congress to promulgate, amend or repeal laws. It is arguably akin to the power of administrative agencies to issue, amend, or repeal rules but, unlike the Antiquities Act, each of these powers has been expressly delegated to agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (definition of “rulemaking”).

[57]See, e.g., John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Am. Enter. Inst., Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations 14–18 (2017), https://perma.cc/PX7W-UD3E. The Interior Solicitor’s 1935 opinion, and a subsequent one in 1947, addressed this issue in reviewing and supporting the validity of the decision by Woodrow Wilson to shrink the Mt. Olympus National Monument. Squillace, supra note 40, at 560–64. According to that opinion, both the Interior and Agriculture Departments thought the area was “larger than necessary.” U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor’s Opinion of Jan. 30, 1935, M-27657 (http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/research-data/4/.). However, there is no legal basis for concluding that the opinions of cabinet officials should overturn a prior presidential determination as to the scope and management requirements of a protected monument. Squillace, supra note 40, at 560–64.

[58]See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455–56 (1920). The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s objection to the establishment of the 808,120 acre Grand Canyon National Monument with these words:

The Grand Canyon, as stated in [President Roosevelt’s] proclamation, “is an object of unusual scientific interest.” It is the greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if not in the world, is over a mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is regarded as one of the great natural wonders, and annually draws to its borders thousands of visitors.

Id. at 455–56. See also, Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1140–41 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing Giant Sequoia National Monument). Additional Supreme Court cases that address Antiquities Act designations support this broad interpretation of what may constitute an “object of historic or scientific interest.” See United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 34 (1978) (Channel Islands); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131–32, 142 (1976) (Devil’s Hole).

[59]Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56.

[60]Tulare Cty., 306 F.3d at 1140–41.

[61]Taft’s original proclamation for the Navajo National Monument in Arizona protected:

[A]ll prehistoric cliff dwellings, pueblo and other ruins and relics of prehistoric peoples, situated upon the Navajo Indian Reservation, Arizona between the parallels of latitude thirty-six degrees thirty minutes North, and thirty-seven degrees North, and between longitude one hundred and ten degrees West and one hundred and ten degrees forty-five minutes West . . . together with forty acres of land upon which each ruin is located, in square form, the side lines running north and south and east and west, equidistant from the respective centers of said ruins.

Proclamation No. 873, 36 Stat. 2491, 2491–92 (1909). The map accompanying the proclamation states that Navajo National Monument is “[e]mbracing all cliff-dwelling and pueblo ruins between the parallel of latitude 36°30’ North and 37 North and longitude 110° West and 110° 45’ West. . . with 40 acres of land in square form around each of said ruins.” Id. at 493 Thus, the original proclamation was ambiguous. It plainly was not intended to include all of the lands within the latitude and longitude description but only 40 acres around the ruins in that area. The map specifically identified at least 7 sites as “ruins” and appeared to denote a handful of other sites that might have been intended for protection under the original proclamation, although the map is a little unclear on this point. The revised proclamation issued three years later, also by Taft, clarified the ambiguous references in the original proclamation. It included a survey done after the original proclamation and protects two, 160-acre tracts of land and one, 40 acre tract. Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733, 1733–34, 1738 (1912).

[62]See supra Section II.A.

[63]In National Monuments, supra note 52, at 10, the Solicitor acknowledged that the Mineral Leasing Act does not apply to national monuments. Nonetheless, he held that “in the event of actual or threatened drainage of oil or gas under lands within the Jackson Hole National Monument by wells on non-federally-owned lands, the authority to take the necessary protective action, including the issuance of oil and gas leases, would impliedly exist.” Id. at 10–11. To be clear, however, the Solicitor was not sanctioning surface occupancy of national monument lands but only the issuance of leases that would allow the federal government and the lessee to share in the oil and gas production that was being extracted from a well on non-federal lands. For further discussion of this issue, see Squillace, supra note 40, at 566–68.

[64]See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

[65]About a dozen monuments have been abolished by the Congress. None of these were larger than 10,000 acres, and no monument established by a president has been de-designated by Congress without redesignating the land as part of another national monument or other protected area since 1956. See Squillace, supra note 40, at 550, 585–610 (appendix). See also National Park Service, Archeology Program: Frequently Asked Questions (May 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/BW3C-X52Z (noting no parks as “abolished” since 1956 except for Misty Fjords, which was subsequently made part of Tongass National Park).

[66]See e.g., Proclamation No. 277, 40 Stat. 1175 (1919)(expanding size of Grand Canyon park).