Facebook’s Alternative Facts

[W]e show related articles next to [content flagged by fact-checkers] so people can see alternative facts.”

 

      -Sheryl Sandberg, Sept. 5, 2018

 

Nearly two years have passed since Kellyanne Conway, Counselor to President Donald J. Trump, coined the term “alternative facts” during a television interview. At the time, Conway’s language provoked a sharp response. “Alternative facts are not facts,” her interviewer replied. “They’re falsehoods.”[1] Commentators mostly agreed: Alternative facts were “an assault on foundational concepts of truth”[2] and “the new way of disregarding unpalatable evidence.”[3] Even a year later, one writer likened alternative facts to “reality denial” and claimed that the term had been “mocked out of existence.”[4]

In September 2018, alternative facts roared back into relevance when Facebook’s chief operating officer, Sheryl Sandberg, told a Senate committee that Facebook deploys alternative facts in its fight against misinformation.[5] In Facebook’s strategy, Sandberg explained, potentially false content is presented in users’ News Feeds alongside related articles “so people can see alternative facts.”[6] “The fundamental view is that bad speech can often be countered by good speech,” she said,[7] possibly meaning to evoke Louis Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v. California.[8] Thus, she explained, Facebook’s “Related Articles” feature literally places “good speech” (fact-checked content) beside “bad speech” (false content) in users’ scrolling feeds. To Sandberg, alternative facts did not describe reality denial but nearly its opposite: a strategy for evidence-based course correction.

Facebook’s use of Related Articles to fight misinformation, together with the articles’ public characterization as “alternative facts,” provide a case study for exploring the company’s private ordering of speech. They highlight Facebook’s power to control the communicative content of speech in digital space;[9] Facebook’s highly experimental approach to behavioral modification of users; Facebook’s lack of accountability for its speech-regulating choices beyond its economic relationships; Facebook’s selective neutrality in speech-related disputes; the complex relationship between speech practices that suppress misinformation and those that increase user engagement; and the tension that exists between Facebook’s role as a governor of others’ speech and its role as a corporate political speaker in its own right.

None of these factors justifies regulating Facebook as a state actor—a question that may weigh on the minds of the Supreme Court justices who hear Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck this term.[10] Permitting the government to regulate platforms like Facebook as state actors would, among other things, promote the “both sides” approach that I criticize in this essay. Competition among platforms obviates the need for content-based regulation, so long as users can choose from among an array of providers. Some of them might, however, justify legal constraints on matters of corporate structure, such as dual class stock, that limit managerial accountability, corrode corporate democracy, and, at Facebook, indirectly but powerfully influence how political discourse gets structured.[11]

In this short essay, I argue that Facebook’s adoption of the alternative-facts frame potentially contributes to the divisiveness that has made social media misinformation a powerful digital tool. Facebook’s choice to present information as “facts” and “alternative facts” endorses a binary system in which all information can be divided between moral or tribal categories—“bad” versus “good” speech, as Sandberg put it in her testimony to Congress. As we will see, Facebook’s related-articles strategy adopts this binary construction, offering a both-sides News Feed that encourages users to view information as cleaving along natural moral or political divisions.

In addition, the company’s adoption of alternative facts reflects its strong adherence to both-sides capitalism, in which corporate actors claim that they must be value neutral and politically impartial in order to mitigate business risks or satisfy fiduciary obligations to their investors. The fallacy of both-sides capitalism is its promise that neutrality in commerce—like Facebook’s claim to be a “platform for all ideas”—results in neutral outcomes. The alternative-facts frame demonstrates this. Though it has been presented, by both executive-branch officials and Facebook’s leadership, as politically neutral, the alternative-facts frame advances an ideological bias against evidence-based reasoning. As I show, Conway herself conceived alternative facts to demonstrate how contestation undermines evidence-based reasoning.[12] Because this is true, Facebook’s alternative facts may unwittingly reinforce the post-truth and politically charged notion that once content is contested, resorting to more information won’t help the user distinguish truth from falsity.

If so, Facebook’s alternative facts provide an example of how the superficial neutrality of both-sides capitalism creates new, digitally enhanced threats to democratic discourse. Broadly, the danger is that businesses will adopt tactics that appear neutral but, at least where the democratic process has been commercialized, produce biased results. Facebook’s embrace of alternative facts raises the specific concern that, in order to mitigate the business risks involved in challenging misinformation, the company is deploying platform features that undermine fact-based reasoning and, as a result, strengthening the political hand of one set of actors.

I. Facebook and Political Misinformation

Facebook, Inc., generates “substantially all” of its revenue from advertising.[13] This includes not only traditional advertisements for products and services but also enhanced content distribution for a fee. Although the company does not disclose the proportion of its ad revenue that comes from political expression, we know that political expression generates value for the company, and that Facebook has actively sought to build engagement around political expression on its platform in the U.S. since at least 2006.[14] In both 2015 and 2016, the upcoming U.S. presidential election was the number one “most talked-about global [topic]” on Facebook.[15]

Key to political discourse on Facebook is the News Feed, which presents users with an updating list of posts by the user’s friends and others.[16] Created in 2006 and initially unpopular with many users, “News Feed” has become the platform’s core feature.[17] In 2012, to compete with Twitter, Facebook made changes to News Feed to promote news articles using author bylines and headlines, enabling Facebook to become the leading social media gateway to news publishers’ web sites.[18] Facebook quickly found innovative ways to monetize News Feed. It began allowing users to pay to boost their posts to the top of their friends’ News Feeds.[19] By 2014, Mark Zuckerberg was proclaiming that Facebook’s goal was to make News Feed the “perfect personalized newspaper for every person in the world,” by populating each individual’s News Feed with a customized mix of content.[20]

Yet by January 2015—the start of the 2016 election cycle—Facebook announced self-regulatory reform to counter misinformation: It would reduce distribution of posts that users had reported as hoaxes.[21] It was around this time that Facebook added a specific option for users to report news as false.[22]

In May 2016, just a few months before the election, Gizmodo published charges by an anonymous former Facebook employee that the editors of Facebook’s “Trending” feature censored topics “of interest to conservative readers.”[23] Trending used both an algorithm and an editorial team to populate a running list of popular topics at the top of the Facebook dashboard. Stories “covered by conservative outlets (like Breitbart, Washington Examiner, and Newsmax) that were trending enough to be picked up by Facebook’s algorithm were excluded unless mainstream sites like the New York Times, the BBC, and CNN covered the same stories.”[24] This was essentially true; Facebook’s Trending editorial team had been curating trending topics with attention to the judgments of well-established news outlets.

A backlash followed; the Republican Party issued a statement accusing Facebook of liberal bias and using its influence “to silence view points.”[25] Facebook’s own data analysis showed that conservative and liberal topics were approved as trending topics “at virtually identical rates.” [26] Nonetheless, it initiated a major policy change, terminating its Trending editorial team in August 2016 and relying exclusively on algorithms to produce the Trending list. Almost immediately, false news stories began to proliferate in the Trending list.[27] To this day, critics trace Facebook’s amplification of false news stories in the lead-up to the November 2016 election to this change from human curators to algorithm. In January 2017, after the election, Facebook modified its Trending algorithm so that it no longer reflected only a story’s popularity among users, but took into account its recognition by content publishers, a change meant to incorporate a measure of credibility; in June 2018, as the U.S. midterm elections approached, Facebook eliminated the Trending feature altogether.[28]

II. Facebook’s Strategy to Fight Misinformation

In the days after the 2016 election, Mark Zuckerberg claimed it was a “pretty crazy idea” that fake news on Facebook had influenced the election “in any way.”[29] He followed this up by writing that Facebook would strive to improve its efforts to combat fake news, but added the caveat that “[i]dentifying the ‘truth’ is complicated.”[30] These statements by the company’s CEO and controlling shareholder—under an uncommon arrangement, Facebook’s dual-class stock vests Zuckerberg with voting control of the company—suggest that reducing misinformation was not a priority at the time. Nonetheless, by the end of 2016, Facebook had begun experimenting with new features to reduce misinformation.

Several themes run through Facebook’s efforts. First, the company says it does not want misinformation on its platform. However, its executives have consistently emphasized that Facebook shouldn’t be “the arbiter of what’s true and what’s false.”[31] Thus, a major tension exists at the heart of Facebook’s efforts: it wishes to preserve the appearance of neutrality, but Facebook does convey the true–false judgments of fact-checkers to its users, and it suppresses purportedly false content through down-ranking. Facebook may not issue a final judgment about the truth or falsity of content, but it has created a distribution system that relies on assessments of truth and falsity to determine the scope of a message’s distribution. The company is an arbiter of truth and falsity in the practical sense that it chokes off distribution of purportedly false content.

A second theme is the tension between Facebook’s interest in encouraging user engagement and its interest in censoring false but engaging content. Facebook insists on delivering content that users want, even if what users want is misinformation. “We don’t favor specific kinds of sources — or ideas,” Facebook proclaims in its News Feed Values:

Our aim is to deliver the types of stories we’ve gotten feedback that an individual person most wants to see. We do this not only because we believe it’s the right thing but also because it’s good for our business. When people see content they are interested in, they are more likely to spend time on News Feed and enjoy their experience.[32]

This may be why Zuckerberg was reluctant to ascribe bad motives to Holocaust deniers in a July 2018 interview, when he said that he believed Holocaust deniers were not “intentionally getting it wrong.”[33] If Facebook’s users demand content that denies the Holocaust occurred—and some do—Facebook wants to give it to them. Facebook’s business goal of keeping users engaged is thus sometimes in conflict with its professed desire to get misinformation off its platform. This conflict seems to be at the heart of Facebook’s selective embrace of neutrality as a guiding principle.

A third theme is Facebook’s willingness to experiment with behavioral modification of its users. In the year and a half that followed the 2016 election, Facebook experimented with several behavioral interventions around false news. The purpose of these experiments seems to have been to reduce circulation of obviously false content. Although Facebook has disclosed information about these experiments, it has been remarkably less transparent about down-ranking, in which it suppresses content. As a result, we know little about how down-ranking is used by the company to suppress misinformation.

A. Facebook’s First Experiment: Disputed Flags

By late November 2016, Zuckerberg was describing to journalists a new “product” that would address concerns about misinformation.[34] This was “Disputed Flags,” a feature employed by Facebook from roughly December 2016 to December 2017. The company marked content in user News Feeds with red icons to signal it had been disputed by fact-checkers or users.[35] Facebook ended the experiment after finding, among other things, that the flags “could sometimes backfire.”[36] It told users that research had shown that “putting a strong image, like a red flag, next to an article may actually entrench deeply held beliefs—the opposite effect to what [Facebook] intended.”[37]

B. Facebook’s Second Experiment: A Revamped Related Articles Feature

In 2013, Facebook began offering users who read an article “new articles they may find interesting about the same topic.” [38] In this early feature, called “Related Articles,” Facebook supplied additional, recommended content after the user clicked on a link.[39] Its purpose was to increase user engagement and to enhance content customization. Immediately following the 2016 election, Mark Zuckerberg identified “raising the bar for stories that appear in related articles” as one of seven publicly featured “projects” the company had undertaken to address misinformation.[40] This suggests that Facebook eventually came to believe that the original Related Articles feature amplified low-quality content to users before the election.

In spring 2017, while it was experimenting with Disputed Flags, Facebook began testing a different version of Related Articles. The new Related Articles supplied additional content to a user before the user read an article shared in News Feed, and was specifically designed to address misinformation.[41] A few months later, the company told users that it had received feedback that “Related Articles help [sic] give people more perspectives and additional information, and helps them determine whether the news they are reading is misleading or false,” and announced it was expanding the feature.[42]

Related Articles works like this: When someone flags content on Facebook as potentially false, Facebook sends it to third-party fact-checkers. In the United States, Facebook currently uses five fact-check organizations certified by the International Fact-Checking Network: the Associated Press, Factcheck.org, PolitiFact, Snopes.com, and The Weekly Standard Fact Check.[43] Some of these organizations are paid by Facebook for their fact-checking work, but others reportedly reject payment.[44]

If the fact-checker confirms its falsity, Facebook “typically” reduces an article’s traffic by 80%.[45] This is down-ranking, which Zuckerberg has said “destroys the economic incentives that most spammers and troll farms have to generate these false articles in the first place.”[46] Facebook also warns users who are about to share or have shared the false content, and shows Related Articles—short headlines with links to longer articles—next to the false content. For at least some subject matter, Related Articles are not culled from different sources around the internet, but are created by Facebook’s partner fact-check organizations specifically for the purpose of being appended to flagged Facebook content.[47]

This is a screen shot from a video Facebook posted on December 20, 2017, titled “How Facebook Addresses False News,” which shows the “Related Articles” approach:[48]

[[{“fid”:”834″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

 
   

Although Facebook’s example shows the two Related Articles clearly disputing a false article about aliens, some Related Articles do not clearly reject the flagged content. In response to an actual October 2018 post titled “Republicans Vote to Make It Legal Nationwide to Ban Gays & Lesbians from Adopting,” for example, Facebook appended these two related articles[49]:

[[{“fid”:”835″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

 
   

These two actual Related Articles are unlike the examples that Facebook provided above, insofar as they lack headlines that refute the false content; the user must click through to the linked content and read the respective articles to understand what (if anything) Politifact.com and Snopes.com believed was false about the original article. It is quite likely that Facebook has data about click-through rates that would tell us something about the success of the Related Articles strategy. The fact that it has not published any data since beginning the Related Articles experiment more than eighteen months ago might suggest that the data doesn’t support the feature’s efficacy.

Facebook has continued to experiment with new tweaks and features to address political misinformation. In the summer of 2018, it revealed plans to create its own news content: news programs on its video service, Watch, produced for a fee by established news companies such as CNN and Fox News.[50] In September 2018, Facebook’s fact-checking product manager, Tessa Lyons, revealed that Facebook had begun using technology to “predict articles that are likely to contain misinformation and prioritiz[ing] those for fact-checkers to review.”[51] According to Lyons, the company uses predictive signals such as reader comments on the post that question its veracity, and the post’s source. If a Facebook Page sharing content has “a history of sharing things that have been rated false by fact-checkers,” it triggers review.[52]

III. Facebook’s Alternative Facts

A. The News Feed’s Binary Construction

More than a year passed between Facebook’s roll-out of the new Related Articles feature and Sheryl Sandberg’s description of related articles as “alternative facts.” [53] Her remarks may have been intended to evoke Louis Brandeis, the icon of free speech: “The fundamental view,” Sandberg said, “is that bad speech can often be countered by good speech, and if someone says something’s not true and they say it incorrectly, someone else has the opportunity to say, ‘Actually, you’re wrong, this is true.’”[54]

Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v. California likewise associated false information with moral wrong: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,” he wrote, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”[55] Of course, Brandeis wasn’t advocating a closed universe of “more speech” provided exclusively by the State, the way that Facebook’s closed universe of News Feed posts presents an exclusive set of curated content. Brandeis’s moral gloss on the solution of “more speech” was grounded, at least in part, on the assumption that citizens, not a single State or a State-like entity, would provide the counter-speech to avert “evil.”

Brandeis also believed that context mattered. “More speech” was the remedy for misinformation only “if there be time.”[56] More speech may not be a viable remedy for misinformation where the context tends to discourage active listening or to discredit the speech. Brandeis’s famous endorsement of “more speech” doesn’t translate easily to social media’s curated feed, especially in light of new insights in behavioral and decision science.

Brandeis conceived of an active speaker and an active listener engaged in “public discussion.”[57] But that assumption does not hold up on social media platforms. In Facebook’s News Feed, information is presented to please the recipient, as determined by Facebook’s customizing algorithms. The “facts” versus “alternative facts” frame of Related Articles interrupts this pleasing data stream’s flow and introduces a binary construction in which content divides between that which conforms customized specifications (“bad” speech, in Sandberg’s depiction), and Related Articles that don’t (“good” speech). However, if the algorithms got the original assessment correct, the reader actually may experience Related Articles more like “bad” speech interrupting the flow of “good” misinformation. The decision to present point and counterpoint in this format not only sends users the simplistic message that information itself is binary, but also twists the user’s intuitive sense about which information is “good” versus “bad.”

In fact, empiricists have tested the extent to which Facebook’s Related Articles are likely to mitigate “motivated reasoning” and stem the influence of false information disseminated on Facebook. The work of two researchers, Leticia Bode of Georgetown University and Emily K. Vraga of George Mason University, is directly on point.

In the first of two studies, they found that corrective Related Articles successfully reduced misperceptions for individuals who previously held a false belief about GMOs and were shown false information about GMOs in a simulated Facebook News Feed.[58] However, they found no effect in a similar study of subjects who held a false belief about the link between vaccines and autism.[59] Bode and Vraga concluded that the length of time a misperception lingered in public discourse affected its debunk-ability, and that correction was more effective “when false beliefs are not deeply ingrained among the public consciousness.”[60]

In a follow-on study, Bode and Vraga explored how a subject’s conspiracist ideation affected his or her capacity for correction. Research has shown that individuals high in conspiracist ideation—those who endorse multiple unrelated conspiracy theories—are particularly vulnerable to misinformation.[61] Bode and Vraga measured subjects’ conspiracist ideation and then asked them to view a simulated Facebook News Feed, where they were exposed to a post, purportedly from USA Today (but in fact fake), which contained false information.[62] Some subjects were then shown two related articles that debunked the fake story, and others were shown debunking comments by Facebook users.[63] Individuals high in conspiracist ideation tended to rate both types of correction as “equally (not) credible.”[64] Although the study’s authors concluded that correction worked, the corrective effects were “relatively small in size.”[65]

Together, these studies suggest that the more “deeply ingrained” health-related misperceptions are, the less likely it is that Related Articles can debunk them. Individuals with conspiracist ideation simply did not trust Related Articles. If this is true, political misinformation that connects to deeply-ingrained partisan commitments might be particularly difficult to debunk through Related Articles. Facebook may discover, like it did with Disputed Flags, that its assumptions about how people respond to its behavioral interventions are erroneous.

As I have argued elsewhere, “alternative facts” are a rhetorical trick.[66] The frame suggests that, in a controversy, each side presents information in its favor. The two sides can’t agree on the facts because facts are a matter of perspective.[67] Ultimately the post-truth reasoner suggests that facts and alternative facts aren’t particularly helpful for resolving a dispute: the greater the controversy, the greater the cacophony of facts bombarding us from both sides. In such a situation, the post-truth reasoner tells us, other inputs—a gut check, tribal affiliation, or trust in a group leader—can provide a superior basis for decision making. In a post-truth world, where one finds alternative facts, one should use alternative decision-making processes.[68]

As this suggests, Facebook’s “alternative facts” may contribute to, rather than ameliorate, the toxicity of social media discourse. The binary construction of a “both sides” News Feed is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

B. “Both Sides” Capitalism

Fundamentally, Facebook’s both-sides News Feed is evidence of its broader adherence to both-sides capitalism, in which for-profit businesses claim impartiality not as a moral virtue, but as a business imperative. Like other adherents to both-sides capitalism, Facebook treats viewpoint neutrality as key to its economic prospects.

There are many reasons that a platform for political discourse might pledge allegiance to both-sides capitalism. The company might perceive that its monopolistic ambitions do not allow it to cede market share to competitors catering to different political affiliations. It might also see a commercial benefit to presenting “both sides” of controversies: It could encourage users to spend more time on Facebook, or to click through to a broader range of links. Facebook has a business interest in remaining free from regulation. If the company is perceived as partisan, this could encourage the opposing political party to pursue laws that reduce Facebook’s profits or prospects. Finally, Facebook is a political actor in its own right, and an active participant in campaign finance and lobbying. It may view both-sides neutrality as a means to deflect criticism when it spends money to influence politics in its own favor.

Facebook took the both-sides approach so far that it formed a fact-checking partnership with a partisan news source, The Weekly Standard, resulting in a new round of controversy. In September 2018, Facebook came under fire when The Weekly Standard flagged as false an article published by ThinkProgress because of its title, “Brett Kavanaugh Said He Would Kill Roe v. Wade Last Week and Almost No One Noticed.”[69] The title was meant to be hyperbolic rather than literal; the article did not falsely attribute any statements to Kavanaugh. Judd Legum, who later became the publisher of ThinkProgress, captured the critique in a tweet alleging that the purpose behind Facebook’s fact-checking program is “to appease the right wing.”[70]

But both-sides capitalism, as implemented by Facebook, is about more than appeasement. It is the claim that, in order to satisfy its obligations to investors and customers, a company must provide services to anyone who can pay for them, promote any ideology regardless of substance, and treat all ideas equally. Increasingly, Silicon Valley tech companies like Facebook present both-sides capitalism, wrongly, as neutral in operation and neutral in outcome.

Finally, we might ask whether Facebook has a real incentive to foster critical thinking in its users. In other words, perhaps Facebook or its CEO and controlling shareholder, Mark Zuckerberg, benefit by advancing an ideological agenda through the alternative-facts frame. Brand loyalty can be a form of post-truth reasoning, and Facebook has nurtured a valuable brand of social media service. Facebook might believe that it does not benefit by sharpening its users’ critical-thinking skills. Considering all the problems the platform has had with privacy, for example, company managers may worry that well-informed users will delete Facebook and move on to a competitor.

V. Conclusion

Facebook’s attempt to rehabilitate “alternative facts” during Sheryl Sandberg’s testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence drew little attention, but it underscores important tensions in the way the company fights misinformation. It also exposed the company’s commitment to “both sides” capitalism on a national stage.

Facebook’s Related Articles strategy adopts the binary frame of “alternative facts,” and thus conditions users to accept a two-sided view of information that may increase polarization and partisanship, not diffuse it. Facebook may have adopted this binary approach because it fits comfortably within the News Feed format, or because the company views political discourse as a series of simple, binary disagreements that can be staged as for-profit entertainment. Either way, information on Facebook reaches up to 185 million people in North America every day. It seems unlikely that Facebook is serious about behavioral intervention given the research suggesting its difficulty, and more likely that Facebook’s evolving features result from the company’s profit motive.

It’s also possible that Related Articles has become a minor strategy, with down-ranking of false content doing most of the work. In preparing this short essay, I went looking for Related Articles in the News Feeds of students and associates, but found few examples. Some avid Facebook users couldn’t ever recall seeing Related Articles in their own Feeds. Is this because Facebook had successfully suppressed false content through down-ranking? It’s hard to know. Without more transparency from Facebook, users and researchers are left in the dark.

 


[1] See Rebecca Sinderbrand, How Kellyanne Conway Ushered in the Era of ‘Alternative Facts,’ Wash. Post (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017 /01/22/how-kellyanne-conway-ushered-in-the-era-of-alternative-facts/ (providing video and transcript of the January 22, 2017, interview) [http://perma.cc/TW6P-YABP].

[2] Bret Stephens, Trump: The Reader’s Guide, Wall St. J. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://ww w.wsj.com/articles/trump-the-readers-guide-1485216078 [http://perma.cc/N5HV-Z3YC].

[3] Stefan Kyriazis, George Orwell’s 1984 Explains Trump: Doublespeak, Alternative Facts and Reality Control, Express (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.express.co.uk/entertainment/bo oks/759436/Trump-George-Orwell-1984-Doublespeak-alternative-facts-crimestop-reality-control [http://perma.cc/8DTK-WQVR].

[4] Louis Menand, Words of the Year, New Yorker (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.c om/magazine/2018/01/08/words-of-the-year [http://perma.cc/2WKU-RCBZ].

[5] Foreign Influence Operations and Their Use of Social Media Platforms: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong., at 1:34:54–1:35:14 (2018) [hereinafter Sandberg Senate Testimony], video available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearing s/open-hearing-foreign-influence-operations’-use-social-media-platforms-company-witnesses [http://perma.cc/7J39-ULU7] (testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).

[9] See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1599 (2017) (arguing that private content platforms are systems of governance “responsible for shaping and allowing participation in our new digital and democratic culture”).

[10] Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2018 WL 3127413 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 17-1702).

[11] See, e.g., Chris Hughes, The Problem With Dominant Mark Zuckerberg Types, Bloomberg (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-10/the-problem-with-dominant-mark-zuckerberg-types (describing a growing “international cam­paign” against super-voting rights for founders).

[12] See Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 Ind. L. J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6–7), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=32093 66 [http://perma.cc/Z7NY-YGTD].

[13] Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 28 (Jul. 26, 2018).

[14] See, e.g., Christine B. Williams and Girish J. ‘Jeff’ Gulati, Social Networks in Political Campaigns: Facebook and the Congressional Elections of 2006 and 2008, 15 New Media & Soc’y 52, 56 (2012).

[15] Betsy Cameron and Brittany Darwell, 2015 Year in Review, Facebook Newsroom (Dec. 9, 2015), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/12/2015-year-in-review/ [http://perma.cc/Y XY9-657Z]; Sheida Neman, 2016 Year in Review, Facebook Newsroom (Dec. 8, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/facebook-2016-year-in-review/[http://perma.cc/GY F5-52B2].

[16] See Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook (Sep. 5, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts /10103084921703971 [http://perma.cc/7YFV-F66V] (explaining the thought process behind News Feed in a September 2016 post marking its tenth anniversary). Zuckerberg wrote that “News Feed has been one of the big bets we’ve made in the past 10 years that has shaped our community and the whole internet the most.” Id.

[17] See Farhad Manjoo, Can Facebook Fix Its Own Worst Bug?, N.Y. Times: N.Y. Times Mag. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/magazine/can-facebook-fix-its-own-worst-bug.html [http://perma.cc/986J-HXSW] (describing the Facebook News Feed as “the most influential source of information in the history of civilization”).

[18] See Nicholas Thompson and Fred Vogelstein, Inside the Two Years that Shook Facebook—and the World, Wired (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/ [http://perma.cc/68B5-FBYN]; Niall Ferguson, What Is To Be Done? Safeguarding Democratic Governance In The Age Of Network Platf- orms, Hoover, Institution, Nov. 13, 2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/what-be-done-safeguarding-democratic-governance-age-network-platforms [http://perma.cc/3VV3-N79Y] (“Facebook and Google are now responsible for nearly 80 percent of news publishers’ referral traffic.”).

[19] See Hayley Tsukayama, Would You Pay to Promote a Facebook Post?, Wash. Post (May 11, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/would-you-pay-to-prom­ote-a-facebook-post/2012/05/11/gIQA1nlSIU_story.html [http://perma.cc/4GGR-FBW2].

[20] Eugene Kim, Mark Zuckerberg Wants To Build The ‘Perfect Personalized Newspaper’ For Every Person In The World, Bus. Insider (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.businessin sider.com/mark-zuckerberg-wants-to-build-a-perfect-personalized-newspaper-2014-11 [http://perma.cc/7C5C-WEMJ].

[21] Erich Owens & Udi Weinsberg, Showing Fewer Hoaxes, Facebook Newsroom (Jan. 20, 2015), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/01/news-feed-fyi-showing-fewer-hoaxes/ [http:// perma.cc/9MG4-MNL4].

[22] Id.

[23] Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News, Gizmodo (May 9, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006 [http://perma.cc/AJU4-F2TT]. According to the blog, the former employee had worked as a curator of Trending Topics sometime between mid-2014 and December 2015, was “politically conservative,” and “asked to remain anonymous, citing fear of retribution from the company.” Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Team GOP, #MakeThisTrend: Facebook Must Answer for Conservative Censorship, GOP.com: Liberal Media Bias (May 9, 2016), https://gop.com/makethistrend-facebook-must-answer-for-liberal-bias/ [http://perma.cc/6H5R-238K].

[26] Colin Stretch, Response to Chairman John Thune’s Letter on Trending Topics, Facebook Newsroom (May 23, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/05/response-to-chairman-john-thunes-letter-on-trending-topics/ [http://perma.cc/Z3XK-MD25].

[27] See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, Facebook Has Repeatedly Trended Fake News Since Firing Its Human Editors, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-inte rsect/wp/2016/10/12/facebook-has-repeatedly-trended-fake-news-since-firing-its-human-editors/ [http://perma.cc/EAM2-BUBS] (reporting a study from Aug. 31 to Sept. 22 that identified “five trending stories that were indisputably fake,” including a “tabloid story claiming that the Sept. 11 attacks were a ‘controlled demolition’”); Abby Ohlheiser, Three Days After Removing Human Editors, Facebook Is Already Trending Fake News, Wash. Post (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/29/a-fake-headline-about-megyn-kelly-was-trending-on-facebook/

[http://perma.cc/FV5A-MU5T].

[28] Will Cathcart, Continuing Our Updates to Trending, Facebook Newsroom (Jan. 25, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/01/continuing-our-updates-to-trending/ [http: //perma.­cc/G4UW-VEDV]; Jacob Kastrenakes, Facebook Will Remove the Trending Topics Section Next Week, The Verge (June 1, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.thever ge.com­/2018/6/1/17417428/facebook-trending-topics-being-removed [http://perm a.cc/TFX 9-LM­R3]; Nathan Olivarez-Giles & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Moves to Curtail Fake News on ‘Trending’ Feature, Wall St. J. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-moves-to-curtail-fake-news-on-trending-feature-1485367200 [http://perma.cc/W4C4-CAL­M] (“Facebook’s software will surface only topics that have been covered by a significant number of credible publishers.”).

[29] Deepa Seetharaman, Zuckerberg Defends Facebook Against Charges It Harmed Political Discourse, Wall St. J. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/zuckerberg-de fends-facebook-against-charges-it-harmed-political-discourse-1478833876 [http://perma.cc/H224-ZE3Z].

[30] Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/zu ck/posts/10103253901916271 [http://perma.cc/9J8F-53J7].

[31] Sandberg Senate Testimony, supra note 5, at 1:34:19–1:34:42.

[32] News Feed Values, Facebook News Feed, https://newsfeed.fb.com/values/ [http://perma.cc/B3W2-ZRSY] (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).

[33] Kara Swisher, Full Transcript: Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg on Recode Decode, Recode: Recode Decode (Jul. 18, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.recode.net /2018/7/18/1757 5158/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-interview-full-transcript-kara-swisher [http://perma.cc/QU3Y-JMHN].

[34] Deepa Seetharaman, Mark Zuckerberg Explains How Facebook Plans to Fight Fake News, Wall St. J. (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-zuckerberg-explains-how-facebook-plans-to-fight-fake-news-1479542069 [http://perma.cc/UY7F-3836]; Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/101032 69806149061 [http://perma.cc/4CVD-CDPS].

[35] Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with Related Articles, Facebook Newsroom (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feed-fyi-updates-in-our-fight-ag­ainst-misinformation/ [http://perma.cc/3BU2-VD6D]; Barbara Ortutay, Facebook Gets Serious About Fighting Fake News, Associated Press (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.apnews. com/22e0809d20264498bece040e85b96935 [http://perma.cc/X9T2-TLCS].

[36] Jeff Smith, Grace Jackson & Seetha Raj, Designing Against Misinformation, Medium (Dec. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/facebook-design/designing-against-misinformation-e5846b3aa1e2 [http://perma.cc/MKM8-YNCA].

[37] Lyons, supra note 35.

[38] Sara Su, New Test With Related Articles, Facebook Newsroom (Apr. 25, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-fyi-new-test-with-related-articles/ [http://perma.cc/8XEW-8AJ3].

[39] Id.

[40] Zuckerberg, supra note 34.

[41] Su, supra note 38.

[42] Id.

[43] Third-Party Fact-Checking on Facebook, Facebook Business, https://www.faceboo k.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 [http://perma.cc/BN42-NBYJ] (last updated Nov. 7, 2018).

[44] In April 2018, a journalist conducted a study of Facebook’s partnership with these fact-checking organizations for the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. The journalist, Mike Ananny, noted previous reports that the fact-checking partners were paid about $100,000 per year from Facebook for their work. However, Ananny reported that unidentified individuals at several of the organizations told him their organizations had rejected the money. Mike Ananny, The Partnership Press: Lessons for Platform-Publisher Collaborations as Facebook and News Outlets Team to Fight Misinformation, Colum. Journalism Rev.: Tow Ctr. Rep. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/pa rtnership-press-facebook-news-outlets-team-fight-misinformation.php [http://perma.cc/WM5W-L82X].

[45] Facebook, Inc. Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Earnings Call Transcript, at 3 (Jan. 31, 2018), https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q4/Q4-17-Earnings-call-transcript.pdf [http://perma.cc/82SE-FAJ4] (remarks of Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Executive Officer, Facebook).

[46] Id.

[47] Expanding Our Policies on Voter Suppression, Facebook Newsroom (Oct. 15, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/10/voter-suppression-policies/ [http://perma.cc/2L2F-YV2J] (describing this process with respect to articles containing information about how to vote).

[48] Dan Zigmond, How Facebook Addresses False News, Facebook, at 1:02 (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/facebook/videos/10156900476581729/ [http://perma.cc/Z S8G-3C4S].

[49] This screenshot, shared with me by a student, shows Related Articles that appeared in the student’s Facebook News Feed in October 2018. E-mail from student to Sarah C. Haan, Assoc. Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:40 PM EST) (on file with author).

[50] David Ingram, Facebook Enlists Anchors From CNN, Fox News, Univision for News Shows, Reuters (Jun. 6, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-media/facebook-enlists-anchors-from-cnn-fox-news-univision-for-news-shows-idUSKCN1J21SM [http://perma.cc/3BL4-JCQE].

[51] Seeing the Truth, Facebook Newsroom (Sep. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news /2018/09/inside-feed-tessa-lyons-photos-videos/ [http://perma.cc/U7NH-NXLH].

[52] Id.

[53] Sandberg Senate Testimony, supra note 5, at 1:34:54–1:35:14.}

[54] Id.

[55] Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

[56] Id.

[57] Id. at 375–76 (“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. . . . Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. . . . It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”).

[58] Leticia Bode & Emily K. Vraga, In Related News, That Was Wrong: The Correction of Misinformation Through Related Stories Functionality in Social Media, 65 J. of Comm. 619, 624–27 (2015).

[59] Id. at 628.

[60] Leticia Bode & Emily K. Vraga, See Something, Say Something: Correction of Global Health Misinformation on Social Media, 33 Health Commc’n 1131, 1132 (2018).

[61] Id. at 1133.

[62] Id. at 1134.

[63] Id.

[64] Id. at 1137.

[65] Id.

[66] Haan, supra note 12, at 15–17.

[67] Id.

[68] Id.

[69] Mathew Ingram, The Weekly Standard and the Flaws in Facebook’s Fact-Checking Program, Colum. Journalism Rev. (Sep. 18, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/the_new_gatekeepe rs/the-weekly-standard-facebook.php [http://perma.cc/NQV7-M9R5].

[70] Id.

Foreword: Facebook Unbound?

The concept of checks and balances is a core tenet of our democracy; we fear letting any single institution become overly powerful or insufficiently accountable. As Americans, we naturally apply this concept first and foremost to the interactions among our three branches of government, given the principle’s constitutional origins. What happens, though, when a handful of exceedingly powerful private actors—today’s behemoth technology companies—begin to have as much control over our lives as the government does? Should the same impulse that drives our commitment to interbranch checks and balances kick in? How can we ensure that our democracy remains our democracy, even when digitized?

In the past, when highly powerful industries have emerged, our democratic system often has responded by erecting legal and regulatory frameworks around them. We applied antitrust laws to break up the railroads and oil companies.[1] We established the Food and Drug Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to ensure that drug and car manufacturers take adequate measures to protect citizens’ health and welfare.[2] And we heavily regulate common carriers, such as transportation and telecommunications providers, to ensure that they don’t discriminate against groups within the general public.[3] Yet our three branches of government have engaged in only limited ways with technology companies such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon, even though these companies dominate their industries and have a tremendous influence on every corner of our lives—as various contributions to this symposium illustrate. Our government also has failed to regulate the use of high-technology tools that implicate our privacy, such as facial-recognition software and other controversial uses of machine-learning algorithms. Why has the government been slow to engage? Further, assuming that our society disfavors institutions that accrue unchecked power, especially when they wield that power in a way that affects our physical safety, our privacy, and our democratic arena, are there feasible ways to impose constructive constraints?

As an initial step in thinking about these questions, this essay examines a different context in which our checks and balances have proven weak: the national security space. It recounts the basic challenges that the other two branches have faced in checking the Executive’s national security activities. The essay then identifies the ways in which those challenges resonate in the context of checking technology companies, helping us to understand why it has proven difficult for Congress and the courts (and the Executive) to weave a set of legal constraints around technology companies that offer us social media platforms, build advanced law enforcement tools, and employ machine learning algorithms to help us search, buy, and drive.[4] The essay explores alternative sources of constraints on the national security Executive, drawing inspiration from those constraints to envision other ways to shape the behavior of today’s technology behemoths and other companies whose products are driven by our data.

I. The National Security Executive Unbound

It has become a truism that the Executive faces limited constraints when it undertakes activities to protect our national security. Congress rarely enacts statutes to restrict executive military and intelligence actions, and the courts are often loath to bar the Executive from taking the actions it deems appropriate. Accompanying this truism is a long-running debate about whether it is problematic that the Executive has accrued this much power. The debate reached a high-water mark with the publication of Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s book, The Executive Unbound, which argued that the Executive is effectively unconstrained by law and is limited only by politics and public opinion—and that this is unproblematic.[5] A number of scholars critiqued the book as providing an insufficiently nuanced view of how the executive branch operates, as giving inadequate weight to the power of law to constrain,[6] and as failing to appreciate the costs of an unchecked Executive.[7] Few, however, would contest that the Executive has very broad responsibilities in pursuing national security policies and that it can be difficult to force the Executive to alter or abandon those policies.

There are a variety of reasons why the Executive lacks constraints on its national security actions, at least from predictable sources.[8] Congress, the actor best positioned to impose those constraints, often proves both unwilling and unable to cabin the Executive’s military and intelligence activities, including the use of wartime detention, targeted killings, and the introduction of troops abroad. First, Congress tends to lack knowledge about the details of such activities, including the advanced technologies that the military and intelligence agencies are using.[9] Second, identifying sensible solutions for how to regulate these complicated technologies and programs is hard. It requires Congress to strike a nuanced balance between protecting the country and protecting individual life, liberty, privacy, and fair process. Third, Congress fears being blamed if, as a direct or indirect result of its laws, the country suffers an attack or crisis.[10] Finally, when Congress is divided, it faces the ordinary partisan gridlock that occurs whenever it tries to legislate.

The courts have also hesitated to act. Though the Supreme Court issued several high-profile detainee-related decisions in the decade after September 11, 2001, the Court and lower federal courts have avoided reaching decisions on the merits of a range of national security cases related to rendition, surveillance, detention, and military uses of force. Two related instincts seem to drive this. One is the courts’ self-perception that they lack the technical, military, and foreign-policy experience to correctly decide these questions.[11] The other is their sense that Congress, not the courts, should make the hard policy decisions embedded in these cases because Congress is politically accountable in a way that the courts are not. In a case about the procedures to which detainees at Guantanamo were entitled, for instance, Judge Brown of the D.C. Circuit wrote in a concurrence that “the circumstances that frustrate the judicial process are the same ones that make this situation particularly ripe for Congress to intervene pursuant to its policy expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. These cases present hard questions and hard choices, ones best faced directly.”[12] In a case challenging the Executive’s alleged plan to target a U.S. citizen abroad, a D.C. district court relied on a lack of standing and the political-question doctrine to avoid the merits, noting that courts are ill-suited to “make real-time assessments of the nature and severity of alleged threats to national security.”[13] In these and a host of other cases, courts reveal their preference for avoiding decisions on hard national security questions that test the outer bounds of their expertise.

The end result of these enfeebled checks and balances is a very powerful Executive. However, a discussion of executive constraints that focuses only on the actions of Congress and the courts undersells the existence of other factors that constrain the national security Executive, a point I discuss below.

II. Facebook Unbound

Many of the same dynamics that have made it difficult to rein in a powerful national security Executive are playing out in the technology space—leading to what we might call the “Facebook Unbound” phenomenon.[14] Indeed, the academic and foreign-policy conversation about the Executive’s undue power in the national security space, which was a constant refrain in the post-9/11 era, has died down, to be replaced by conversation about the undue power of large technology companies.[15] Several essays in this symposium illustrate the companies’ power and the lack of restrictions on how they use our data or control content on their platforms, and on how the government uses their products in ways that implicate our privacy. The journalist Farhad Manjoo, for example, has adopted the term “Frightful Five” to refer to Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft (all of which own other major technology and consumer products companies, including WhatsApp, Instagram, Waze, YouTube, Audible, Zappos, Whole Foods, and Waymo).[16] Other technology companies that have faced limited regulation include social media platforms such as Twitter; manufacturers of self-driving cars; Uber and Lyft; and companies that use “big data” and machine learning algorithms to produce highly sophisticated, privacy-implicating technologies for the U.S. military and federal, state, and local law enforcement.[17]

What unites these companies is their systematic collection and use of vast amounts of user data to make their products more powerful and their use of machine learning algorithms based on that data to make their systems more effective and more profitable. Some observers are untroubled by the relative lack of constraints on these companies and worry far more about the fact that the national security Executive is unbound. After all, the Executive can impose more severe sanctions and direct physical effects on individuals than companies can. In any case, these technology companies wield enormous control over our lives on a daily basis.[18] It is therefore worth exploring why our government has done little to regulate these companies.

The factors that have led to the lack of constraints on these technology companies are markedly similar to those that have produced the national security Executive. First, members of Congress lack sophisticated understandings of how these companies—and the technologies that undergird their products—work. This was brought into sharp relief when the Senate summoned Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to testify about the company’s privacy policies, data leaks, and Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. At one point, Senator Orrin Hatch asked Zuckerberg how Facebook managed to make money; Zuckerberg, smiling slightly, responded, “Senator, we run ads.”[19]As Daniel Solove has written, “There may be a few in Congress with a good understanding of . . . technology, but many lack the foggiest idea about how new technologies work.”[20]

Second, knowing what to regulate, in what level of detail, and at what stage in the overall development of technologies such as machine learning is simply hard.[21] Laws can easily be overtaken by events in fast-changing areas such as war fighting or technology.[22] Third, Congress fears undercutting U.S. innovation by regulating too soon, which is not unlike Congress’s fear of deliberately reining in the Executive’s national security decisions, particularly in the face of threats from other actors who have not chosen to self-constrain.[23] The United States seeks to out-innovate China; members of Congress will not want to stand accused of slowing down U.S. companies that are developing artificial intelligence, for instance, while Chinese companies press ahead. Finally, partisanship has kicked in when Congress has tried to regulate.[24]

This is not to say that Congress has enacted no rules regulating technology. In the past few years, Congress has been able to enact laws regulating cross-border data requests by law enforcement,[25] holding online platforms accountable if they are used to facilitate sex trafficking,[26] and updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.[27] However, it has failed in its efforts to legislate on the use of encryption, election security (as Jacob Rush details in his contribution), “hacking back,” and drone safety, and it has not tried to regulate facial-recognition software.[28] Efforts to impose federal data-privacy laws on companies are just getting underway.[29]

As with national security issues, some judges have articulated a view that they lack the capacity to correctly assess complicated technical tools and that Congress rather than the courts should be making the hard policy decisions in these areas.[30] In several recent cases that implicated law enforcement uses of new technologies, Justice Alito argued that it is far more desirable for Congress to articulate appropriate uses of law enforcement technologies than for the courts to decide those questions.[31] Although the Court did ultimately reach decisions in these cases, the Court in Carpenter v. United States asserted that it was producing a narrow holding that applied only to the specific technology at issue.[32] And in United States v. Jones, the majority relied on a Fourth Amendment trespass analysis to produce a relatively narrow opinion that would not reach technologies such as remote GPS tracking.[33] Finally, the Court obviously decides what cases to hear, and recently declined to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of predictive algorithms in criminal sentencing.[34]

Where we are dealing with constraints (or the lack thereof) on private companies, we also must ask whether the Executive has imposed regulations or other constraints. The Trump administration seems uninterested in taking steps to influence the behavior of social media platforms, even if it had authority to do so. The President seems to embrace, rather than bemoan, the divisive aspects of social media that Sarah Haan describes. Further, the Executive currently has limited incentives to shape the production and use of tools that law enforcement and military actors have started to deploy, such as facial-recognition software, body-worn cameras, and cell-site location information.[35] Finally, the Federal Trade Commission examined but chose not to bring an antitrust case against Google and the Trump administration does not appear poised to pursue an antitrust case against Amazon.[36] In short, the Executive has done little to bind Facebook and the various other types of technology companies described in this essay. We thus find ourselves confronting broadly unregulated technology actors that know and use oceans of information about us, holding vast amounts of power over what we read, buy, watch, think, and drive.

III. Constraining Our Unbounded Actors

Even though traditional checks and balances by Congress and the courts do not function very well in the national security space, the Executive nevertheless confronts certain constraints on its behavior. Most prominently, citizens can choose to vote the President out of office. There are a number of other, more nuanced ways in which the executive branch checks itself and is checked by nontraditional actors. First, the Executive often seeks public support for its decisions, which may require it to be more transparent than it would otherwise prefer.[37] In a recent example, President Obama disclosed how the Executive made decisions about targeted killings and what constraints it imposed on itself.[38] Sometimes leaks by government officials foist involuntary transparency on the Executive, too. Second, the Executive often makes changes to its national security policies when it faces litigation challenging those policies and it fears that it might lose the case.[39] Third, executive-branch lawyers, who often have a commitment to law as a guiding principle, help ensure that the executive branch generally complies with applicable laws and policies, even when it is inconvenient to do so.[40] Fourth, the Executive often needs to rely on allies for assistance in executing its foreign policy and national security decisions, which means that U.S. national security activities are sometimes indirectly subject to allies’ legal and policy constraints.[41] Finally, the Executive itself engages with (or willingly brings itself under the supervision of) actors who are perceived as more neutral, such as the federal judges on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.

Assuming that Congress will be unable—at least in the short term—to produce significant legislation on privacy, machine learning algorithms, or law enforcement uses of tools such as facial-recognition software, the same types of mechanisms that constrain the national security Executive might helpfully constrain the technologies and companies that are the subject of this symposium.

Public pressure and critiques already have played an important role in prompting companies such as Facebook and Twitter to establish more robust policies on user privacy and content regulation. This pressure has also forced the companies to be more transparent about their privacy and content moderation policies and the algorithms that they use to identify trolls and harassers.[42] Further, public criticism has led Facebook to remove the accounts of particular actors, including those of twenty Burmese officials and organizations responsible for what the United Nations concluded was genocide against the Rohingya.[43] These new pressures come not only from the technologies’ users but also from the companies’ employees.[44] Facing demands from its employees, Google declined to extend its contract with the Defense Department, under which the company provided support to a project deploying machine learning algorithms to war zones.[45] Amazon is facing a similar challenge: 450 of its employees reportedly wrote to CEO Jeff Bezos to demand that Amazon cease selling its facial-recognition software (which the company calls Rekognition) to police.[46]

Like the national security Executive, these companies also are keenly attuned to potential litigation or legislation, and often change their behavior in an effort to fend off those alternatives. Microsoft in particular has been forward-leaning in an effort to help shape any legislation that might come down the pike. In testimony before the U.K. Parliament about regulation of artificial intelligence (“AI”), a Microsoft official told the committee that regulating AI was a job “for the tech industry, the Government, NGOs and the people who will ultimately consume the services” and that it was important “to find a way of convening those four parties together to drive forward that conversation.”[47] Microsoft has also asked Congress to regulate facial-recognition software and has suggested specific areas on which Congress might focus.[48] Microsoft, Twitter, and Google all revealed how Russian agents had used their platforms in the lead-up to their officials’ testimony before Congress, where they expected to be asked about that topic.[49] Facebook announced its strengthened advertising disclosure policies in an attempt to preempt a bill imposing such requirements by law.[50] More recently, Facebook revealed its intention to create an international body to adjudicate content decisions, which may well be an effort to stave off more stringent regulation by Congress.[51] There are exceptions: Google’s CEO declined to appear before Congress, for example, even though he faced significant public pressure to do so.[52] In general, though, even if Congress cannot unite to enact laws, it has managed to convene congressional hearings that have extracted important information and policy changes from the companies.

Foreign governments have also imposed constraints on U.S. technology companies. Just as the U.S. military and intelligence communities sometimes find themselves bound by foreign laws during overseas operations, the U.S. tech companies face direct exposure to foreign legal systems, which have in several cases imposed onerous laws and penalties on them. For example, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) requires companies that process personal data to obtain the affirmative consent of those whose data they are using (the “data subject”).[53] Those processors must also provide, at the data subject’s request, any information they have on the subject; must rectify inaccurate personal data; and must erase the subject’s data at her request. Finally, the GDPR generally prohibits companies from transferring personal data outside the EU, unless the European Commission determines that the data protection laws of the receiving jurisdiction are adequate.[54] Although formally directed only to companies that are located in the EU or that provide services to or monitor the behavior of people in the EU, the GDPR’s impact has been global. Virtually all of the companies discussed in this essay must comply with the GDPR. The EU also fined Google $2.7 billion for disadvantaging its competition by steering search engine users toward its comparison-shopping site.[55] The EU apparently also is considering whether to bring a case against Amazon.[56] In short, foreign governments have constrained U.S. tech companies, even when the U.S. government itself has not.

Finally, these companies have sometimes turned to neutral actors to increase their credibility among users and Congress. As Sarah Haan details, Facebook has enlisted the help of third parties to fact check and identify fake news.[57] Further, Facebook’s plan to set up an independent body to adjudicate content takedowns would draw on the credibility of actors perceived as neutral and expert.[58] Tech companies including Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Nokia, and Ericsson have joined the Global Network Initiative, which commits them to respect freedom of expression and privacy rights when faced with government pressure to turn over user data or restrict communications.[59] Other companies have supported nonprofits such as OpenAI (the goal of which is to ensure that advanced AI capabilities are used for good, not harm) and the Partnership on Artificial Intelligence to Benefit People and Society, which Google, Facebook, Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft formed to establish ethical standards and best practices for AI researchers.[60] The companies have taken all these steps to retain their users’ support for their products and policies (and so maintain their profits).

Most recently—in a move that reflects the operation of three of these constraints at once—Facebook agreed to allow French regulators to monitor Facebook’s policies and tools to observe how the company combats hate speech and to help structure future French regulatory efforts to fight online hate speech more generally.[61] This reflects an effort by Facebook to shape prospective legislation; a decision by a foreign government to impose pressure on the practices of a U.S. platform; and an attempt by Facebook to persuade its users that it is making serious efforts to improve its policies by inviting a kind of “neutral arbiter” to observe its practices. We are likely to see more of all of these types of constraints unless and until—and perhaps even after—legislators decide to act.

IV. Moving Forward

Notwithstanding these different flavors of alternative constraints, the lack of consistent checks by Congress and courts on these technology companies means that the constraints are unpredictable, partial, and of questionable durability. As a result, there is still an important role for statutory constraints, should Congress find the political will to impose them. This is not to say that Congress should regulate for regulation’s sake. Restrictions should be deliberate, balanced, effective, and sensitive to the speed at which technologies develop. In an ideal world, our democratic institutions would reassert themselves to develop legislation in five primary areas: antitrust,[62] the appropriate use of algorithms,[63] privacy, the responsibilities of technology platforms for the content they host, and the use by law enforcement of high-tech tools such as facial-recognition software. A host of proposals already exists on each topic, including in Katelyn Ringrose’s essay on body cameras and facial-recognition systems. As another example, Congress could legislate norms for the development and deployment of machine learning algorithms at a relatively high level of generality (identifying impermissible sources of data, requiring companies to test input data and outputs for systematic bias, and requiring a level of algorithmic explanation when algorithmic decision-making affects individuals).[64] Institutionally, Congress could also bring on board more staffers with technological experience; create opportunities for technology fellows from think tanks and educational institutions; and restore the Office of Technology Assessment, a 200-member congressional support agency that operated from 1972 to 1995 and that researched and summarized technological and scientific matters for Congress.[65]

Courts, too, will prove invaluable as these technologies develop. In a world of “competing facts,” courts reveal the absolute value of neutral arbiters, which are missing from the interactions between cops wearing body cameras and suspects; between Facebook users on the extremes of an issue; and between the U.S. government and those it places on “no fly” lists pursuant to machine learning algorithms.[66] Of course, courts do not generally choose the disputes that come before them, and their decisions are by definition backward-looking (though they have forward-looking implications).[67] Another approach includes self-regulation: Law enforcement actors in the Executive (and within states) could choose to self-regulate when they employ algorithms, as the Obama administration did for targeted killing and as New York City is contemplating for its automated decisions.[68] Finally, there obviously is a role for individuals, private lawyers, and nongovernmental organizations to engage in thoughtful self-help, as Adam Gershowitz’s essay details in the policing and civil-justice context.[69] Grass-roots citizens’ movements can work to persuade companies “that respecting and protecting their users’ universally recognized human rights is in their long-term commercial self-interest.”[70]

Our three branches of government have not yet engaged deeply on the difficult questions of how to shape the technologies that drive every aspect of our future. Understanding why that engagement has been slow opens up possibilities for addressing the underlying obstructions and deploying with purpose the alternative forms of constraint described here.

 


[1] See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (applying antitrust law to the railroad industry); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (same); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (applying antitrust law to the oil industry).

[2] What We Do, FDA., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/ [https://perma.cc/6WYL-CQNS] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019); Understanding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), U.S. Dep’t of Transp., https://www.transportation.gov/transit ion/understanding-national-highway-traffic-safety-administration-nhtsa [https://perma.cc/7L­H4-NDXB] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).

[3] See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018) (requiring every common carrier engaged in interstate communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request therefor); Thomas Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 Comm. L. Con. 67, 76 (2008) (discussing nondiscrimination requirements for package carriers, taxis, and railroads).

[4] See infra Part II.

[5] Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 4–14 (2010).

[6] See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (By Law or By Politics), 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 777, 782–83 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5) (arguing that legal rules and institutions play a “pivotal role” in the production of executive constraint); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 973–74 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5) (arguing that executive officials do not appear to regard themselves as above the law and that legal constraints on the Executive are manifest)..

[7] See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Madisonianism Misunderstood: A Reply to Posner and Vermeule, Am. Const. Soc’y: ACSblog (Apr. 8, 2011), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/mad isonianism-misunderstood-a-reply-to-posner-and-vermeule/ [https://perma.cc/G7YA-RZWF] (critiquing Posner and Vermeule for abandoning the rule of law).

[8] For a general discussion of systemic difficulties in checking the national security Executive, see Ashley Deeks, Predicting Enemies, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1529, 1560–63 (2018).

[9] Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 65, 70 (2016).

[10] See, e.g., Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 37 (2002) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Chairman) (noting that Congress is “not necessarily eagerly asserting the powers that it has. It is a pretty good deal for Congress, if tough decisions about war are made by the executive; if things do not go well, they are not responsible”).

[11] See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting, in a case involving the role of U.S. forces in El Salvador, that the court “lacks the resources and expertise (which are accessible to the Congress) to resolve disputed questions of fact” related to the military situation).

[12] See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring).

[13] Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010).

[14] The reasons for the failures to constrain the national security Executive and technology companies are not unique to these two contexts. However, because there are several important similarities, certain lessons from the national security context can inform how we might proceed in the technology context. Nor do I mean to suggest an overly strong identity between the Executive and powerful technology companies. It should go without saying that there are significant differences between the two. The President faces democratic accountability; the tech companies do not. Unlike the President, tech companies cannot veto legislation. Nor can they invoke executive privilege when Congress asks for information. The companies are not entitled to deference by courts, and it is easier to hold them accountable when they violate the law.

[15] See, e.g., How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like Governments Than Companies, NPR (Oct. 26, 2017) https://www.npr.org/2017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-have-become-more-like-governments-than-companies [https://perma.cc/C58F-ETVD] (interview of Farhad Manjoo, a tech columnist for the New York Times) [hereinafter Tech Giants] (“Amazon is sort of . . . getting its kind of corporate tentacles into a large part of the economy, into shipping, and how warehouses work and robots. Things that will allow it to dominate in the future that we’re kind of just not good at regulating at this point.”); see also Stephen L. Carter, Too Much Power Lies in Tech Companies’ Hands, Bloomberg (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-08-17/too-much-power-lies-in-tech-com­panies-hands [https://perma.cc/EM46-SAEY].

[16] Farhad Manjoo, Tech’s ‘Frightful 5’ Will Dominate Digital Life for Foreseeable Future, N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/technology/techs-frightful-5-will-dominate-digital-life-for-foreseeable-future.html [https://perma.cc/8NXJVT­3L]; Tech Giants, supra note 15 (discussing the subsidiaries that the “Frightful Five” own).

[17] See, e.g., Ben Tarnoff, Weaponizing AI is coming. Are algorithmic forever wars our future?, Guardian (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/11 /war-jedi-algorithmic-warfare-us-military [https://perma.cc/3LNH-E7N2].

[18] See, e.g., Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom 149–65 (2012) (describing major technology companies as “digital sovereigns”); Tech Giants, supra note 15 (discussing how Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Facebook affect the economy, our elections, our jobs, and what we buy; how they innovate more aggressively than the U.S. government; how they act as gateways to many other products we use; and how they may suppress others’ innovations).

[19] Nancy Scola, Zuckerberg Survived But Facebook Still Has Problems, Politico (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/10/zuckerberg-facebook-hearing-senate-474­055 [https://perma.cc/V4JL-37JH].

[20] Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 747, 771 (2005).

[21] Info. Soc’y Project, Governing Machine Learning (2017), https://law.yale.edu/system/f iles/area/center/isp/documents/governing_machine_learning_-_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P FE-6HBZ] [hereinafter Governing Machine Learning].

[22] Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1387 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5) (summarizing Posner and Vermeule’s argument that, because technology is constantly shifting, it is better for Presidents to make their best judgments based on the actual circumstances then governing); Katy Steinmetz, Congress Never Wanted to Regulate Facebook. Until Now, Time (Apr. 12, 2018), http://time.com/5237432/congress-never-wanted-to-regulate-facebook-until-now/ [https://­perma.cc/GF4L-3CMW] (“Congress is always playing catch-up to technology, so statutes it writes can quickly become outdated.”).

[23] Klint Finley, Obama Wants the Government to Help Develop AI, Wired (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/obama-envisions-ai-new-apollo-program/ [https://perma.­cc/3TEH-FX6E] (quoting President Obama as stating, “The way I’ve been thinking about the regulatory structure as AI emerges is that, early in a technology, a thousand flowers should bloom. And the government should add a relatively light touch. . . . As technologies emerge and mature, then figuring out how they get incorporated into existing regulatory structures becomes a tougher problem, and the government needs to be involved a little bit more.”); David Shepardson & Susan Heavey, Amazon, Apple, others to testify before U.S. Senate on data privacy September 26, Reuters (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ww w.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tech-congress/amazon-apple-others-to-testify-before-u-s-senate-on-data-privacy-september-26-idUSKCN1LS25P [https://perma.cc/G5JV-9WGW] (quoting Sen. John Thune as stating that Commerce Committee hearing would allow tech companies to testify about “what Congress can do to promote clear privacy expectations without hurting innovation”); see also Governing Machine Learning, supra note 21 (reflecting participants’ views that standardizing the regulation of machine learning “would stifle innovation in a nascent industry, attempt to solve for problems that haven’t yet arisen, and potentially create barriers to entry for new entrants”).

[24] See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal, The Last Time Congress Threatened to Enact Digital Privacy Laws, It Didn’t Go So Well, Huff. Post (July 27, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpo st.com/entry/congress-digital-privacy-laws_us_5af0c587e4b0ab5c3d68b98b [https://perma­.cc/82TJ-ESVA].

[25] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. V, § 103 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)).

[26] Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 4, 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)).

[27] FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.115-118, 132 Stat. 3 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881 –1881g).

[28] See, e.g., Jacob Rush, Hacking the Right to Vote, 105 Va. L. Rev. Online 67 (2019) (discussing Congress’s failure to regulate election security); Dustin Volz, Mark Hosenball & Joseph Menn, Push for encryption law falters despite Apple case spotlight, Reuters (May 27, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-encryption-legislation-idUSKCN0YI0EM [https://perma.cc/93WR-UQB6] (discussing Congress’s failure to regulate encryption). A draft bill that would authorize companies to “hack back” in certain situations has been pending for several years. Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 4036, 115th Cong. (2017).

[29] Press Release, U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden of Or., Wyden Releases Discussion Draft of Legislation to Provide Real Protections for Americans’ Privacy (Nov. 1, 2018), https://ww w.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-releases-discussion-draft-of-legislation-to-provide-real-protections-for-americans-privacy [https://perma.cc/4KKH-J4RH]. There are some existing federal privacy laws in specific areas, such as health care and student records. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 221, 264, 110 Stat. 1936, 2009, 2033 (1996); Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). Further, California has enacted its own data privacy law. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, AB-375 (June 29, 2018).

[30] See Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 875 (2004) (“Judges struggle to understand even the basic facts of such technologies.”).

[31] See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In Carpenter, Justice Alito wrote, “Legislation is much preferable to the development of an entirely new body of Fourth Amendment caselaw for many reasons, including the enormous complexity of the subject, the need to respond to rapidly changing technology, and the Fourth Amendment’s limited scope.”

[32] Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one. . . . We do not . . . call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools . . . . Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. . . . [W]hen considering new innovations . . . the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not ‘embarrass the future.’” (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944))). Paul Ohm argues that the opinion is in fact sweeping in its consequences, however. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 Harv. J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1–3), https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/bsedj/ [https://perma.cc/B6HL-GS6F].

[33] 565 U.S. 400, 409–11 (2012).

[34] Loomis v. Wisconsin, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/loomi s-v-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/AC9D-3Z5P] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (listing the Supre- me Court’s denial of certiorari on June 26, 2017).

[35] MacKinnon, supra note 18, at 175.

[36] Hal Singer, The FTC’s Decision to Reject the Search Antitrust Case against Google, Forbes (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/halsinger/2012/12/05/the-ftcs-decision-to-reject-the-search-antitrust-case-against-google/ [https://perma.cc/2JBJ-GK97]; Laura Stevens, Why a Trump-Led Antitrust Case Against Amazon is a Long Shot, Wall St. J. (Mar. 31, 2018), https://wsj.com/articles/why-a-trump-led-antitrust-case-against-amazon-is-a-long-shot-1522501200 [https://perma.cc/9LN9-5EL2].

[37] See, e.g., Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents 185 (1990) (identifying public standing as a source of presidential influence); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 113–53 (discussing ways the Executive can garner public support, including through transparency).

[38] Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05 /23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism [https://perma.cc/D23M-PXYR].

[39] Ashley Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 827, 838 (2013).

[40] Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, 1132–33 (2013); Ashley Deeks, The Substance of Secret Agreements and the Role of Government Lawyers, 111 AJIL Unbound 474, 476 (2018).

[41] Deeks, supra note 9, at 76–77; Ashley Deeks, Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law, 7 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 1, 4–5 (2015).

[42] Sarah Frier, Facebook Publishes Content Removal Policies for the First Time, Bloomberg (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-24/face boo k-publishes-content-removal-policies-for-the-first-time [https://perma.cc/4T4E-CFV7] (noti- ng that the “release of the document follows frequent criticism and confusion about the company’s policies”); Julia Carrie Wong, Twitter Announces Global Change to Algorithm in Effort to Tackle Harassment, Guardian (May 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/ technology/2018/may/15/twitter-ranking-algorithm-change-trolling-harassment-abuse [https://perma.cc/9LR5-THZT].

[43] Antoni Slodkowski, Facebook Bans Myanmar Army Chief, Others in Unprecedented Move, Reuters (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-facebook­/facebook-bans-myanmar-army-chief-others-in-unprecedented-move-idUSKCN1LC0R7 [https://perma.cc/MU2B-RJU5].

[44] See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1627–28 (2018); Farhad Manjoo, Why the Google Walkout was a Watershed Moment in Tech, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nyti mes.com/2018/11/07/technology/google-walkout-watershed-tech.html [https://perma.cc/52S F-DS75] (“Protests by [Google’s] workers are an important new avenue for pressure; the very people who make these companies work can change what they do in the world.”).

[45] Daisuke Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset Employees, N.Y. Times (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technol ogy/google-pentagon-project-maven.html [https://perma.cc/TAN3-N7QB].

[46] Isabel Asher Hamilton, An Amazon Staffer Says Over 450 Employees Wrote to Jeff Bezos Demanding Amazon Stop Selling Facial-Recognition Software to Police, Bus. Insider (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-employee-letter-jeff-bezos-facial-recognition-software-police-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/4C93-ARDP].

[47] Science and Technology Committee, Robotics and Artificial Intelligence, 2016–17, HC 145, ¶ 66 (UK).

[48] Brad Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: The Need for Public Regulation and Corporate Responsibility, Microsoft: Microsoft on the Issues (Jul. 13, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/07/13/facial-recognition-technology-the-need-for-public-regulation-and-corporate-responsibility [https://perma.cc/MT9Q-GZW4].

[49] Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone, N.Y. Times (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/techno logy/facebook-google-russia.html [https://perma.cc/UW23-ZGG5].

[50] Id.

[51] Neil Malhotra, Benoit Monin & Michael Tomz, Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (2018); Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s New ‘Supreme Court’ Could Revolutionize Online Speech, Lawfare (Nov. 19. 2018), https://www.lawfa reblog.com/facebooks-new-supreme-court-could-revolutionize-online-speech [https://perma.cc/AHM4-WEMA].

[52] Steven T. Dennis, Senators Criticize Google CEO for Declining to Testify, Bloomberg (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-28/google-ceo-pichai-faulted-by-senators-for-declining-to-testify [https://perma.cc/4K4E-2R5Q].

[53] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 2.

[54] Id. arts. 44–46, at 8–9.

[55] Robert Levine, Antitrust Law Never Envisioned Massive Tech Companies Like Google, Bos. Globe (June 13, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/06/13/google-hugely-powerful-antitrust-law-job/E1eqrlQ01g11DRM8I9FxwO/story.html [https://perma.cc/ZH7D-TEVR].

[56] Guadalupe Gonzales, E.U. Antitrust Commission Sets Sights on Amazon. Here’s Why, Inc. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.inc.com/guadalupe-gonzalez/amazon-margrethe-vestager-preliminary-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/EP6Z-4SHB].

[57] Sarah C. Haan, Facebook’s Alternative Facts, 105 Va. L. Rev. Online 18 (2019).

[58] Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement, Facebook (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/ [https://perma.cc/TR8R-DDQ6].

[59] Global Network Initiative, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org [https://perma.cc/X66R-8JL3] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).

[60] Greg Brockman & Ilya Sutskever, Introducing OpenAI, OpenAI: Blog (Dec. 11, 2015), https://blog.openai.com/introducing-openai/ [https://perma.cc/J3V2-NL4C]; Alex Hern, ‘Partnership on AI’ Formed by Google, Facebook, Amazon, IBM and Microsoft, Guardian (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google-facebook-amazon-ibm-microsoft-partnership-on-ai-tech-firms [https://perma.cc/EG74-RJVD].

[61] Tony Romm & James McAuley, Facebook Will Let French Regulators Study Its Efforts to Fight Hate Speech, Wash. Post (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/tech nology/2018/11/12/facebook-will-let-french-regulators-study-its-efforts-fight-hate-speech/ [https://perma.cc/L5QU-VYWB].

[62] Ted Cruz has called for use of antitrust laws to break up power of Facebook and others. Press Release, U.S. Sen. for Texas Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz: We Have an Obligation to Defend the First Amendment Right of Every American on Social Media Platforms (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3723 (accessed Jan. 8, 2019); see also Robert Levine, Antitrust Law Never Envisioned Massive Tech Companies Like Google, Bost. Globe: Ideas (June 13, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2 018/06/13/google-hugely-powerful-antitrust-law-job/E1eqrlQ01g11DRM8I9FxwO/story.html [https://perma.cc/L424-7XKW].

[63] See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Cyberdelegation and the Administrative State 10–14 (Stan. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2754385, 2016), http s://ssrn.com/abstract=2754385 [https://perma.cc/2EPS-EZT8] (contemplating the executive branch’s use of algorithms to regulate and adjudicate); Daniel Newman, Inside Look: The World’s Largest Tech Companies are Making Massive AI Investments, Forbes (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2017/01/17/inside-look-the-worlds-large st-tech-companies-are-making-massive-ai-investments/#54ff6f3c4af2 [https://perma.cc/HM­5D-W374] (describing how Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft are all investing heavily in AI).  

[64] See Governing Machine Learning, supra note 21 (suggesting that regulation could mandate levels of explainability, prevent specific types of bias, or specify what types of models or data sets could be used for which purposes); Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 5–7 (Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Working Paper, 2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3437 2584 [https://perma.cc/7GQ7-BB7K].

[65] Mitch Ambrose, Another Physicist Congressman Attempts to Revive the Office of Tec- hnology Assessment, Am. Inst. of Physics (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/an other-physicist-congressman-attempts-revive-office-technology-assessment [https://perma.­cc/B73D-WUJL].

[66] Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1252 (2008).

[67] Glenn S. Gerstell, Gen. Couns., Nat’l Sec. Agency, Keynote Address to the American Bar Association 28th Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law Conference (Nov. 1, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/speeches-testimo nies/Article/1675727/keynote-address-by-glenn-s-gerstell-general-counsel-nsa-to-the-american-bar-ass/ [https://perma.cc/LK7N-YVGT]).

[68] Projects, NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/operations/proj ects/ads-task-force.page [https://perma.cc/74BJ-R2YT] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).

[69] Adam Gershowitz, Criminal Justice Apps: A Modest Step Towards Democratizing the Criminal Process, 105 Va. L. Rev. Online 37 (2019).

[70] MacKinnon, supra note 18, at 175.

Agency Design and the Zero-Sum Argument

Zero-sum arguments are common in discussions of the administrative state. Such an argument was forcefully presented in Free Enterprise Fund, where the Court wrote, “In a system of checks and balances, ‘[p]ower abhors a vacuum,’ and one branch’s handicap is another’s strength.”[1] This zero-sum argument has gained considerable force in recent challenges to agency design. Under the zero-sum framework, one branch’s diminished control over the administrative state necessitates a gain to the other branches. Typically, the President’s loss is Congress’s gain, although this is not always the case.[2] Empowered by this baseline understanding, opponents of a particular structure argue that limitations on presidential control disrupt the separation of powers, impermissibly altering the balance required by the Constitution.

 

But the zero-sum argument is not the only one to appear in agency-design case law. In Free Enterprise Fund, for instance, the Supreme Court considered whether two layers of for-cause removal protection violated Article II’s Vesting Clause.[3] In finding the protection unconstitutional, the Court expressed concern that “the diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”[4] Insulating officers through two layers of removal protection “subverts . . . the public’s ability to pass judgment” on the President.[5] In other words, the agency’s design was impermissible because it limited political accountability. This concern exists without regard to a corresponding gain by Congress.

It is worth noting that these two concerns are not identical. In the first situation—commonly known as “aggrandizement”—power had passed from the President to Congress, compromising the balance between politically accountable actors. In the second situation—the context of “diffusion”—power had passed from the President to unaccountable hands, beyond the reach of the electorate altogether.[6] These two arguments are frequently conflated under the broad rubric of separation of powers,[7] and the zero-sum argument is the mechanism through which this happens. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently ignored diffusion while holding that the Federal Housing Finance Agency is unconstitutionally structured because “when one branch tries to impair the power of another, this upsets the co-equality of the branches and degrades the Constitution’s deliberate separation of powers.”[8]

This Essay contends that the zero-sum argument is misplaced and not required by existing law. A decrease in the executive’s control over the administrative state does not always correspond with a gain to Congress or the judiciary. Zero-sum rhetoric groups ideas that are best left distinct, and this rhetoric comes with a cost. First, it masks the new and powerful role that diffusion arguments are playing in agency design cases. Second, it leads to confusion about the issues at stake in assessing agency structure. Third, it prevents the courts from looking to more useful facts in understanding diffusion as an independent constitutional harm.

Stripping away zero-sum language reveals that many cases that purport to be about the separation of powers, in fact, are not—at least not in the way the label is frequently employed. The challenge for a modern court is assessing not the balance between constitutional actors, but the point at which federal power is exercised beyond the reach of any accountable actor at all.[9] The harm that comes from the former defect—aggrandizement—is distinct from the harm that comes from the latter—diffusion.

Since Free Enterprise Fund, lower courts have grappled with how to identify when diffusion rises to an unconstitutional level. This essay does not speak for or against this project. The specific question in Free Enterprise Fund, the removal power, has long been a topic of academic attention.[10] Likewise, the broader question of how best to understand the constitutional allocations of powers between branches of government has been well developed by many able scholars.[11] Instead, this Essay takes the law as it exists now and critically examines what it requires from lower courts tasked with applying it. This examination leads to two conclusions. First, the courts should look beyond the Supreme Court’s precedents involving aggrandizement to identify when diffusion becomes unconstitutional. Free Enterprise Fund requires the courts to draw a new constitutional line, and these precedents do not offer any guidance on where it is. Second, any attempt to draw this line will require a careful examination of how the precise statute in question affects political accountability as a factual matter. Judge Griffith’s recent opinion in the CFPB litigation, discussed below, demonstrates this analytical approach. In brief, moving beyond zero-sum arguments helps us find the right answers by identifying the right questions.

I. The Government is not Zero-Sum

Lawyers, scholars, and judges often employ zero-sum language to undergird larger arguments about the proper “balance of power” in the constitutional system.[12] While disagreeing about the proper balance, they all seem to share a premise that what one branch gains, another must lose. As this Part argues, “balance” is not a unitary concept. Since power is not zero-sum, balance can be upset by a limit on one constitutional actor (diffusion), even without a corresponding expansion in another (aggrandizement). These are discrete, and at times contradictory, harms.

This Part begins by briefly summarizing the Supreme Court’s case law on agency design, arguing that prior to Free Enterprise, diffusion did not play an outcome-determinative role.  In fact, cases from before 2011 fit neatly into three groups: (1) cases interpreting a specific structural provision of the Constitution, like the Appointments Clause, (2) cases that upheld the statute in question against a broader separation of powers challenge,[13] and (3) cases that invalidated a statute because the Court found that one branch aggrandized itself with the power of another.[14] To be sure, the court often suggested broader principles were at work, but these theories were not essential to resolving the cases.  This Part then explores how Free Enterprise Fund changed the Court’s agency design doctrine,[15] before turning to recent attempts to apply Free Enterprise Fund to financial regulatory institutions.

A. The Law Before Free Enterprise

For many years after the New Deal, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding legislative incursions on the executive’s control of government proceeded on two tracks, which the Supreme Court recognized.[16] On the first track, the Court interpreted the specific constitutional provisions that assign responsibility among branches of government. For instance, the Court invalidated attempts to place government officers in a manner not consistent with the Appointments Clause,[17] appoint officers in violation of the Recess Clause,[18] or pass laws in a manner that did not conform to the Presentment Clause.[19] In these cases, the Court simply discerned the meaning of the constitutional provision at issue.[20] When a specific structural provision was not implicated,[21] the court adopted a balancing approach,[22] asking if a law “prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”[23] The decisions along this second track fell into a predictable pattern. While some of the opinions employed zero-sum rhetoric,[24] the Court struck down only statutes that involved aggrandizement. In other words, agency design was unconstitutional if it put members of Congress (or their agents) in control of the administrative state or put executive function inside the legislative branch.

The line between the two tracks was not always clear—some opinions, for example, reach the same conclusion along both routes[25]—but the outcome was. Statutes could limit the President’s ability to control personnel or agency action, as long as another constitutional actor was not stepping in to fill the void. Currently, the statutes at large are full of organic statutes and general management laws that structure the President’s ability to manage the federal government.[26] These laws fit neatly into the Supreme Court’s then-existing doctrine, which permitted the administrative state to serve as the repository of managerial functions and to disperse power among different executive branch actors, but prevented inter-branch encroachment. Past Court holdings treated aggrandizement as more problematic than diffusion; it did not conflate them into a single zero-sum harm.

In this respect, the Court’s doctrine around agency independence was not unique. Other areas of administrative law support the premise that although agencies are within the executive branch, they are analytically separate from the President and the Congress. The analysis in Nixon v. General Services Administration is instructive. Under the Presidential Recording and Material Preservation Act, an executive agency (GSA) is required to take possession of presidential records and screen them for preservation. The case gave rise to a separation of powers challenge on the grounds that “the Act encroaches upon the Presidential prerogative to control internal operations of the Presidential office and therefore offends the autonomy of the Executive Branch.”[27] On the challenger’s view, this reflects “an impermissible interference by the Legislative Branch into matters inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch.”[28] After stating the applicable test, based on the ability to carry out “constitutionally assigned functions,” the Court rejected the claim, noting that

[i]t is therefore highly relevant that the Act provides for custody of materials in officials of the Executive Branch and that employees of that branch have access to the materials only for ‘lawful government use, subject to the Administrators regulations. For it is clearly less intrusive to place custody and screening of the materials within the Executive Branch itself than to have Congress or some outside agency perform the screening function.[29] 

This analysis requires a few assumptions. First, authority in the GSA is not the same as authority in the President. Second, authority in the GSA is not the same as authority in Congress. Finally, the proper way to frame the question is to look at how much the President is impaired by the agency’s authority, irrespective of Congress. In other words, assess diffusion as distinct from aggrandizement.

Stepping back, the law before Free Enterprise Fund is easily summarized. As a matter of agency design, one branch of government could not encroach on another. The Court acknowledged that some limitations on the President would be problematic in and of themselves,[30] but the Court did not draw a constitutional line.

B. The Law After Free Enterprise Fund

The legal landscape changed with Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, where the Court found that two levels of for-cause removal protection from the President amounted to an unconstitutional insulation from executive authority.[31] This case was the first to invalidate a personnel restriction that did not infringe on a specific textual provision or directly increase congressional control.[32] Even Myers v. United States,[33] commonly understood to represent a robust view of presidential authority, involved a statute that gave Congress itself the authority to remove officers.[34]  Rather than proceeding along the two-track tradition, the Court instead found the scheme invalid under the Article II Vesting Clause.[35]

It is difficult to see the structure at issue as an aggrandizement of Congress. The case involved the provision of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act that sets up the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a body to oversee accounting firms that audit public companies. The Board was created to supervise, investigate, and sanction firms in this industry, under the oversight of the SEC. The members of the PCAOB are selected by the SEC, not Congress, to five-year terms and are protected from at-will removal by the SEC. This structure represents a fair amount of insulation from the President, but it puts the members no closer to Congress, which has no role in their selection, supervision, or removal.[36] The relevant harm is thus a far cry from the prior cases that either placed the legislative branch directly in charge of executive functions or made officers removable only with the consent of the Congress.

Instead of looking to Congress’s gain, then, the opinion rightly focused on the President’s loss of control. After reviewing the prior cases involving personnel independence,[37] all of which could be made to fit the two-track approach, the Court articulated a new boundary. As the majority understood the issue, two-layers of for-cause removal protection meant the President lacked the authority to “oversee the Board” or check the “dispersion of responsibility.”[38] While the Court concluded that the “Act’s restrictions are incompatible with the . . . separation of powers,”[39] the opinion does not speak to other branches. Instead, the real fear is that the legislation “reduce[d] the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”[40] The opinion focused on the balance between the agency and the President, not the President and the other branches. Zero-sum rhetoric makes an appearance,[41] but there is no real suggestion that Congress was grabbing control of the accounting industry through the PCAOB.

While the Court referenced its aggrandizement decisions, its analysis was motivated by diffusion. As such, the case started the law down a new path. This is not to say that the Court ignored its precedents or fundamentally undermined the existing course of the law. To the contrary, many prior cases suggested that such a limit might exist,[42] and in Free Enterprise, the government itself admitted that constraints on the President’s removal authority could present constitutional defects.[43] On its own terms, the opinion suggests that it was the novelty of the agency design, not a change in the law, that drove the change in outcome.[44]

The opinion is not remarkable for its introduction of the diffusion argument. It is notable because the argument finally carried the day. Since then, the challenge has become drawing the new line that the diffusion rationale requires. With the removal power, where diffusion and the zero-sum argument point in the same direction, this challenge might not seem so difficult. In fact, that is likely the best way to understand the zero-sum argument in Free Enterprise Fund itself. The earlier decisions involving aggrandizement all limited the president without a corresponding reduction in congressional control, so it was appropriate to conclude that “Congress’ political power . . . necessarily increase[d] vis-à-vis the President.”[45] When litigants challenge an agency for its independence from both the President and Congress, however, diffusion and aggrandizement point in opposite directions. In these situations, the zero-sum argument loses its force and the Court’s task becomes more difficult.

C. The CFPB and FHFA Litigation

The financial industry would soon provide two prominent examples of agencies challenged because they are independent of both the White House and Congress. First, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 created the Federal Housing Finance Agency to oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.[46] Several years later, the Dodd–Frank reform legislation created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), consolidating formerly scattered authority in this area and providing new regulatory tools to the agency.[47] Given that Free Enterprise Fund suggested a willingness to accept longstanding regulators,[48] the novel structures of these two agencies were fertile ground to test the boundaries of permissible diffusion. These challenges have given rise to two major circuit court opinions, both of which demonstrate the trouble with zero-sum thinking. Specifically, litigants and judges have struggled with assessing features of agency design that limit both congressional and presidential control. Specifically, there is confusion over how to weigh the agencies’ independence from the budget process, which would otherwise afford Congress an opportunity each year to affect agency policy.

 In PHH Corp. v. CFPB, litigants brought a challenge to the CFPB’s design under the Vesting Clause of Article II.[49] As structured by Dodd–Frank, the agency enjoys significant independence from the President. The CFPB is headed by a single administrator, not a multi-member commission. This director is appointed to a five-year term, with for-cause removal protection during that tenure. The agency also enjoys other structural features that insulate it from political influence. For example, since it receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, the CFPB does not depend on congressional largesse during the annual appropriations cycle.[50]

The litigation ultimately focuses on whether the removal provision, either standing alone or in combination with the budgetary process, is unconstitutional.[51] Advocates of the CFPB see the agency as nothing special, at least in a constitutional sense. Congress has long employed single administrators, for-cause removal protections, and funding outside the annual appropriations cycle. The combination, they claim, is no more problematic than any discrete part. To its detractors, however, the aggregation of these features in a single entity is both novel and threatening, pulling the agency well outside the normal push and pull of partisan politics. While the challengers prevailed in the initial hearing before the D.C. Circuit, the agency prevailed en banc.

If the Supreme Court is one day tasked with resolving the question, one thing should be clear: The zero-sum conception of constitutional power is wholly inapplicable to a structure like that of the CFPB. If all adjustments to the administrative state amount to different ways of distributing the pie among branches of government, as the zero-sum concept would require, then the features of the CFPB actually mitigate one another. If the government is zero-sum, the removal restrictions of the CFPB Administrator limit the President and aggrandize Congress. Likewise, the budget autonomy limits the Congress and necessarily aggrandizes the President. If the zero-sum logic is followed to its conclusion, an agency can avoid constitutional defect by simply applying additional limits to each branch in equal measure, a result that is clearly contradictory to the accountability rationale of Free Enterprise Fund

Given this implication, it is unsurprising that zero-sum language did not make a prominent appearance in the briefing. The suggestion that “power abhors a vacuum” is nowhere to be found. And the challengers even argue that Congress abdicated its own authority in the creation of the agency, a sort of anti-aggrandizement. As they saw it, the decision to place the operating budget outside the annual appropriations process deprives Congress of an “important check . . . over the CFPB,” while “limit[ing] [the] accountability to the President too.”[52] By arguing that this independence limited the authority of both branches, the petitioners tacitly accepted that a zero-sum argument did not help their case.

Nonetheless, the briefs filed in advance of the en banc rehearing suggest the parties did not distinguish between the types of harms reflected in the case law. Their citations demonstrate that the litigants are fighting over diffusion while talking about aggrandizement. The petitioner’s argument on the constitutional merits cites Chadha, Myers, Free Enterprise, Bowsher, Morrison, Humphrey’s Executor, Noel Canning, and Freytag. The only case involving a diffusion concern, Association of American Railroads, was cited for a different proposition.[53] In defending the statute, the CFPB followed a similar course, citing to Nixon, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, Noel Canning, Bowsher, Mistretta, and Free Enterprise.[54] As discussed in Part I, these cases (with the exception of Free Enterprise) have little to say about the line between appropriate independence and unconstitutional diffusion.

The FHFA litigation has similarly highlighted the difficulty of fitting budget independence into the zero-sum framework. Unlike the D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp., which ultimately upheld the CFPB, a Fifth Circuit panel applied Free Enterprise Fund to find that the FHFA was unconstitutionally structured.[55] In doing so, the Court engaged in a thorough analysis of both the case law on removal and the literature suggesting that removal is not the only source of agency independence.[56] Much of the opinion focuses on diffusion, noting the harm that emerges from having government actors too isolated from political accountability. Focusing on this harm leads the Court to correctly conclude that the question before them is one of degree: “Ultimately, ‘an agency’s practical degree of independence from presidential influence depends’ on the combined effect of these (sometimes mutually reinforcing) structural features.”[57] This is exactly the sort of analysis that diffusion as a separate harm requires.

The Court’s reasoning is weakened, however, by its need to square this fact-intensive and practical analysis with zero-sum rhetoric around agency design. For instance, the opinion quotes Free Enterprise Fund for the proposition that “excessive insulation allows Congress to accumulate power for itself.”[58] On this view, Congress’s “control over the salary, duties, and even existence of executive offices” goes unchecked when an agency is isolated from the President.[59] The problem with this type of argument becomes plain when the court later discusses the FHFA’s funding source. Much like the CFPB, the FHFA receives funding outside the annual appropriations cycle.[60] As previously mentioned, the CFPB litigants saw this feature as weakening Congress’s control. In forcing its analysis into the zero-sum box, the Fifth Circuit argues that the FHFA’s funding source weakens the President: “By placing an agency outside the normal appropriations process, the President loses ‘leverage’ over the agency’s activities. . . . The FHFA stands outside the budget . . . and is therefore immune from presidential control.”[61]

Compare this argument to the earlier assertion that agency independence empowers Congress through its power to control salaries, duties, and offices. These levers are the product of Congress’s power to enact statutes. So is the annual appropriations process. Both require bicameralism and presentment. Both can be vetoed, and both could see a veto overridden. Yet the Fifth Circuit frames the legislative power to set duties, salaries, and offices (by statute) as a reason for congressional dominance, while framing the absence of the power to set funding levels (by statute) as an inhibition on the President. The attempt to put the budget provision into the zero-sum framework of earlier cases is understandable. Once the unique contribution of Free Enterprise Fund is recognized, however, it is unnecessary and detracts from the core accountability concern that is well developed in other parts of the opinion. 

The CFPB and FHFA cases both confronted agencies free from the annual appropriations cycle. As a practical matter, removing an agency from the pressures of annual appropriations inhibits both branches. The power of the purse is one of Congress’s primary checks on the actions of the executive branch.[62] Similarly, the President, acting through the Office of Management and Budget, exerts tremendous pressure on agencies through the budget request process.[63] Although this form of independence could be relevant to the diffusion of power, it does not tell us much about the balance of power between the branches. But this reality is difficult to square with the reliance on the zero-sum argument in earlier cases, which sees the two as one in the same. In the CFPB case, the litigants accepted as much and focused solely on diffusion. In the FHFA litigation, however, the court examined the feature in a way that fit the zero-sum framework, grouping its analysis under a single “separation of powers” idea.

II. Understanding Diffusion as a Separate Harm

The theory of the Vesting Clause found in Free Enterprise Fund is applicable to any feature of agency design that could plausibly limit political accountability. It can therefore be deployed to a range of statutes affecting financing, litigating authority, officer qualifications, and direct reporting, among others.[64] While some methodological approaches might lead to these statutes being invalidated wholesale, the Court’s approach in Free Enterprise Fund was more fact intensive and functional, as the lower courts have recognized.[65] Moreover, while interpretive techniques like a “presumption against novelty” in agency design may help the Court reach decisions involving new structures, they tell us little about the ones we already have.[66]

This Part briefly notes two potential analytical approaches, both of which move beyond the zero-sum framework. The first is to consider other areas of the law that implicate a diffusion harm, such as privatization and federalism. While these areas may share certain qualities with agency design, they ultimately do not offer much guidance for lower courts. The second is to develop an agency-specific understanding of diffusion, focused on political accountability. This option requires the courts to think more about what accountability means and how it is measured; a project that may prove difficult to square with the current focus of the law on personnel alone. This approach requires that lower courts engage in a more fact-bound assessment of statutes that structure agencies until the Supreme Court provides more complete guidance, especially because other areas of law do not provide workable standards.

A. Analogies Outside the Separation of Powers

The diffusion harm in Free Enterprise is grounded in political accountability concerns. The Supreme Court has explored political accountability in both its federalism decisions and its cases involving the delegation of power to private actors, so these are natural starting points for trying to develop a workable constitutional limit on diffusion.

Modern American federalism is characterized by sovereigns acting in overlapping domains, which allow for cooperation and contestation.[67] The current doctrine does not attempt to carve out separate spheres of federal and state action. Instead, it ensures the federal government cannot avoid accountability for its actions by commandeering the states. Under New York[68] and Printz[69]—the two most significant cases in this area—the federal government cannot use the states to enforce its policies, at least not directly. The role of political accountability in these cases is therefore straightforward and defensible. Since the Constitution divides power between two elected sovereigns, one cannot conscript the other and thereby distort the public’s assessment of credit and blame.[70] The Court recently applied this logic to coercion, finding that indirect mandates in federal grants can have the same distorting effect in extreme cases.[71] In the context of federal–state relations, therefore, how a policy is implemented matters.[72] The federal government may have the power to impose its will on local subjects, but it must do so directly and on fair terms.

Political accountability is also central in a line of cases involving delegations of power to private actors.[73] When Congress delegates discretion to public actors within the executive branch, that practice aligns with the structure of the aggrandizement cases; one branch loses the ability to fill gaps in the law while the other branch gains that power. If there is a constitutional defect, it is the transfer of legislative power from Congress to the President.[74] The harm that stems from delegating power to private actors, however, is different and warrants greater scrutiny.[75] Notably, this scrutiny is framed in terms of accountability. As the D.C. Circuit recently stated, “delegating the government’s powers to private parties saps our political system of democratic accountability. This threat is particularly dangerous where both Congress and the Executive can deflect blame for unpopular policies by attributing them to the choices of a private entity.”[76] In other words, the harm is not the balance between political actors, but rather shifting the blame outside the government altogether. To support this conclusion, the opinion cited not only to prior cases involving delegations to private actors, such as the New Deal–era Carter Coal decision, but also to the federalism cases.[77] This makes sense to the extent that the cases share a common premise—that federal actors have empowered (or coerced) actors outside their control to implement national policy, thus compromising the public’s ability to hold the proper official accountable. This accountability concern is central to the limits on diffusion identified in both areas.

The value of these cases to questions of agency design is limited. While these areas are concerned with maintaining a distinction (federal/state, public/private), the Constitution does not reflect a similar concern for administration. To the contrary, political control over administration is explicitly designed to make many individuals accountable for any given action.[78] Branches share responsibility for appointing personnel, financing government operations, and constraining incursions by administrators on individual liberty. Under a structure where both political branches are supposed to share blame and credit for federal action, what work is political accountability doing? Moreover, the privatization cases suggest that diffusion concerns are heightened for private actors, even relative to independent agencies.[79] In brief, whereas the other two areas can look to political accountability as a way to draw a useful and enforceable distinction, it is not clear that idea can do the same work here. Instead, the courts will likely need to try something new; they will need to develop a framework for understanding the unique relationship between agency design and political accountability. 

B. Independent Harms in the Administrative State

An agency’s design clearly has some effect on its political responsiveness.[80] While Free Enterprise Fund identifies one point at which this effect is too limiting, it does little to provide a way forward.  To apply its holding, the Court must accept two premises. To note these premises is not to resolve them, but it is a necessary step in developing a workable doctrine of diffusion.

First, the extent to which a particular agency design diffuses power presents an empirical and measurable question: How much does the structure actually limit political accountability?[81] In measuring that harm, the zero-sum argument, which frames the question as one of the separation of powers, offers little guidance. As Adrian Vermuele has noted, the separation of powers is not an unassailable “idol”: “[I]t is not obvious that what are, after all, merely institutional arrangements could ever be the sort of things that could be ‘contaminated,’ even in principle. The language of the sacred is simply misplaced as to such highly contingent matters of institutional design.”[82]

Instead, the courts must examine a core principle—democratic accountability—as a factual matter. Ultimately, this question is not a “vague and slippery” search for balance between the branches.[83] It requires a factual assessment of what the terms of the restriction on presidential authority mean.[84] Labels like “for-cause removal” or “financial independence” are too broad, and courts must parse more critically the provisions before them. As the financial regulators demonstrate, not all features of agency design will necessarily empower one branch over the other. This time Congress chose to limit its control through annual appropriations. Next time it might involve an agency free of congressional subpoenas or oversight hearings. In either event, the courts will be asked to assess the effect of such a feature, even though there is no aggrandizement.

The D.C. Circuit’s recent assessment of the CFPB demonstrates how such an analysis might look. The majority[85] and dissents[86] offer thorough and persuasive accounts of how existing case law speaks to the permissibility of the CFPB’s design. While disagreeing on the outcome, the majority and dissent ask general questions about how the agency’s design fits into existing precedent. As discussed in Part I, however, this precedent does not tell us much about the dispositive question under Free Enterprise Fund: at what point does the diffusion of power to an agency, and the attendant loss of political accountability, become unconstitutional?

Answering requires knowing the actual limits placed on the President. And for that, Judge Griffith’s solo concurrence on the removal question makes an important contribution to the debate. He explains the reason for his separate opinion at the outset: “My colleagues debate whether the agency’s single-Director structure impermissibly interferes with the President’s ability to supervise the Executive Branch. But to make sense of that inquiry, we must first answer a more fundamental question: How difficult is it for the President to remove the Director?”[87] Judge Griffith goes on to describe the language of the removal provision—allowing for removal in cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”—and finds that it allows for removal based on policy disagreement. Judge Wilkins’s concurring opinion employs a similar inquiry, ultimately finding Judge Griffith’s conclusion contestable.[88] But the result is not as important as the question, which rejects the idea that all removal restrictions should be treated equally or raise the same constitutional concerns. As Judge Griffith put it, “agency independence is not a binary but rather a matter of degree.”[89]

The new diffusion doctrine’s second necessary premise is that individual limits on presidential authority cannot be viewed in isolation. As the Fifth Circuit noted, the Supreme Court’s holding in Free Enterprise Fund requires the court to “look at the aggregate effect of the insulating mechanisms to determine whether an agency is excessively insulated.”[90] While the court then went on to consider a range of statutory provisions applicable to the FHFA, there is reason to think that the inquiry should have been even broader. The insulation of a given agency can turn on its relationship to other agencies, state governments, and political actors in Congress and in private life.[91] Even though these non-traditional features of independence are hard to measure and not readily susceptible to easy labels (like “for-cause removal”), they are powerful.

Analyzing diffusion requires a fact-intensive assessment of the limits on presidential control, considered in their full legal and political context. If this seems like a functional inquiry, it is because the law requires one. The court in Free Enterprise Fund drew a line in the sand at two layers of for-cause removal from the President. The defect in that statutory arrangement is clearly distinct from those in prior aggrandizement cases. This diffusion harm is rooted in a loss of political accountability, which only a careful factual examination can measure.

 

*    *    *

An agency’s design can implicate two discrete harms. The first—aggrandizement—involves one branch encroaching on the domain of another. This encroachment upsets the separation of powers by placing the responsibilities of one constitutional actor under the control of another. The second—diffusion—does not implicate the balance of power between the branches; it instead places the exercise of federal power beyond the reach of an accountable official. The reliance on zero-sum rhetoric masks this distinction. In doing so, courts attempt to fit facts into a theoretical framework ill-suited to answer the question required by current law. Instead of relying on the unitary concept of agency independence expressed in the zero-sum argument, courts should take on the difficult task of defining political accountability and setting the limit at which it has been impermissibly diffused. These tasks may be unfamiliar, but under current law they are unavoidable.

 


    [1] Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010) (citing Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion for the D.C. Circuit below); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“We have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that . . . undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.”); Nixon v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“Rather, in determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”).

    [2] See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) (finding that an adjudication by the bankruptcy courts violated Article III); Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the OSH Act of 1970 violated the non-delegation doctrine).

    [3] 561 U.S. 477.

    [4] Id. at 497.

    [5] Id. at 498.

    [6] The labels “aggrandizement” and “diffusion” for these two defects are not new. The first is commonly used in the court’s opinions, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976), while the latter has been invoked both in Free Enterprise Fund itself and subsequent scholarship on the case. See Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 1133, 1133 (2014).

    [7] See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1961–71 (2011) (describing the formalist concern with “encroachment,” whereby specific limits on presidential control are invalidated because of the general separation of powers principle).

    [8] Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 659 (5th Cir. 2018).

    [9] While the court in Free Enterprise used “diffusion” to signal a particular kind of constitutional defect, the diffusion of power in many executive branch actors can arguably mitigate, not create, constitutional defects. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 605–06 (2001); Manning supra note 7, at 1947 (“[R]ather than embracing an overarching separation of powers principle, the [Constitution] . . . reflects countless context-specific choices about how to assign, structure, divide, blend, and balance federal power.”).

    [10] Compare Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 1205 (2014) (arguing that presidential removal of officers is constitutionally required), with Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163 (2013) (arguing that removal restrictions, both in statute and prevailing convention, are not critical to determining constitutional questions of agency independence). See also Aziq Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2013) (arguing that courts should consider this entire area non-justiciable under the political question doctrine); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1779 (2006) (presenting a theory of the removal power distributed across all three branches of government).

    [11] An abbreviated survey includes Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 103, 107-11 (2009) (providing a concise presentation of the Unitary Executive theory, which the authors presented more fully elsewhere); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 581 (1984) (arguing for a “framework for understanding the scope of Congress’s authority to structure American government that . . . require[s] that those who do the work of law-administration have significant relationships with [Congress and the President]”); Manning, supra note 7 (arguing for a less general approach to separation of powers questions that would allow for more flexibility in areas where the Constitution is less clear about institutional arrangements); Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1231 (arguing that separation of powers law should account for “unwritten rules of the game, or conventions,” which lie “[b]etween ‘politics’ on the one hand and formal written law on the other”).

    [12] Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Power Arguments, the Structural Constitution, and the Problem of Executive “Underenforcement”, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1677, 1678 (2016).

    [13] See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (finding that Congress can delegate authority to the President to define aggravating factors for military capital cases); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding a delegation to the judiciary to promulgate the Sentencing Guidelines); Nixon v. Gen. Servs. Admin, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act).

    [14] See, e.g., MWAA v. Citizens For The Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).

    [15] The notion that Free Enterprise Fund represents a fundamental break from past practice is found in other scholarship. See Huq, supra note 10, at 14.

    [16] See MWAA, 501 U.S. at 274 (“To forestall the danger of encroachment ‘beyond the legislative sphere,’ the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on the Congress. It may not ‘invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the ‘single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures’ specified in Article I.” (citations omitted)); see also Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 484–86 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment) (“In some of our more recent cases involving the powers and prerogatives of the President, we have employed something of a balancing approach, asking whether the statute at issue prevents the President from accomplishing his constitutionally assigned functions. . . . In a line of cases of equal weight and authority, however, where the Constitution by explicit text commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the President, we have refused to tolerate any intrusion by the Legislative Branch. . . . The justification for our refusal to apply a balancing test in these cases, though not always made explicit, is clear enough. Where a power has been committed to a particular Branch of the Government in the text of the Constitution, the balance already has been struck by the Constitution itself.” (citations and emphasis omitted)).

    [17] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

    [18] Noel Canning v. NLRB, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).

    [19] INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

    [20] See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (defining “officers” for the purpose of applying the analysis of Buckley).

    [21] This Essay assumes that the Vesting Clauses themselves are not a specific structural provision, at least not one comparable to the Appointments Clause. This assumption is based on the Court’s reluctance to view the Vesting Clauses as a source of rigid structural rules. As discussed in Section I.B, even recent decisions based on the Vesting Clause, like Free Enterprise Fund, did not import specific rules through the Vesting Clause, instead using the provision as the launching point for a more balanced inquiry involving political accountability.

     [22] See, e.g., MWAA v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991).

    [23] Nixon v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).

    [24] See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–22 (1986) (explicitly mentioning the separation of powers and diffusion in a case involving aggrandizement); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.”).

    [25] See MWAA, 501 U.S. at 277, n. 23 (finding that because the scheme was invalid as aggrandizement, potential objections based on specific textual provisions were unresolved); see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714. While the majority in Bowsher invalidated the scheme on the grounds of congressional aggrandizement, Justice Stevens would have reached the same conclusion by finding the scheme a violation of Article I’s requirement of bicameralism and presentment. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment).

    [26] See, e.g., Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix); 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2012); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 784-812 (2013) (surveying statutory provisions).

    [27] Nixon, 433 U.S. at 439–40 (1977).

    [28] Id. at 440.

    [29] Id. at 443–44. Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that the Administrator of GSA is appointed by the President and the staff who conduct the record review are executive employees, both of which the Court saw as relevant to the constitutional question. Id. at 441.

    [30] This lay of the land is summarized in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–97 (1988). By framing the Court’s holding in Myers v. United States as involving an aggrandizement concern, the Court in Morrison fit the case into the existing framework, even though the language of the opinion extended well beyond that rationale. Id. at 686–87 (discussing Myers). Significant portions of Morrison have been challenged by later cases, but Free Enterprise Fund did not directly conflict with Morrison’s holding on the removal question and its vitality remains an open question.

    [31] Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).

     [32] At the time of the opinion, there was uncertainty as to whether the holding would work a major change in separation of powers law, or was instead a more incremental or “boundary enforcing” decision. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 Duke J. of Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 9 (2010).

    [33] 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

    [34] This had been the previous rationale for harmonizing the case with later, more permissive holdings. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686 (1988) (“Unlike both Bowsher and Myers, this case does not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials. . . .”). The majority opinion in PHH Corp. also distinguished the case on these grounds. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).

    [35] Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.

    [36] See id. at 485.

    [37] All of the cases cited on the personnel question either involved aggrandizement (Myers, Bowsher) or resulted in the agency design being upheld (Humphreys, Perkins, Morrison).

    [38] Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495–98.

    [39] Id. at 498.

    [40] Id. at 502.

    [41] Id. at 500.

    [42] See, e.g., Nixon v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).

    [43] Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 502 (“The United States concedes that some constraints on the removal of inferior executive officers might violate the Constitution.”).

    [44] See id. at 496.

    [45] In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Judge Kavanaugh discussed the relationship between the two at length in his dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, which argued that the PCAOB was unconstitutional. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 694 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

    [46] Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1101, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).

    [47] Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title X, 124 Stat. 1383 (2010).

    [48] See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496, 505–06.

    [49] PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (order vacated, rehearing en banc granted Feb. 16, 2017).

    [50] PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). The agency is also empowered to communicate to Congress without White House approval. See 12 U.S.C. § 250.

    [51] PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 92–101.

    [52] Opening En Banc Brief for Petitioners at *26–27, PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc)  (No. 15-1177), 2017 WL 947733.

    [53] Id. at *28.

    [54] Brief on Rehearing en Banc of Respondent at *17–32, PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (No. 15-1177), 2017 WL 1196119.

    [55] Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 640 (5th Cir. 2018).

    [56] Id. at 660–61.

    [57] Id. at 661.

    [58] Id. at 661.

    [59] Id. at 662.

    [60] Id. at 667–69.

    [61] Id. at 669. (emphasis added).

    [62] See generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers 45–77 (2017) (discussing the power of the purse).

    [63] See generally Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Policy Control, 125 Yale L.J. 2182 (2016).

    [64] See Datla & Revesz, supra note 26, at 784–812.

    [65] See Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 664 (5th Cir. 2018).

    [66] Professor Leah Litman’s recent work makes a persuasive case against such a presumption in constitutional law. Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407 (2017). The phenomenon can be observed in many Supreme Court and appellate court opinions that would strike down legislation on separation of powers grounds. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1333 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.  dissenting); PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Assoc. of Am. Rrs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 721 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

    [67] See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1260–65 (2009) (describing the prevailing theories of federalism).

    [68] New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–83 (1992) (discussing the possibility of “shifting responsibility” to avoid accountability).

    [69] Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–31 (1997).

    [70] Id.

    [71] NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). The opinion was not framed in Tenth Amendment terms, but did cite to these cases as a means of limiting Congress’s Article I power to tax and spend. Id. at 559. The reach of this decision is still largely undetermined. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 557 (2013).

    [72] To see this point in action, consider that the majorities in both New York and NFIB rejected the notion that the laws in question were appropriate because a more aggressive exercise of power would be appropriate—the “greater includes the lesser” objection. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 624 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) (“Congress could have recalled the existing legislation, and replaced it with a new law making Medicaid as embracive of the poor as Congress chose. The question posed by the 2010 Medicaid expansion, then, is essentially this: To cover a notably larger population, must Congress take the repeal/reenact route, or may it achieve the same result by amending existing law?”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 959 (1997) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“Perversely, the majority’s rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State’s rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies.”). This objection does not carry force when the concern is political accountability between the state and federal governments, not simply the substantive limits of Congress’s power. 

    [73] In practice, there are not many cases in this area because courts have long accepted that privatization, even of significant tasks, does not automatically equate to a private exercise of governmental power. See Jon D. Michaels, Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s Threat to the American Republic 125–26 (2017) (“[I]n in the absence of clear, prohibitory language, courts have largely continued giving privatization a free pass. Specifically, courts have generally declined to treat contractors, deputies, and the like as the true recipients of delegated powers—and thus subject to the doctrinal bar on private delegations.”).

    [74] Or possibly the judiciary. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 366 (1989).

     [76] Assoc. of Am. Rrs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 721 F.3d 666, 670–71 (D.C. Circ. 2013) (“Even an intelligible principle cannot rescue a statute empowering private parties to wield regulatory authority.”), rev’d Dep’t of Trans. v. Assoc. of Am. Rrs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231–33 (2015).

    [76] Assoc. of Am. Rrs., 721 F.3d at 675.

    [77] Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).

    [78] See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in the Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127 (2000) (describing this tension).

    [79] Dep’t of Trans., 135 S. Ct. at 1231–32 (noting that private actors are distinguished by a profit motive, in addition to federal control).

    [80] See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15 (2010). 

    [81] See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 6, at 1137–38 (applying such an empirical analysis to the legislative veto mechanism). There is not widespread agreement that this is the proper way to understand the Vesting Clause of Article II. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 10, at 1209–10 (“The recognition that ‘independence’ has an uncertain and unpredictable connection to presidential control and that administration depends largely on political factors makes it all the more important to revisit the constitutional framework of administration and to establish the boundaries for presidential control.”).

    [82] Adrian Vermuele, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State 71 (2016).

    [83] Posner, supra note 12, at 1714. As an example, “[t]he reason we should care about constraints on the removal power is not that those constraints upset some balance between Congress and the President. The reason is that those constraints may improve or worsen the performance of the bureaucracy. To determine whether they do, one must consider the particular body in question and ask why the constraints might be useful or harmful.”

      [84] Much of Free Enterprise Fund’s dissent focused exactly on these question, looking to whether the for-cause removal provision presented any discernible limit on the President in practice. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 525–26 (2010) (Breyer, J. dissenting).

    [85] PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 84–91 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). In all, the case resulted in seven different opinions, addressing different constitutional and statutory questions.

    [86] Id. at 137, 146–48 (Henderson, J. dissenting) (discussing the removal from the annual appropriations process); id. at 188 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting). Judge Kavanaugh focused on the removal question, consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior cases.

    [87] Id. at 124 (Griffith, J. concurring).

    [88] Id. at 122–23 (Wilkins, J. concurring).

    [89] Id. at 136 (Griffith, J. concurring).

    [90] Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 664 (5th Cir. 2018).

    [91] Barkow, supra note 80, at 49–63.