Hacking the Right to Vote

Most Americans believe the right to vote is one of the most important constitutional rights.[1] Moreover, eight out of ten Americans are concerned the country’s voting system is vulnerable to hackers.[2] Although new voting technology has been implemented across the country, it largely enables, rather than prevents, hacking, causing “frightening vulnerabilities” for election administration.[3] It seems that “America’s most ancient civilian office, the local election clerk, has become saddled with new and alien responsibilities tantamount to a military contractor.”[4] Hacking presents a novel threat to elections and may have far-reaching implications on the right to vote.

Part I describes the current state of election technology and the hurdles preventing improvements. Part II addresses Russia’s cyberattacks in the 2016 elections. It highlights the unprecedented risk hacking poses to the right to vote and suggests that courts must intervene. Part III reviews recent litigation to suggest that vulnerable voting machines violate the right to have one’s vote counted accurately, which reimagines traditional right-to-vote jurisprudence in the context of hacking. Finally, Part IV posits that hacks that burden voter access, increase voter frustration, and foil voter participation are more likely, just as dangerous, yet less responsive to right-to-vote jurisprudence than hacks manipulating vote tabulations.

I. The Problem with Voting Technology: Federalism, Funding, and Industry

Voting technology matters so much because elections are so often so close. Accurate machines ensure that the electoral process both selects true winners and convinces losers to accept unfavorable results.[5] The constitutional right to vote accordingly guarantees that each voter has about the same opportunity to have his or her vote counted, by requiring that counting methods (e.g., voting machines) distribute counting errors roughly equally. This is the promise and peril of Bush v. Gore.[6] Problems with voting technology, where some legally valid votes may not be counted properly, which produces high residual vote rates, risk undermining the fundamental right to vote and the public’s confidence that the will of the people has been freely and fairly expressed.[7]

Despite the stakes, there are three roadblocks to better voting machines.[8] First, federalism. According to the constitution’s text and the gloss of history and tradition, states have wide discretion in election administration.[9] They run federal elections subject only to Congress’s authority, exercised occasionally, [10] to “at any time by Law make or alter such regulations.”[11] States also have plenary power over the time, place, and manner of local elections, subject to the restriction that they not overburden the right to vote.[12] Accordingly, federal legislators fiercely resist anything resembling federal interference with state autonomy.[13]

Second, funding. Although many election officials say that modernizing voting technology is an important concern,[14] there are scant resources available to them to address it.[15] Modernization, to be sure, is not cheap. South Carolina estimates that it will cost $40 million to replace its voting machines—$39 million more than its legislature allocated in 2017.[16]

Finally, industry. The roughly $300 million market[17] for voting technology is problematic. The industry is small but politically well connected, with especially strong ties to the Republican Party.[18] It is mostly regulated at the state level.[19] Customers are often locked into long-term contracts and face high switching costs, destroying industry incentives to innovate.[20] Certifying new technology takes years.[21] Equipment designs, hardware, and software are usually proprietary.[22] Companies thus fight in court to prevent prying eyes when challenged. John Kerry lost a battle in 2004 to access the source code behind voting machines in Ohio.[23] So too did a 2006 candidate for Florida’s 13th Congressional District, who alleged that machines in one county erroneously registered 18,000 “no” votes in her race.[24] Moreover, the industry is composed of only three hardware companies that manufacture over eighty percent of machines and, in contrast, a large number of tiny third-party software vendors.[25] And of the few industry-wide changes made after Bush in 2000, some actually undermined opportunities to innovate and improve the voting experience.[26]

Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) in 2002 in response to Bush.[27] HAVA authorized $3.65 billion in payments to states to improve voting technology, and appropriated $3.28 billion of that amount between 2003 and 2010.[28] States used funds to purchase new machines, often direct-recording electronic (“DRE”) or optical-scan machines.[29] DREs read digital ballots. Optical-scanners read paper ballots. Both machines store votes on memory cards. Optical-scanners keep digital images of the paper ballots they read, which can provide an audit trail. DREs can, but do not always, print paper images that voters can review, although their scrolls could conceivably be hacked to print voters’ choices correctly while recording different choices on the memory card.[30] Whereas in 2000 just nine percent of voting precincts were using DREs, after HAVA was passed the number of precincts using DREs increased to sixty-seven percent, despite the risk of hacking.[31]

Whatever gains were realized in the early 2000s have been all but lost. Forty-one states still use machines that are at least ten years old,[32] which creates a higher risk of failure and predictable vulnerabilities. Thirteen states still use machines that do not provide paper trails.[33] Some states report scavenging for new parts on eBay.[34] Forty-three states and the District of Columbia use voting machines that are no longer manufactured.[35] In 2018, Congress provided $380 million more in grants to states to improve federal election administration.[36] Yet these appropriations are entirely insufficient to replace voting machines, which are “reaching the end of their natural life cycle.”[37] It would cost $2 per voter per year, [38] or over $270 million annually based on recent presidential-election turnout rates,[39] to upgrade and properly maintain voting machines across more than 10,000 “hyperdecentralized” election jurisdictions.[40]

The rapid shift to new voting technology in the wake of Bush, although well-intended, was poorly implemented. Coupled with inadequate maintenance and industry standstill, it created the conditions in which the hacks that now imperil the right to vote could occur. Indeed, software vendors, in at least one instance, let known security issues persist for eleven years.[41]

The strings attached to HAVA’s grants[42] arguably hurt election security more than they helped. First, states had to consolidate voter registration databases previously maintained at the county level.[43] That created a one-stop shop for breaches. Second, the Act’s strict (albeit necessary) voting standards limited the kinds of voting machines states could buy with HAVA funds.[44] That lead to widespread adoption of electronic voting technology,[45] which in turn created incentives for private companies to rush to market with untested machines to take advantage of the windfall of cash and to sell states products that were not needed, such as e-pollbooks, which election officials often use to check-in voters on Election Day. Finally, states had to implement changes before the 2004 federal election,[46] leaving no time for risk assessment, debugging, or testing. The speedy move to technology, without a plan or the funds to upgrade software and hardware regularly, was a solution in search of a problem: hackable voting machines.[47] 

II. Hacking and the Right to Vote

The last presidential election put election hacking on the map, although election officials have been aware of the risk of hacking for decades.[48] Russia’s attacks practically compel the conclusion that problems with election technology are not just “political questions” for the “political branches,”[49] but rights-based threats that demand the attention of courts. Where the political system fails to adequately protect election integrity and the right to vote, courts must fill the vacuum.

Russia’s attacks were, indeed, unparalleled in nature and scope.[50] Russian hackers targeted election infrastructure in twenty-one states with sophisticated cyberattacks.[51] They successfully breached voter registration rolls in Illinois,[52] stole the username and password of an election official in Arizona,[53] and infiltrated an unnamed private company.[54] Russian hackers also sent emails to 122 email addresses associated with named local governmental organizations and election officials containing malicious code[55] and accessed county election websites in Georgia, Iowa, and Florida.[56] The era of local administrative control over voting technology is over. Russia’s hacks changed the narrative.

The right to vote, which is implicated by voting technology in ways unforeseeable even a decade ago, is a fundamental constitutional right.[57] At bottom, the idea is that “[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”[58] The right adapts to the times, precluding first-generation infringements (restrictions on an individual’s ability to cast a ballot) as well as second-generation infringements (efforts to dilute the effectiveness of one’s vote).[59] This jurisprudence culminated in Bush v. Gore, which applied the right to vote to election administration specifically, holding that counting votes by methods or means with similar levels of accuracy, or probabilities of inaccuracy, is part and parcel of the right to vote.[60] As a result, when states rapidly modernized their voting systems, a number of technology-related challenges ensued, because of what Bush said and did not say and what states did and did not do.

The first round of voting technology challenges sought to enforce uniform adoption of electronic voting technology under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.[61] Studies showed that paper-based punch cards and optically scanned ballots caused a greater number of votes to be invalidated in predominantly African-American precincts than elsewhere—a “racial gap” in the residual vote rate, or probability that votes would be counted inaccurately.[62] States rendered such challenges moot by implementing electronic voting systems statewide, reducing the residual vote rate by one million between 2000 and 2004.[63]

Challenges also arose in states whose counties purchased different types of technology. For example, in Weber v. Shelley, the plaintiffs argued that although voting equipment reduced under- and over-votes in the aggregate, it still did not distribute the residual vote rate equally across all groups and thus violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.[64] Because machines have varying levels of accuracy, by using one machine in some counties but not everywhere, the state subjected voters to different probabilities that their votes would be counted accurately. The challenge failed. The court found that the electronic system in use did not restrict the right to vote severely enough to justify relief.[65] Courts facing these sorts of challenges cite Justice Souter’s dissent in Bush, which justified the use of different technologies across election jurisdictions based on “concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so on.”[66]

Beyond the challenges presented by the holding in Bush, voting-technology challenges continued to fail because of the standard of scrutiny established by Anderson v. Celebreze[67] and Burdick v. Takushi[68] (referred to as the Anderson–Burdick sliding scale test). Under the Anderson-Burdick sliding scale test, courts apply strict scrutiny to an election administration practice, such as what voting technology to buy or maintain, only if it is unreasonable and discriminatory or if it imposes a “severe” burden on voters.[69] If the burden is “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory,” or it is not severe, then it is constitutional if the state demonstrates an “important regulatory interest[]”[70] or even “legitimate and valid” concerns.[71] Anderson-Burdick is the workhorse of election administration law, even though it is arguably in deep tension with the central holding of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, which is that any practice that burdens the right to vote and that is unrelated to voter qualifications, not just outright proscriptions of the franchise, should receive strict scrutiny.[72] Indeed, Harper said that “[t]he degree of the discrimination is irrelevant”[73] precisely because the voter regulation at issue there (a poll tax in order to obtain a ballot) was unrelated to voter qualifications. Presumably, then, something far less severe than a poll tax as a condition for obtaining a ballot would trigger strict scrutiny if it were unrelated to voter qualifications. Yet, under Anderson-Burdick, the degree of a burden, even one that has nothing to do with voter qualifications such as voting technology that counts votes with varying degrees of accuracy, seems to be a threshold question as well as a dispositive one.

The Court applies Anderson-Burdick to election administration because of the basic difficulties of administering elections.[74] Voters cannot expect perfection across jurisdictions because it is impracticable to ever fully equalize burdens. Some voters will always live farther from polling places. It will always be harder for some voters to obtain photo identification. Lines will always be longer and ballots more confusing for some voters. Some jurisdictions will always have fewer dollars or political capital to update voting equipment and will thus use older machines with greater residual vote rates. That is the inescapable reality of election administration, or so it seems. To require otherwise, in the Court’s view, would hamstring local officials seeking to impose order on a chaotic democratic process.[75] Thus, at least in the context of voter technology, states can treat dissimilar people who are similarly situated differently without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.

Essentially, then, Bush and its progeny suggest that unequal residual vote rates are symptomatic of inevitably imperfect technologies. Bush and its progeny also suggest those rates are innocuous, in that they are beyond the reach of the constitution’s right to vote, because they are reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and do not severely burden that right. Election hacking, however, has forced at least one court to revisit that calculus.

III. Hacking the Right to Vote

Hacking sits squarely at the intersection of the Court’s right-to-vote jurisprudence and issues surrounding voting technology. For example, in Curling v. Kemp, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found that challengers to Georgia’s statewide voting technology provided sufficient evidence to show, on the basis of a factual record that was yet to be fully developed, “that their votes cast by DREs may be altered, diluted, or effectively not counted.”[76]

First, the court did not discuss whether a particular residual vote rate must be found in order to find a right-to-vote violation.[77] In fact, because it was a pre-election challenge, no such finding was possible.

Second, the challengers actually showed “serious security flaws and vulnerabilities,” as opposed to pointing to merely theoretical or hypothetical flaws, including “outdated software susceptible to malware and viruses.”[78] This showing established “a concrete,” nonspeculative risk that ballots could be altered in a way that undermines the opportunity to cast an effective vote.[79]

Finally, the court dismissed Georgia’s argument, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that the injury to challengers’ right to vote was caused by hackers rather than the state.[80] States typically have no duty to protect citizens from privately inflicted harms, but the court found that, for at least the purposes of the motion to dismiss stage, there was a plausible causal connection, even if only indirectly, between the state’s use of unsecure DREs and the injury to challengers’ constitutional rights.[81]

The nature of hacking is the chief reason why Curling stands apart from Bush and its progeny. At the end of an election, there will be no way to determine the accuracy of a vote count. Post-Bush courts did not foresee this possibility. In one case, for example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge based on differing methods manual recounting to determine whether machines registered the correct number of no-votes, because the mere possibility of an “allegedly inferior type of review” in the event of a manual recount was not so substantial a burden as to warrant strict scrutiny.[82]

Hacking, on the other hand, conceals its own detection. Malicious code that modifies vote counts hides evidence of its existence by also modifying the audit logs, vote records, and protective counters stored by the machine that are installed as countermeasures.[83] Even electronic ballot “images are themselves subject to manipulation by hackers.”[84] Given the archaic nature of election machines, a post-election investigation will not find evidence that anything went awry. Courts cannot rely on the absence of evidence of tampering or malfunction as evidence of absence of accuracy issues, or as evidence of user error, in the hacking era.

Hacking is no longer a far-off risk, either, but rather a near certainty. It is easy to manipulate vote tabulations even if voting machines are disconnected from the internet, or “air-gapped.” Hackers can access machines through the modems that transmit vote totals on election night.[85] Hackers can “compromise voting equipment at many points along the supply chain, from the factory assembler to the election software programmer to the technician who makes a repair or installs a software upgrade.”[86] Hackers could also commandeer remote access software that allows contractors to make updates from home, or infect installable memory cards that are carried to central-counting facilities to upload votes.[87] Hackers can even compromise computers in election offices, then spread malicious code to voting machines when election officials program ballots.[88]

Admittedly, it is harder to manipulate vote tabulations in a way that picks winners and losers—but this is because of an information gap, not a technology gap. To effectively do so, hackers “would have to know which districts could affect the outcome. Then they’d have to change just enough votes to ensure victory without switching so many that it would draw attention.”[89] All the same, Curling suggests that antiquated voting systems are hackable voting systems and hackable voting systems violate the right to vote. This is not to suggest that the right to vote requires something that is not theoretically possible, i.e., unhackable voting machines. It is only to suggest that states must not sit idly by while vulnerabilities create arbitrary disparities in whether votes will be counted accurately.

IV. Access Hacks: Third-Generation Infringements on the Right to Vote

Manipulating vote tabulation is not the only way to hack an election. “Access hacks” have the effect of placing obstacles before voters that frustrate their ability to effectively participate in the voting process. The problem is that voting operations seem to be designed to perform the simple task of casting a ballot in an overcomplicated way, like a Rube Goldberg machine. Vulnerabilities include not just machinery, but websites, registration databases, e-pollbooks, and recording and reporting systems—systems that hackers could exploit to aggregate countless low-value burdens on voters. This is the third generation, or perhaps the final frontier, of voting infringements.[90] Although harder to address in court, given existing right-to-vote doctrine, these risks can be mitigated with system updates.

Legacy systems contain known vulnerabilities that can disrupt election infrastructure. Hackers can take down voting machines through a Distributed Denial of Service (“DDoS”) attack. In North Carolina in 2016, an alleged software glitch demonstrated the chaos that an attack on infrastructure could cause, such as machine crashes, long lines, extended hours, and back-up paper ballots (if counties have them, which is by no means a guarantee).[91] Long lines destroy voter confidence “even when individuals do not experience the long lines themselves” because voters could decide that voting simply is not worth the trouble or wait.[92] Hackers can also crash e-pollbooks, which election officials often use to check-in voters on Election Day. In 2006 in Denver, for example, an e-pollbook malfunction caused about 20,000 people to leave polling places without voting.[93] In 2008 in Georgia, a similar malfunction caused two-hour-plus lines.[94]

Similarly, legacy databases are vulnerable to information exploitation, where hackers manipulate voter records to increase frustration and foil participation. Hackers could access databases to change precinct assignments to send voters to the wrong location, wasting time and costing votes.[95] In 2016, when a Russian agent logged into a single election jurisdiction’s database in Illinois, he opened a backdoor to the files on all of the state’s voters in all 109 jurisdictions’ statewide since 2006.[96] He then gained access to 15 million voter registrations, stole 90,000 files, and attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to change voter information including names and addresses.[97] Likewise, in California’s 2016 presidential primary, hackers used private voter information, including Social Security numbers, to change voter registrations in the state’s database, preventing a number of voters from casting ballots.[98]

Hackers can even take advantage of state voter restrictions to disrupt elections and sow division. To illustrate this issue, consider Georgia. Just before Election Day in 2018, officials used an exact match voter registration law to stall over 50,000 voter registrations containing information that was inconsistent, they argued, with drivers-license records, such as mismatched signatures, omitted middle initials, misspelled names, and missing hyphens.[99] They rejected a number of absentee ballots for similar reasons.[100] A disproportionate number of voters facing stalled registrations and rejected absentee ballots were black.[101] Georgia’s secretary of state, who is now governor, used Georgia’s exactmatch voter registration law as a justification for the mass suspension.[102] Hackers could exploit Georgia’s oppressive law and others like it to precisely the same effect. By altering voter registrations to make them inconsistent with drivers-license records, hackers could depress turnout, suppress or functionally deny the vote, or change the outcome of the election. To be sure, thirty-one states introduced ninety-nine bills impeding access to registration and voting in 2017,[103] so the target market is a mile wide and the firewalls an inch deep.

V. Conclusion

It is difficult to square the extent to which we value the right to vote with the state of voting technology. Federalism, funding, and industry get in the way. Courts must then act as the forum of last resort. However, in the wake of Bush, technology became a solution in search of a problem, enabling the hacks that now imperil the right to vote. Bush’s progeny provided little recourse until Curling, where the unique nature, unparalleled scope, and concrete threat of hacking brought the vulnerability of voting machines into sharp relief. Curling offers promise in an area of the law where there is mostly peril. Moreover, although right-to-vote jurisprudence, even Curling, has little to say about what happens when hackers target information databases in order to increase frustration and thwart participation, sensible system upgrades and security protocols may reduce the likelihood of such threats. In short, judges have a role to play in holding states accountable, states must play a role in providing support to local officials across 10,000 election jurisdictions, and voters must begin demanding changes through their exercise of the franchise––by resort to the very polls that are endangered by hackers––and in keeping the faith otherwise.

 

 


[1] Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchi- sement of Felons, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1519, 1533–34 (2002) (finding that 93.2% of survey respondents believe that the right to vote is either the most important or one of the most important rights in a democracy).

[2] Billy Morgan, New Survey Reveals Concerns About the Security of the Nation’s Voting System Ahead of the Midterm Election, U. of Chi. Harris Sch. of Pub. Pol’y (Oct. 10, 2018), [https://perma.cc/N4CG-MXQ2].    

[3] Benjamin Wofford, The Hacking Threat to the Midterms Is Huge. And Technology Won’t Protect Us., Vox (Oct. 25, 2018, 5:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/3XX4-VD2G].

[4] Id.; see also Alejandro de la Garza, Should You Be Afraid of Election Hacking? Here’s What Experts Say, Time (Oct. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/E7HM-A76Y] (explaining the vulnerability of elections in view of the unprecedented nature of the threat, including equipment hacks and misinformation campaigns).

[5] Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars 8-10 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of public confidence in election results, and of widespread election reform in securing that confidence, in the wake of Bush v. Gore).

[6] Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (“The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.”).

[7] The nation lost approximately between 4 million and 6 million votes in the 2000 presidential election. The Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Voting: What Is What Could Be 8–9 (2001) [hereinafter Voting Technology Project]. Using residual votes and lost votes from the past four presidential elections, 1.5 million presidential votes and 3.5 million votes for governor and senator are lost each election because of problems with voting equipment. Id.

[8] Despite opportunities to improve election technology, hardware and software products have barely advanced in the last decade. See Penn Wharton Pub. Pol’y Initiative, The Business of Voting 19 (2017) [hereinafter Business of Voting]. See generally The Presidential Commission on Election Admin., The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration (2014) [hereinafter Election Administration Commission] (explaining the problems with existing voting technology and recommending updates).

[9] U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.

[10] Congress did not pass a law regulating federal election administration until 1842. Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 660 (1884); see also An Act For The Apportionment of Representatives Among the Several States According to the Sixth Census, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842). Congress passed comprehensive statutes in 1870 and 1871 in order to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. See Force Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Force Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871) (amending the Force Act of 1870); Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Between 1957 and 1982 Congress passed several laws protecting the right to vote free of intimidation and arbitrary or capricious factors. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. (2012).

[11] U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.

[12] See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1964); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) ( “The power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgement of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote.” (citation to Wesberry omitted)).

[13] Wofford, supra note 3.

[14] See Election Administration Commission, supra note 8, at 11 & n.10 (finding that, in a nationwide survey of election officials, twenty-four percent of respondents said that “voting technology and voting machine capacity” need improvement or update—the highest percentage of any category in the survey).

[15] Id. at 10 (explaining that the most common complaint of election administrators is a lack of resources and that election administrators characterize themselves as “the least powerful lobby in the state legislatures”).

[16] Michael Wines, Wary of Hackers, States Move to Upgrade Voting Systems, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2017), [https://perma.cc/4A96-YC9H].

[17] See Business of Voting, supra note 8, at 23.  

[18] Kim Zetter, The Crisis of Election Security, N.Y. Times (Sept. 26, 2018), [https://perma. cc/Z6DW-JH2Q].

[19] Business of Voting, supra note 8, at 30.

[20] Id. at 32–36.

[21] Id. at 38.

[22] Id. at 42.

[23] Zetter, supra note 18.

[24] See H.R. Rep. No. 110-528, at 2–3 (2008).

[25] Business of Voting, supra note 8, at 14–15, 18–19, 54.

[26] See generally Stephen Ansolabehere & Ronald Rivest, Voting Equipment and Ballots (2013), [https://perma.cc/PX57-ZSU9].

[27] Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (prior to 2010, 2018 amendments).

[28] Arthur L. Burris & Eric A. Fischer, Cong. Res. Serv., The Help America Vote Act and Election Administration: Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election, at Summary (2016).

[29] See Business of Voting, supra note 8, at 11, 13, 19, 55.

[30] Zetter, supra note 18.

[31] Id.

[32] Lawrence Norden & Wilfred U. Codrington III, America’s Voting Machines at Risk—An Update, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Mar. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/Z3AH-YJZW].

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Lawrence Norden & Wilfred U. Codrington III, Brennan Ctr. for Just., America’s Voting Machines at Risk 15–16 (2015), [https://perma.cc/7XZL-9UK4].

[36] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. E, Tit. V (2018); see also U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2018 HAVA Election Security Funds, [https://perma.cc/75VV-G6NW] (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).

[37] Election Administration Commission, supra note 8, at 63.

[38] See Voting Technology Project, supra note 7, at 53.

[39] Federal Election Commission, Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results 7 (Jan. 30, 2017), [https://perma.cc/MJ3V-VZ3H] (showing that 136,669,237 votes were cast in 2016 for president).

[40] Hasen, supra note 5, at 8; Election Administration at State and Local Levels, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures (June 15, 2016), [https://perma.cc/R5P9-QNVN].

[41] Wofford, supra note 3; see also Sue Halpern, Election-Hacking Lessons From the 2018 Def Con Hackers Conference, New Yorker (Aug. 23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9JXB-JQJ5] (explaining that, despite extensively documented vulnerability to hacks, the AccuVote-TSX is still in use in eighteen states).

[42] Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 101–02, 253, 301, 303–04, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (prior to 2010, 2018 amendments).

[43] Id. at § 303.

[44] Id. at §§ 102, 301; see also Burris, supra note 28, at 5 (“Under HAVA, systems used in federal elections must provide for error correction by voters, accessibility for persons with disabilities, manual auditing, alternative languages, and error-rate standards. Systems must also maintain voter privacy and ballot confidentiality, and states must adopt uniform standards for what constitutes a vote on each system.”).

[45] Election Assistance Commission, The 2014 EAC Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report 14, 264–65 tbl. 42 (June 30, 2015), [https://perma.cc/AQG5-8JMQ] (finding that in 2014 the DRE without a voter audit trail was the most widely deployed technology across the states and that DREs overall made up nearly seventy percent of all voting machines).

[46] Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 102(a)(3), 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (prior to 2010, 2018 amendments).

[47] It also ignored one of the central lessons of Bush: Volusia County. There, partly due to a faulty memory card and computer glitch, Al Gore lost 16,000 votes in a matter of minutes while the Socialist candidate gained 10,000. See Dana Milbank, Tragicomedy of Errors Fuels Volusia Recount, Wash. Post (Nov. 12, 2000), [https://perma.cc/3QYN-3XLM]; but see Zetter, supra note 18 (questioning whether the faulty memory card caused the mishap).

[48] Paul Krugman, Hack the Vote, N.Y. Times (Dec. 2, 2003), [https://perma.cc/T7XJ-MR2H]. There was also a 1969 front-page article in Los Angeles Times describing a “war games” exercise to determine if computerized punch-card readers could be rigged, which provided “a chilling look at the state of computer art and the implications it holds for future elections,” when the “offensive” team, tasked with finding ways to rig the election machines, won all six trials by successfully infiltrating the machines without being detected by the countermeasures implemented by their opponents. See Richard Bergholz, How Elections Can Be Rigged Via Computers, L.A. Times, July 8, 1969, at 1, 24.

[49] See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (“A controversy is nonjusticiable––i.e., involves a political question––where there is a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . .’”); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962) (discussing the nature of a “political question”).

[50] Although the intelligence community insists no results were altered, there has not been a full examination of all the evidence. “Intelligence assessments are based on signals intelligence—spying on Russian communications and computers for chatter or indicating that they altered votes—not on a forensic examination of voting machines and election networks.” Zetter, supra note 18.

[51] Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (statement of Samuel Liles, Acting Dir. of the Cyber Div., Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.); see also Nat’l Intelligence Council, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections 3 (2017), [https://perma.cc/S3BQ-UUCE].

[52] Nicole Perlroth et al., Russian Election Hacking Efforts, Wider than Previously Known, Draws Little Scrutiny, N.Y. Times (Sep. 1, 2017), [https://perma.cc/VP4R-E3MJ]; see also Matthew Cole et al., Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days Before 2016 Election, Intercept (June 5, 2017, 3:44 PM), [https://perma.cc/9ZMA-GV7R] (reporting on leaked NSA document detailing Russian hacking).

[53] Miles Parks, Will Your Vote Be Vulnerable on Election Day?, NPR (May 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/RS7H-58PE].

[54] Cole et al., supra note 52.

[55] Id.

[56] Indictment at 26, United States v. Netyksho, No. 18-cr-00215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018).

[57] The Supreme Court has pointed to a number of constitutional provisions to establish the fundamental right to vote. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (once the state legislature vests the right to vote in its people, equal protection applies to the manner of its exercise); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1983) (the right to vote is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces the First Amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964) (the right to vote in state elections is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (same); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941) (the right to vote for Congressmen, and by extension participate in congressional primaries, is found in Article I, Section II of the constitution).

[58] Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.

[59] See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (noting that restrictions are impermissible when they burden “the right of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively”); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (noting that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise”).

[60] Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (“[T]here must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.”); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted) (“The right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing”); Gray, 372 U.S. at 380 ( “Every voter’s vote is entitled to be counted once. It must be correctly counted and reported.”); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The right to vote includes the right to have the ballot counted.”); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 387–88 (1944) (noting that the right to vote includes the right to have vote counted); Classic, 313 U.S. at 315 (“Obviously included within the right to choose . . . is the right of qualified voters . . . to cast their ballots and have them counted.”).

[61] See, e.g. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 852 (6th Cir. 2006), superseded as moot by Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court noted that “[v]iolations of the Equal Protection Clause are no less deserving of protection because they are accomplished with a modern machine than with outdated prejudices.” Id. at 880.

[62] Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 46, 58 (2003); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1711, 1754–68 (2005) (arguing that electronic technology can reduce or eliminate the racial disparities resulting from punch-card systems).

[63] Charles Stewart III, Residual Vote in the 2004 Election, 5 Election L.J. 158, 158 (2006).

[64] 347 F.3d 1101, 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).

[65] Weber, 347 F.3d at 1106; see also Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that different voting methods have different trade-offs, and the state’s important regulatory interests justify choosing between them).

[66] See, e.g., Wexler, 452 F.3d at 1233 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 134 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting));Weber, 347 F.3d at 1107 & n. 2 (citing the same).

[67] 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).

[68] 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).

[69] Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted) (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn’ to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”).

[70] Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting that “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes”).

[71] Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761–62 (1973).

[72] 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined . . . . Those principles apply here.”).

[73] Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.

[74] Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (“Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.”); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Each provision [of election administration], whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote.”).

[75] Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”); see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (explaining that subjecting every voting regulation to strict scrutiny would “tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently”).

[76] Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1324–25 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (noting the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of one or more of their constitutional claims, in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction, was a “cautious, preliminary one, especially in light of the initial state of the record,” but that the evidence sufficiently showed that “votes cast by DRE may be altered, diluted, or effectively not counted on the same terms as someone using another voting method – or that there is a serious risk of this under the circumstances”).

[77] While at least one court in the post-Bush era expressly declined to specify a precise error rate for determining when voting technology is constitutional and when it is not, see Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d. 843, 876 (6th Cir. 2006), it applied strict scrutiny based on a fully developed factual record indicating that in ten counties in Ohio the residual vote rate was over 3% in the 2000 election, id. at 872, while intentional undervoting makes up an estimated 0.23% to 0.75% of all residual votes, id. at 848, and that approximately 55,000 votes were lost in the 2000 presidential election statewide. Id. at 871. The Stewart court went so far as to say that the disparate technology at issue would fail even rational-basis review. Id. at 872; see also; Black v. McGuffage, 209 F.Supp.2d 889, 893, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs sufficiently stated an equal protection claim where jurisdictions without error notification had an average residual vote rate of 3.85%, but jurisdictions with error notification had an average residual vote rate of less than 1%).

[78] Curling, 334 F.Supp.3d at 1308, 1322. (featuring testimony of Dr. Alex Halderman, a computer scientist at the University of Michigan, showing “how a malware virus can be introduced into the DRE machine by insertion of an infected memory card (or by other sources) and alter the votes cast without detection”).

[79]  Id. at 1324.

[80] Id. at 1317.

[81] Id. at 1317.

[82] Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2006).

[83] Curling, 1303 F.Supp.3d at 1308–9 (Dr. Halderman demonstrated that “[t]he DRE machine’s paper tape . . . confirmed the same total number of votes, including the results of the manipulated or altered votes” in spite of the fact that the machines “record individual ballot data in the order in which they are cast and they assign a unique serial number and timestamp to each ballot”).

[84] De la Garza, supra note 4.

[85] Zetter, supra note 18.

[86] Wines, supra note 16. 

[87] Zetter, supra note 18.

[88] Halpern, supra note 41. Dr. J. Alex Halderman, a computer scientist and expert witness in Curling, demonstrated this point at Def Con’s Voting Village on a machine that remains in use in eighteen states. Id.

[89] Massimo Calabresi, The Secret History of Election 2016, Time (July 31, 2017), [https://perma.cc/L8K2-FPXQ].

[90] See generally Carol Anderson, One Person, No Vote: How Voter Suppression is Destroying Our Democracy (2018) (summarizing modern voter suppression efforts); Desmond Ang, Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter? Long-Run Effects of Federal Oversight Under the Voting Rights Act 2, 39 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP18-033, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8M6N-UNKT] (finding suggestive early evidence that voting protections have been greatly eroded in the five years since the Court’s holding in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013), that the Voting Rights Act’s continued coverage based on historical, rather than current, measures of discrimination is unconstitutional).

[91] Perlroth et al., supra note 52.

[92] Charles Stewart III & Stephen Ansolabehere, Waiting in Line to Vote, Executive Summary (CalTech/MIT Voting Project, Working Paper No. 114, 2013), [https://­perma.cc/T7KK-AH9N]; Voting Technology Project, supra note 7, at 32 (explaining that in the 2000 election, approximately one million voters said that they did not vote because the line was too long or the hours were too short).

[93] Zetter, supra note 18.

[94] Id.

[95] See id.

[96] See Calabresi, supra note 87, at 34.

[97] Id. at 34–35.

[98] Id. at 32.

[99] See Astead W. Herndon, Georgia Voting Begins Amid Accusations of Voter Suppression, N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2018), [https://perma.cc/A9N7-RHA7].

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103] Voting Laws Roundup 2017, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (May 10, 2017), [https://perma.cc/ G6UF-SKVX].

Law Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns

Half of American adults are currently in a law enforcement facial-recognition network.[1] As the use of body-worn camera (“BWC”) technology by law enforcement increases, the demand for facial-recognition technology likewise accelerates.[2] Through grants called Smart Policing Initiatives, the U.S. Department of Justice has dedicated over $20 million to provide BWCs for law enforcement across the nation.[3] Companies are racing to integrate BWCs with facial recognition technology, hoping to eventually use artificial intelligence to recognize faces captured in real time, despite privacy concerns.[4] Once equipped with facial-recognition technology, BWCs could dramatically increase the number of individuals logged in law enforcement facial-recognition networks, enabling police officers to act as sophisticated surveillance mechanisms.[5]

Anyone passing a police officer equipped with this technology may be scanned, identified, and cataloged in a facial-recognition database without being suspected of any crime or even communicating with the officer.[6] This transforms walking down a street where police are present into a police interaction.[7] In addition to the very real possibility that bad actors might potentially get a hold of the resulting data, facial-recognition technologies disproportionately affect people of color, and integration with BWCs carries the probability of chilling free speech in public spaces. Although technology often outpaces legislation, privacy law must rise to meet the requirements of the First and Fourth Amendments in response to the integration of facial-recognition technology and BWCs.

In Part I, this essay examines the history of BWCs, contemporary use, and probable future impact. Part II analyzes how their integration with FRT disproportionately impacts African Americans, chills free speech, and implicates privacy concerns.[8] Part III describes how different federal and state courts and legislatures have handled real time data collection through new technologies.[9] This essay concludes with recommendations for lawmakers regarding retention and utilization of camera footage collected via BWCs.

I. Pairing BWCs with Facial Recognition Technologies

Increasing public attention on police shootings of unarmed black victims has ignited discussion around BWCs. But the government, the courts, and the public all lack an adequate understanding of the dangers of integrating BWCs with biometric technologies, like facial-recognition technology, and are currently ill-equipped to deal with the resulting, rapidly approaching surveillance state.

In an effort to correct unconstitutional practices and eliminate racial discrimination, a federal district court in New York ordered officers to use BWCs.[10] In Floyd v. City of New York, the court identified BWCs as an exceptional way to prevent constitutional harms.[11] First, the court found that BWCs “will provide a contemporaneous, objective record of stops and frisks.”[12] These recordings can validate whether a stop and frisk was warranted.[13] Second, the court reasoned that when citizens and police officers know that an exchange is being recorded, this will foster an environment of mutual respect and lawful interactions between the parties.[14] Third, according to the court, BWC recordings will serve as a legitimizing measure in response to police distrust, particularly in communities where stops and frisks are disproportionately directed.[15]

But law enforcement agencies like the New York Police Department are not motivated solely by protecting constitutional rights and incentivizing good behavior, as their zeal for pairing facial recognition technology with BWCs makes apparent.[16] It is expected that the use and adoption of BWCs will continue to accelerate, and the FBI has stated that adopting greater facial-recognition technologies is central to its mission.[17] But the FBI also realizes that this evolving technology will require clear policies and regulations.[18]

Given the push for law enforcement agencies to adopt innovative surveillance technologies as quickly as possible,[19] development of facial-recognition technology that will pair with BWCs is quickly gaining market importance.[20] A 2016 U.S. Department of Justice–funded study found that at least nine out of thirty-eight BWC manufacturers currently include some form of facial recognition in their camera technology or are planning for its possible future inclusion.[21]

In May of 2018, one of the largest BWC marketers, Axon,[22] gained a patent for software that can find faces and other objects in footage from body cameras in real time.[23] According to the company’s patent, “once a face is captured by a user’s body-worn camera, a hand-held device ‘provides the name of the person to the user of the capture system.’”[24] The development of such a system brings questions about misuse and the potential for arbitrary and reckless application of the technology. In response to those concerns, Axon’s CEO said

there are police forces around the world that use batons and guns in very abusive ways . . . it’s too blunt to say that because there is a risk of misuse, we should just write them off. We need to dig a layer deeper and understand what are the benefits and what are the risks.[25]

But who bears responsibility for performing that calculus? Government and law enforcement may lack the inclination to rigorously examine how pairing these technologies may present hidden dangers.

II. Ramifications of Integration

Many government agencies encourage the use of facial-recognition software with BWC-accrued footage.[26] The Department of Justice focuses on the practical benefits of receiving identification in real time and the cost savings that agencies will realize by not having to hire and train personnel to review video footage later.[27] But notwithstanding the positive aspects of melding BWCs with facial-recognition technology, numerous negative effects require the law’s attention before the technology runs rampant. Those effects include, but are not limited to, disparities in how the technology treats African Americans, chilling free speech, and vulnerability to third-party hacking and misuse of data.

It is important to understand who these paired technologies are most likely to impact, and how their technological shortcomings might exacerbate that differential treatment. For example, FRT has far higher error rates when utilized to identify African American faces.[28] Algorithms used in new technology may appear unbiased at first, but according to researchers,

 [t]he deeper we dig, the more remnants of bias we will find in our technology. We cannot afford to look away this time, because the stakes are simply too high.  We risk losing the gains made with the civil rights movement and women’s movement under the false assumption of machine neutrality.[29]

These automated systems reflect the priorities, preferences, and prejudices of their coders, and this “coded gaze” leads to tangible negative effects for African Americans.[30] Technology so prone to error should not constitute reliable or admissible evidence.

Pervasive government surveillance can also have a chilling effect on freedom of speech. This monitoring demonstrably lessens Americans’ “willingness to engage in public debate and to associate with others whose values, religion, or political views may be considered different from their own,” leading to a “spiral of silence.”[31] Anonymous free speech is protected by the First Amendment,[32] but real-time face recognition will redefine public spaces by destroying anonymity. Anonymous speech allows for the proliferation and protection of views that might be critical of law enforcement. Dissenters might be subjected to negative repercussions if they can be easily identified through the use of facial-recognition technology. And, based on current technology, over time these burdens would disproportionately fall on minorities.

Moreover, a regulatory void in this area prevents state and federal lawmakers from addressing hard questions about security and privacy as related to footage accrued via BWC. BWC data’s off-site aggregation increases the risk that bad actors can hijack facial-recognition feeds. Moving data off-site makes it more difficult to ensure that best technical practices are followed.[33] New regulations must protect the staggering amount of third-party biometric data, the collection of which creates tremendous security risk, in addition to profound privacy and civil-liberties problems.[34]

III. Contemporary Cases and Legislation Set a Legal Framework

Select jurisdictions do regulate facial recognition technologies in conjunction with BWCs, but there is no current federal legislative consensus on the matter. In 2015, Oregon passed a law barring facial-recognition searches of recordings from BWCs. That law only touches on recordings, and does not govern the use of real-time footage.[35] Recently, New Hampshire passed a similar law.[36] On a local level, the City of Cincinnati as well as six police departments have adopted similar regulations.[37] Despite this anecdotal progress, there should be a federal consensus on how to best balance technology adoption with privacy, free speech, and security.[38]

The Supreme Court has held that “innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion.”[39] In 1968, following Katz v. United States[40] and Berger v. New York,[41] the federal government enacted the Wiretap Act.[42] Since then, law enforcement’s ability to wiretap a suspect’s phone or electronic device has been constrained primarily by statute, as opposed to constitutional case law.

Case law inevitably has blind spots. United States v. Carpenter created a legal loophole through which law enforcement can hold personally identifiable information until it becomes historical, and thereby usable without the need for a warrant.[43] That amount of time is, as of now, undecided. Using the Wiretap Act and the Katz concurrence as a possible framework for reform, an individual may enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his image as captured by facial-recognition technology. But once law enforcement’s use of facial-recognition technology becomes ubiquitous, surveillance subjects will have more difficulty arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects their image. Thus, arguments arising out of privacy concerns are time-bound. 

Regulating law enforcement surveillance via statute is the best way to create a holistic scheme. Legislatures are better positioned than courts to research the complex effects of new technology and to draft legislation accordingly. While drafting, they can benefit from model legislation and existing biometrics laws governing commercial entities. In the meantime, the public relies on courts to protect civil liberties. When judges are given the task of governing technological innovation, they are often ill-suited to appropriately identify future risks. And jurisdiction-specific case law cannot generate a unified solution to the emerging privacy issues that law enforcement’s use of real-time facial-recognition technology on accrued BWC footage raises. Without any federal laws or decisions on the books, this practice will be largely unregulated, aside from any best practices adopted by various agencies in what might be an ad hoc manner. 

In addition to the Wiretap Act, legislators may also examine the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) as well as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) to help formulate model legislation.[44] VPPA and FERPA, although old and limited in scope, provide research-backed definitions of personally identifiable information and regulate how such information should be kept, aggregated and disseminated.[45] For example, FERPA requires that personal information be shared only under specified circumstances.[46] For biometric information, this could mean compartmentalizing data into two or more different sets, with strict limits on who holds the keys connecting them. For facial-recognition technology, this would disaggregate the information that, when combined, most individuals consider private. Those separated data identifiers can include faces along with names, booking numbers, and Social Security numbers. Although compartmentalization is only a small step towards protecting data, it constitutes a massive hindrance for bad actors.

Rather than reinventing the wheel, model legislation on facial-recognition technology recently penned by the Georgetown Law School’s Privacy and Technology Center may also be broadened to include provisions directly related to the wearing of body cameras by law enforcement.[47] The model legislation includes recommendations on both the state and federal levels, and addresses many of the concerns raised in this article as to who has access to FRT data, how individuals can go about having their data technically forgotten, and proper means of training law enforcement officers. However, the legislation does not ponder the true depth of information that will be gleaned via BWC, and it completely discounts the concept of nonconsensual facial-recognition technlogy. If BWCs are running facial recognition in real time, nonconsensual collection of facial feature data will be collected and retained. While there is little question of facial-recognition technology being utilized in situations where felonies are occurring, BWC manufacturers will push law enforcement to engage facial-recognition technology capabilities at most, if not all, times. Therefore, regulations concerning retention and data aggregation are key. In addition to these concerns, facial-recognition technology’s current margin of error when identifying persons of color could lead to disproportionate effects when deployed on BWCs. Proposed legislation should fix this technical issue, while also working to better the technology and alerting law enforcement of efficacy requirements.

Conclusion

In order to best limit privacy concerns, the chilling of speech in public arenas, and current technology’s discriminatory effects, lawmakers should keep in mind the following five principles: (1) limit the facial-recognition data collected from BWCs; (2) provide notice to communities subject to law enforcement facial-recognition data collection; (3) limit the retention of footage gathered via BWC; (4) strictly limit whom the data may be shared with and for what purposes; and (5) establish independent oversight ensuring police accountability and mitigation of facial-recognition misidentification errors likely to have a racially disparate impact.

It is time for the law to address the critical gaps in democratic and constitutional protections that BWCs and facial-recognition technology create. There needs to be a national consensus on the retention and utilization of real-time camera footage accrued by BWCs. At the very least, cities and states should begin regulating law enforcement’s use of facial-recognition software as BWCs become more ubiquitous. More generally, lawmakers must address the various dangers technological integration presents before we unwittingly become a surveillance state.

 


[1] Clare Garvie et al., Geo. L. Ctr. on Privacy & Tech., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America 1 (2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org /sites/default/files/2016-12/The%20Perpetual%20Line-Up%20-%20Center%20on%2 0Privacy%20and%20Technology%20at%20Georgetown%20Law%20-%20121616.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9FK-ACCM].

[2] Id. at 29.

[3] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Awards Over $20 Million to Law Enforcement Body-Worn Camera Programs (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/department-justice-awards-over-20-million-law-enforcement-body-worn-camera-programs [http://perma.cc/P7V5-6WG3]. There have been legal arguments both for and against the widespread use of body cameras. See generally Michael D. White, Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras: Assessing the Evidence (2014), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewd oc/download;jsessionid=492D2B3F28A31AFEDFB411749436AB7F?doi=10.1.1.683.3623&rep=rep1&type=pdf.Although they were implemented following a nationwide push against the shooting of unarmed black men by police and have been widely regarded as a positive adoption when it comes to civilian–police altercations, recent studies have shown that the use of BWCs has not had any dampening effect on police violence. David Yokum, Anita Ravishankar & Alexander Coppock, Evaluating the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras (The Lab @ DC, Working Paper, 2017), https://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/TheLabDC_MPD_BW C_Working_Paper_10.20.17.pdf [http://p erma.cc/GN3P-QT8F].

[4] Ava Kofman, Real-time Face Recognition Threatens to Turn Cops’ Body Cameras into Surveillance Machines, The Intercept (Mar. 22, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://theintercept.c om/2017/03/22/real-time-face-recognition-threatens-to-turn-cops-body-cameras-into-surveillance-machines/ [http://perma.cc/6Z62-ACCM].

[5] Patrick Tucker, Facial Recognition Coming to Police Body Cameras, Defense One (July 17, 2017), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/07/facial-recognition-coming-poli ce-body-cameras/139472/ [http://perma.cc/QF35-ALKU].

[6] Tom Simonite, Few Rules Govern Police Use of Facial-Recognition Technology, Wired (May 22, 2018, 9:35 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/few-rules-govern-police-use-of-facial-recognition-technology/ [http://perma.cc/8BHJ-4XY3].

[7] Letter from Civil Rights Groups to the Axon AI Ethics Board 1–2 (April 26, 2018), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2018/Axon AI Ethics Board Letter FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/6YJF-36EC]. It has recently been found that several cities used body cameras to gather information on Black Lives Matter protesters in order to create a “watch list.” Aris Foley, Memphis Police Store Secret Surveillance of Black Lives Matter Protesters for ‘Watch List,’ AOL.com. (Feb. 21, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/news /2017/02/21/memphis-police-store-secret-surveillance-black-lives-matter-protesters/21718619/ [http://perma.cc/GW9F-28J2]. In addition to the First Amendment concerns raised by the Black Lives Matter allegations, it is an open question whether law enforcement’s ability to image and identify an innocent civilian presents the potential for a Fourth Amendment search.

[8] Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 1591, 1618–19 (2017).

[9] Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that the use of cell site location information by law enforcement constitutes a search in some circumstances).

[10] Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. (footnote omitted).

[14] Id.

[15] Id. The court also noted the benefit to officers who would be required to wear the camera. Id. (“Video recordings will be equally helpful to members of the NYPD who are wrongly accused of inappropriate behavior.”).

[16] See generally Fanny Coudert et al., Body-worn Cameras for Police Accountability: Opportunities and Risks, 31 Computer L. & Sec. Rev. 749 (2015) (providing an overview around the goals of BWCs and the risks they may present going forward).

[17] Statement Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Kimberly J. Del Greco, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Law Enforcement’s Use of Facial Recognition Technology (Mar. 22 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/law-enforcements-use-of-facial-recognition-technology [http://perma.cc/6JRD-AYXE] (“[W]e at the FBI cannot fail to meet our assigned mission. We must continue to exceed expectations and never rest on past successes. Hence, we must embrace new technologies such as automated FR and optimize allocated resources to achieve mission objectives.”).

[18] Vivian Hung et al., The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Market Survey on Body Worn Camera Technologies 404 (2016), https://www.ncjrs. gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250381.pdf [http://perma.cc/5Y7F-K8X4].

[19] Jennifer Lynch, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Face Off: Law Enforcement Use of Face Recognition Technology 1 (2018), https://www.eff.org/files/2018/02/15/face-off-report-1b.pdf [http://perma.cc/6S86-G3BW].

[20] Felix Juefei-Xu et al., A Preliminary Investigation on the Sensitivity of COTS Face Recognition Systems to Forensic Analyst-style Face Processing for Occlusions 25 (Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshop Paper, 2015), http://xuj uefei.com/felix_cvpr15_cots.pdf [http://perma.cc/WCF9-HES3].

[21] Lynch, supra note 19, at 21.

[22] Taylor Soper, Police Body Cam Maker Axon Buys Vievu, Ending Competition Between Rivals, GeekWire (May 4, 2018, 10:21 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2018/police-body-cam-maker-axon-buys-vievu-ending-competition-rivals [http://perma.cc/BK35-R62W] (citing Joshua Brustein, The Biggest Police Cam Company Is Buying Its Main Competitor, Bloomberg (May 4, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloom berg.com/news/artic les/2018-05-04/the-biggest-police-body-cam-company-is-buying-its-main-competitor [http://perma.cc/­C2TL-JXPE]).

[23] Alex Pasternack, Cop Cameras Can Track You in Real-Time and There’s No Stopping Them, FastCompany, (July 31, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40564084/cop-came ras-can-track-you-in-real-time-and-theres-no-stopping-them [http://perma.cc/BZW2-S7ZS].

[24] Id.

[25] Ian Wren & Scott Simon, Body Camera Maker Weighs Adding Facial Recognition Technology, NPR (May 12, 2018, 8:07AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/12/61032088/wha t-artificial-intelligence-can-do-for-local-cops [http://perma.cc/5EWD-AEVQ].

[26] Kelly Blount, Body Worn Cameras With Facial Recognition Technology: When it Constitutes a Search, 3 Crim. L. Prac. 61, 63 (2017).

[27] Hung et al., supra note 18, at 403.

[28] Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 Proc. of Machine Learning Res. 1 (2018), http://pro­ceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf [http://perma.cc/HRR9-69HX] (scrutinizing algorithmic bias in FRT from Microsoft, IBM and Face++ Cognitive Services showing significant differences in average error rates between light-skinned men and dark-skinned women).

[29] Overview of Gender Shades Project, MIT Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Architecture + Planning, https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/gender-shades/overview/ [http://perma.cc/AFB3-GHVF] (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).

[30] Id.

[31] Lynch, supra note 19, at 9.  (describing the spiral as “the significant chilling effect on an individual’s willingness to publicly disclose political views when they believe their views differ from the majority”). The EFF points to evidence accrued from a social-media experiment, when in 2016, research documented the silencing effect on participants’ dissenting opinions when they knew of government surveillance—participants were much less likely to express negative views of government surveillance on Facebook when they perceived that those views were “outside the norm.” Id.

[32] McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” (citation omitted)).

[33] Lynch, supra note 19, at 21.

[34] Garvie et al., supra note 1, at 1.

[35] Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.741(1)(b)(D) (2015).

[36] N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 105-D:2(XII) (2017).

[37] Cincinnati Police Dep’t, Procedure 12.540, Body Worn Camera System (2016), https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/Procedures/12540.pdf [http://perma.cc/4N­NA-8LAX]; see Garvie et al., supra note 1 (providing background data on state and city policies related to BWCs and facial-recognition technology).

[38] Cf. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 Emory L.J. 526, 530 (2016) (advocating for a judicial, rather than legislative, consensus by articulating a six-part framework to guide Fourth Amendment analysis).

[39] Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).

[40] 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

[41] 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

[42] 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). The Wiretap Act, officially Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, attempted to codify the Fourth Amendment principles set forth by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Current model legislation regarding facial-recognition technology seeks to impose annual reporting of facial-recognition technology used by law enforcement agencies, similar to analogous requirements under the Wiretap Act. Garvie et al., supra note 1, at 102–15.

[43] Jake Laperruque, Privacy After Carpenter: We Need Warrants for Real-Time Tracking and “Electronic Exhaustion,” POGO (Jul. 2, 2018), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/0 7/privacy-after-carpenter-we-need-warrants-for-real-time-tracking-and-electronic-exhaustion/ [http://perma.cc/VSSF-6U2L].

[44] Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).

[45] See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3), (d); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(K)(i)– (ii).

[46] Joel Reidenberg et al., Fordham L. Sch. Ctr. on Law & Info. Pol’y, Privacy and Cloud Computing in Public Schools 4–6 (2013), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cg i?article=1001&context=clip [http://perma.cc/7HBG-H9S6].

[47] Garvie et al., supra note 1, at 102–15.

Criminal-Justice Apps: A Modest Step Toward Democratizing the Criminal Process

Substantive criminal law and the criminal-justice process are both famously opaque. Although society expects people to be on notice of the substantive criminal law,[1] the average person has little understanding of the breadth of the penal code and what the legislature has criminalized.[2] Even for conventional crimes that everyone is aware of (think of drunk driving, speeding, and burglary, to name just a few) the average person likely has no idea what particular elements make up those crimes.[3]

Criminal procedure is similarly a mystery to most of the public.[4] The average driver has no idea whether she can refuse to let an officer look around her car[5] or whether she can decline to take a breathalyzer test.[6] Most famously, almost everyone waives their Miranda rights[7]­­—even after specifically being told that they do not have to talk—because they do not really understand their options. Once arrested, the process of getting out of custody and retaining a lawyer is confusing.[8] Arraignments, bail determinations, preliminary hearings, and motions to suppress are also likely befuddling to the average individual.[9]

The procedural confusion is compounded by the sheer practical difficulty of exercising constitutionally protected rights. For instance, defendants have a right to a fair trial, yet large numbers of defendants are handicapped by being unable to make bail.[10] These individuals often waive their trial rights and plead guilty simply to get out of custody.[11] And for defendants who can afford to hire lawyers, finding the right attorneys and making time to consult with them is enormously difficult.

In short, the criminal justice system affords suspects and defendants considerable statutory and constitutional protections. Yet, as in many other areas of our democracy, these individuals, especially vulnerable members of the population, lack the necessary information and ability to take advantage of these legal protections.

Technology is slowly starting to make the criminal-justice system more understandable and beginning to help even the playing field for disadvantaged groups. In recent years, lawyers, activists, and policymakers have introduced cell phone applications—what I will call “criminal-justice apps”—that are slowly beginning to democratize the criminal-justice system.  These apps fall into a variety of categories: (1) apps that teach individuals about the law; (2) apps that help suspects and defendants connect with lawyers; (3) apps that help defendants navigate confusing court systems; and (4) what we might think of as reform apps or paradigm-shifting apps that seek to bring systemic changes to the criminal justice system.

To be sure, many of these apps were created by lawyers out of self-interest in order to generate business. But a few apps have emerged purely as a public service, in order to enhance the power of suspects and defendants who have been historically disadvantaged in the criminal-justice system. Whether these apps were designed with a profit motive or as a public service, they serve a democratizing function. Criminal-justice apps make it (at least somewhat) easier for individuals to be informed about the criminal-justice system and to navigate it on a more equitable basis.

Using apps focused on DWIs, bail, stop-and-frisk, and recording of the police as illustrative examples, this essay explores how apps are democratizing criminal justice. While many of the apps are exciting, this essay concludes with a cautionary note: Unlike other technological breakthroughs, criminal-justice apps will likely lead to only modest change at a modest pace.

I. Apps That Teach Law:

One of the greatest barriers to a more egalitarian criminal justice system is simply lack of knowledge. Law is complicated. Criminal codes are massive, and most citizens do not have more than a cursory knowledge about what has been criminalized.[12] Nor do most individuals know much about their criminal-procedure rights.[13] Apps in a few select areas have begun to narrow this information deficit.

A. DWI Apps Are Increasingly Common

The most common type of criminal-justice app is the DWI (Driving While Intoxicated/Impaired) app. Numerous criminal-defense attor­neys—no doubt in an effort to acquire clients—have created apps with information for drivers who are about to find themselves in legal trouble.

Some of the DWI apps provide considerable legal information. For example, the colorfully named “Oh Crap! App” has a section on “Basic Rights” that includes information on the right to record police, the right to refuse to answer a police officer’s questions, the right to a lawyer, and an explanation of how police cannot search without a warrant or consent.[14] The app also offers defense-oriented guidance on how to answer an officer’s questions about whether you have been drinking to avoid incriminating responses.[15] Likewise, the app has a section on consenting to field sobriety tests and correctly notes that “[y]ou cannot be forced to submit to field sobriety tests in the State of Virginia.”[16] It further opines that the walk and turn test and one leg stand test “are almost impossible to perform to law enforcement standards in a stressful situation whether alcohol has been consumed or not.”[17] While the claims about the unfairness of the field sobriety tests may be exaggerated,[18] they nevertheless provide drivers with a coherent set of advice on their rights and how they can respond to law enforcement.

While the Oh Crap! App tries to steer individuals away from confessions and field sobriety tests, it also offers wise and accurate advice about when to cooperate with law enforcement. The app advises that police do have the authority to demand a driver’s license and registration and to order the driver out of the vehicle.[19]

Other DWI apps provide even more information. For instance, the “DWI Defense” app, designed by a Missouri law firm, offers advice on how to avoid being pulled over in the first place.[20] It also offers strategic advice to help the possibly intoxicated avoid being arrested, such as keeping with the flow of traffic, rolling down the window to vent smells in the vehicle, and not saying things such as “I just had one beer with dinner.”[21] While some might see this advice as an objectionable effort to help people engage in drunk driving, the overall thrust of the information is to help individuals be more knowledgeable about how drunk-driving laws operate.

Other DWI apps try to simplify the relevant rules of criminal law, procedure, and investigation as much as possible for users with no legal background. A DWI app from a Texas lawyer provides “12 Rules for Dealing with Police.”[22] The twelve rules include many of the points made above, but they also wisely caution people to ask to see an actual warrant before allowing a blood draw.[23]

In addition to providing legal information, some of the DWI apps also have valuable functions designed to prevent drunk driving in the first place. For instance, a number of apps have a blood-alcohol content calculator that allows a user to estimate whether their blood-alcohol level might exceed the legal limit of 0.08.[24] The more sophisticated apps also seek to help individuals avoid legal trouble by including icons that allow the user to call nearby taxi services.[25]

The DWI apps are still a relatively modest part of the legal landscape. Each year, more than a million people are arrested for driving while intoxicated.[26] Likely only a small percentage of those individuals consulted a DWI app before leaving a bar or while an officer was in the process of investigating them on the road. Still, the apps have become prevalent. The lawyer who created the Oh Crap! App estimates that it has been downloaded over 100,000 times since it was created in 2013.[27] With such a large number of downloads, some arrestees surely consulted the app in the moments before they were being arrested.[28] And even those who did not consult it at the moment of arrest likely internalized some of the information from prior review. Of course, while I recognize that more information does not always mean better information, in the case of DWI stops where most citizens have limited knowledge of the law and are at a power imbalance with the police, the apps may be very valuable.

II. Apps to Connect Defendants with Lawyers

In addition to a lack of legal knowledge, a key problem for many criminal defendants is finding the right lawyer. App designers have created mechanisms to find, contact, and compare attorneys. Not surprisingly, all of the aforementioned DWI apps also provide ways to directly communicate with the lawyer who created the app. Some DWI apps enable the user to immediately call a lawyer[29] or send a pre-filled email to an attorney.[30] Some apps also provide an icon to contact a bail bondsman in addition to a lawyer.[31]

Beyond the DWI area, there are also websites that connect individuals with lawyers for other types of offenses. For instance, one website enables individuals to upload traffic tickets, receive competing offers from lawyers, and then hire an attorney.[32]

Another app—“Got My Legal Help”—identifies the user’s location, when prompted, and immediately puts the user in touch with an attorney licensed in the relevant jurisdiction and with expertise in the applicable area of law.[33] This app is valuable not just to individuals who have no prior experience with lawyers, but also to well-connected individuals who happen to be away from home when they are arrested.

Of course, we should be cautious in extolling the virtue of “find a lawyer” apps. These are early-generation apps with limited functionality. More worrisome, the lawyers have a profit motive. And most troubling is the possibility that some of the lawyers who acquire clients by apps may not be the most capable or cost-effective attorneys.[34] In short, clients may be drawn to attorneys who are less skilled and more expensive than they otherwise would have hired.  Of course, problems with lawyer advertising have always existed.[35] Mobile apps at least move the ball forward by helping those with no legal contacts find attorneys, helping others find the right type of attorney, and making it easier to begin getting legal advice by breaking down some of the existing communication barriers.[36]

Moreover, there is vast potential for future apps that connect individuals to lawyers. Think of TripAdvisor and Yelp, which provide individuals with the opportunity to rate and compare hotels, destinations, and restaurants. Engineers could create a similar app where previous clients rate lawyers, describe the kind of case the lawyer handled, and the result of the proceeding. A criminal defendant without the first idea whom to hire could scroll through such an app and make a more informed decision about their representation. Of course, all of the information might not be accurate—much as there are both self-serving and unfair reviews on Yelp and TripAdvisor—but the defendant would have far more information than she would without the app. And lawyers who know they will be publicly reviewed will have an incentive to provide good service to their clients in order to avoid bad reviews.

III. Apps That Help Individuals Navigate the Legal System

The legal process is obviously confusing. In theory, an attorney helps individuals navigate the complicated process. But not all criminal defendants have attorneys.[37] And even for those who have legal representation, it is sometimes hard to get a timely and thorough answer to legal questions from an overburdened defense attorney.[38] In a very small number of courts, there are apps to help individuals decipher the legal issues and procedures in the court system.

For example, following a conviction, many defendants are obligated to pay restitution or fines.[39] Failure to do so leads previously released individuals to be taken back into custody.[40] To make this process easier for federal defendants, courts are beginning to create apps that enable individuals to pay fines from their phones. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota created an app—“MND Debt”—that enables users to “make payments for restitution, fines, and assessments from anywhere with no additional charge.”[41] In Hawaii, individuals can use the “Hawaii Courts Mobile” app to access records, find court forms, and also pay fines.[42]

Once cases are finalized, many convicted individuals seek to expunge their criminal records, but find the process to be complicated. Multiple jurisdictions have apps that assist people in trying to expunge their criminal records. For instance, the “Expunge.io” app provides attorney referral assistance for individuals with a juvenile record in Cook County, Illinois.[43] The “ExpungeMaryland” app provides “an assessment of an individual’s eligibility for expungement” and “referrals to pro bono legal groups.”[44]

In 2014, California enacted a law that downgraded some crimes from felonies to misdemeanors.[45] The downgrade was significant for defendants who had already served their sentences but were saddled with felony convictions that hindered their employment opportunities. However, utilizing the new law to clear felonies from their record proved difficult for some individuals. Each California county adopted its own procedure to implement the law, and there was limited staffing to help individuals complete the paperwork.[46] Reformers thus created an app—“Clear My Record”—that helps individuals apply across counties to have their convictions reduced.[47] There are also other expungement apps that are “attorney facing” and that enable lawyers and law school clinics to import data and populate form documents much faster.[48]

In civil cases, there are a few apps to help pro se litigants navigate the court system. For instance, the “Florida Courts HELP” app seeks to help Floridians who represent themselves in family-law cases.[49] The app provides access to nearly 200 family-law forms that can be filled out on the device, contact information for help centers, user-friendly instructions about how the process works, lawyer referrals, and a glossary that explains dozens of legal terms.[50]

The Legal Services of Northern Virginia has likewise created an app, with funding by the Legal Services Corporation, to help individuals navigate the court system. Their app—“Legal Case Navigator”—assists individuals in Northern Virginia by providing links to legal forms, a map of the local courthouse, lawyer referral phone numbers, and basic information about individuals’ legal rights.[51] It even enables the individual to access information about their own pending case.[52]

Although the Florida and Northern Virginia apps are focused on civil issues such as family law, consumer law, elder law, expungements, and housing law, the concept could easily be expanded to the criminal-justice context. For instance, as noted above, the Florida Courts HELP app includes a glossary of dozens of legal terms that average citizens otherwise may not understand. Criminal-law terminology can be just as confusing, and a criminal-courts app would be similarly valuable in translating concepts for a lay audience.

IV. Apps Aimed at Reforming the Criminal Justice System

While most of the criminal-justice apps were created by lawyers seeking to generate business, there are also apps designed by nonprofits that seek to reform the criminal-justice system.

A. Bail Apps Seeking to Change the System

Scholars and criminal-justice reformers have turned their attention to the bail system in recent years. Most arrestees are poor and do not have thousands or even hundreds of dollars in discretionary funds to pay bail.[53] Arrestees therefore turn to bail bondsmen, who typically require the suspect to pay ten percent of the bail amount.[54] Many defendants cannot even afford the ten percent, and must remain in jail pending trial.[55] Unable to show up for work, some will lose their jobs, which causes a cascade of other financial and basic life problems. Detainees who were in drug treatment programs or homeless shelters may lose their beds in such facilities.[56] They might even suffer violence while incarcerated. And, perhaps most significantly, the biggest indicator that a defendant will plead guilty is whether he is detained pending trial.[57]

Although there have been some successful reform efforts through litigation,[58] the money bail system is still one of the biggest obstacles to creating an egalitarian criminal-justice system in the United States.[59] Reformers are creating apps to tackle the problem.

In late 2017, engineers launched “Appolition,” an app that links to users’ bank accounts and rounds up the spare change on debit and credit card purchases and donates the money to grassroots groups that post bail for incarcerated misdemeanor suspects.[60] In the first month, Appolition raised $18,000 to post bail for pretrial detainees;[61] as of January 23, 2019, the app has raised around $200,000 and bailed over fifty people out of jails across the United States.[62]

Similarly, consider “Bail Bloc,” a blockchain-based bail app, also launched in late 2017, which “allocates a small percentage of the operating device’s excess computing power to mine cryptocurrency.”[63] The Bail Bloc app converts the cryptocurrency to dollars and donates the proceeds to The Bronx Freedom Fund, which then donates it to pretrial detainees. In the first two months after launch, the app raised about $5,000.[64]

An app backed by rapper and entrepreneur Jay-Z—“Promise”—aims to provide local criminal-justice systems with an alternative to pretrial incarceration and the conventional bail process.[65] The app (which is currently in the design stage) would “monitor and support participants” by generating a calendar of obligations such as court appearances, drug testing, and substance-abuse counseling, and then remind users to attend these obligations.[66] The app would also provide referrals and support for job training, counseling, housing, and other needs.[67] The Promise app would enable case managers to “monitor compliance with court orders and better keep tabs on people via the app.”[68] As of March 2018, the app was being tested in one county and the designers were in talks with other counties to offer the service as an alternative to pretrial detention in county jails.[69]

There are also profit-based apps designed to help individuals make bail. For instance, when people have been pulled over and think they will be arrested they can utilize the “Arrest SOS” app.[70] The app sends a message to an attorney and bail-bond agent in the ZIP code where the arrest occurs, and the bail bondsman immediately begins the bail process.[71] The idea is not only to speed up the process of making bail, but also to help arrestees whose cell phones have been impounded and cannot remember phone numbers to call a friend or relative during the booking process.[72] A similar app—“iGotBerries”—operates on a fifteen-minute delay so that an individual can tap the app immediately after being pulled over, but still cancel the request if she is released at the scene rather than being arrested.[73]

Of course, these bail apps have yet to make a dent in the massive multi-billion-dollar bail industry.[74] Nevertheless, they signal how app developers are seeking to disrupt the traditional bail paradigm and empower individuals to deal more effectively with the criminal-justice system.

B. Apps That Record and Report on Police Interactions

In 2012, the New York affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) introduced the “Stop and Frisk Watch” app. The app enables users to record footage and then immediately send it to the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) and report on incidents they observed but did not film.[75] The app also alerts users when people near their location are being stopped by the police.[76] Finally, the app has a “know your rights” feature that informs users about their rights to film the police.[77]

After the release of the NYCLU Stop and Frisk Watch app, other ACLU chapters followed suit with a “Mobile Justice” app that provides users with the same general functionality as the Stop and Frisk Watch App.[78] The Mobile Justice app is available in seventeen states and the District of Columbia.[79]

III. Untapped Potential: The Miranda App

The Supreme Court’s Miranda doctrine is supposed to help suspects avoid being coerced into making confessions.[80] Yet, scholars have documented for decades how most suspects illogically waive their Miranda rights and confess, even after receiving Miranda warnings.[81] The reason may be that being confronted by a police officer is inherently coercive.[82] Or it could be that the warnings go by so quickly[83] and are sometimes read incorrectly by police, such that the suspects do not truly understand them and waive their rights as a result. Or perhaps some suspects are visual learners and do not really process information that is provided verbally.[84] Others may simply think remaining silent in the face of accusations is unnatural and makes them look guiltier.[85]

Professors Andrew Guthrie Ferguson and Richard Leo recently proposed a Miranda app that would solve many of these problems.[86] The Miranda app would be free for all devices and would present individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights in formats for both visual and oral learners.[87] Moreover, providing the Miranda rights on an app would enable the suspect to review the law in a “slow, clear, and repetitive manner.”[88] If a suspect were confused, he could go back and review the options more than once.[89] The app “could even offer individuals a choice of programs that might be more culturally relevant to their particular circumstance.”[90]

The Miranda app is certainly a good idea. Suspects would benefit from a clearer explanation and understanding of their Miranda warnings. And some police officers would benefit by having a clear statement of the Miranda warnings available at the touch of a button. Indeed, in the past, Apple’s App Store sold a Miranda app that was created by a police officer and which listed all of the warnings and translated them into Spanish.[91] The American Bar Association (ABA) recently started a pilot program in New Orleans in which police officers “provide a Miranda translation using Spanish phrasing that has been approved by certified translators with plain language pictographic images and audio.”[92] Although not yet an app, the ABA program utilizes some of the same reforms outlined by Professors Ferguson and Leo and could easily be converted to a more technologically sophisticated cell phone or iPad application.

      While an app would effectuate the spirit of the Miranda decision, unfortunately there are substantial obstacles to widespread adoption. Police departments have a disincentive to create and adopt a Miranda app that does a thorough job of helping suspects understand their Miranda rights; confused suspects are more likely to waive their rights and confess, and police departments like to get confessions.[93] Moreover, police officers face minimal repercussions if they read the warnings incorrectly. Except in rare cases,[94] courts will reject Miranda challenges based on the argument that the officers misread the warnings.[95]

In sum, under the current legal regime, police departments do not have an incentive to create a Miranda app or adopt one created by a third party; they may actually think they are strategically better off without one. Not surprisingly, the New Orleans Police Department, which is testing Miranda warnings with Spanish translation and pictographic images, is doing so while under a consent decree with the United States Department of Justice.[96] Without comparable pressure on most police departments, it may be a long road to implementing a widely used Miranda app.

V. Democracy and Criminal-Justice Apps

What are we to make of the proliferation of criminal-justice apps? Will the apps described in this essay revolutionize criminal justice the way cell phones and internet technology have altered so many other areas of life? Today, people use their cell phones for music, email, texting, photography, podcasts, traditional news, and, perhaps most significantly, social media. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (which are predominantly used as cell phone apps[97]) have played a significant role in everything from overthrowing foreign dictatorships[98] to quite possibly altering the outcome of the 2016 presidential election.[99] Is criminal justice next?

The case for cell phone applications being a democratizing force is straightforward. Criminal-justice apps put more information in the hands of the individuals who need it and help them to exercise their constitutional and statutory rights.[100] For instance, in the past, an average person with no legal education who was pulled over for DWI had no idea whether he had the legal right to refuse a breathalyzer or where he would find a lawyer with the special expertise to help him.[101] Now, his cell phone can tell him what the police are legally permitted to do and it can immediately direct him to a lawyer specializing in DWI defense.[102]

Not that long ago, a person who knew he was about to be arrested might have resigned himself to languishing in jail over the weekend. Today, he can tap on a cell phone app that will contact a bail bondsman and initiate the process to post bail before the arrest occurs.[103] Moreover, because poor people who cannot make bail face an increased risk of conviction, criminal-justice apps that raise and distribute bail money can help the poor have the same chance at justice as the more affluent.[104]

When an arrestee needs to find the right lawyer to help defend herself, criminal-justice apps can help her to effectuate her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.[105] Later in the process, criminal-justice apps can help a suspect navigate the court process and even expunge his conviction.[106]

In short, criminal-justice apps are democratic because they directly convey valuable information and help individuals overcome monetary obstacles in order to exercise their constitutional rights.

At present, of course, criminal-justice apps serve a limited audience. Although the number of apps is growing, the total number of downloads (i.e., the utilization) is not huge. To put it in perspective, the Appolition app raised $140,000 in its first six months.[107] That money likely had a huge impact in the lives of the pretrial detainees who received the money and were thus extricated from pretrial incarceration, but the United States has a multi-billion-dollar bail industry,[108] making $140,000 a tiny sum by comparison.

While criminal-justice apps presently have a modest footprint, it is not difficult to envision how they could grow. For a point of comparison, consider a driver looking for a coffee shop on an unfamiliar highway using an early generation iPhone map. The early iPhone map certainly constituted progress—our driver no longer had to completely guess where to exit the highway—though it still was not easy for the driver to quickly find a coffee shop. Today, however, there are apps that not only identify which highway exits have coffee shops,[109] but corporate-designed apps that direct drivers to the closest store. Our driver can tap on her Starbucks app, find the closest location, order her favorite drink, and be directed right to the store—including to a location she has never visited before.[110]

The question, then, is whether criminal-justice apps will ever progress from their current state—what we might think of as equivalent to the early iPhone map application—and bring us to the point where navigating the legal system is as easy, egalitarian, and ubiquitous as finding a roadside Starbucks and ordering a drink from your phone. The short answer, unfortunately, is likely no.

Law is not simple, neither in doctrine nor in logistics. The complexities of a DWI prosecution cannot be answered in a few simple statements on a cell phone application.[111] Each criminal case is different, and nuanced analysis is often critical. Nor can the criminal-justice process easily be described in detail on a cell phone application. Lawyers practice for years to become experts in all the procedural steps and motions that can occur in a criminal case. Moreover, even within the same courthouse, there are procedural variations from judge to judge. In short, criminal law and procedure cannot be simplified in a cell phone application, except at a very high level of generality.

Nor is the quality of criminal-defense lawyers easily reduced to a cell phone rating. Thousands of criminal defense lawyers handle numerous different types of cases. While TripAdvisor can help individuals determine which hotel is the cleanest and quietest, there are simply too many variables in criminal cases to allow for a comparably informative rating system of criminal-defense attorneys. To note the most obvious variable, the strength of criminal charges varies by defendant.  Some criminal cases are so strong that Perry Mason could not help the defendant, while in other cases the charges are so weak that even a terrible attorney could win at trial or negotiate a favorable plea bargain. Most Yelp users can agree which restaurants have the best pizza and fastest service because the same food (at least by and large) is being served to all the patrons. Criminal cases are far more individualized.

While criminal-justice apps can serve a democratizing purpose, our expectations for the scope and speed of change should be modest. Americans have grown accustomed to rapid technological change. For example, in 1998, most people watched movies by driving to a video store (often a Blockbuster Video) to rent physical copies of movies. In less than a decade, Blockbuster was in free fall, and Netflix took over the market by first cost-effectively delivering movies directly to consumers’ homes[112]  and, only a few years later, shifting to a highly successful streaming-based model.[113] Technology revolutionized the home movie market—twice—in a very short period of time.

The speed of the Netflix revolution (or that of Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, or other platforms, for that matter) simply is not likely in the criminal-justice space. The criminal-justice system is made up of thousands of diversified systems. Most cases are not handled at the federal level, or even at the state level for that matter. The criminal-justice “system” is actually thousands of different counties with their own prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.[114] The variety of procedural and substantive rules across jurisdictions would make it incredibly difficult to develop a nationwide application.

Furthermore, there are no large institutional players. The large institutional players that cross county lines—think of the ABA, the ACLU, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)—do not have the market power to affect rapid technological change. Additionally, they are not powerhouse technology players and they are not likely to become them. Perhaps most importantly, they do not have the singular focus of Silicon Valley companies. The ABA, ACLU, and NACDL (and other organizations like them) have diverse sets of priorities. Cell phone applications that are attempting to democratize criminal justice are not even close to the top of their lists. Of course, the future could bring a new criminal-justice player that we are not presently aware of. There was no Netflix during the Blockbuster era, and it was not that long ago that we lived in a world without behemoths like Amazon, Facebook, and Twitter. Without a profit motive, however, it is difficult to see a disruptive force like those companies revolutionizing the criminal-justice space. 

In short, criminal-justice apps serve a democratizing purpose. They educate the citizenry and further the exercise of constitutional rights. Criminal-justice apps will bring change to the system, but they are not likely to be game changers. Instead, we should anticipate that criminal-justice apps will bring modest change at a modest pace.

VI. Conclusion

The criminal-justice system is confusing. Most people do not have a good grasp of either the substantive criminal law or criminal procedure. Moreover, the system appears to be stacked against those who do not understand their rights and those who are too poor to afford bail. In recent years, lawyers, activists, and policymakers have introduced cell phone apps that are very slowly beginning to democratize the criminal-justice system. These criminal-justice apps teach individuals about the law, help suspects and defendants connect with lawyers, assist defendants in navigating the judicial system, and undertake reform efforts by attempting to bring about systemic changes to problematic areas such as the bail process. Criminal-justice apps serve a democratic purpose by conveying valuable information and lessening the financial obstacles defendants face in exercising their constitutional rights.

We should, however, be cautious and not expect too much change. Substantive law is far too complicated and legal processes far too intricate to distill into easy-to-use apps. Moreover, there is no large institutional player driving a revolution of criminal-justice cell phone applications. Criminal-justice apps are therefore likely to be a positive, though modest, democratizing force.

 


[1] See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1984) (“All citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law.”).

[2] See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 Hastings L. J. 633, 638 (2005) (“The proliferation of potentially redundant offenses causes several significant problems. First, overstuffed criminal codes make it more difficult for the average citizen to understand what the criminal code commands.”); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States From Themselves?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 169, 170 (2003).

[3] See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal Law, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 879, 953 (2007) (“Rather than promoting the principle of notice, today’s criminal law creates an impregnable network of prohibitions that no one but a criminal law expert could decipher.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055, 1075 (2016) (finding that defendants may have difficulty understanding and recognizing technical doctrines, such as mens rea and accomplice liability, and evaluating the elements of crimes).

[4] See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 913 (2006).

[5] See Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 509, 526 (2015).

[6] Practically speaking, the answer is “yes,” as it is impractical for an officer to physically force an individual to blow into a tube. But the Supreme Court recently gave states the green light to criminalize refusal to take a breathalyzer (though not a warrantless blood draw). See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2163–65 (2016). 

[7] See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 276 (1996) (finding that approximately seventy-eight percent of respondents waived their Miranda rights).

[8] See Mark D. Killian, Survey Looks at How People Choose Lawyers, Fla. B. News, May 15, 2001, at 19.

[9] See Bibas, supra note 4, at 924 (“[L]egalese, jargon, euphemism, and procedural complexities garble court proceedings.”).

[10] See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale L.J. 1344, 1360 (2014).

[11] See Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 779, 832 (2018) (“The most significant predictor of whether a defendant enters a guilty plea is his custodial status.”).

[12] See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.

[13] See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text; Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468, 1472 (1985) (“[T]he fundamental problem with fourth amendment law is that it is confusing.”).

[14] See Oh Crap! App, [https://perma.cc/SC4Z-WZK3] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).

[15] See id. (“The answer to this question can be incriminating, thus, you have the right not to answer it when asked by law enforcement.”).

[16] Id.; Whitestone Young, Is it Mandatory to Take a Field Sobriety Test in Virginia?, [https://perma.cc/DU3V-ENE6] (last visited Jan, 4, 2019).

[17] See Oh Crap! App, supra note 14.

[18] Three prominent studies on the Standardized Field Sobriety Test found that police officers’ arrest decisions based on such tests were accurate, that is the drivers had measured BAC of 0.008% or higher, in over 86% of cases. See Steven J. Rubenzer, The Standardized Field Sobriety Tests: A Review of Scientific and Legal Issues, 32 L. & Hum. Behav. 293, 297 (2007). But, because of the potential for confounding variables that are present at many DWI stops, the validity of the experimental design and results of the aforementioned studies has recently been questioned. Id. at 306.

[19] See Oh Crap! App, supra note 14. The app also provides valuable information on the right to consult with an attorney, breathalyzer refusals, and evidence preservation. See id.

[20] See DWI Defense, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/5LNK-VPP7] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (“If you speed, roll through a stop sign, forget to signal, drive with a burned-out light, or fail to place new registration tags on your license plate, you risk getting pulled over.”).

[21] Id. 

[22] See ATX DWI, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/YPR2-QXWE] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).

[23] Id.

[24] See, e.g., Oh Crap! App, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/SC4Z-WZK3] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019); The Dude, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/N3WC-WSYB] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).

[25] See Oh Crap! App, supra note 24.

[26] See Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [https://perma.cc/4EXE-63ZJ] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).

[27] See Telephone Interview with Robert Rehkemper, Managing Partner, Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, PLC (Aug. 2, 2018) (interview conducted by Elizabeth Brightwell).

[28] Using a DWI app during a traffic stop does carry a risk. If an individual is fiddling with a phone after being pulled over, there is some chance that an officer will confuse the cell phone with a weapon.

[29] See, e.g., The Dude, supra note 24 (displaying a “call me now” button); Buffalo DWI Lawyers, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/UT4S-T4B5] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (providing a defense attorney’s phone number); Louisiana DWI Defense: Glynn Delatte, Jr, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/WG62-4NN4] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (displaying a “call me now” button).

[30] See, e.g., DWI Arrest Phone Apps, Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, [https://perma.cc/P85J-C8YB] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (describing features of the law firm’s DWI & Arrest Guide App, including an “I’m Being Arrested!!” button that sends a prefilled email to the firm).

[31] See, e.g., Oh Crap! App, supra note 24.

[32] See How it Works, Bernie Sez [https://perma.cc/EQ3D-FF7J] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018). The app is also able to connect DWI defendants with attorneys. Speeding/DUI Info, Bernie Sez, [https://perma.cc/94NY-9PGD] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).  

[33] See Got My Legal Help, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/4BVF-AKWH] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).

[34] Cf. Gene W. Murdock & John White, Does Legal Service Advertising Serve the Public’s Interest?, 8 J. Consumer Pol’y. 153, 162 (1985) (finding that “lower quality lawyers are more prone to use Yellow Pages advertising”).

[35] See John B. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 493, 496–97 (1984).

[36] On the lack of information available to consumers in selecting a lawyer, see Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 283, 284–85 (1992).

[37] See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 Ind. L.J. 571, 572, 591 (2005).

[38] See generally Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1564 (2018) (documenting the various problems facing indigent criminal defendants who rely on underfunded and overworked public or appointed defense attorneys).

[39] See Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt and Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 Md. L. Rev. 486 (2016).

[40] Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 509, 523–26 (2011).

[41] See MND Debt: Pay US Court, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/CAB9-B4LY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).

[42] See Hawaii Courts Mobile, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/DL77-4DUJ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).

[43] See Jason Tashea, A Good Name Is Hard To Clear: A National Report of Digital Expungement Applications, SIMLab (Sept. 1, 2016), [https://perma.cc/Z4C8-3G8P].

[44] Id.

[45] See What You Need to Know About Proposition 47, Calif. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., [https://perma.cc/SBZ7-W3WJ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).

[46] See Jason Shueh, Code for America’s Clear My Record App Gives Ex-Convicts a Second Chance, State Scoop (Dec. 2, 2016), [https://perma.cc/FL69-VE36].

[47] See id.

[48] See Tashea, supra note 43.

[49] See Florida Courts HELP App, Florida Courts Help, [https://perma.cc/5BAG-8766] (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) (discussing the app’s features).

[50] See id.

[51] See Legal Case Navigator, iTunes App Store, [https://perma.cc/G976-RBMG] (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).

[52] See id.

[53] See Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, The Atlantic (Apr. 12, 2016), [https://perma.cc/FB8V-3RPU].

[54] See Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §12.1(b), at 650 (4th ed. 2004).

[55] See Burdeen, supra note 53 (“More than 60 percent of people locked up in America’s jails have not yet been to trial, and as many as nine in 10 of those people are stuck in jail because they can’t afford to post bond.”).

[56] See Yale Law Sch. Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Human Rights Clinic, “Forced into Breaking the Law”: The Criminalization of Homelessness in Connecticut 18 (2016), [https://perma.cc/2YPU-KMLF].

[57] See Roberts, supra note 11, at 832.

[58] See Eli Rosenberg, Judge in Houston Strikes Down Harris County’s Bail System, N.Y. Times (Apr. 29, 2017), [https://perma.cc/F75T-G6G7].

[59] See Shima Baradaran Baughman, The Bail Book: A Comprehensive Look at Bail in America’s Criminal Justice System 1–11 (2018).

[60] See Victoria Law, This App Collects Spare Change to Bail People Out of Jail, Wired (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/RGC8-9L7F]; see also Frequently Asked Questions, Appolition, [https://perma.cc/Z6AD-P583] (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) (describing how the app works).

[61] Law, supra note 60.

[62] Allana Akhtar, A Movement Is Underway to End Cash Bail in America. This App Found an Ingenious Way to Help, Money (Jan. 23, 2019), http://money.com/money/55 09560/a-movement-is-underway-to-end-cash-bail-in-america-this-app-found-an-ingenious-way-to-help/; see also @blackwomangaze, Twitter (June 16, 2018, 10:00 AM), [https://perma .cc/F3EL-K8Q3] (retweeted by Appolition’s Twitter profile on June 16, 2018) (claiming that the app raised $140,000 within six months of launch).

[63] See Arvind Dilawar, You Can Download an Easy Blockchain App to Help Poor People Make Bail, Quartz (Jan. 23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/924Z-SSKT].

[64] See id.; see also infra Part VI for a discussion of whether these apps will be successful.

[65] See Jenna Amatulli, Jay-Z’s Roc Nation Partners With App Aiming To Better Criminal Justice System, Huffington Post (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:20 PM), [https://perma.cc/7RXN-KUPK].

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] See Megan Rose Dickey, Bail Reform’s Complex Relationship with Tech, TechCrunch (May 20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/VF5C-T43K].

[69] See Amatulli, supra note 65.

[70] See The App That Gets You Out of Jail, Arrest SOS, [https://perma.cc/3F36-RVNT].

[71] Id.

[72] See id; see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1973) (“[O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant.”).

[73] See iGotBerries: DWI SOS App & Police SOS, Google Play Store, [https://perma.cc /K2ZB-X2ZF] (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).

[74] Ten issuers underwrite fourteen billion dollars in bail bonds, resulting in two billion dollars of annual profit. Gillian B. White, Who Really Makes Money Off of Bail Bonds?, The Atlantic (May 12, 2017), [https://perma.cc/G4P3-LXQT]. Compare the size of this industry to the roughly $200,000 raised by Appolition, see supra note 62, and the $5,000 raised by BailBloc. See supra note 64.

[75] See Stop and Frisk Watch App, N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union, [https://perma.cc/PHD3-YK3N] (last visited Nov. 18, 2018); see also Azi Paybarah, Civil Libertarians Introduce a Stop-and-Frisk App, Politico (June 6, 2012, 2:15 PM), [https://perma.cc/Z6JP-TYDH] (describing the intended function of the app prior to its release in 2012).

[76] Stop and Frisk Watch App, supra note 75.

[77] Id.

[78] See ACLU Apps to Record Police Conduct, Am. Civ. Liberties Union, [https://per ma.cc/5HVQ-9E6L] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).

[79] See id. Notably, many of the DWI apps discussed in Part I.A. above also have a recording function that enables the user to record the traffic stop and turn it over to the attorney. See, e.g., The Dude, supra note 24.

[80] See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (“The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing.”) (emphasis omitted).

[81] See, e.g., Leo, supra note 7, at 276 (finding that approximately seventy-eight percent of suspects waived their rights, even after having the Miranda warning read to them).

[82] I do not mean to suggest here that the police behaved illegally. A suspect can internally feel compelled to answer, even though the police followed proper procedure. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 579, 594–601 (2007).

[83] See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” in Our National Culture?, in 29 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 203, 247, 250 (Michael Tonry ed. 2002).

[84] See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein & Katherine Austin Stalcup, Te(a)chnology: Web-Based Instruction in Legal Skills Courses, 49 J. Legal Educ. 480, 488 (1999).

[85] See Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 849, 890 (2017).

[86] See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and Machine, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 935 (2017).

[87] Id. at 950–51 (“[B]ecause the medium of an App allows for digital innovation, we envision video, graphics, and animations adding explanatory power to the design. Written descriptions of legal terms could be accompanied by visual explanations through images, graphics, animations, or hyperlinks. Videos of real people, avatars, or a combination of the two could be used to capture the attention of viewers. A narrator (available in multiple languages) would guide users through the process of understanding Miranda warnings and obtaining a valid waiver or acknowledging the invocation of rights.”)

[88] Id. at 951.

[89] Id.

[90] Id.

[91] Eugene Nielsen, Law Enforcement iPhone Apps, Part 1, Hendon Media Group [https://perma.cc/L4RC-V49H] (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (describing the “Police Miranda Warning” app); see also Miranda Warnings/ Rights, Google Play Store, [https://­perma.cc/TU8Q-RFNW] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019) (providing a quick reference guide to assist law enforcement and security officers in providing the Miranda warning).

[92] See Innovative Miranda Tools Being Tested by New Orleans Police in Effort to Broaden Access to Justice, Am. B. Ass’n (July 27, 2018), [https://perma.cc/QFC2-BWSW].

[93] See William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 975, 983 (2001).

[94] See, e.g., United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th. Cir. 2006) (holding warnings inadequate because the suspect “was not told that anything he said could be used against him in court”).

[95] See Michael D. Cicchini, The New Miranda Warning, 65 SMU L. Rev. 911, 914 (2012) (“The reality is that lower courts have created ‘countless exceptions and loopholes’ to label nearly any imaginable version of the warning as legally adequate—even if it miserably fails to convey anything resembling Miranda’s substance.”); see also Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195, 200–05 (1989) (explaining that as long as the warning reasonably conveys to a suspect his rights, the warning need not be in the exact form described in Miranda).

[96] Emily Lane, NOPD Sets “Ambitious Goal” To Exit Consent Decree by 2020, Chief Says, NOLA (Aug. 5, 2017, updated May 31, 2018), [https://perma.cc/GWA2-V5KZ]; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.

[97] See Brian R. Fitzgerald, Data Point: Social Networking Is Moving on From the Desktop, Wall St. J. (Apr. 3, 2014, 12:07 PM), [https://perma.cc/KL9D-J6UR] (observing that more than eighty-five percent of Twitter use in 2014 was on mobile devices).

[98] See Maeve Shearlaw, Egypt Five Years On: Was It Ever a ‘Social Media Revolution’?, Guardian (Jan. 25, 2016, 7:35 AM), [https://perma.cc/PTM8-87PL].

[99] See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/WW7X-6CJB].

[100] See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2012) (“Access to the law — that is, facilitating and delivering legal services — goes to the very heart of First Amendment concerns and values by contributing to Justice Holmes’ marketplace of ideas, acting as a checkpoint on government action, facilitating individual development, and cultivating political discourse.”).

[101] See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

[102] See discussion supra Part I.A.

[103] See supra notes 31 & 70­–74 and accompanying text.

[104] See discussion supra Part IV.A.

[105] See discussion supra Part II.

[106] See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.

[107] See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

[108] See White, supra note 74.

[109] See, e.g., iExit Interstate Exit Guide, [https://perma.cc/E6F3-SRG9] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).

[110] See David Oragui, The Success of Starbucks App: A Case Study, Medium (June 12, 2018), [https://perma.cc/CF39-Q55N] (“Using the geo-location feature, a user can see where the closest Starbucks locations are, the menu at each location, and even place an order that can be ready upon arrival.”).

[111] There are multi-volume treatises devoted to the complex law of driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., Richard E. Erwin. & Leon A. Greenberg, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Civil—Criminal (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 1971).

[112] See A Timeline: The Blockbuster Life Cycle, Forbes (Apr. 7, 2011, 2:23 PM), [https://perma.cc/W28U-GRP9].

[113] See Seth Fiegerman, Netflix Hits 125 Million Subscribers, CNN (Apr. 16, 2018, 6:48 PM), [https://perma.cc/YR8H-4X8L]; Ashley Rodriguez, Ten Years Ago, Netflix Launched Streaming Video and Changed the Way We Watch Everything, Quartz (Jan. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/H4GY-89EC].

[114] See Steven W. Perry & Duren Banks, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 234211, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 – Statistical Tables (2011) (identifying 2,330 state prosecutors’ offices).