Paved in Good Intentions: The Venerable Aims and Unique Vulnerabilities of Purportedly Independent Committees

Introduction

Prior to the Twelfth Amendment’s ratification in 1804, electors for the Electoral College cast two votes for President; the person who would receive the most votes would be named President, the runner-up named Vice President.

The presidential election of 1796, the first contested presidential election, ended in such a manner. Fearing a de facto monarchy or lifetime appointment, President George Washington decided not to run for a third term of office.[1] Then-Vice President John Adams ran alongside then-South Carolina Governor Thomas Pinckney as the Federalist Party’s candidates, while then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and then-Senator Aaron Burr ran as Democratic-Republicans.[2] Adams ascended to the Presidency while Jefferson inherited Adams’s old office; the two highest posts were to be held by persons of different parties with starkly different beliefs.[3]

This election is far from the only instance in which a minority opinion was guaranteed a voice; within the last decade, politicians have deliberately sought to appoint—and in fact have appointed—those in different political camps.[4] More recent nominations had better success of achieving bipartisan cooperation than did “Jefferson [who]—although vice president—did little to inhibit, and in fact encouraged, the growing Republican opposition to the Adams administration.”[5] Currently, myriad federal statutes limit the number of persons of the same political party who can serve on an executive-appointed board, commission, or committee,[6] thereby guaranteeing future iterations of Jefferson’s accidental vice presidency—albeit on a smaller scale—and guarding against “a tyranny of the majority over minority interests.”[7]

But the laudable goals of those statutory guarantees are imperiled for two divergent reasons. First, these statutes simply limit the maximum number of persons affiliated with one political party or with the President’s party who can serve on a committee.[8] They accordingly rely on a series of norms to ensure that the minority view is indeed put forward, allowing a President to subvert these goals with simple maneuvering. Second, and somewhat orthogonally, the political landscape in the United States is changing, with increased polarization and, relatedly, renewed interest in third parties.[9]

Recognizing these changes, this Essay reviews the generic structure of statutes creating purportedly independent committees[10] and discusses its aforementioned vulnerabilities. Thereafter, the Essay offers a novel solution, reinventing committee size and composition to prevent manipulation and ensure proper representation of the country’s views, including those of third parties.

I. The Problem

Congress created myriad executive departments to carry out its various statutory mandates. The President directly controls these departments, which serve at the President’s pleasure. Congress has also created a number of so-called “independent agencies” to neutrally carry out congressional directives independent of the President and related partisan politics, which are often controlled by a committee or commission.[11]

If the goal of these agencies is to implement statutory directives without direct allegiance to the President, one wonders: how is this independence to be created and enforced? To ensure the independence of judges, Article III guarantees life tenure and stable salary.[12] Judges are thus not subject to political whims because they cannot be professionally penalized for their judicial acts.[13]

However, life tenure is a poor approach for staffing administrative agencies. Unlike courts, agencies are designed to possess and apply technical expertise reflecting the current state of knowledge in a given field.[14] Given the need for dynamic growth and adaptation, life tenure would hinder rather than further the overall goals of administrative agencies.

Recognizing this, Congress instead adopted a “light” version of life tenure: agency chairs may only be terminated “for cause,” barring their firing simply based on policy decisions.[15] In addition to for-cause termination, independent agencies also feature a bipartisan requirement, which ensures a seat at the table for those who purportedly disagree with the President. For example, the Federal Communications Commission’s enabling statute provides: “The maximum number of commissioners who may be members of the same political party shall be a number equal to the least number of commissioners which constitutes a majority of the full membership of the Commission.”[16]

Thus, unlike judges, commissioners of independent agencies retain a level of democratic accountability: because they are not tenured for life, commissioners have an interest in remaining in the good graces of their respective political parties to ensure future employment. Relatedly, such agencies are not structured to effectuate pure winner-take-all majoritarian will; instead they are designed to represent a broader spectrum of political views. With these features, such agencies are effectively “independent” of the Executive while remaining accountable to and representative of the public.

While much ink has been spilled discussing the President’s ability to terminate independent commissioners,[17] little has been said about the bipartisanship requirement. This is unsurprising, as the requirement is an unusually straightforward mechanism that may not prompt academic inquiry. But despite its seemingly unambiguous command, the bipartisanship mechanism requires further analysis, as it can neither ensure broader democratic accountability nor prevent majoritarian control. This is so for two independent but closely interrelated reasons.[18]

The first reason is what we call the “enforceability problem.” The bipartisanship requirement creates a limitation on the number of “members of the same political party” as the President.[19] But these statutes provide no guidance to determine whether this requirement has been met in a litigated case; party affiliation could be defined by voter registration, previous presidential vote, previous congressional vote, or any number of other litmus tests. Furthermore, such indicia of partisan alliance—voter registration, latest political vote or donation, etc.—are volitional and thus subject to manipulation.

Additionally, the text of these statutes appears to permit a President to appoint a simple majority of commissioners from her own party and thereafter appoint additional commissioners whose views closely align with hers but identify as independents or members of a non-dominant party. Many Americans do not identify with a political party[20] and, in fact, Presidents have on many occasions appointed self-declared “independents” as agency heads.[21] In sum, the bipartisanship requirement provides inadequate guidance to courts and permits significant gamesmanship.

As a matter of practice, the statutory requirement is executed by a norm overlay in which each political party is entitled to an equal number of seats on an independent commission to be selected by members of the Senate.[22] The President then appoints the chair, supplying the vote to create a simple majority. But no law compels the President to nominate those in the minority. And as is well documented, in recent years, there have been “pervasive[] . . . breaches in ethical norms, especially at the highest levels of government. These breaches threaten to undermine public trust not only in particular officials but also in the integrity of bedrock governmental institutions,”[23] including the independent agencies at issue here.[24] Thus, a judicially enforceable legal structure may be required to preserve minority representation in independent agencies. Such a framework should provide clear guidance about how partisan affiliation should be defined and provide safeguards against gamesmanship by manipulation of the confirmation process.  

The second reason is what we will call the “underinclusiveness problem.” That is, while independent agencies are designed to represent a broader spectrum of political views than the President and executive departments, these commissions in fact represent the views of the two dominant political parties and, moreover, only the views of Senate leaders. Because the minority-viewpoint requirement is a mere bipartisanship requirement, the statutory framework is underinclusive insofar as it ignores the broader spectrum of views not encapsulated in the two dominant political parties as reflected in the Senate. While forced bipartisanship may serve as a counterbalance to the whims of any administration, agency commissions should not simply replicate the political preference of the Senate; they should instead reflect a broader spectrum of the country’s political preferences for how the laws should be executed Moreover, broadening the spectrum of views represented in independent committees will become essential should third parties gain national support that is significant, yet insufficient to secure representation in the legislative branch. [25]

II. The Solution

The purpose of this Essay is not solely to highlight “independent” committees’ flaws; it also offers remediation.[26] It must be said at the outset, though, that no solution is perfect; this Essay does not purport to have the silver bullet. Rather, the goal is to identify laudable principles that could guide legislatures in fashioning a system far superior to the current structure.

A. Committee Composition

There exist two potential options to ensure that independent committees include views other than those of the dominant political party. One option eliminates all partisan affiliation requirements and simply requires a super-majority of senators (60) to consent to a given appointment. Unfortunately, this option likely fails to address concerns identified supra, particularly the “underinclusiveness” problem. A second option reimagines the committee structure altogether, modifying both its size and its political composition. While this is the better overall option, there are many potential variations on how one could redesign the committee. Unfortunately, potential features aimed at addressing one flaw would introduce or exacerbate another, thereby undermining the very purpose of the redesign. Thus, this Essay offers a “Goldilocks” solution, an ideal solution that minimizes the harms laid out without implicating others.

1. Option One: Super-Majority Senate Approval

One solution is simple: require that appointees receive a supermajority of Senate votes to ensure a broader set of viewpoints represented on the committee. Because this would theoretically take non-majoritarian views into account, this approach should allow for a broader spectrum of appointees without a need for formal partisan allocation, thereby solving the “proxy problem.”

While seemingly elegant, this is an imperfect solution. First, if supermajority consent is the only qualification, there would be no safeguard in the event that one party controls sixty seats in the Senate and the White House, something that has occurred within the last decade.[27] Second, in today’s hyper-partisan political reality, if the party in the White House does not also control sixty seats in the Senate, there is a good chance that no nominees are ever passed. This approach could therefore freeze the status quo at arbitrary points in time—when the President’s party does not also hold a supermajority in the Senate.

Further, the supermajority solution is inadequate to address the underinclusiveness problem; it would, at most, reflect the political preferences of a supermajority of senators and simply create committees of mini-Senate replicas and would arguably do nothing to tolerate, let alone encourage, third-party recognition. Thus, supermajority approval, while nice in theory, fails to adequately address the aforementioned concerns.

2. Option Two: Reimagining the Committee Size, Structure

Because the supermajority protection would not achieve its desired aims, independent committees must be recreated to accommodate two important political realities today: increasing support for a third party in American politics[28] and a growing schism between the national popular vote and the Electoral College.[29] Therefore, the committee should be restructured to represent the electorate’s political preferences by apportioning the committee’s seats based on a given party’s national support. To realize this aim, the committee’s size must also be tied to the number of viable parties, with viability based on the percentage of support the party receives at a national level.

This solution minimizes the deficiencies above, providing meaningful definition of the minority views to be represented and broadening the spectrum of represented views. What’s more, this proposal has the added benefit that it will not change the composition of committees today, but provides an adaptable framework to accommodate changes once the landscape indeed shifts.

To be sure, this approach will not lessen the import of political parties as a key source of power. This answer is not perfect, but it is at worst the same as the status quo in which high-ranking members of the dominant political parties select nominees; however, it provides greater upside potential in the event that non-dominant parties generate sufficient support to receive seats on a commission.

B. Party Viability

If committees are to incorporate minority viewpoints so as to remain independent, any political party that receives the support of a substantial portion of the electorate should get its policy position(s) represented. Three questions are bound in that assertion: how does one measure support, how much support is sufficient to entitle a party to representation, and how does partisan affiliation translate into commissioner selection?

1. Measuring Support

To measure support, it would be easy to tabulate the percentage of representatives, senators, governors, or other officeholders affiliated with a party. The more egalitarian metric, however, is the percentage of votes that party’s candidate received in the presidential election. Because of structural biases against third-party candidates, such candidates rarely make it through the legislative electoral process; limiting representation to parties that have obtained elected positions therefore perpetuates these biases and ignores the political preferences of many Americans. Moreover, aligning committee representation to the national popular vote would incentivize would-be third-party voters to come to the polls rather than stay home for sake of defeatism.

More fundamentally, the presidential election represents a voter’s view of how the law should be executed. Preference in a presidential election should therefore better reflect voters’ preferences for the actions of independent committees than would votes for federal legislative or state executive offices.

2. Viability Threshold

The appropriate threshold percentage to entitle a party to a commissioner is a complicated question. If the viability threshold is too high, this enterprise will be for naught because independent committees will remain de facto bipartisan. However, setting the threshold too low risks introducing fringe viewpoints that have failed to gain significant support and do not represent the views of most Americans.[30] Because determining the threshold will involve this intricate balancing, the legislature should determine what level is appropriate.

While it may be counterintuitive to believe that members of Congress would have any willingness to embrace a system that could introduce nonmajor parties into the federal government, it is actually in the best interest of congressional members to endorse this proposal. As discussed supra, the bipartisan committee structure as it exists, implemented by a series of norms, is susceptible to manipulation and gamesmanship across several axes. By addressing the “enforceability problem,” this proposal actually furthers the interests of the majority parties, especially in the short term when there is no viable third-party contender.

3. From Support to Representation

Any party over the determined threshold is entitled to representation on these independent commissions. But, as discussed supra, most indicia of partisan affiliation are subject to manipulation, and relying on an informal process is an inadequate safeguard in a political climate of rapidly deteriorating norms. Therefore, this approach should include a meaningful reasonability standard: a nominee shall be considered a member of a party if there is a reasonable demonstration of affiliation with that party’s belief over time. Such a standard allows for flexibility but empowers a judge to invalidate an appointment when pretext and abuse are present.[31]

C. Committee Size

If the legislature decides who must have a seat at the table to remain independent, a subsequent question is: how big should the table be? The committee’s size should be directly tied to the threshold percentage of a political party such that political representation is proportional on the committee.

Consider a committee that has a fixed size of five seats. If the viability threshold is set at 5%, a party with 6% support is guaranteed one slot, while the other two parties—totaling 94% support—would have to split four seats among them. Leaving committee size and party viability untethered to one another could distort political representation on the committee, undermining the very purpose of this restructuring. Put simply, there would be a significant difference between a party’s popular support and the representation it wields on a committee.[32] Therefore, N, the number of people on the committee, is in some way inversely proportional to T, the threshold amount:

[[{“fid”:”872″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

In real terms, as T gets smaller, N will get larger, and vice versa.

D. The Upshot

The logical conclusion from these observations—that committees’ composition should be proportional to popular political support and that committee size must be tied to the number of viabilities—is twofold. First, the threshold for party viability must be high enough to prevent creating a massive committee but low enough that substantial third parties are not foreclosed representation. Second, the President’s party is no longer guaranteed a majority.

1. Reasonable Thresholds

The math spells out the need for reasonable bounds on thresholds. On one hand, T has a maximum for including a third party at 33.33%: if it were set any higher, a third party would not be mathematically eligible for representation. And if T is set near that mark, third parties will likely be foreclosed representation until they are of equal size and force as the two dominant parties—not exactly an ideal solution to nurture the growth of third parties.

On the other hand, if T is 5%, the committee will be ~20 persons large, a far cry from where most stand today.[33] Even assuming that 5% national support would be a desirable viability threshold, this is simply impracticable. In a government that boasts “hundreds of federal agencies and commissions,”[34] filling so many seats with genuine experts that can adequately represent the interests of the populace is at best unlikely, requiring tens of thousands of families to uproot their lives, move to Washington, and likely cut their income. And even if this were possible, it is doubtful that the government would allocate the funds necessary to pay these new commissions and even a barebones staff.

Even if we could identify the right individuals and staffers, and even if legislatures budgeted for their salaries, there is no guarantee that they would be approved in time to do the job.[35] Adding more to the Senate’s workload without commensurate changes to the Senate rules to expedite voting would mean many of the seats would remain open indefinitely,[36] defeating the very purpose of a larger committee. And, finally, supersized committees would likely be unable to function efficiently and would almost certainly be subject to the same deadlock that plagues the Senate. Therefore, a large committee may simply not be possible.

In sum, T is likely best set between 10 and 25% to accommodate yet another “Goldilocks” problem. Setting T at 20% provides an easy, viable solution for two chief reasons: first, the math is simply more practicable—creating a five-person commission—and thus the solution is more digestible to those suffering from arithmophobia.[37] Second, 20% is simply a reasonable middle ground in the boundaries laid out above—until a third party is thriving and a fourth party begins its ascent, at least.

2. The President’s Party Is Not Guaranteed a Majority

Necessarily, the President’s party would no longer be guaranteed the commission’s majority. Indeed, if the President’s party does not represent the majority opinion, this guarantee undermines fair representation. To this point, a study conducted by National Public Radio estimates that, because of the Electoral College’s peculiarities and because forty-eight states demand that the majority of the state popular vote receives 100% of its Electoral College votes, one could win the Presidency with approximately 23% of the national popular vote.[38] While unlikely, the winner of the Electoral College lost the popular vote twice in the last five presidential elections.[39] Therefore, to maintain genuine representation, the President’s party cannot automatically be granted a majority representation on an odd-numbered committee. Acknowledging that this is inconsistent with any theory of a unitary executive and could be seen as undermining the President’s role in executing the laws of the United States, it should be stressed that this proposal applies only to independent committees. Accepting that such committees should in fact operate independent of the day-to-day machinations of the executive branch, proportional representation rather than presidential control should be the preferable structure.

E. Limiting Principles: Simple Majority

To ensure that this proposal does not result in less diversified commissions, a party’s representation should be capped at a simple majority. Leaving a committee to be purely representative could create a tyranny of the majority: if one party dominates the popular vote, the entire committee would then be members of that party. Skeptics could argue that in the biggest electoral landslide in recent history, Ronald Reagan trounced Walter Mondale. Reagan won forty-nine states but only won 58% of the vote.[40]

Nevertheless, for fear of this hypothetical, and to ensure independent commissions retain moderating forces, this rejiggered committee caps one party’s representation to a simple majority. In the event of such a landslide victory, the excess seats would simply be distributed amongst the minority parties pro rata.[41]

Conclusion

The United States political system has in recent years undergone significant transformation and is on the verge of an even greater sea change. Whether it takes years or decades for the waves to crest is yet to be seen, though continued discord with the two-party system and further norm-breaking suggests we may see white caps on the earlier side of this spectrum. We must therefore (metaphorically) batten down the hatches and solidify the foundations of our institutions while allowing for the flexibility of change. Understandably, pushes for such reform, where forwarded, have focused on institutions such as the Supreme Court.[42] But the administrative state, arguably “the president’s most effective tool for exercising power in domestic affairs,”[43] cannot be overlooked. This Essay charts such a path, explaining the pitfalls of the current structure vis-a-vis undercurrents of norm-breaking and third-party demand. More than that, however, we hope it inspires deeper thinking about adopting analogous structural changes across the government.

 

 


[1] See, e.g., George Washington’s Farewell Address, George Washington’s Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/george-washingtons-farewell-address/ [https://perma.cc/X9CC-FARC] (last visited July 30, 2019) (“Washington feared that if he were to die while in office, Americans would view the presidency as a lifetime appointment.”).

[2] Peter Onuf, Thomas Jefferson: Campaigns and Elections, Miller Ctr., https://miller­center.org/president/jefferson/campaigns-and-elections [https://perma.cc/XS7T-HRXS] (last visited July 30, 2019).

[3] Id.

[4] See, e.g., Ross Cohen, Why Did President Obama Appoint a Republican to Head the FBI?, HuffPost (June 28, 2017, 3:26 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-did-president-oba­ma-appoint-a-republican-to-head_b_­5949ae52e4b0710bea889a4d [https://perma.cc/U5RC-MVM9] (“President Obama liked to be bipartisan as often as he could. He either appointed, or tried to appoint, an unusually high number of Republicans in his administration (e.g. Chuck Hagel, Bob Gates, Judd Gregg, Jon Huntsman, Ray LaHood, Ben Bernanke, David Petraeus, Robert McDonald, John McHugh, Michael Donley, etc.)”); Toby Harnden, Barack Obama to Appoint Republicans to Key Cabinet Roles, Telegraph (Nov. 12, 2008, 6:55 PM), https://­www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barack­obama/3448362/Barack-Obama-to-appoint-Republicans-to-key-cabinet-roles.html [https://­perma.cc/AZ2X-RYY4] (“Obama is planning to appoint Republicans to key positions in his cabinet as part of a new bipartisan approach in Washington.”).

[5] Onuf, supra note 2.

[6] See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (establishing the Securities and Exchange Commis­sion and requiring that “[n]ot more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party”); 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (2012) (establishing the Federal Election Commission and stating that “[n]o more than 3 members of the Commission appointed under this paragraph may be affiliated with the same political party”).

[7] Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975).

[8] See, e.g., supra note 6 (listing examples of committees that limit the number of persons serving on a commission in one political party); 15 U.S.C. § 7107 (2012) (holding that of the 15-person Interagency Committee on Women’s Business Enterprise, “4 shall be . . . members of the same political party as the President” and “4 shall . . . not be members of the same political party as the President”).

[9] More extreme views can give rise to increased demand for a third political party that either encompasses the extreme view or occupies an increasingly-barren middle ground.

[10] This Essay’s conclusions regarding committee structure do not apply to proposals reimagining the Supreme Court’s appointment process. See, e.g., Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court, NBC News (June 3, 2019, 6:03 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttigieg-s-plan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/4C6G-6ZDT]. That process has far different considerations and deserves individualized analysis.

[11] See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111 (2000).

[12] U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”).

[13] However, judges are directed to abide by a code of conduct. Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges Canon 2(B) (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2019) (“A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.”).

[14] See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 342 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.”).

[15] See Breger & Edles, supra note 11, at 1138; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (invalidating dual-layer for-cause removal protection as inconsistent with the executive power of the President); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (upholding constitutionality of for-cause removal protection for Federal Trade Commission commissioner).

[16] 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2012).

[17] See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2013).

[18] A more fundamental problem persists: whether political party affiliation is an adequate proxy for policy preferences. Accepting today’s political system, this Essay does not directly challenge this assumption but seeks to shore up protections against manipulation on the basis of this assumption. Moreover, solutions which attempt to address the “proxy problem” would likely prove infeasible. See infra Subsection II.A.1.

[19] See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2012).

[20] See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Continue to Embrace Political Independence, Gallup (Jan. 7, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/245801/americans-continue-embrace-political-independence.aspx [https://perma.cc/QSR5-2XXD].

[21] See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Importance of Independence, 14th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities and Financial Law Lecture at Fordham Law School (Oct. 3, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/­spch100113mjw [https://perma.cc/GPU6-XG9D]) (chair of an agency self-identifying as an “Independent”).

[22] See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-some­times-in-name-only.html [https://perma.cc/F3HY-WSW4].

[23] Preet Bharara et al., Nat’l Task Force on Rule of L. & Democracy, Proposals for Reform 4 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/TaskForceReport_­2018_09_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JKR-TLRN]. And, indeed, it appears to be the case that “one breach of norms begat another.” Brian Beutler, Republicans Think Capitol Hill’s Rules Are for Suckers, New Republic (Jan. 9, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/139707/rep­ublicans-think-capitol-hills-rules-suckers [https://perma.cc/CM9N-8SVG]. The ways in which norms have been broken are extensive and varied, but exemplars can be found in the judiciary, e.g., Noah Feldman, Opinion, Don’t Pack the Supreme Court, Democrats. You’d Live to Regret It., Bloomberg (Mar. 28, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/­opinion/articles/2019-03-28/supreme-court-packing-would-backfire-on-democrats [https://­perma.cc/5FRC-EEHW] (referring to the failed nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court as “br[ea]k[ing] the existing norms of judicial appointment”); Five Ways the White House and Senate Have Broken the Judicial Confirmation Process, Am. Const. Soc’y: In Brief (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/inbrief/broken-process-an-unprecedented-senate-judicial-nomination-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/X4AF-ZZ5X] (listing five ways in which the Trump Administration and Republican Senate have undermined norms in the judicial confirmation process: lacking advice from home-state senators on appointments, the undermining of the blue slip process, diminishing the importance of ratings from the American Bar Association, insufficient vetting, and significantly cutting hearings for appointees to answer potentially hostile questions). However, we do not feel that enshrining this norm in law is the optimal way to solve the enforceability problem.

[24] Cf. David Dayen, Chuck Schumer Neglected to Name a Democratic Commissioner for the SEC. Now It’s Open Season for Wall Street, Bank Lawyers Crow, Intercept (Mar. 28, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/28/sec-democratic-commissioner-chuck-schumer/ [https://perma.cc/AMR9-QG8L] (“When the Republican nominee, former chief counsel for the Senate Banking Committee Elad Roisman, sailed through the Senate to confirmation in September, it effectively orphaned Lee, giving the Trump administration incentive to slow-walk her nomination, and giving Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell incentive in the future to prevent her from getting a floor vote. This freezes out one of the SEC’s seats, giving Republicans an indefinite 3-1 advantage.”).

[25] Those that would argue that third parties ought not be represented on commissions lest they gain a foothold in Congress fail to see that structural problems with first-past-the-post voting and head-to-head matchups create institutional barriers to entry that commissions can bypass. Commissions should not replicate Congress’s problems.

[26] Cf. President Theodore Roosevelt, The Man in the Arena: Citizenship in a Republic, Address at the Sorbonne, Paris (Apr. 23, 1910), in Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches 778, 781–82 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004) (“It is not the critic who counts . . . . The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena . . . .”).

[27] Gary Price & Tim Norbeck, A Look Back at How The President Was Able to Sign Obamacare into Law Four Years Ago, Forbes (Mar. 26, 2014, 1:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2014/03/26/a-look-back-at-how-the-pre­sident-was-able-to-sign-obamacare-into-law-four-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/KX3C-R5KE] (“Now the Democrats had a safe majority in the House and a filibuster-proof supermajority of 60 in the Senate.”).

[28] Lee Drutman, How Much Longer Can the Two-Party System Hold?, Vox (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/9/17/17870478/two-party-system-electoral-reform [https://perma.cc/D7G8-P2X2] (noting that demand for a third party sits at “68 percent . . . the highest in at least 25 years”).

[29] See, e.g., Daniel Ura, Coalition to Change Electoral College Votes Grows Closer to 270-Vote Mark, United Press Int’l. (June 13, 2019, 6:25 AM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/­US/2019/06/13/Coalition-to-change-Electoral-College-votes-grows-closer-to-270-vote-ma­rk/6361560294210/ (noting that two of the five instances in which a candidate won the popular vote but lost the Electoral College occurred recently and that such results have spurred increased demand to bypass the Electoral College by way of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact).

[30] One may argue that this whole proposal risks substituting nonpartisan moderate com­missioners for third-party extremists. However, that argument depends on a series of assumptions about the nature of the two dominant political parties in the coming decades and about the type of third party that may emerge and, ultimately, garner substantial public support. More importantly, refusing a potential ideological extremist a seat at the table, we feel, would be a far greater evil than undermining democratic principles of representation.

[31] A more straightforward standard may theoretically be beneficial, but may be a constitutionally dubious encroachment of the President’s appointment power.

[32] Admittedly, no solution will be perfect. Even today’s five-person commissions hold an imbalance; five-person committees in a country that is split 50.1%–49.9% would consist of three and two members of each respective party, a 60-40 split resulting in representation disproportionate by 19.8%. Perfection, however, cannot be the enemy of progress.

[33] See generally Christopher M. Davis & Michael Greene, Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations 13, 33–34, 48 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30959.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XKS-KAMT] (noting that only a handful of commissions or boards have over 20 members, including the National Institute of Building Sciences’ Board of Directors (21 members), the National Science Board (24), National Museum and Library Services Board (20), National Science Foundation (24), National Council on the Arts (25), and the National Council on the Humanities (27)).

[34] Our Government: Federal Agencies & Commissions, White House, https://www.white­house.gov/about-the-white-house/federal-agencies-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/5B9P-42­YS] (last visited July 30, 2019).

[35] The Senate, the “world’s greatest deliberative body,” The Idea of the Senate, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/idea_of_the_senate/1842Clay.htm [https://perma.cc/GL6F-NUA3] (last visited July 30, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted), does not meet every day; their votes are lumbering, and there are already “approximately between 1,200 and 1,400 [executive branch] positions” that require the Senate’s advice and consent. Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s Confirmation Process, and Changes Made in the 112th Congress 7 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41872.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HLA-CQ5R].

[36] Not to mention the current administration’s penchant for leaving positions open. Cf. Amanda Becker, Trump Says Acting Cabinet Members Give Him ‘More Flexibility,’ Reuters (Jan. 6, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-cabinet/trump-says-acting-cabinet-members-give-him-more-flexibility-idUSKCN1P00IG [https://perma.cc/77­Y8-92HS] (reporting that President Trump appreciates that non-confirmed acting department heads afford him “more flexibility,” though without explanation).

[37] A fear of math, common for those in law and politics.

[38] Danielle Kurtzleben, How to Win The Presidency with 23 Percent of The Popular Vote, NPR (Nov. 2, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/02/500112248/how-to-win-the-presidency-with-27-percent-of-the-popular-vote [https://perma.cc/3TLN-T8D6].

[39] Tara Law, These Presidents Won the Electoral College — But Not the Popular Vote, Time (May 15, 2019), https://time.com/5579161/presidents-elected-electoral-college/ [https:­//perma.cc/WRT7-GD77].

[40] See Presidential Elections 1972–2008, Voting America: United States Politics, 1840–2008, https://dsl.richmond.edu/voting/preselections.html [https://perma.cc/Q8ZG-J6WG] (last visited July 30, 2019).

[41] As it currently stands, committees often share terms that extend beyond a President’s term—another mechanism to encourage bipartisan cooperation. To match committees to presidential votes, the commissioners’ terms would necessarily need to be adjusted to match the President’s term.

[42] See, e.g., Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, Politico (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/QJ6F-5TEB].

[43] M. Anthony Mills, Deconstructing the Administrative State, RealClearPolicy (June 29, 2017), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2017/06/29/deconstructing_the_administra­tive_state_110284.html [https://perma.cc/4XM2-R3T5].

Self-Policing: Dissemination and Adoption of Police Eyewitness Policies in Virginia

Introduction

Professional policing organizations and agencies increasingly emphasize the importance of law enforcement adopting clear and comprehensive written policies and procedures, as well as accompanying training and supervision.[1] The focus on adoption of written policy has been particularly urgent in high profile areas like the use of deadly force, in which federal consent decrees have resulted in extremely detailed written policies.[2]  The adoption of written policy has traditionally been far less common in the area of police evidence-gathering.[3] However, in recent years, professional policing organizations have emphasized the role of best practices in policing, including in areas such as eyewitness identifications in which patrol guides traditionally did not offer detailed guidance.[4] There is very little regulation of police, however, and state law itself rarely sets out practices that police should follow. Police must self-police: police organizations must themselves draft and disseminate policy. One pressing question is whether states or other actors, such as accreditation organizations, can disseminate model policies to promote adoption, particularly where there are so many smaller police agencies. This Essay describes a success story: one that suggests self-policing can occur under the right conditions.

One pressing area in which police policies had lagged was that of eyewitness procedures, where national policing organizations have strongly recommended the adoption of improved practices,[5] but at the same time, national surveys have found highly uneven adoption of those best practices.[6] Those best practices are extremely important. As the National Research Council explained in a landmark 2014 report summarizing the scientific research in the area of human visual memory, “it is well known that eyewitnesses make mistakes and that their memories can be affected by various factors including the very law enforcement procedures designed to test their memories.”[7] In particular, the hundreds of DNA exonerations in recent years, the vast majority of which involved eyewitness misidentifications, have brought home the malleability and fragility of eyewitness memory. DNA testing has resulted in the reversal of high-profile wrongful convictions, which have made the consequences of eyewitness misidentifications and poor police procedures particularly clear. In a book, I set out the results of a study of the role eyewitness evidence played in trials of the first 250 DNA exonerees.[8] Over two-thirds of those exonerees had been convicted based on eyewitness misidentifications, and most had been misidentified following the use of suggestive law enforcement identification procedures.[9]

In this Essay, I present the results of studies used to assess the adoption of eyewitness identification policies in Virginia, a state in which prior guidance was very thin. Law enforcement agencies were required in 2005 to adopt a written policy, but they were free to adopt any policy of their choosing.[10]  All of the over-300 law enforcement agencies in Virginia had their policies on this subject requested, using the state freedom of information law. While, as of 2005, agencies were only required to have some written policy in place, over time, particularly beginning in 2011, the state law enforcement policy agency supplied detailed model policy on eyewitness procedure. One reason  policymakers were focusing on this problem was that Virginia experienced a series of DNA exonerations in cases involving eyewitness misidentifications; as of 2013, thirteen of sixteen DNA exonerations in Virginia had involved eyewitness misidentifications.[11] Nevertheless, as reported in an earlier 2013 study, those model practices were only being haltingly adopted.[12] In particular, many agencies did not have blind or blinded lineups, in which the administrator does not know which photo is that of the suspect or cannot view which photo the eyewitness is examining. A substantial body of basic research examines how humans perceive images and form visual memory. That research has been complemented by applied research in the area of eyewitness identification. This research has resulted in a large body of knowledge concerning how to test visual memory accurately, including face identification, and a set of best practices that are recommended to test and preserve the memory of an eyewitness.[13] Scientists have emphasized that the use of blinding is “central to the scientific method because it minimizes the risk that experimenters might inadvertently bias the outcome of their research, finding only what they expected to find.”[14] Thus, blinding is essential to any objective factfinding.

Five years later, in 2018, we re-surveyed agencies and found that there is now extensive dissemination and widespread adoption of the state model policy. Specifically, the vast majority of agencies have adopted blinded policies, clear instructions to eyewitnesses, guidelines for selecting fillers for lineups, recording of confidence statements, and many agencies require videotaping of lineup procedures. Those improved eyewitness identification practices have been adopted by the vast majority of agencies over the past five years.

Part I discusses the law and science of eyewitness memory and the legislative and policy background in Virginia. Part II presents the findings of this study. This study, while it examines each of the features of the lineup policies adopted in Virginia, focuses first on the adoption of blind or blinded procedures. As described, such adoption occurred in less than half of the surveyed agencies in 2013, but by 2018, there had been a remarkable change, and the overwhelming majority had adopted blind or blinded procedures. Part III discusses why this change may have occurred and the implications of this experience in Virginia for future efforts to improve police practices.

I. Legislative and Policy Background

A. The Law and Science of Eyewitness Memory

That eyewitness memory can be highly unreliable in police investigations has been a staple of criminal procedure for centuries. As the U.S. Supreme Court has put it, “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”[15] However, the Supreme Court has not regulated police identification procedures in response to this well-known problem. Instead, the Court has set out broad and quite deferential rules that potentially exclude as evidence unnecessarily suggestive identifications, as a constitutional matter, leaving regulation of eviden­tiary questions largely to state courts or to police agencies in the first instance.[16]

Thus, as the National Research Council has suggested, “[t]he best guidance for legal regulation of eyewitness identification evidence comes not from constitutional rulings, but from the careful use and understanding of scientific evidence to guide fact-finders and decision-makers.”[17] Police officers use a variety of different procedures to ask an eyewitness to identify a culprit, including: (1) showups; (2) photo arrays; (3) live lineups; and (4) mugshots and computer presentations of photos in which there is no designated suspect.[18] In a showup, which usually occurs at or near the crime location and shortly after the crime occurred, officers present a single, live suspect to a witness.[19] In photo arrays, officers present the eyewitness with a series of photographs, one of which is the suspect, and the others called “fillers,” or known non-suspects.[20] Live lineups, in which the suspect and fillers are presented in person to an eyewitness, are less commonly used.[21] Additional procedures may be used in which officers do not have a suspect. If so, officers may show mug books or sets of photographs to see if the eyewitness can identify a suspect, or they may ask the eyewitness to help prepare a composite image or drawing of a culprit.[22]

In scientific terms, the procedures used to test eyewitness memory should take account of both estimator variables and system variables.[23] Both types of variables can affect the memory of an eyewitness.[24] Estimator variables are factors relating to the conditions of the crime-scene viewing, such as the lighting, the eyewitness’s eyesight, familiarity with the perpetrator, or race.[25] Studies have shown that individuals display an “own-race bias,” or a greater difficulty identifying persons of a different race.[26] Estimator variables cannot be controlled by law enforcement.[27] In contrast, system variables are factors associated with the procedures that officers use to obtain identifications by an eyewitness.[28] System variables can be controlled by law enforcement.[29]

The National Research Council report made quite clear its recommendation that blind or blinded lineups should be used by law enforcement.[30] This recommendation is based upon decades of research in a number of fields on the ways in which the expectations of an administrator can bias subjects, including through inadvertent means of communication. “Even when lineup administrators scrupulously avoid comments that could identify which person is the suspect, unintended body gestures, facial expressions, or other nonverbal cues have the potential to inform the witness of his or her location in the lineup or photo array.”[31] By contrast, “[t]he ‘blinded’ procedure minimizes the possibility of either intentional or inadvertent suggestiveness and thus enhances the fairness of the criminal justice system.”[32]

The National Research Council report also highlighted that agencies should adopt standard instructions for eyewitnesses.[33] Those instructions should inform the eyewitness that a culprit may or may not be present in the lineup.[34] That instruction is crucial because an eyewitness otherwise may expect that the culprit will be present and that there is a correct choice that should be made. Showups should be limited in their use.[35] Such an instruction can still be given before conducting a showup, and agencies should have standard instructions and procedures to avoid undue suggestion in showup procedures.[36] The confidence of the eyewitness should be documented, preferably through a recording of the entire eyewitness identification procedure.[37] Standard procedures should use terminology that is easily understandable by eyewitnesses.[38] There should be clear rules on the number and selection of fillers for lineups.[39] There are a number of state statutes and model policies that provide useful models for agencies,[40] as well as a recent update to the White Paper by the American Psychology-Law Society that summarizes the state of the research on eyewitness identification procedures.[41]

B. Virginia Regulation of Eyewitness Identifications

In 2005, the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation requiring that police adopt some form of written eyewitness identification procedure.[42] DCJS had in place, from 1993 through 2005, an extremely brief model policy on eyewitness identification.[43] The new 2005 legislation was accompanied by a more detailed model policy.[44] However, the 2005 model policy did not include instructions on how to effectively “blind” a lineup by presenting photos in folders, held by the eyewitness so they cannot be seen by the administrator, without the need to obtain an administrator who is unfamiliar with the investigation. The folder-shuffle method is an inexpensive and practical solution to the problem of blinding; in addition, agencies can use computerized administration of eyewitness identification procedures.[45] In addition, the 2005 model policy had mandated sequential policies, but only made blind administration optional.[46] A 2010 survey by the Virginia State Crime Commission found that at least twenty-five percent of agencies responding to the survey still had no policy on the subject, despite enactment of that legislation five years earlier requiring that written procedures be adopted (and presumably even more agencies not responding lacked policies).[47]

C. The 2011 DCJS Model Policy

In Virginia, a new state model policy was adopted by the Department of Criminal Justice Services (“DCJS”) in 2011 in response to a series of DNA exonerations caused by eyewitness misidentifications, as well as concern with the slow pace of adoption of best practices.[48] The DCJS model policy is not only quite detailed but also flexible, as it is designed to be operationalized by agencies of different sizes and resources. The policy reflects each of the best practices highlighted in the National Research Council report (although it pre-dates that report). 

Importantly, the DCJS model policy states that all eyewitness identification procedures should be conducted blind, by an officer who does not know which photo is that of the suspect, or blinded, so that the administrator cannot tell whether the eyewitness is examining the suspect photo.[49] To respond to the concern raised by smaller agencies, that it is not always practically possible to spare an additional officer unfamiliar with the suspect’s identity, the DCJS model policy sets out the “folder shuffle” method.[50] That method provides a way to inexpensively make a procedure blind (and sequential) by placing the photos in folders and shuffling them, with several blanks at the end. The eyewitness can open the folders and examine the photos inside, without the administrator seeing what the eyewitness is viewing. In addition to requiring blind or blinded procedures, the 2011 DCJS model policy also sets out consistent instructions to eyewitnesses, requires careful documentation of the confidence and statements by the eyewitness, and encourages both audio and video recordings to be made of the entire identification procedure.[51] These procedures were far more detailed than the prior model policy, and they provide a comprehensive model for agencies of all sizes.[52] In 2014, minor revisions were made to the model policy, largely to clarify the folder method procedures.[53]

D. The 2013 Study of Virginia Lineup Procedures

A spring 2013 study of lineup procedures in Virginia found that despite the passage of additional time since the model policy had been promulgated and disseminated to agencies throughout the state, many agencies still were not adopting the model policy, and crucially, were not conducting lineups blind or blinded.[54] Of the 201 agencies that responded to either the survey or the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests, 145 supplied eyewitness identification policies.[55] “Troubling findings included that in total, only 40%, or 58 of 144 policies,” provided by responding agencies, “required blind lineup procedures or made them available as an option.”[56] Only 6% of agencies that provided policies had adopted the entire model policy disseminated by DCJS.[57] “[O]f the 144 eyewitness identification policies reviewed, 29% or 42 policies required blind lineup procedures. Ten more required that blind lineups be used where practicable.”[58] Six more provided that blind lineups be available as an optional practice.[59]

Regarding the folder shuffle method, “[o]nly 9 agencies described the folder shuffle method as an option.”[60] The folder shuffle method was fairly new and had been first recommended, as noted, in the 2011 DCJS model policy as a way for small agencies to effectively blind a lineup procedure.[61] “Instead, far more common were policies that were sequential, but not blind: two-thirds or 63% of the departments required or offered sequential lineups (91 of 144).”[62] Those policies may have made lineups even less reliable, since a sequential policy introduces more interaction between the administrator and the eyewitness, since each picture is shown one at time; a non-blind sequential policy may give greater cause to fear that suggestion can contaminate the results.[63]

Further, “[o]nly 88 of 144 departments had required standard instructions [to the eyewitness] as a matter of policy.”[64] Only “[a]bout half, or 71 of 144 agencies’ policies, required taking a confidence statement of some kind using the eyewitnesses’ own words. Those that did require taking a confidence statement often did not detail how that should occur.”[65] Most (63%) had sequential policies; however, 23% had sequential but not blind policies.[66] As noted, such policies may be even more vulnerable to suggestion than policies that had previously been in place. And 41 agencies (mostly sheriffs’ offices that may not conduct investigations in which identification procedures would be used) responded that they did not have eyewitness identification policies.[67]

II. Results of the 2018 Study of Virginia Eyewitness Identification Policies

In fall 2018, every policing agency in Virginia was mailed a FOIA request for all eyewitness identification policies.[68] In 2018, 193 agencies supplied policies, which constituted a much higher response rate than to the FOIA requests made for the 2013 study. An additional 40 agencies responded that they do not conduct investigations and do not have a policy—or simply do not have a policy.

Blind and blinded lineups. Of those that did supply policies, 158 agencies had blind policies, with just 30 of the 159 saying that they conduct lineups blind only where it is practicable to do so. Just 22 agencies did not provide for blind or blinded lineups. Compare these figures to those in 2013, where only 58 policies required or made optional blind or blinded lineup policies.[69] While 166 agencies use sequential lineups, just a handful of agencies use sequential but not blind policies.

Folder method. In another major change from the 2013 study, in 2018, 129 agencies had adopted policies that use the folder method or made it available as an option when there is not an independent officer available to conduct the photo array procedure. Compare these figures to those in 2013, where only 9 policies included the folder shuffle option, indicating that smaller agencies were not aware of the DCJS recommendations to make blinded lineups feasible at low cost.[70]

Sequential lineups. Almost without exception, they required sequential as well (the problem had been with those that were sequential but not blind). Moreover, in 2013, there were 51 agencies, out of 144 responding that had extremely brief policies, many dating back to a rudimentary 1993 model policy, which were only a few paragraphs long and included no meaningful operational instructions.[71]

Instructions to witnesses. In 2013, many agencies did not have policies detailing instructions to be given to eyewitnesses; only 88 of 144 policies surveyed at that time included such guidance in policies.[72] In 2018, in contrast, this was nearly universal. Of the 193 policies obtained, 167 had policies on instructions to eyewitnesses, 168 had in their policies requirements and instructions on obtaining confidence statements from eyewitnesses,[73] and 166 had a required statement from the administrator to the eyewitness that the suspect may or may not be present.

Fillers. Almost all of the policies had language indicating that fillers should resemble the suspect and stating how many filler photos should be included in a lineup; 171 of the 193 policies included policies on fillers.

Recording. Regarding electronic recording of eyewitness identification procedures, another important change since 2013 was that 76 required videotaping and 42 additional agencies required audio. In 2013, only 25 agencies made recording an option.[74] This marks a dramatic shift towards electronic recording of eyewitness identification procedures.

The figure below displays a comparison as between the 2013 and 2018 findings, displaying the number of agencies adopting each type of procedure.

Figure 1. Virginia Lineup Policies, 2013 and 2018

[[{“fid”:”868″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

One important question was whether different agencies responded to the FOIA requests in 2018 as compared to 2013, which could explain the very different patterns observed in the policies. Of the 87 that did not have blind policies in 2013, most of those agencies, 50 of them, have since changed and adopted blind policies. Only 13 have remained the same, and continue not to use blind eyewitness identification policies. It was 23 of those agencies that did not have blind policies that did not respond to the 2018 survey. Nine agencies responding for the first time to the new 2018 survey, which did not respond in 2013, have non-blind policies.

DCJS Model Policy adoption. This change marks a near universal adoption of the 2011 DCJS model policy, with its revisions, by Virginia law enforcement agencies. Not all of these policies include verbatim all of the language from the DCJS model policy, but many of these agencies have recently adopted policies that use much of the DCJS language. Only a handful of agencies, in 2018, still had such cursory and problematic policies, which is also a very important change.

III. Implications for Future Efforts to Improve Police Practices

By 2018, the vast majority of Virginia residents lived in jurisdictions in which best practices regarding eyewitness identifications had been adopted. The larger agencies, with one exception, have all adopted these best practices. As a result, of the 8.5 million Virginia residents, only 9% or about 740,000 people, lived in jurisdictions that have not adopted these policies. Of the 126 accredited agencies in Virginia, only six very small agencies did not adopt the DCJS model policy in substance.[75]

What changed between 2013 and 2018? A combination of efforts by policing organizations, dissemination between agencies, regional training by DCJS, media coverage in response to the 2013 study, and involvement of the Crime Commission, all may have helped to drive this change. There was some media attention to the 2013 survey findings, and in response, some agencies stated that they planned to update their policies.[76] There was legislation introduced in 2014 to require that agencies conform to the DCJS model policy, but it was tabled in the committee in which it was introduced.[77] The introduction of that draft legislation may have had some limited impact.

The involvement of professional policing organizations was also crucial to the success of these efforts. Executive Director Dana Schrad of the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police worked with police chiefs, following the prior survey, to assess efforts to revise policies.[78] As noted, almost all accredited agencies later adopted these policies, at least among responding agencies. The Virginia accrediting organization added additional language regarding content of eyewitness identification policies.[79]  Meanwhile, DCJS led new efforts to conduct training on the DCJS policy and made agencies aware of its provisions. The DCJS policy was modestly revised to respond to agencies’ questions about the meaning of certain provisions. Observers noted that successful implementation of the DCJS model policy in small jurisdictions “should be persuasive” to other small departments.[80] Agencies seemed to pass on information about the issue through word of mouth and sharing best practices. In addition, accrediting agencies, policing associations, insurance providers, and lawmakers remained interested in the problem and continued to make agencies aware of the need to pay attention to the issue.

Conclusion

The results of this survey give reason to be more optimistic that policing agencies, even in jurisdictions with large numbers of fairly small agencies, can adopt best practices in a consistent fashion, at least if sustained efforts are made to engage with agencies. In 2013, based on the results of the survey of Virginia lineup policies, I suggested that due to institutional inertia, not policy choices, there was far too slow a pace of adoption of best practices. At the time, it appeared that stronger regulatory measures might be needed to safeguard the accuracy of criminal investigations. However, five years later, the evidence suggests that policing institutions can slowly come to adopt best practices, without such stronger regulatory measures. A combination of training, growing awareness, media coverage, and sharing of information between agencies, may have resulted in a real statewide improvement of practices: self-policing was successful in adoption of improved police policy. These results suggest that close work—with professional policing organizations, policymakers, accreditation bodies, and police agencies themselves—can be an effective way to shape law enforcement policy through self-policing.

 


[1] See, e.g., Police Exec. Research Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force (2016), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4­TQ-LZP7] (recommending policy for police use of force); President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 19–20 (2015) [hereinafter President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing], https://­cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PL3-94FY] (emph­asizing that law enforcement agencies “should have comprehensive policies” on issues such as the use of force as well as policies that are “reflective of community values”).

[2] Brandon L. Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 Va. L. Rev. 211 (2017) (describing federal consent decrees and analyzing the text of use of force policies adopted by major law enforcement agencies). For an example of a state law requiring agencies to adopt written policies regarding certain areas, including use of force, see, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 2803-B (2015).

[3] See Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1993).

[4] The International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) has taken an active role in promoting consideration of ways to improve the “accuracy and thoroughness” of police investigations. Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, National Summit on Wrongful Convictions: Building a Systemic Approach to Prevent Wrongful Convictions 10 (2013), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/IACP-Wrongful_Convictions_Summit_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY7P-3JCQ].

[5] See, e.g., Va. State Crime Comm’n, HB 207: Law Enforcement Lineups 15 (2010), http://­vscc.virginia.gov/documents/2010/law_lineups.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV4H-9AVD] (refer­encing CALEA’s Law Enforcement Policy 42.2.11 as a model policy); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tech. Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement iii (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf [https://perma.cc/­U2CG-XQ57]; Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Model Policy: Eyewitness Identification (2016) [hereinafter IACP], https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/EyewitnessIDPolicy­2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRL2-CXJS].

[6] Many agencies have policies that are decades out of date, or they have no written policies at all. See, e.g., Police Exec. Research Forum, A National Survey of Eyewitness Identification Procedures in Law Enforcement Agencies 46–47, 89 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/­pdffiles1/nij/grants/242617.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AM3-QT44].

[7] Nat’l Research Council, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 1 (2014) [hereinafter Nat’l Research Council].

[8] Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 9, 48 (2011).

[9] Id. at 49.

[10] Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-390.02 (West 2005).

[11] Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Virginia Case Study, 2 Va. J. Crim. L. 1, 7–8 (2014) (describing examples of misidentifications from Virginia DNA exonerations). Similarly, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (“DCJS”) noted in their model policy that “[t]en of thirteen DNA exonerations in Virginia involved eyewitness misidentifications. Few cases in Virginia have been suitable for DNA testing, since the policy until the last decade was that crime scene evidence would be destroyed post-conviction. Those Virginia eyewitness identifications involved suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification procedures.” Va. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Services, Model Policy on Eyewitness Identification, General Order 2-39, at 1 (2014) [hereinafter DCJS 2014 Model Policy]. Note that the author served on a Virginia Crime Commission task force that informed the revision of this DCJS model policy.

[12] See Garrett, supra note 11 (presenting a study of Virginia law enforcement policies, of which few complied with state model policy on lineup procedures).

[13] See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council, supra note 7, at 103–09.

[14] Id. at 106.

[15] United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).

[16] Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). The “reliability” factors adopted by the Court in Manson, having been already set out in its earlier ruling in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972), ask that the judge examine: (1) the eyewitness’s opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the crime; (2) the eyewitness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the description that the eyewitness gave of the criminal; (4) the eyewitness’s level of certainty at the time of the identification procedure; and (5) the length of time that had elapsed between the crime and the identification procedure. Manson, 432 U.S. at 98–99. The Court did not assign any particular weight to these various factors. The Supreme Court more recently has held that when unreliability in eyewitness identifications is not due to intentional police action, it is not regulated under the Due Process Clause at all. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012). The Justices in Perry stated that the Court did “not doubt either the importance or the fallibility of eyewitness identifications,” but held that state legislation, evidence law, and safeguards such as expert testimony and jury instructions should be relied on to ensure the accurate presentation of eyewitness evidence. Id. at 245–46. A large body of scientific research has called into question the validity of many of the Supreme Court’s so-called “reliability” factors. For scholarly criticism in light of the social-science research, see, e.g., Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 Wyo. L. Rev. 189, 196–202 (2006); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 118–22 (2006); Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. & Hum. Behav. 1, 16 (2009).

[17] See Nat’l Research Council, supra note 7, at 5; see also President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note 1, at 23 (recommending adoption of identification procedures “that implement scientifically supported practices that eliminate or minimize presenter bias or influence”).

[18] See DCJS 2014 Model Policy, supra note 11, at 2–3.

[19] See id. at 4–5.

[20] See IACP, supra note 5, at 1.

[21] See Gary L. Wells et al., Policy and Procedure Recommendations for the Col­lection and Preservation of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, at 11–12 (forth­coming 2020), http://ap-ls.wildapricot.org/resources/Documents/Feb42019EWwhi­tepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3­YH-G5L8].

[22] A recent draft White Paper describes the state of scientific research on eyewitness identification procedures. Id.

[23] Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1546 (1978) (first coining the terms “estimator” and “system” variables).

[24] Id. at 1548.

[25] Id. at 1548–50.

[26] See Nat’l Research Council, supra note 7, at 96.

[27] Wells, supra note 23, at 1548.

[28] See id. at 1552–55.

[29] Id. at 1552.

[30] Nat’l Research Council, supra note 7, at 3.

[31] Id. at 106.

[32] Id. at 107.

[33] Id. at 3.

[34] Id. at 107.

[35] See id. at 26–27.

[36] See id.

[37] See id. at 108–09.

[38] Id. at 107.

[39] See id. at 26–27.

[40] See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.83 (West 2010); Va. State Crime Comm’n, HB 207: Law Enforcement Lineups 15 (2010), http://vscc.virginia.gov/documents/2010/law_lineups.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV4H-9AVD] (referencing CALEA’s Law Enforcement Policy 42.2.11 as a model policy); IACP, supra note 5; DCJS 2014 Model Policy, supra note 11.

[41] See Wells et al., supra note 21.

[42] Virginia Code § 19.2-390.02 (West 2005) states: “Policies and procedures for law enforcement to conduct in-person and photo lineups—The Department of State Police and each local police department and sheriff’s office shall establish a written policy and procedure for conducting in-person and photographic lineups.”

[43] See Va. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Services, Report on the Law Enforcement Lineup Policy Survey and Review, General Order 2-1, at 26 (2012), https://web.archive.org/­web/20150915001917/http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/research/documents/LawEnforceLineup_final.pdf [hereinafter Lineup Policy Survey].

[44] See id., General Order 2-39, at 20–25.

[45] See Nat’l Resource Council, supra note 7, at 107.

[46] See Va. State Crime Comm’n, HB 207: Law Enforcement Lineups 8 (2010), http://vs­cc.virginia.gov/documents/2010/law_lineups.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV4H-9AVD].

[47] See id. at 18.

[48] Va. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Services, Model Policy on Eyewitness Identification, General Order 2-39, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter DCJS 2011 Model Policy] (on file with Virginia Law Review Association). 

[49] Id. at 6–7.

[50] Id. at 5–6.

[51] Id. at 9–11.

[52] See Lineup Policy Survey, supra note 43, General Order 2-1, at 26.

[53] See DCJS 2014 Model Policy, supra note 11, at 5–7.

[54] Garrett, supra note 11, at 15–16. “A DCJS follow-up survey of 267 law enforcement agencies in September 2011 created additional new cause for concern,” since it “indicated that most departments still had not adopted best practices.” That survey was conducted shortly after the new model policy took effect. Id. at 13.

[55] Id. at 6.

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] Id. at 15.

[59] Id.

[60] Id. at 17.

[61] See DCJS 2011 Model Policy, supra note 48, at 5. 

[62] Garrett, supra note 11, at 17.

[63] See id. at 17–18.

[64] Id. at 20.

[65] Id. at 21.

[66] Id. at 17.

[67] Id. at 14–15.

[68] Part II analysis is derived from data collected by the author. Brandon L. Garrett, VA Eyewitness Policies Data Set (2019) (on file with author).

[69] Garrett, supra note 11, at 15.

[70] Id. at 17.

[71] Id. at 18.

[72] Id. at 20.

[73] In 2013, only half of the agencies required taking a confidence statement from an eyewitness. Id. at 21.

[74] Id.

[75] I am grateful to Gary Dillon for his assistance with this analysis.

[76] See, e.g., Jordan Fifer, Lineup Policies Slow to Catch On, Roanoke Times, (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.roanoke.com/news/virginia/lineup-policies-slow-to-catch-on/article_98­95c72d-c5b5-5f9c-8b80-10c12b9b8f0c.html [https://perma.cc/XD77-FGLE] (describing how agencies were in the process of updating their policies).

[77] See H.D. 805, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014).

[78] See Fifer, supra note 76.

[79] See Va. Law Enf’t Prof’l Standards Comm’n, Virginia Law Enforcement Accreditation Program Manual 26, 54–55 (2016), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/­files/publications/law-enforcement/virginia-law-enforcement-accreditation-program-man­ual.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4KL-PSM6]. In Virginia, agencies may be accredited through the Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission. See Va. Law Enf’t Prof’l Standards Comm’n, About VLEPSC, http://vlepsc.org/wp/?page_id=96 [https://per­ma.cc/H7PZ-FBWV] (last visited July 18, 2019).

[80] Karen L. Bune, Virginia Pushes a ‘Best Practice’ Model for Suspect Lineups, PoliceOne.com (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.policeone.com/chiefs-sheriffs/articles/6493783-Virginia-pushes-a-best-practice-model-for-suspect-lineups/ [https://perma.cc/YE5T-LXH3].

The Future is Almost Here: Inaction is Actually Mistaken Action

Professor Ryan Calo has written a response to our article appearing in the current issue of the Virginia Law Review, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era,[1] in which we develop the proposition that the United States is on the verge of a new era in transportation, requiring a new legal regime. As many commentators have noted, over the coming decades, there will be a revolution in driving, as manually-driven cars are replaced by automated vehicles (AVs).[2] There will then be a radically new world of auto accidents: most accidents will be caused by cars, not by drivers.

In a world of accidents dominated by AVs, current tort doctrine, in our view, will be anachronistic and obsolete. We present a proposal for a more effective system, adopting strict manufacturer responsibility for auto accidents. We call this system Manufacturer Enterprise Responsibility, or “MER.” In describing and developing our proposal for MER, we present a detailed, extensively analyzed approach that would promote deterrence and compensation more effectively than continued reliance on tort in the coming world of auto accidents.[3] MER would be a manufacturer-financed, strict responsibility bodily injury compensation system, administered by a fund created through assessments levied on AV manufacturers.

Professor Calo does not disagree with the framework of our proposal—which he describes as “sensible and well thought out”[4]—but takes a different tack: arguing that legal scholarship, such as our proposal, has limited capacity to anticipate the future of unfolding law and technology. Here, we respond to his main points.

We agree with Professor Calo’s opening supposition that proposing policymaking about issues that may take decades to become ripe may well be like imagining, in the 1950s, what it would be like to commute to Mars. But this analogy is seriously misleading, because AVs are already on the roads being tested. It is as if we were already traveling to Mars on an experimental basis, with routine trips back and forth being planned for the near future. We cannot afford to wait and see what the future brings over a period of decades; a world in which there are privately owned AVs being operated on highways and city streets is just over the horizon. The failure to do something about that is not the equivalent of keeping our policymaking powder dry. Similarly, Professor Calo’s caution that AVs represent a “qualitatively distinct affordance”[5]—both in vehicle design (absence of steering wheels, gas and brake pedals, and so on), and traffic patterns (of commuting and congestion)—has no bearing on the fact that vehicular injuries will still occur, even if in reduced number, which will need to be addressed by accident law.

In this regard, the current liability regime will apply to AVs unless affirmative steps are taken to adopt a different regime. Given the distinct issues and problems that accidents involving AVs will pose, products liability law will be making a “sweeping intervention[],”[6] to reference Professor Calo’s cautionary note, into the world of AV accidents, whether we like it or not. The question is whether we simply let that happen even though we can predict that passively allowing this intervention will have negative consequences, or we devise an intervention that will have more positive consequences than watching as the current system is less and less capable of handling AV accidents. This leaves us with two options.  We could let the transition take place and watch our current system become less and less capable of handling the new regime, or we can devise an intervention that addresses the challenges we will face. As our article indicates, the serious difficulties posed at present in design defects cases will be greatly exacerbated in assigning liability in conventional products liability terms in the context of the esoterica of safety-generating algorithms and machine learning.[7]

It may be, as Professor Calo imagines, that Google and Uber, rather than auto manufacturers, will become the central players in developing AVs. But some entity will still have to make the vehicles, and they will consist of both software developed by the Googles and Ubers of this world and hardware made by the vehicle manufacturers. Google and Uber are not likely to be manufacturing brakes, tires, and air bags. If Google and Uber are responsible only for accidents caused by software, and Ford, GM, and Toyota are solely responsible for accidents caused by hardware, retaining conventional products liability will generate the very litigation nightmare that MER is designed to avoid.[8] Under our approach, if it turns out that Google and Uber rather than Ford and Toyota should be responsible for all accidents “arising out of the operation of HAVs,”[9] then our proposal can be transposed so that Google and Uber are responsible for contributions to the MER fund.[10] The basic rationale for our proposal will still be applicable.

Professor Calo also is concerned that, at some point in the unforeseeable future, individuals will not own AVs. Instead, third parties such as Google, Uber, or cities will own them. He seems to think that our assumption that “individuals will own and insure their own cars,”[11] if incorrect, will undermine our proposal—for example, because we deliberately omit protection against property damage from MER. But so what? Nothing turns on this. Ride-sharing owners would also presumably have to decide whether to buy property (collision and comprehensive) insurance or to self-insure. Whether these entities or individuals have to make that decision would not change anything of consequence.

He also comments that the “incentive structure of an app-based technology company that both owns and operates its vehicles differs rather markedly from that of a car manufacturer that sells vehicles to people.”[12] Perhaps, but in what relevant respects? No one thinks that products liability law generates different incentives for conglomerates than for single-product companies. Why should there be a difference in this regard between technology companies and manufacturers? If there is an insight here, it eludes us.

The fact that “dramatically distinct modalities of transportation”[13] could arise once there are a lot of AVs on the roads leads Professor Calo to argue against pre-empting state experimentation with a single national approach. We would concur in a qualified fashion. This concern is why MER would not be triggered until AVs constitute twenty-five percent of all registered vehicles. That condition is meant to provide ample time for social, cultural, and technological evolution to tell us what “transportation modalities” actually have developed. But there is a deeper point to be made here. If the world of tomorrow features flying drones and/or comprehensive mass transportation, that will be soon enough to rethink liability law. Should we remain frozen until then?

Relatedly, Professor Calo asks what assumptions we are making about the trajectory of law and technology or its social impact. In fact, we are making no assumptions. Why should we be addressing whether a MER-type system would apply to harms from surgical robots? Having said that, we agree that the theory underlying MER may extend “well beyond”[14] driverless cars. The theory could extend to other kinds of accidents as well. It might even be nice (though it might also be unwise, or even dangerous) to have a single, unified approach to compensation and liability for accidental physical harm. New Zealand has done that, with mixed results.[15] In the United States we have never done it. As a practical matter, it is impossible.

In the United States we almost always address one major social policy concern at a time, instead of trying to address all our problems at once. Workers’ compensation is illustrative, even though the theory underlying workers’ compensation might also have applied to other settings. Similarly, auto no-fault compensation is grounded in the motor vehicle context. It addresses the cluster of issues associated with auto accidents, although some of these issues also arose, and still arise, in connection with injuries caused by defective products and harmful environmental exposures.

In the last few decades we have adopted a number of targeted compensation funds—the childhood vaccine-injury fund,[16] the 9/11 victim compensation fund,[17] and the birth-related neurological injury funds in Florida[18] and Virginia.[19] The principles underlying these approaches are not entirely consistent either, as one of us has repeatedly noted.[20] Since we are not going to have consistency across all of our liability and compensation regimes, deferring to lack of consistency—along with inability to predict long-term future scenarios of accident-generating technology—is a prescription for paralysis. Consequently, if in the future we need to think about applying MER to drone-related accidents, or robots performing surgery, we can face those issues as the need arises.

In short, because doing nothing about the law governing accidents involving AVs would actually constitute mistaken action, we should do the sensible thing. In our view, MER is exactly that.

 


[1] Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Respon­sibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 Va. L. Rev. 127 (2019).

[2] See id. at 129–30 nn. 4–6 (collecting sources).

[3] Id. at 147–64.

[4] Ryan Calo, Commuting to Mars: A Response to Professors Abraham & Rabin, 105 Va. L. Rev. Online 84, 84 (2019).

[5] Id. at 86.

[6] Id. at 84.

[7] Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 139–45.

[8] An alleged braking failure causing injury, for example, might very well raise issues of joint responsibility of the software and hardware systems.

[9] Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 132.

[10] This is likely to be a relatively objective determination of which entity has dominant responsibility for manufacture of the vehicle.

[11] Calo, supra note 4, at 87.

[12] Id. at 87.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 88.

[15] For discussion, see Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi Style, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 187 (2008).

[16] 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–34 (2012).

[17] 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012).

[18] Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.301–16 (West 2018).

[19] Va. Code. Ann. §§ 38.2-5000–21 (West 2018).

[20] See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circum­scribed Response or an Auspicious Model, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 769 (2003).