From Carrie Buck to Britney Spears: Strategies for Disrupting the Ongoing Reproductive Oppression of Disabled People

In June 2021, Britney Spears made headlines when she testified to a judge that she was being prevented from having children because her conservator would not allow her to stop using contraception. Britney Spears’s dreadful experiences are a glaring reminder that nearly 100 years after the infamous Buck v. Bell decision, reproduction is still weaponized to subjugate people with disabilities. Indeed, the reproductive oppression experienced by Britney Spears and other people with actual or perceived disabilities is deeply entrenched in our laws, in our policies, and in our collective conscience. Confronting these persistent inequities will require us to radically transform our laws and policies. This Essay responds to the ongoing reproductive injustice experienced by disabled people by proposing a vision to assist activists, legal professionals, scholars, and policymakers conceive of and articulate the basic contours of a paradigm shift that supports the coalescence of the reproductive justice and disability justice movements. The guiding principles set forth herein are intended to advance a long-overdue conversation about reproductive justice for people with disabilities by providing a starting point for activists, scholars, legal professionals, and policymakers to use, critique, and improve upon. The need for action could not be more timely or clear.

Introduction

“I want to be able to get married and have a baby . . . . I wanted to take the (IUD) out so I could start trying to have another baby. But this so-called team won’t let me go to the doctor to take it out because they don’t want me to have children—any more children.” – Britney Spears1.Jem Aswad, Read Britney Spears’ Full Statement Against Conservatorship: ‘I Am Traumatized’, Variety (June 23, 2021, 3:59 PM), https://variety.com/2021/music/‌news/britney-spears-full-statement-conservatorship-1235003940/ [https://perma.cc/QJ6Y-9UBH] (transcript of Spears’s June 23, 2021, statement to Los Angeles Superior Court Judge, Brenda Penny).Show More

On June 23, 2021, Britney Spears delivered a twenty-four-minute statement to the Los Angeles Superior Court passionately pleading for an end to the thirteen-year conservatorship to which she has been subjected.2.Id. At the time of this writing, Britney Spears’s case is ongoing. On September 29, 2021, the court suspended Britney Spears’s father, James Spears, as his daughter’s conservator and temporarily replaced him with a new conservator. Joe Coscarelli, Julia Jacobs & Liz Day, Judge Frees Spears From Father’s Control (Oct. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/‌2021/09/29/arts/music/britney-spears-court-decision-conservatorship.html [https://perma.cc/9N3S-S8NA]. The court has scheduled a hearing for November 12, 2021, to determine whether the conservatorship should end.Id.Show More In her heartbreaking testimony, Britney Spears presented a lengthy list of abuses she has allegedly endured, including surveillance, confinement, forced medication, and arduous labor demands.3.Aswad, supra note 1.Show More One detail stood out as especially egregious: Britney Spears wants to get married and have more children but is being prevented from doing so because her conservators will not authorize the removal of her intrauterine device (“IUD”).4.Id.Show More The juxtaposed responses of people with and without disabilities are a telling commentary on the state of reproductive freedom for disabled people.5.Consistent with disability rights and disability justice movements, this Essay acknowledges the importance of language in shaping how we think about disability and how ableism can pervade language choices as well as reflect and perpetuate disability-based subordination. Lydia X. Z. Brown, Ableism/Language, Autistic Hoya(Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.autistichoya.com/p/ableist-words-and-terms-to-avoid.html [https://perma.cc/HS2F-LJ2C]. To that end, I use person-first and identity-first language interchangeably (e.g., “parents with disabilities” and “disabled parents”) in recognition of the disability community’s diverse language preferences. See generally Dana S. Dunn & Erin E. Andrews, Person-First and Identity-First Language: Developing Psychologists’ Cultural Competence Using Disability Language, 70 Am. Psych. 255 (2015) (exploring the evolving language preferences among people with disabilities).Show More Fans, celebrities, and public officials, on the one hand, expressed horror and astonishment that such reproductive oppression was lawfully occurring in the United States.6.See, e.g., @yooitsmo, Twitter (June 24, 2021, 11:58 AM), https://twitter.com/yooitsmo/‌status/1408092248265445387 [https://perma.cc/UX86-TLL3] (“I’m sorry but…Britney HAS to keep an [IUD] in under her conservatorship??? How is any of this legal/okay???”); Meghan McCain (@MeghanMcCain), Twitter (June 23, 2021, 9:14 PM), https://twitter.com/‌MeghanMcCain/‌status/1407869786156146689 [https://perma.cc/T7S7-3X6G] (“This goes beyond any normal courts, there should be human rights violations investigations. Britney Spears was held captive, out in the open and we gawked at her and didn’t listen. This is how we treat famous women. Thank God she didn’t kill herself. There is a rot in our culture”); Congresswoman Katie Porter (@katieporteroc), Twitter (June 24, 2021, 7:25 PM), https://twitter.com/katieporteroc/status/1408204566592561157 [https://perma.cc/‌AA53-C7WG] (“Every American—regardless of their gender identity or disability status—ought to be able to make decisions about their own bodies. #FreeBritney”).Show More People with disabilities, on the other hand, while enraged, were not surprised that Britney Spears’s conservator was exerting reproductive control over her, explaining that such efforts are emblematic of the United States’ ongoing practice of weaponizing their reproduction to subjugate them.7.See, e.g., Imani Barbarin (@Imani_Barbarin), Twitter (June 24, 2021, 10:54 AM), https://twitter.com/Imani_Barbarin/status/1408076140028305422 [https://perma.cc/3W8S-DPTB] (“I don’t like the gaslighting that goes on when disabled people tell y’all that what’s happening with #FreeBritney is not at all unique. You just have a hierarchy of disability and a point at which you think someone is “too disabled” to care about.”); Sarah Lerner (@SarahLerner), Twitter (June 23, 2021, 6:42 PM), https://twitter.com/SarahLerner/status/‌1407831499164962817 [https://perma.cc/A8BU-TS75] (“Britney Spears being held under a 13-year conservatorship and being forced to keep her IUD in despite the fact that she wants another child is where disability rights and reproductive rights intertwine.”); Dr. Sherri G. (@onlymeindc), Twitter (June 24, 2021, 9:27 PM), https://twitter.com/onlymeindc/‌status/1408235268545519617 [https://perma.cc/UV6J-LU5J] (“The Britney Spears situation is most definitely a disability rights issue. The medical and social models of disability are clashing right in front of your eyes. One model boils us down to impairment through oppressive paternalism forcing us in the sick role and the other doesn’t.”); Eric Michael Garcia (@EricMGarcia), Twitter (June 23, 2021, 5:55 PM), https://twitter.com/EricMGarcia/‌status/1407819545394434051 [https://perma.cc/8BKP-PMAL] (“As always, it’s important to remember that #FreeBritney is a disability rights issue. If the state can do this to one of the most influential pop stars in my lifetime, think about what it can do to others.”).Show More

Britney Spears’s experiences are neither unique nor uncommon. Rather, the belief that people with actual or perceived disabilities—including physical, intellectual, sensory, and psychiatric disabilities—should not have reproductive autonomy is woven into our nation’s fabric.8.See infra Part I (contextualizing the United States’ history of the reproductive oppression of people with disabilities and the ways in which it persists today).Show More Each day, disabled people experience reproductive oppression, including forced sterilization, coerced abortion, inadequate access to sexual and reproductive health services and information, and loss of custody of their children.9.Id.Show More The injustices are even more pronounced for multiply marginalized people with disabilities, including disabled people of color and LGBTQ+ people.10 10.Zoe Brennan-Krohn & Rebecca McCray, Britney Spears’ Reproductive Freedom Is a Disability Rights Issue, ACLU (June 25, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/britney-spears-reproductive-freedom-is-a-disability-rights-issue/ [https://perma.cc/KZ9E-75WS] (“Spears’ experience is part of a long history of people with disabilities—most often people of color—being robbed of the right to control their reproductive destinies.”); Nat’l LGBTQ Task Force, Queering Reproductive Justice: A Toolkit 5–7 (Zsea Beaumonis, Candace Bond-Theriault, Stacey Long Simmons & Sabrina Rewald eds., 2017), https://www.thetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Queering-Reproductive-Justice-A-Toolkit-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L88-TMXB].Show More The reproductive oppression experienced by disabled people is deeply entrenched in our laws, in our policies, and perhaps most importantly, in our collective conscience. To transform our society into one that respects and supports reproductive freedom for people with disabilities, therefore, the systems that propagate these injustices must be entirely dismantled.

This Essay responds to the persistent reproductive oppression experienced by people with disabilities by proposing a vision to help activists, legal professionals, scholars, and policymakers conceive of and articulate the basic contours of a paradigm shift that supports the coalescence of the reproductive justice and disability justice movements. Part I examines the social context, institutions, and history that perpetuate reproductive oppression among people with disabilities in the United States. It describes the origins of weaponizing reproduction to subjugate disabled people and contemporary examples of such injustice. Part II explores two complementary frameworks for analyzing and confronting the reproductive oppression of disabled people: reproductive justice and disability justice. Finally, guided by reproductive justice and disability justice, Part III proposes four guiding principles necessary for a jurisprudential and legislative agenda to achieve and deliver reproductive justice for people with disabilities.

I. Persistent Reproductive Injustice

The recent revelations of the reproductive control being exerted by Britney Spears’s conservator must be situated within the nation’s long and reprehensible history of weaponizing reproduction to oppress disabled people, as well as other marginalized communities. This Part limns the ways in which laws and policies have led to the reproductive oppression of people with disabilities—particularly girls and women with disabilities11 11.Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8Berkeley Women’s L.J. 122, 123–24 (1993) (“Only a few of the dozens of cases regarding involuntary sterilizations involve the sterilization of males. Therefore, sterilization practice is interwoven with the issue of control of female reproductive rights and, to some extent, of female sexual expression.”). But seeIn reGuardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 708–09 (Iowa 2014) (evaluating an appeal brought by a 21-year-old man with intellectual disabilities challenging the legality of a vasectomy his guardian had arranged for him without obtaining a court order); Renu Barton-Hanson, Sterilization of Men with Intellectual Disabilities: Whose Best Interest Is It Anyway?, 15 Med. L. Int’l 49, 57–58 (2015) (examining recent cases concerning sterilization of men with intellectual disabilities and noting the frequent justification as purportedly promoting sexual freedom).Show More—beginning with the eugenics movement. Without attempting to provide a complete description of the myriad ways in which reproduction has been weaponized to subjugate disabled people, this Part highlights examples of how these practices have lawfully endured over time, focusing primarily on contemporary practices.

A. Historical Reproductive Injustice

The United States has a horrible history of preventing disabled people from controlling their destinies, including enacting laws and policies restricting their reproductive decision-making. During the eugenics movement of the early 1900s, more than thirty states passed involuntary sterilization laws, postulating that people with disabilities and other marginalized communities were socially inadequate and should be prevented from procreating.12 12.See Eric M. Jaegers, Note, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and Sterilization, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 947, 948, 953–54 (1993) (“The purpose of these laws was to protect and streamline society by preventing reproduction by those deemed socially or mentally inferior.”).Show More This line of reasoning underscored the infamous 1927 Buck v. Bell decision.13 13.274 U.S. 200 (1927).Show More Carrie Buck was purportedly a “feeble minded” woman institutionalized in Virginia.14 14.Id. at 205; see also Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 Const. Comment.331, 336 (1985) (asserting that Buck was not “feebleminded” but rather institutionalized to hide her rape).Show More She was likewise the daughter of a “feeble minded” woman committed to the same institution.15 15.Buck, 274 U.S. at 205; Gould, supra note 14, at 334.Show More At seventeen years old, Carrie Buck became pregnant after being raped; her daughter Vivian was also deemed “feebleminded.”16 16.Gould, supra note 14, at 333, 336; Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.Show More After Vivian’s birth, the institution sought to sterilize Carrie Buck in accordance with Virginia’s compulsory sterilization statute.17 17.Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–06; Gould, supra note 14, at 331.Show More It should be noted that Vivian was removed from her mother after birth and placed in a foster home.18 18.Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell 104–05 (2008).Show More Following a series of appeals, the law was upheld as constitutional in part on the grounds that it served “the best interests of the patients and of society.”19 19.Buck, 274 U.S. at 206–08.Show More Concluding this historical decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. declared, “It is better for all the world, if . . . society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”20 20.Id. at 207.Show More During the twentieth century, as many as 70,000 Americans, many of whom were people of color or whom had disabilities, were sterilized.21 21.Fresh Air, The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/07/469478098/the-supreme-court-ruling-that-led-to-70-000-forced-sterilizations [https://perma.cc/5KYD-Z79X].Show More Notably, Buck v. Bell has never been overturned.22 22.Fifteen years after Buck v. Bell was decided, the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law requiring that people with two or more convictions for felonious offenses be sterilized. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536–37, 543 (1942). Although both Skinner and Buck concern involuntary sterilization statutes, Skinner’s analysis took a narrower focus, relating only to the punitive sterilization of criminals, thereby avoiding addressing the forced sterilization of people with disabilities. Id. at 542–43.Show More

Laws forbidding people with disabilities from marrying were another hallmark of the eugenics movement.23 23.Brooke Pietrzak, Marriage Laws and People with Mental Retardation: A Continuing History of Second Class Treatment, 17 Dev. Mental Health L. 1, 34–35 (1997).Show More Specifically, three eugenics-based justifications were put forth to advance marriage restrictions: “the potential children must be protected; people with [disabilities] themselves must be protected; and society at large must be protected.”24 24.Id. at 35.Show More For example, a Connecticut law banned “epileptics, imbeciles, and feebleminded persons” from marrying or having extramarital sexual relations before the age of forty-five.25 25.Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1418, 1432 (1981).Show More In 1974, a study found that over forty states had laws preventing people with intellectual disabilities from marrying.26 26.President’s Comm. on Mental Retardation, OHD 74-21002, Silent Minority 33 (1974).Show More The most recent systematic investigation of these statutes was undertaken in 1997 and found that thirty-three states still had laws restricting people with intellectual or psychiatric disabilities from marrying.27 27.Pietrzak, supra note 23, at 1–2. Although no known studies have systematically examined marriage laws as they apply to people with disabilities, scholars contend that these statutes continue to exist in some states. Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 Emory L.J. 527, 548–49 (2014).Show More

B. Contemporary Reproductive Injustice

As Britney Spears’s recent testimony demonstrates, people with disabilities’ reproductive freedom continues to be controlled in a multitude of ways. For example, while nearly all states have repealed their involuntary sterilization laws, most states still permit sterilization with prior judicial authorization.28 28.See Vanessa Volz, Note, A Matter of Choice: Women with Disabilities, Sterilization, and Reproductive Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century, 27 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 203, 207–08 (2006).Show More Recently, the parents of Mary Moe,29 29.Mary Moe is a pseudonym; Massachusetts General Law requires that informed consent proceedings for an abortion be kept confidential. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12R (2020).Show More a 32-year-old pregnant woman with a psychiatric disability, petitioned a Massachusetts court for guardianship over Mary Moe to consent to an abortion.30 30.In re Guardianship of Mary Moe, 960 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).Show More Although Mary Moe vehemently opposed abortion, the trial court appointed her parents as co-guardians and authorized that Mary Moe be “coaxed, bribed, or even enticed . . . by ruse” into a hospital for an abortion.31 31.Id. at 353 (quoting the family court’s decision).Show More Further, the trial judge ordered sua sponte, and without notice, that Mary Moe be sterilized “to avoid this painful situation from recurring in the future.”32 32.Id. (quoting the family court’s decision).Show More Eventually, the decision was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court noting in regard to the sterilization order, “No party requested this measure, none of the attendant procedural requirements has been met, and the judge appears to have simply produced the requirement out of thin air.”33 33.Id. at 355.Show More Although Moe’s case had a positive outcome consistent with her articulated desires, her case demonstrates how disabled people experience threats to their reproductive freedom even with supposed judicial protections.

The “Ashley X” case provides another disturbing example of how the reproductive freedom of people with disabilities is subordinated. Ashley was a young girl with intellectual and physical disabilities.34 34.Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 Archives Pediatrics & Adolescent Med. 1013, 1014 (2006); Marcia H. Rioux & Lora Patton, Beyond Legal Smokescreens: Applying a Human Rights Analysis to Sterilization Jurisprudence, in Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law 243, 243–44 (Marcia H. Rioux, Lee Ann Basser & Melinda Jones eds., 2011).Show More In 2004, at age six, a Washington hospital, with Ashley’s parents’ permission, performed a series of procedures, including growth attenuation via hormone therapy, a hysterectomy, and bilateral breast bud removal.35 35.Gunther & Diekema, supranote 34; Rioux & Patton, supra note 34, at 244.Show More Her physicians and family justified the permanent alteration of her body by arguing that the procedures ensured “the best possible quality of life,” by enabling her to be more easily cared for by her family, while also allowing her to “retain more dignity in a body that is healthier, more of a comfort to her, and more suited to her state of development.”36 36.The “Ashley Treatment”, Towards a Better Quality of Life for “Pillow Angels”, at 3, 12 (Mar. 17, 2012), http://pillowangel.org/Ashley%20Treatment.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E3Z-VCEQ] (the document is authored by: “Ashley’s Mom and Dad”).Show More Further, Ashley’s parents asserted, “Ashley has no need for her uterus since she will not be bearing children,”37 37.Id. at 10.Show More and her physicians contended that the hysterectomy benefited both Ashley and her family because it “eliminate[d] the complications of menses.”38 38.Gunther & Diekema, supranote 34, at 1015.Show More Thus, Ashley’s “best interest was equated with her parents’ ability to maintain her at home and being easily able to carry and move her.”39 39.Rioux & Patton, supra note 34, at 244–45.Show More Notably, Ashley’s parents successfully sought these procedures with just the authorization of an internal ethics board and not through adjudication.40 40.Id. at 244.Show More Years later, an investigation revealed that the hospital had violated state law in this matter.41 41.Amy Burkholder, Report: ‘Pillow Angel’ Surgery Broke Law, CNN (May 8, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/05/08/ashley.ruling/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8RD-LF78] (“Children’s Hospital, in acknowledging its error, said that beyond implementing changes to ensure that sterilization of disabled children doesn’t happen again without a court order, it will seek court approval for other procedures involved in the controversial growth attenuation therapy.”).Show More Nonetheless, the “Ashley Treatment” remains accepted globally, with more than 100 families estimated to have subjected their children to similar procedures while thousands more are said to have considered it.42 42.Ed Pilkington & Karen McVeigh, ‘Ashley Treatment’ on the Rise Amid Concerns from Disability Rights Groups, The Guardian (Mar. 15, 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/‌2012/mar/15/ashley-treatment-rise-amid-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/B5WF-ENKY].Show More Thus, “[i]f the parents and doctors are all on board, these sorts of sterilization decisions can easily fly under the radar and evade mechanisms of legal accountability.”43 43.Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability and Reproductive Justice, 14 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 273, 289 (2020).Show More

Sterilization remains a standard procedure for many people with disabilities. Indeed, several recent studies have found that disabled women, especially those with intellectual disabilities, are significantly more likely than nondisabled women to be sterilized and at younger ages.44 44.See Justine P. Wu et al., Female Sterilization Is More Common Among Women with Physical and/or Sensory Disabilities than Women Without Disabilities in the United States, 10 Disability & Health J. 400, 403 (2017); William Mosher et al., Contraceptive Use by Disability Status: New National Estimates from the National Survey of Family Growth, 97 Contraception 552, 555 (2018); Henan Li et al., Female Sterilization and Cognitive Disability in the United States, 2011–2015, 132 Obstetrics & Gynecology 559, 561 (2018).Show More Further, today, sterilization of people with disabilities is primarily “driven by parents, guardians, and social service providers who are uneasy . . . [that] they will incur the additional burden of caring for the offspring.”45 45.Beverly Horsburgh, Schrödinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 531, 572 (1996).Show More Tellingly, in petitions to courts for approval to sterilize people with disabilities or terminate their pregnancies, guardians often cite cost as a prevailing factor.46 46.Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 122, 126 (1993).Show More In fact, in authorizing the sterilization of disabled people, courts often advance analogous presumptions to those put forward in Buck, such as that people with disabilities are “incapable of adequate parenting” and their children will “inevitably be a financial burden on the state.”47 47.Id.Show More Thus, while the “[e]ugenic rhetoric might have declined,” the “eugenic motivations and eugenic laws did not.”48 48.Mary Ziegler, Reinventing Eugenics: Reproductive Choice and Law Reform After World War II, 14 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 319, 350 (2008).Show More While sterilization should unquestionably be an option for permanent contraception for people who choose it, given the country’s history, it is not difficult to imagine that many of these sterilizations may be coerced.

Inadequate access to sexual and reproductive health services and information, including contraception, also thwarts disabled people’s reproductive autonomy. As Britney Spears’s experiences demonstrate, there is significant tension concerning people with disabilities and contraception. On the one hand, research indicates that disabled women have less contraception knowledge and lower contraception use compared to nondisabled women.49 49.Robyn M. Powell, Susan L. Parish, Monika Mitra, & Eliana Rosenthal, Role of Family Caregivers Regarding Sexual and Reproductive Health for Women and Girls with Intellectual Disability: A Scoping Review, 64 J. Intell. Disability Rsch. 131, 132 (2020) (citing studies).Show More On the other hand, like Britney Spears, some women with disabilities are forced by family members or guardians to use contraception out of fear that their disabled relative will become pregnant.50 50.Id. at 151 (citing studies).Show More In these instances, Britney Spears and others are in effect sterilized since they cannot reproduce due to forced contraception. Thus, some disabled people have inadequate access while other people are denied contraceptive decision-making. Extant research also suggests that pregnant women with disabilities experience higher risks of complications and poorer outcomes than nondisabled women because of inadequate access to health care.51 51.Monika Mitra, Linda M. Long-Bellil, Suzanne C. Smeltzer & Lisa I. Iezzoni, A Perinatal Health Framework for Women with Physical Disabilities, 8 Disability Health J.499, 499 (2015) (citing studies); Lesley A. Tarasoff et al., Health of Newborns and Infants Born to Women with Disabilities: A Meta-Analysis, 146 Pediatrics, e20201635, at 2 (2020) (citing studies); Ilhom Akobirshoev, Susan L. Parish, Monika Mitra & Eliana Rosenthal, Birth Outcomes Among US Women with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 10 Disability & Health J. 406, 409tbl. 2 (2017) (comparing maternal and infant outcomes of women with and without intellectual disabilities).Show More Indeed, adverse perinatal outcomes are often the result of physical barriers, communication barriers, and programmatic barriers, including healthcare providers’ negative attitudes about sexuality and reproduction among disabled women.52 52.Robyn M. Powell, Erin E. Andrews & Kara B. Ayers, Becoming a Disabled Parent: Eliminating Access Barriers to Health Care Before, During, and After Pregnancy, 96 Tul. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract‌_id=3808017 [https://perma.cc/3JD2-WD5G] (interviewing disabled parents about their experiences accessing health care services).Show More

Finally, prejudice and speculation about the competencies of parents with disabilities—emulating those raised during the eugenics movement—have led to contemporary discriminatory child welfare, family law, and adoption and foster care policies and practices that assume parental unfitness.53 53.See generally Nat’l Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of Parents with Disabilities and Their Children 15 (2012) [hereinafter “Rocking the Cradle”], https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB7C-XMMG] (“The report provides a comprehensive review of the barriers and facilitators people with diverse disabilities—including intellectual and developmental, psychiatric, sensory, and physical disabilities—experience when exercising their fundamental right to create and maintain families, as well as persistent, systemic, and pervasive discrimination against parents with disabilities. The report analyzes how U.S. disability law and policy apply to parents with disabilities in the child welfare and family law systems, and the disparate treatment of parents with disabilities and their children. Examination of the impediments prospective parents with disabilities encounter when accessing assisted reproductive technologies or adopting provides further examples of the need for comprehensive protection of these rights.”).Show More For example, disabled parents experience disproportionate rates of child welfare system involvement and loss of parental rights.54 54.Id. at 16.Show More Parents with disabilities also contend with state statutes that include disability as grounds for the termination of parental rights.55 55.Id. at 265–300 (finding that over two-thirds of state dependency laws list parental disability as grounds for termination of parental rights).Show More Family courts often deny parents with disabilities custody of or visitation with their children.56 56.Robyn M. Powell, Family Law, Parents with Disabilities, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 Fam. Ct. Rev. 37, 38 (2019) (“Indeed, parents with disabilities contend with substantial and persistent bias within the family law system, often threatening their custody and visitation rights.”).Show More For example, Britney Spears has had limited access to her children since she was placed under conservatorship.57 57.Laura Rizzo, Inside Britney Spears’ Custody Battle with Kevin Federline for Kids Sean Preston and Jayden, Life & Style Mag. (June 24, 2021), https://www.lifeandstylemag.com/‌posts/does-britney-spears-have-custody-of-kids-preston-and-jayden/ [https://perma.cc/EQY3-9KZ3] (explaining that Britney Spears had 30% custody at the time and was reportedly seeking 50%).Show More Meanwhile, foster care and adoption agencies regularly discriminate against prospective disabled parents based on presumptions that they are unfit to care for children.58 58.Rocking the Cradle,supranote 53, at 153–66 (describing the ways prospective parents with disabilities experience discrimination within the foster care and adoption system).Show More

II. Reproductive Justice and Disability Justice

Britney Spears’s tragic experiences are a stark reminder that nearly 100 years after the infamous Buck v. Bell decision, reproductive freedom is still denied to far too many disabled people, often because of discriminatory laws and policies. Thus, attention by activists, legal professionals, scholars, and policymakers to these matters is urgently needed. The four guiding principles for achieving reproductive justice for disabled people proposed in Part III infra are guided by two complementary frameworks: reproductive justice and disability justice. Both reproductive justice and disability justice are intersectional social movements, theories, and praxes which provide important lenses for analyzing and responding to the ongoing weaponization of reproduction to subjugate people with disabilities. This Part briefly describes each framework.

A. Reproductive Justice

Reproductive justice is based on the international human rights framework. It draws from reproductive rights and social justice. Reproductive justice was first “conceived in 1994 by feminists of color to conceptualize reproductive rights struggles embedded in social justice organizing that simultaneously challenged racism and classism, among other oppressions.”59 59.Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 327, 328 (2013).Show More According to Loretta Ross, co-founder of the SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Health Collective, “[t]he Reproductive Justice framework analyzes how the ability of any woman to determine her own reproductive destiny is linked directly to the conditions in her community—and these conditions are not just a matter of individual choice and access.”60 60.Loretta Ross, What is Reproductive Justice?, in Reproductive Justice Briefing Book: A Primer on Reproductive Justice and Social Change 4, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php?fID=4051 [https://perma.cc/5SSG-QVSD] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter “Reproductive Justice Briefing Book”].Show More

Drawing from intersectionality, which “illustrate[s] how racial and gender oppression interact in the lives of Black women,”61 61.Loretta J. Ross & Rickie Solinger, Reproductive Justice: An Introduction 73 (2017).Show More reproductive justice is “based on the understanding that the impacts of race, class, gender, and sexual identity oppressions are not additive but integrative,”62 62.Id. at 74.Show More and understands that only a holistic lens can address them. Accordingly, reproductive justice centers on “the ways in which aspects of social status and social identity (e.g., age, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, ability) combine to impact women’s experiences.”63 63.Joan C. Chrisler, Introduction: A Global Approach to Reproductive Justice—Psychosocial and Legal Aspects and Implications, 20 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 1, 4 (2013).Show More In other words, reproductive justice recognizes the ways in which intersecting factors, such as race and disability, constrain the reproductive freedom of marginalized communities.

Reproductive justice emerged as a movement because women of color and other marginalized communities felt that the reproductive rights movement disregarded their needs and experiences.64 64.Sarah London, Reproductive Justice: Developing a Lawyering Model, 13 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y 71, 75 (2011).Show More Reproductive justice, therefore, goes beyond our traditional understanding of reproductive rights in two critical ways. First, reproductive justice recognizes the importance of choice while also considering the broader social, legal, and institutional structures that affect people’s reproductive decision-making.65 65.Reproductive Justice Briefing Book, supranote 60, at 4. (“Moving beyond a demand for privacy and respect for individual decision making to include the social supports necessary for our individual decisions to be optimally realized, this framework also includes obligations from our government for protecting women’s human rights. Our options for making choices have to be safe, affordable and accessible, three minimal cornerstones of government support for all individual life decisions.”).Show More Second, and relatedly, reproductive justice applies to all aspects of reproductive freedom instead of just abortion rights.66 66.Id. (“Instead of focusing on the means—a divisive debate on abortion and birth control that neglects the real-life experiences of women and girls— the Reproductive Justice analysis focuses on the ends: better lives for women, healthier families, and sustainable communities.”).Show More Accordingly, reproductive justice “includes not only a woman’s right not to have a child, but also the right to have children and to raise them with dignity in safe, healthy, and supportive environments.”67 67.Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just Rights, Dissent (Fall 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reproductive-justice-not-just-rights [https://perma.cc/C37U-GS88]; see also Luna & Luker, supra note 59, at 343 (“[R]eproductive justice is equally about the right to not have children, the right to have children, the right to parent with dignity, and the means to achieve these rights.”).Show More Thus, “[b]y moving beyond the traditional pro-choice narrative and into the reality of lived experiences within the women’s communities, the reproductive justice movement focuses on the inequality among groups of women that inhibits access to these rights for some more than others.”68 68.Seema Mohapatra, Law in the Time of Zika: Disability Rights and Reproductive Justice Collide, 84 Brook. L. Rev. 325, 343 (2019).Show More In other words, reproductive justice challenges the pro-choice/pro-life dichotomy, viewing “choice” as something that divides people in policy and practice because it accepts that all people have an equal ability to make the same choices.

Reproductive justice necessitates “an integrated approach that draws on constitutional protections and movement-based policy strategies.”69 69.Priscilla A. Ocen, Incapacitating Motherhood, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2191, 2240 (2018).Show More Further, reproductive justice recognizes that “many kinds of laws shape the conditions in which women conceive and bear children.”70 70.Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—and Why It Matters in Law and Politics, 93 Ind. L.J. 207, 210 (2018).Show More Reproductive justice emphasizes an affirmative government role “in ensuring that all women have the social, political, and economic power and resources to make the best decisions for themselves and their families.”71 71.Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, Editorial, The Paradox of Disability in Abortion Debates: Bringing the Pro-Choice and Disability Rights Communities Together, 84 Contraception 541, 542 (2011).Show More Rather than relying only on litigation and attorneys, reproductive justice also engages in grassroots and community organizing.72 72.London, supra note 64, at 71–72.Show More

Extant legal scholarship has demonstrated the importance of applying reproductive justice to dissect and address the reproductive oppression of people with disabilities.73 73.See, e.g., Robyn M. Powell, Confronting Eugenics Means Finally Confronting Its Ableist Roots, 27 Wm. & Mary J. Race, Gender & Soc. Just. 607, 628–31 (2021) (examining the history of eugenics in the United States and calling for a justice-based approach to address the role of ableism in eugenics); Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 279–86; Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 Utah L. Rev. 587, 627–30 (2017) (describing ways in which reproductive justice should be used to advocate for programs to support people with disabilities as a mechanism for reducing disability-based abortions); Mohapatra, supra note 68, at 325–27 (2019) (using the Zika virus to highlight the tensions between reproductive rights and disability rights); Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race, Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 Du Bois Rev. 313, 316–18 (2013) (proposing how organizing based on an intersectional analysis can help facilitate alliances between reproductive justice, racial justice, women’s rights, and disability rights activists to develop strategies to address reproductive genetic technologies); Roberts, supra note 67 (describing the failures of the reproductive rights movement to respond to the needs of marginalized communities, including people with disabilities, and calling for a reproductive justice framework instead).Show More As Samuel Bagenstos notes, “[j]ust as ‘regulating Black women’s reproductive decisions has been a central aspect of racial oppression in America,’ regulating disabled people’s reproductive decisions has been a central aspect of disability oppression in America.”74 74.Bagenstos, supranote 43, at 285 (quoting Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty 6 (1997)).Show More Hence, reproductive justice can be engaged to confront the myriad oppressions that prohibit people with disabilities from enjoying their reproductive freedoms by confronting and disrupting the longstanding systems that propagate reproductive injustice.

B. Disability Justice

Disability justice is an equally important lens for dislocating the nation’s ongoing reproductive oppression of people with disabilities. Indeed, “reproductive justice is disability justice.”75 75.Sins Invalid, Skin, Tooth, and Bone—The Basis of Movement is Our People: A Disability Justice Primer 59 (2d ed. 2019) (capital letters omitted).Show More Specifically, disability justice provides an important framework for examining ableism as it relates to other forms of oppression and identity. Disability justice was first conceived in 2005 by the Disability Justice Collaborative, a group of Black, brown, queer, and trans people.76 76.Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha, Care Work: Dreaming Disability Justice 11 (2018).Show More Disability justice includes ten fundamental principles needed to achieve a truly inclusive and just society: “intersectionality . . . leadership of those most impacted . . . anti-capitalist politics . . . cross-movement solidarity . . . recognizing wholeness . . . sustainability . . . commitment to cross-disability solidarity . . . interdependence . . . collective access . . . [and] collective liberation.”77 77.Sins Invalid, supranote 75, at 22–26 (capital letters omitted).Show More

Similar to reproductive justice, disability justice distinguishes itself from a rights-based approach and calls for a holistic approach to disrupting the longstanding systems that cause oppression. According to Sins Invalid, a disability justice performance project, “Rights-based strategies often address the symptoms of inequity but not the root. The root of disability oppression is ableism and we must work to understand it, combat it, and create alternative practices rooted in justice.”78 78.Id. at 15, 47.Show More Thus, “[w]here disability rights seeks to change social conditions for some disabled people via law and policy, disability justice moves beyond law and policy: It seeks to radically transform social conditions and norms in order to affirm and support all people’s inherent right to live and thrive.”79 79.Talila “TL” Lewis, Disability Justice Is an Essential Part of Abolishing Police and Prisons, Level (Oct. 7, 2020), https://level.medium.com/disability-justice-is-an-essential-part-of-abolishing-police-and-prisons-2b4a019b5730 [https://perma.cc/J5QL-9UNR].Show More In other words, “[a]t its core, the disability rights framework centers people who can achieve status, power and access through a legal or rights-based framework, which we know is not possible for many disabled people, or appropriate for all situations.”80 80.Sins Invalid, supra note 75, at 15.Show More Disability justice is based on community and grassroots organizing.

Further, like reproductive justice, intersectionality81 81.In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to help explain the oppression of African-American women. SeeKimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 140 (1989). Since then, intersectionality has been used to study how people who are members of multiple socially marginalized communities experience discrimination, including people with disabilities. See, e.g., Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 Geo. J.L. & Mod. Critical Race Persps. 209, 211–22 (2010).Show More is a fundamental aspect of disability justice. Indeed, disability justice was developed as a “movement-building framework that would center the lives, needs, and organizing strategies of disabled queer and trans and/or Black and brown people marginalized from mainstream disability rights organizing’s white-dominated, single-issue focus.”82 82.Piepzna-Samarasinha, supra note 76, at 11.Show More Notably, “disability justice values an intersectional analysis which requires us to consider the complexities of reproductive justice in the context of ableism.”83 83.Sins Invalid, Reproductive Justice is Disability Justice 1, https://www.sinsinvalid.‌org/s/Reproductive_Justice_is_Disability_Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XUF-Z8JL] (last visited June 26, 2021).Show More For example, disabled people at the intersection of other marginalized identities, such as disabled people of color or LGBTQ+ disabled people, experience even greater reproductive oppression. Hence, “[p]eople who exist at the intersection of race and disability experience a multi-dimensional form of discrimination that is continually at risk of being flattened to a single dimension—either race or disability—due to the limitations of our collective understanding of intersectionality.”84 84.Alice Abrokwa, “When They Enter, We All Enter”: Opening the Door to Intersectional Discrimination Claims Based on Race and Disability, 24 Mich. J. Race & L.15, 20–21 (2018).Show More

III. Achieving Reproductive Justice: Four Guiding Principles

“Big problems require big solutions.” –Ruth Wilson Gilmore85 85.Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Foreword to Dan Berger, The Struggle Within: Prisons, Political Prisoners, and Mass Movements in the United States viii (2014).Show More

The ongoing reproductive control of Britney Spears exposes the persistent subordination of people with disabilities. Moreover, it shines a light on the urgent need for a long-overdue conversation: How does the United States finally confront its deplorable history of weaponizing reproduction to subjugate disabled people? As this Essay demonstrates, the reproductive oppression experienced by people with disabilities is deeply entrenched in our laws, in our policies, and in our collective conscience. Indeed, the problems of reproductive oppression are complex and require an interdisciplinary and interprofessional response that engages all fields of expertise, including law, medicine, public health, social work, and organizing, among others.

Below, I propose four guiding principles that I believe are necessary for a jurisprudential and legislative approach to achieving reproductive justice for people with disabilities. First, achieving reproductive justice for disabled people requires activists, scholars, legal professionals, and policymakers to actively engage people with disabilities. Second, legal and policy responses must be developed and implemented to ensure people with disabilities’ rights to autonomy and self-determination are protected. Third, sexual and reproductive health services and information must be accessible and available for people with disabilities. Finally, people with disabilities and their families must be guaranteed rights, justice, and wellness for themselves and their families.

These guiding principles, which are grounded in the extant legal and social science scholarship, are foundational elements of more significant legal and policy changes that will need to be fleshed out in considerable detail. They are outlined in broad strokes to help facilitate a discussion among activists, legal professionals, scholars, and policymakers about the basic contours of a paradigm shift that supports the coalescence of reproductive justice and disability justice. Disrupting the longstanding systems that oppress disabled people’s reproductive freedom will undeniably require a multifaceted approach. However, the need for such action could not be more timely or clear.

A. Center People with Disabilities as Leaders

Both reproductive justice and disability justice underscore the importance of centering people from marginalized communities as leaders in developing and implementing laws and policies that impact them. Indeed, a fundamental aspect of justice-based approaches is “listening to, engaging, and developing affected communities.”86 86.Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 338 (2015) (describing the importance of actively engaging socially marginalized communities to address inequities).Show More According to Sins Invalid, “By centering the leadership of those most impacted, we keep ourselves grounded in real-world problems and find creative strategies for resistance.”87 87.Sins Invalid,supra note 75, at 23.Show More Centering disabled people as leaders is also consistent with the disability community’s mantra, “nothing about us, without us,” which emphasizes that people with disabilities should be actively involved in legal and policy efforts that affect them.88 88.James I. Charlton, Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability Oppression and Empowerment 3 (1998).Show More Undeniably, when the voices of marginalized communities, including people with disabilities, are centered, solutions that benefit all members of society are conceived.

Cross-movement organizing is an important aspect of disrupting the reproductive oppression of disabled people. Historically, there have been significant tensions—particularly concerning issues of prenatal genetic testing for markers of disability and abortion on grounds of fetal disability—between the disability rights and reproductive rights movements.89 89.Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 280–81.Show More However, as the Center for Reproductive Rights notes, “[t]he cost of ignoring tensions between the disability rights and reproductive rights movements is high.”90 90.Center for Reproductive Rights, Shifting the Frame on Disability Rights for the U.S. Reproductive Rights Movement 2 (2017), https://reproductiverights.org/wp-content/uploads/‌2020/12/Disability-Briefing-Paper-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/52GS-T2NV].Show More Accordingly, the Center for Reproductive Rights intentionally developed partnerships with disability rights groups in an effort to begin bridging the gap between the movements.91 91.See id. at 1–2.Show More These discussions are an important reminder that the movements must work collectively to confront the subjugation of disabled people’s reproductive freedom, and that intentionally including people with disabilities is critical to developing legal and policy responses.

Accordingly, the first guiding principle to achieving reproductive justice for disabled people requires activists, scholars, legal professionals, and policymakers to actively engage people with disabilities, especially disabled people of color and LGBTQ+ disabled people, in leading legal and policy responses to address reproductive oppression. Such engagement will require an understanding of and respect for disabled people sharing their lived experiences and should elevate people with disabilities to leadership positions within movements. Because disabled people are the experts of their lives, centering them will lead to legal and policy responses that are disability-competent and address the actual reproductive needs of people with disabilities.

As previously explained, centering disabled people as leaders should also lead to cross-movement organizing and a broader effort to foster alliances and grow partnerships among the impacted communities. Cross-movement solidarity will produce progress toward specific policy goals and increase and enhance the dignity of people who can value one another’s shared humanity. Practically, this means that reproductive justice activists must make concerted efforts to include disabled people in their work. Similarly, disability rights and justice activists must recognize the diversity of the disability community and ensure that disabled people from marginalized communities hold leadership roles within the movements. To achieve reproductive justice, disabled people, especially disabled people of color and LGBTQ+ people, must be centered in all legal and policy efforts.

B. Protect Autonomy and Self-Determination

As Britney Spears’s heartbreaking ordeal exposes, people with disabilities are often denied bodily autonomy and self-determination, which in turn can result in reproductive oppression. Constitutional doctrine relating to abortion is rooted in a principle of autonomy.92 92.See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev.858, 876 (1993) (“The language of autonomy has provided the central rationale for protecting individual women’s control over the abortion decision.”).Show More Specifically, constitutional protections of abortion rights are rooted in the guarantee of “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 93.Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding [in Roe v. Wade] that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages . . . that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe.”).Show More Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the liberty protected by the U.S. Constitution involves freedom in making “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”94 94.Id. at 851.Show More Likewise, a cornerstone of the disability rights movement is autonomy.95 95.Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 745, 795 (2007) (“[P]aternalism has historically been one of the most significant contributors to the disadvantage people with disabilities experience. Non-disabled parents, teachers, doctors, rehabilitation counselors, employers, and others have arrogated to themselves the prerogative to decide what is best for people with disabilities. In so doing, they have deprived people with disabilities of opportunities to work and participate in the community. They have denied people with disabilities the autonomy that consists in making one’s own choices. And they have denied people with disabilities the dignity of risk— the opportunity to develop their skills, test them in the world, and succeed or fail according to their talents.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).Show More Indeed, disabled people have continuously fought against paternalism and the notion that other people—namely, family members and professionals—are best equipped to make decisions for disabled people.96 96.Charlton, supra note 88, at 3 (“Control has universal appeal for [disability rights movement] activists because the needs of people with disabilities and the potential for meeting these needs are everywhere conditioned by a dependency born of powerlessness, poverty, degradation, and institutionalization. This dependency, saturated with paternalism, begins with the onset of disability and continues until death.”)Show More

Guardianship, also known as conservatorship in some states, is a draconian and antiquated system that has existed for centuries and robs disabled people of autonomy and self-determination.97 97.Candida Moss, The Romans, the Supreme Court, and Britney Spears—Conservatorship Abuse Has Been Happening for 2000 Years, The Daily Beast (June 26, 2021), https://www.thedailybeast.com/britney-spears-the-romans-and-the-supreme-court-conservatorship-abuse-has-been-happening-for-2000-years [https://perma.cc/7UJL-389G] (tracing the history of guardianship to Roman law).Show More According to disability justice advocates:

While the law varies from state to state, guardianship orders routinely authorize third parties to make decisions about the most personal and important decisions in an individual’s life—choices that impact the person’s own body and reproductive health; how and where they receive medical, psychiatric, and psychological treatment; how the money and resources they work to earn are spent; and even with whom they associate.98 98.Ctr. for Pub. Representation, Statement from Disability Justice and Supported Decision-Making Advocates: Britney Spears Spotlights the Need for Change Now (June 25, 2021), https://supporteddecisions.org/2021/06/25/britney-spears/ [https://perma.cc/SKK5-2HKH].Show More

Notably, like Britney Spears, many people under guardianship are forced to use contraception to prevent pregnancy.99 99.Sara Luterman, For Women Under Conservatorship, Forced Birth Control Is Routine, The Nation(July 15, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/conservatorship-iud-britney-spears/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WD-SSCC].Show More According to the National Council on Disability, an estimated 1.3 million people with disabilities currently have guardians.100 100.Nat’l Council on Disability, Beyond Guardianship: Toward Alternatives that Promote Greater Self-Determination 17 (2018), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Guardianship_‌Report_Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8WG-5HBX].Show More

Although “[t]he guardianship system is designed as a last resort, applied only when an individual lacks capacity to make decisions,” there is “reason to believe that guardianships are imposed on many individuals without sufficient evidence of their decision-making incapacity and that, in some cases, disability alone appears to be used as a sufficient justification for the imposition of guardianship.”101 101.Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 Pa. St. L. Rev. 1111, 1117 (2013).Show More Consequently, the second guiding principle for achieving reproductive justice for disabled people requires the development and implementation of legal and policy responses that ensure people with disabilities’ autonomy and self-determination are protected. For example, disability rights advocates are pushing states to implement supported decision-making as a least restrictive alternative to guardianship.102 102.Ctr. for Pub. Representation, U.S. Supported Decision-Making Laws, https://supported‌decisions.org/resources-on-sdm/state-supported-decision-making-laws-and-court-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/L58P-TTEY] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) (listing states that have implemented supported decision-making).Show More Broadly, supported decision-making provides people with disabilities greater autonomy in their choices while receiving assistance from people whom they choose and trust.103 103.Ctr. for Pub. Representation, About Supported Decision-Making, https://supported‌decisions.org/about-supported-decision-making/ [https://perma.cc/KG45-F327] (last visited June 25, 2021).Show More It “does not require court involvement and can be coupled with other legal tools, such as powers of attorney and advance health care directives, that promote self-determination and autonomy.”104 104.Ctr. for Pub. Representation, supra note 98.Show More In addition to states enacting supported decision-making, efforts are needed to thwart the “school-to-guardianship pipeline,” whereby schools encourage parents to attain guardianship of their children once they reach the age of majority.105 105.Nat’l Council on Disability, Turning Rights into Reality: How Guardianship and Alternatives Impact the Autonomy of People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 29–36 (2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Turning-Rights-into-Reality_508_0.‌pdf [https://perma.cc/H2PR-X7Y7].Show More In sum, to achieve reproductive justice, legal and policy efforts must protect the autonomy and self-determination of people with disabilities, including ensuring that they receive the least restrictive supports and abolishing guardianship.

C. Ensure Sexual and Reproductive Health Services and Information Are Accessible and Available to People with Disabilities

As described in Part II, disabled people experience a range of barriers to sexual and reproductive health services and information, often resulting in inadequate access and adverse outcomes.106 106.See supra Section II.B.Show More Although federal disability laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),107 107.Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.Show More Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”),108 108.Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796.Show More and Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Section 1557”)109 109.Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a); 45 C.F.R §§ 92.102–105.Show More mandate that healthcare providers be accessible and prohibit disability-based discrimination, these laws are often violated.110 110.Powell, supranote 73, at 625–27 (describing federal disability laws’ application to matters concerning reproductive justice).Show More Moreover, disabled people often do not have access to adequate sexual and reproductive health information, such as sexuality education.111 111.Robyn M. Powell & Michael Ashley Stein, Persons with Disabilities and Their Sexual, Reproductive, and Parenting Rights: An International and Comparative Analysis, 11 Frontiers L. China 53, 57–58 (2016) (explaining the implications of disabled people not receiving sexuality education).Show More Without comprehensive information, people with disabilities are unable to make informed decisions about their reproductive wellbeing. Further, because disabled people are more likely to be poor and receive public benefits, policies such as the Hyde Amendment, which bars the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion care,112 112.SeeHyde Amendment Codification Act, S. 142, 113th Cong. (2013) (originally passed in 1977);Alina Salganicoff, Laurie Sobel & Amrutha Ramaswamy, The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for Abortion Services, Kaiser Fam. Found.(Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/the-hyde-amendment-and-coverage-for-abortion-services/ [https://perma.cc/NT7W-QL6W].Show More often inhibit their access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services.113 113.Rocking the Cradle,supranote 53, at 178 (noting that “Medicaid and Medicare [are] the primary health insurers for people with disabilities”).Show More

As such, the third guiding principle for achieving reproductive justice for disabled people necessitates ensuring that sexual and reproductive health services and information are accessible and available. Greater compliance with and enforcement of existing legal protections are urgently needed to ensure reproductive justice for people with disabilities. To that end, the United States Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) should prioritize the reproductive rights of people with disabilities, such as by investigating alleged violations of disability-based discrimination by reproductive health providers and enforcing the law as necessary.

Disabled people also need access to comprehensive and accessible information about sexuality and reproduction. For example, existing research indicates that people with disabilities may be at increased risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS due in part to limited access to education and information about prevention.114 114.Nora Ellen Groce et al., HIV Issues and People with Disabilities: A Review and Agenda for Research, 77 Soc. Sci. & Med. 31–37 (2013) (analyzing research about the intersection of HIV/AIDS and people with disabilities and calling for greater attention to the topic).Show More For people with intellectual disabilities, not receiving sexual education has led to high rates of sexually transmitted infections and sexual assaults, along with limited ability to report abuses because of lack of knowledge.115 115.Amy Swango-Wilson, Meaningful Sex Education Programs for Individuals with Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities, 29 Sexuality & Disability 113–16 (2011).Show More

Further, a health justice approach is needed, recognizing that the social determinants of health impact access to sexual and reproductive health services and information.116 116.See generallyBenfer, supra note 86 (explaining the social determinants of health and the health justice framework).Show More Developing and implementing laws and policies that are consistent with health justice will allow for addressing factors such as poverty and transportation and how they affect disabled people’s access to sexual and reproductive health services and information. Hence, by addressing the social determinants of health, people will have greater access to those services and information.

D. Guarantee Rights, Justice, and Wellness for People with Disabilities and Their Families

Finally, people with disabilities and their families encounter numerous laws and policies that threaten their rights, justice, and wellness. For example, consider a parent with a physical disability who is unemployed and receives monthly Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits of $794.117 117.Soc. Sec. Admin., SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2021, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/‌cola/SSI.html [https://perma.cc/DW5R-6MY3] (last visited July 20, 2021).Show More She also receives Medicaid, which pays for in-home personal care assistants. Although she would like to work, at least part-time, draconian rules proscribe that she will lose her SSI benefits if she earns more than $1,310.118 118.Soc. Sec. Admin., Substantial Gainful Activity, https://www.ssa.‌gov/oact/cola/sga.html [https://perma.cc/9YWP-XS5G] (last visited September 2, 2021).Show More Since Medicaid eligibility in her state is tied to receipt of SSI benefits, she will also lose Medicaid and needed in-home supports. Thus, stringent federal and state rules force this mother to live in poverty.

Reproductive justice should not depend on where people live, how much they make, or who they are. And yet, as the above narrative illustrates, all too often these factors infringe on people with disabilities’ reproductive justice. For example, for people with disabilities, especially disabled parents, poverty is a persistent issue that directly affects access to housing, food, and other basic necessities needed for people’s wellbeing.119 119.Rocking the Cradle,supra note 53, at 202 (“[T]he most significant difference between parents with disabilities and parents without disabilities is economic . . . .”).Show More Although many people with disabilities receive government benefits, these benefit programs often keep people in poverty. Antiquated rules and restrictions force some people with disabilities to choose between creating families and receiving necessary income assistance.120 120.While marriage is certainly not required to form families, it should be available to people with disabilities the same as it is for nondisabled people. However, strict asset programs prevent disabled people from marrying. See Waterstone, supra note 27, at 549 n. 132.Show More Poverty is also a persistent issue because of high rates of unemployment among disabled people. U.S. Census Bureau data shows that compared to nondisabled people, people with disabilities have lower rates of employment, lower median annual earnings, and higher rates of poverty.121 121.U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Economic Characteristics for the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population by Disability Status, https://data.census.gov/‌cedsci/table?t=Disability&tid=ACSST1Y2019.S1811&hidePreview=true&vintage=2018 [https://perma.cc/6JFJ-DATH] (last visited July 11, 2021).Show More

People with disabilities, especially disabled people of color and LGBTQ+ people, often additionally contend with discriminatory legal and social service systems that separate them from their families.122 122.See Section I.B supra (noting that disabled parents have disproportionate rates of child welfare system involvement and termination of parental rights).Show More For example, the child welfare system—more accurately known as the family policing system123 123.‘Abolition Is the Only Answer’: A Conversation with Dorothy Roberts, Rise Mag. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.risemagazine.org/2020/10/conversation-with-dorothy-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/9DMC-DQBL] (“Policing captures what this system does. It polices families with the threat of taking children away. Even when its agents don’t remove children, they can take children and that threat is how they impose their power and terror. It is a form of punishment, harm and oppression.” (quoting Dorothy Roberts) (emphasis in original)).Show More—targets people of color and disabled parents using pathology, control, and punishment.124 124.See generallyRobyn M. Powell, Achieving Justice for Disabled Parents and Their Children: An Abolitionist Approach, 33 Yale J.L. & Feminism (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (arguing that child welfare system abolition is necessary to protect disabled parents and their children).Show More An estimated two-thirds of state child welfare system laws explicitly include parental disability, usually intellectual or psychiatric disabilities, as grounds for termination of parental rights.125 125.Rocking the Cradle,supra note 53, at 16.Show More Thus, in many states, disabled people are lawfully denied their right to raise children.

Accordingly, the fourth guiding principle recognizes that to achieve reproductive justice, people with disabilities and their families must be guaranteed rights, justice, and wellness for themselves and their families. Changing the income and asset rules that keep people with disabilities in poverty would enable them to have livable incomes and the families they desire. Employment opportunities similarly need to be expanded so that people with disabilities can work and earn livable wages. Further, parents with disabilities and their children must be able to live free from fear of unnecessary separation and have access to non-punitive supports and resources. Thus, the child welfare system, and other carceral systems, must be abolished to achieve true reproductive justice. Legal and policy solutions that reflect the fourth guiding principle will need to be comprehensive and transformative.

Conclusion

Britney Spears’s appalling experiences are a stark reminder that nearly 100 years after the infamous Buck v. Bell decision, reproductive freedom is still denied to far too many disabled people. Although forced sterilization of people with disabilities has waned over time, reproductive justice still has not been realized for all people with disabilities. Indeed, revelations about Britney Spears’s harrowing struggles show that the right to decide whether to have children is still not fully afforded to people with disabilities.

The reproductive oppression experienced by people with disabilities is deeply entrenched in our laws, in our policies, and in our collective conscience. Accordingly, addressing the persistent reproductive oppression of people with disabilities will require us to transform our laws and policies radically. Informed by reproductive justice and disability justice frameworks, the four guiding principles set forth above provide a vision for transforming laws and policies to ensure reproductive justice for people with disabilities. This Essay seeks to advance a long-overdue conversation about reproductive justice for people with disabilities by providing a starting point for activists, scholars, legal professionals, and policymakers to use, critique, and improve upon. The need for such action could not be more timely or clear.

  1. * JD, PhD, Bruce R. Jacob Visiting Assistant Professor at Stetson University College of Law. Concepts from this Essay were presented during ReproAction’s webinar, “#FreeBritney? Respecting the Autonomy and Decision-Making of People with Disabilities,” on September 29, 2020. This Essay was supported by a generous research grant from the Stetson University College of Law. I extend my appreciation to Edson Abadia, Jr., for his critical research assistance.

  2. Jem Aswad, Read Britney Spears’ Full Statement Against Conservatorship: ‘I Am Traumatized’, Variety (June 23, 2021, 3:59 PM), https://variety.com/2021/music/‌news/britney-spears-full-statement-conservatorship-1235003940/ [https://perma.cc/QJ6Y-9UBH] (transcript of Spears’s June 23, 2021, statement to Los Angeles Superior Court Judge, Brenda Penny).

  3. Id. At the time of this writing, Britney Spears’s case is ongoing. On September 29, 2021, the court suspended Britney Spears’s father, James Spears, as his daughter’s conservator and temporarily replaced him with a new conservator. Joe Coscarelli, Julia Jacobs & Liz Day, Judge Frees Spears From Father’s Control (Oct. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/‌2021/09/29/arts/music/britney-spears-court-decision-conservatorship.html [https://perma.cc/9N3S-S8NA]. The court has scheduled a hearing for November 12, 2021, to determine whether the conservatorship should end. Id.

  4. Aswad, supra note 1.

  5. Id.

  6.  Consistent with disability rights and disability justice movements, this Essay acknowledges the importance of language in shaping how we think about disability and how ableism can pervade language choices as well as reflect and perpetuate disability-based subordination. Lydia X. Z. Brown, Ableism/Language, Autistic Hoya (Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.autistichoya.com/p/ableist-words-and-terms-to-avoid.html [https://perma.cc/HS2F-LJ2C]. To that end, I use person-first and identity-first language interchangeably (e.g., “parents with disabilities” and “disabled parents”) in recognition of the disability community’s diverse language preferences. See generally Dana S. Dunn & Erin E. Andrews, Person-First and Identity-First Language: Developing Psychologists’ Cultural Competence Using Disability Language, 70 Am. Psych. 255 (2015) (exploring the evolving language preferences among people with disabilities).

  7. See, e.g., @yooitsmo, Twitter (June 24, 2021, 11:58 AM), https://twitter.com/yooitsmo/‌status/1408092248265445387 [https://perma.cc/UX86-TLL3] (“I’m sorry but…Britney HAS to keep an [IUD] in under her conservatorship??? How is any of this legal/okay???”); Meghan McCain (@MeghanMcCain), Twitter (June 23, 2021, 9:14 PM), https://twitter.com/‌MeghanMcCain/‌status/1407869786156146689 [https://perma.cc/T7S7-3X6G] (“This goes beyond any normal courts, there should be human rights violations investigations. Britney Spears was held captive, out in the open and we gawked at her and didn’t listen. This is how we treat famous women. Thank God she didn’t kill herself. There is a rot in our culture”); Congresswoman Katie Porter (@katieporteroc), Twitter (June 24, 2021, 7:25 PM), https://twitter.com/katieporteroc/status/1408204566592561157 [https://perma.cc/‌AA53-C7WG] (“Every American—regardless of their gender identity or disability status—ought to be able to make decisions about their own bodies. #FreeBritney”).

  8. See, e.g., Imani Barbarin (@Imani_Barbarin), Twitter (June 24, 2021, 10:54 AM), https://twitter.com/Imani_Barbarin/status/1408076140028305422 [https://perma.cc/3W8S-DPTB] (“I don’t like the gaslighting that goes on when disabled people tell y’all that what’s happening with #FreeBritney is not at all unique. You just have a hierarchy of disability and a point at which you think someone is “too disabled” to care about.”); Sarah Lerner (@SarahLerner), Twitter (June 23, 2021, 6:42 PM), https://twitter.com/SarahLerner/status/‌1407831499164962817 [https://perma.cc/A8BU-TS75] (“Britney Spears being held under a 13-year conservatorship and being forced to keep her IUD in despite the fact that she wants another child is where disability rights and reproductive rights intertwine.”); Dr. Sherri G. (@onlymeindc), Twitter (June 24, 2021, 9:27 PM), https://twitter.com/onlymeindc/‌status/1408235268545519617 [https://perma.cc/UV6J-LU5J] (“The Britney Spears situation is most definitely a disability rights issue. The medical and social models of disability are clashing right in front of your eyes. One model boils us down to impairment through oppressive paternalism forcing us in the sick role and the other doesn’t.”); Eric Michael Garcia (@EricMGarcia), Twitter (June 23, 2021, 5:55 PM), https://twitter.com/EricMGarcia/‌status/1407819545394434051 [https://perma.cc/8BKP-PMAL] (“As always, it’s important to remember that #FreeBritney is a disability rights issue. If the state can do this to one of the most influential pop stars in my lifetime, think about what it can do to others.”).

  9. See infra Part I (contextualizing the United States’ history of the reproductive oppression of people with disabilities and the ways in which it persists today).

  10. Id.

  11. Zoe Brennan-Krohn & Rebecca McCray, Britney Spears’ Reproductive Freedom Is a Disability Rights Issue, ACLU (June 25, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/britney-spears-reproductive-freedom-is-a-disability-rights-issue/ [https://perma.cc/KZ9E-75WS] (“Spears’ experience is part of a long history of people with disabilities—most often people of color—being robbed of the right to control their reproductive destinies.”); Nat’l LGBTQ Task Force, Queering Reproductive Justice: A Toolkit 5–7 (Zsea Beaumonis, Candace Bond-Theriault, Stacey Long Simmons & Sabrina Rewald eds., 2017), https://www.thetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Queering-Reproductive-Justice-A-Toolkit-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L88-TMXB].

  12. Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8

     

    Berkeley Women’s L.J. 122, 123–24 (1993) (“Only a few of the dozens of cases regarding involuntary sterilizations involve the sterilization of males. Therefore, sterilization practice is interwoven with the issue of control of female reproductive rights and, to some extent, of female sexual expression.”). But see In re Guardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 708–09 (Iowa 2014) (evaluating an appeal brought by a 21-year-old man with intellectual disabilities challenging the legality of a vasectomy his guardian had arranged for him without obtaining a court order); Renu Barton-Hanson, Sterilization of Men with Intellectual Disabilities: Whose Best Interest Is It Anyway?, 15 Med. L. Int’l 49, 57–58 (2015) (examining recent cases concerning sterilization of men with intellectual disabilities and noting the frequent justification as purportedly promoting sexual freedom).

  13. See Eric M. Jaegers, Note, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and Sterilization, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 947, 948, 953–54 (1993) (“The purpose of these laws was to protect and streamline society by preventing reproduction by those deemed socially or mentally inferior.”).

  14. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

  15. Id. at 205; see also Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 Const. Comment.

     

    331, 336 (1985) (asserting that Buck was not “feebleminded” but rather institutionalized to hide her rape).

  16. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205; Gould, supra note 14, at 334.

  17. Gould, supra note 14, at 333, 336; Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.

  18. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–06; Gould, supra note 14, at 331.

  19. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell 104–05 (2008).

  20. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206–08.

  21. Id. at 207.

  22. Fresh Air, The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/07/469478098/the-supreme-court-ruling-that-led-to-70-000-forced-sterilizations [https://perma.cc/5KYD-Z79X].

  23. Fifteen years after Buck v. Bell was decided, the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law requiring that people with two or more convictions for felonious offenses be sterilized. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536–37, 543 (1942). Although both Skinner and Buck concern involuntary sterilization statutes, Skinner’s analysis took a narrower focus, relating only to the punitive sterilization of criminals, thereby avoiding addressing the forced sterilization of people with disabilities. Id. at 542–43.

  24. Brooke Pietrzak, Marriage Laws and People with Mental Retardation: A Continuing History of Second Class Treatment, 17 Dev. Mental Health L. 1, 34–35 (1997).

  25. Id. at 35.

  26. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1418, 1432 (1981).

  27. President’s Comm. on Mental Retardation, OHD 74-21002, Silent Minority 33 (1974).

  28. Pietrzak, supra note 23, at 1–2. Although no known studies have systematically examined marriage laws as they apply to people with disabilities, scholars contend that these statutes continue to exist in some states. Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 Emory L.J. 527, 548–49 (2014).

  29. See Vanessa Volz, Note, A Matter of Choice: Women with Disabilities, Sterilization, and Reproductive Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century, 27 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 203, 207–08 (2006).

  30. Mary Moe is a pseudonym; Massachusetts General Law requires that informed consent proceedings for an abortion be kept confidential. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12R (2020).

  31. In re Guardianship of Mary Moe, 960 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).

  32. Id. at 353 (quoting the family court’s decision).

  33. Id. (quoting the family court’s decision).

  34. Id. at 355.

  35. Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 Archives Pediatrics & Adolescent Med. 1013, 1014 (2006); Marcia H. Rioux & Lora Patton, Beyond Legal Smokescreens: Applying a Human Rights Analysis to Sterilization Jurisprudence, in Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law 243, 243–44 (Marcia H. Rioux, Lee Ann Basser & Melinda Jones eds., 2011).

  36. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 34; Rioux & Patton, supra note 34, at 244.

  37. The “Ashley Treatment”, Towards a Better Quality of Life for “Pillow Angels”, at 3, 12 (Mar. 17, 2012), http://pillowangel.org/Ashley%20Treatment.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E3Z-VCEQ] (the document is authored by: “Ashley’s Mom and Dad”).

  38. Id. at 10.

  39. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 34, at 1015.

  40. Rioux & Patton, supra note 34, at 244–45.

  41. Id. at 244.

  42. Amy Burkholder, Report: ‘Pillow Angel’ Surgery Broke Law, CNN (May 8, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/05/08/ashley.ruling/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8RD-LF78] (“Children’s Hospital, in acknowledging its error, said that beyond implementing changes to ensure that sterilization of disabled children doesn’t happen again without a court order, it will seek court approval for other procedures involved in the controversial growth attenuation therapy.”).

  43. Ed Pilkington & Karen McVeigh, ‘Ashley Treatment’ on the Rise Amid Concerns from Disability Rights Groups, The Guardian (Mar. 15, 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/‌2012/mar/15/ashley-treatment-rise-amid-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/B5WF-ENKY].

  44. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability and Reproductive Justice, 14 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 273, 289 (2020).

  45. See Justine P. Wu et al., Female Sterilization Is More Common Among Women with Physical and/or Sensory Disabilities than Women Without Disabilities in the United States, 10 Disability & Health J. 400, 403 (2017); William Mosher et al., Contraceptive Use by Disability Status: New National Estimates from the National Survey of Family Growth, 97 Contraception 552, 555 (2018); Henan Li et al., Female Sterilization and Cognitive Disability in the United States, 2011–2015, 132 Obstetrics & Gynecology 559, 561 (2018).

  46. Beverly Horsburgh, Schrödinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 531, 572 (1996).

  47. Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 122, 126 (1993).

  48. Id.

  49. Mary Ziegler, Reinventing Eugenics: Reproductive Choice and Law Reform After World War II, 14 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 319, 350 (2008).

  50. Robyn M. Powell, Susan L. Parish, Monika Mitra, & Eliana Rosenthal, Role of Family Caregivers Regarding Sexual and Reproductive Health for Women and Girls with Intellectual Disability: A Scoping Review, 64 J. Intell. Disability Rsch. 131, 132 (2020) (citing studies).

  51. Id. at 151 (citing studies).

  52. Monika Mitra, Linda M. Long-Bellil, Suzanne C. Smeltzer & Lisa I. Iezzoni, A Perinatal Health Framework for Women with Physical Disabilities, 8 Disability Health J.

     

    499, 499 (2015) (citing studies)

    ;

    Lesley A. Tarasoff et al., Health of Newborns and Infants Born to Women with Disabilities: A Meta-Analysis, 146 Pediatrics, e20201635, at 2 (2020) (citing studies); Ilhom Akobirshoev, Susan L. Parish, Monika Mitra & Eliana Rosenthal, Birth Outcomes Among US Women with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 10 Disability & Health J.

    406, 409

    tbl. 2

    (2017) (

    comparing maternal and infant outcomes of women with and without intellectual disabilities)

    .

  53. Robyn M. Powell, Erin E. Andrews & Kara B. Ayers, Becoming a Disabled Parent: Eliminating Access Barriers to Health Care Before, During, and After Pregnancy, 96 Tul. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract‌_id=3808017 [https://perma.cc/3JD2-WD5G] (interviewing disabled parents about their experiences accessing health care services).

  54. See generally Nat’l Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of Parents with Disabilities and Their Children 15 (2012) [hereinafter “Rocking the Cradle”], https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB7C-XMMG] (“The report provides a comprehensive review of the barriers and facilitators people with diverse disabilities—including intellectual and developmental, psychiatric, sensory, and physical disabilities—experience when exercising their fundamental right to create and maintain families, as well as persistent, systemic, and pervasive discrimination against parents with disabilities. The report analyzes how U.S. disability law and policy apply to parents with disabilities in the child welfare and family law systems, and the disparate treatment of parents with disabilities and their children. Examination of the impediments prospective parents with disabilities encounter when accessing assisted reproductive technologies or adopting provides further examples of the need for comprehensive protection of these rights.”).

  55. Id. at 16.

  56. Id. at 265–300 (finding that over two-thirds of state dependency laws list parental disability as grounds for termination of parental rights).

  57. Robyn M. Powell, Family Law, Parents with Disabilities, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 Fam. Ct. Rev. 37, 38 (2019) (“Indeed, parents with disabilities contend with substantial and persistent bias within the family law system, often threatening their custody and visitation rights.”).

  58. Laura Rizzo, Inside Britney Spears’ Custody Battle with Kevin Federline for Kids Sean Preston and Jayden, Life & Style Mag. (June 24, 2021), https://www.lifeandstylemag.com/‌posts/does-britney-spears-have-custody-of-kids-preston-and-jayden/ [https://perma.cc/EQY3-9KZ3] (explaining that Britney Spears had 30% custody at the time and was reportedly seeking 50%).

  59. Rocking the Cradle, supra note 53, at 153–66 (describing the ways prospective parents with disabilities experience discrimination within the foster care and adoption system).

  60. Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 327, 328 (2013).

  61. Loretta Ross, What is Reproductive Justice?, in Reproductive Justice Briefing Book: A Primer on Reproductive Justice and Social Change 4, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php?fID=4051 [https://perma.cc/5SSG-QVSD] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter “Reproductive Justice Briefing Book

    ”]

    .

  62. Loretta J. Ross & Rickie Solinger, Reproductive Justice: An Introduction 73 (2017).

  63. Id. at 74.

  64.  Joan C. Chrisler, Introduction: A Global Approach to Reproductive Justice—Psychosocial and Legal Aspects and Implications, 20 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 1, 4 (2013).

  65. Sarah London, Reproductive Justice: Developing a Lawyering Model, 13 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y 71, 75 (2011).

  66. Reproductive Justice Briefing Book

    ,

    supra note 60, at 4. (“Moving beyond a demand for privacy and respect for individual decision making to include the social supports necessary for our individual decisions to be optimally realized, this framework also includes obligations from our government for protecting women’s human rights. Our options for making choices have to be safe, affordable and accessible, three minimal cornerstones of government support for all individual life decisions.”).

  67. Id. (“Instead of focusing on the means—a divisive debate on abortion and birth control that neglects the real-life experiences of women and girls— the Reproductive Justice analysis focuses on the ends: better lives for women, healthier families, and sustainable communities.”).

  68. Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive Justice, Not Just Rights, Dissent (Fall 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reproductive-justice-not-just-rights [https://perma.cc/C37U-GS88]; see also Luna & Luker, supra note 59, at 343 (“[R]eproductive justice is equally about the right to not have children, the right to have children, the right to parent with dignity, and the means to achieve these rights.”).

  69. Seema Mohapatra, Law in the Time of Zika: Disability Rights and Reproductive Justice Collide, 84 Brook. L. Rev. 325, 343 (2019).

  70. Priscilla A. Ocen, Incapacitating Motherhood, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2191, 2240 (2018).

  71. Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—and Why It Matters in Law and Politics, 93 Ind. L.J. 207, 210 (2018).

  72. Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, Editorial, The Paradox of Disability in Abortion Debates: Bringing the Pro-Choice and Disability Rights Communities Together, 84 Contraception 541, 542 (2011).

  73. London, supra note 64, at 71–72.

  74. See, e.g., Robyn M. Powell, Confronting Eugenics Means Finally Confronting Its Ableist Roots, 27 Wm. & Mary J. Race, Gender & Soc. Just. 607, 628–31 (2021) (examining the history of eugenics in the United States and calling for a justice-based approach to address the role of ableism in eugenics); Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 279–86; Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 Utah L. Rev. 587, 627–30 (2017) (describing ways in which reproductive justice should be used to advocate for programs to support people with disabilities as a mechanism for reducing disability-based abortions); Mohapatra, supra note 68, at 325–27 (2019) (using the Zika virus to highlight the tensions between reproductive rights and disability rights); Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race, Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 Du Bois Rev. 313, 316–18 (2013) (proposing how organizing based on an intersectional analysis can help facilitate alliances between reproductive justice, racial justice, women’s rights, and disability rights activists to develop strategies to address reproductive genetic technologies); Roberts, supra note 67 (describing the failures of the reproductive rights movement to respond to the needs of marginalized communities, including people with disabilities, and calling for a reproductive justice framework instead).

  75. Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 285 (quoting Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty 6 (1997)).

  76. Sins Invalid, Skin, Tooth, and Bone—The Basis of Movement is Our People: A Disability Justice Primer 59 (2d ed. 2019) (capital letters omitted).

  77. Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha, Care Work: Dreaming Disability Justice 11 (2018).

  78. Sins Invalid, supra note 75, at 22–26 (capital letters omitted).

  79. Id. at 15, 47.

  80. Talila “TL” Lewis, Disability Justice Is an Essential Part of Abolishing Police and Prisons, Level (Oct. 7, 2020), https://level.medium.com/disability-justice-is-an-essential-part-of-abolishing-police-and-prisons-2b4a019b5730 [https://perma.cc/J5QL-9UNR].

  81. Sins Invalid, supra note 75, at 15.

  82. In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to help explain the oppression of African-American women. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 140 (1989). Since then, intersectionality has been used to study how people who are members of multiple socially marginalized communities experience discrimination, including people with disabilities. See, e.g., Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 Geo. J.L. & Mod. Critical Race Persps. 209, 211–22 (2010).

  83. Piepzna-Samarasinha, supra note 76, at 11.

  84. Sins Invalid, Reproductive Justice is Disability Justice

    1,

    https://www.sinsinvalid.‌org/s/Reproductive_Justice_is_Disability_Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XUF-Z8JL] (last visited June 26, 2021).

  85. Alice Abrokwa, “When They Enter, We All Enter”: Opening the Door to Intersectional Discrimination Claims Based on Race and Disability, 24 Mich. J. Race & L.

     

    15, 20–21 (2018).

  86. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Foreword to Dan Berger, The Struggle Within: Prisons, Political Prisoners, and Mass Movements in the United States viii (2014).

  87. Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 338 (2015) (describing the importance of actively engaging socially marginalized communities to address inequities).

  88. Sins Invalid,

     

    supra note 75, at 23.

  89. James I. Charlton, Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability Oppression and Empowerment 3 (1998).

  90. Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 280–81.

  91. Center for Reproductive Rights, Shifting the Frame on Disability Rights for the U.S. Reproductive Rights Movement 2 (2017), https://reproductiverights.org/wp-content/uploads/‌2020/12/Disability-Briefing-Paper-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/52GS-T2NV].

  92. See id. at 1–2.

  93. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev.

     

    858, 876 (1993) (“The language of autonomy has provided the central rationale for protecting individual women’s control over the abortion decision.”).

  94. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding [in Roe v. Wade] that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages . . . that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe.”).

  95. Id. at 851.

  96. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 745, 795 (2007) (“[P]aternalism has historically been one of the most significant contributors to the disadvantage people with disabilities experience. Non-disabled parents, teachers, doctors, rehabilitation counselors, employers, and others have arrogated to themselves the prerogative to decide what is best for people with disabilities. In so doing, they have deprived people with disabilities of opportunities to work and participate in the community. They have denied people with disabilities the autonomy that consists in making one’s own choices. And they have denied people with disabilities the dignity of risk— the opportunity to develop their skills, test them in the world, and succeed or fail according to their talents.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

  97. Charlton

    ,

    supra note 88, at 3 (“Control has universal appeal for [disability rights movement] activists because the needs of people with disabilities and the potential for meeting these needs are everywhere conditioned by a dependency born of powerlessness, poverty, degradation, and institutionalization. This dependency, saturated with paternalism, begins with the onset of disability and continues until death.”)

  98. Candida Moss, The Romans, the Supreme Court, and Britney Spears—Conservatorship Abuse Has Been Happening for 2000 Years, The Daily Beast (June 26, 2021), https://www.thedailybeast.com/britney-spears-the-romans-and-the-supreme-court-conservatorship-abuse-has-been-happening-for-2000-years [https://perma.cc/7UJL-389G] (tracing the history of guardianship to Roman law).

  99. Ctr. for Pub. Representation, Statement from Disability Justice and Supported Decision-Making Advocates: Britney Spears Spotlights the Need for Change Now (June 25, 2021), https://supporteddecisions.org/2021/06/25/britney-spears/ [https://perma.cc/SKK5-2HKH].

  100. Sara Luterman, For Women Under Conservatorship, Forced Birth Control Is Routine, The Nation

     

    (July 15, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/conservatorship-iud-britney-spears/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WD-SSCC].

  101. Nat’l Council on Disability, Beyond Guardianship: Toward Alternatives that Promote Greater Self-Determination 17 (2018), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Guardianship_‌Report_Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8WG-5HBX].

  102. Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 Pa. St. L. Rev. 1111, 1117 (2013).

  103. Ctr. for Pub. Representation, U.S. Supported Decision-Making Laws, https://supported‌decisions.org/resources-on-sdm/state-supported-decision-making-laws-and-court-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/L58P-TTEY] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) (listing states that have implemented supported decision-making).

  104. Ctr. for Pub. Representation, About Supported Decision-Making, https://supported‌decisions.org/about-supported-decision-making/ [https://perma.cc/KG45-F327] (last visited June 25, 2021).

  105. Ctr. for Pub. Representation, supra note 98.

  106. Nat’l Council on Disability, Turning Rights into Reality: How Guardianship and Alternatives Impact the Autonomy of People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

    29–36 (2019),

    https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Turning-Rights-into-Reality_508_0.‌pdf [https://perma.cc/H2PR-X7Y7].

     

  107. See supra Section II.B.

  108. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.

  109. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796.

  110. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a); 45 C.F.R §§ 92.102–105.

  111. Powell, supra note 73, at 625–27 (describing federal disability laws’ application to matters concerning reproductive justice).

  112. Robyn M. Powell & Michael Ashley Stein, Persons with Disabilities and Their Sexual, Reproductive, and Parenting Rights: An International and Comparative Analysis, 11 Frontiers L. China 53, 57–58 (2016) (explaining the implications of disabled people not receiving sexuality education).

  113. See Hyde Amendment Codification Act, S. 142, 113th Cong. (2013) (originally passed in 1977); Alina Salganicoff, Laurie Sobel & Amrutha Ramaswamy, The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for Abortion Services, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/the-hyde-amendment-and-coverage-for-abortion-services/ [https://perma.cc/NT7W-QL6W].

  114. Rocking the Cradle, supra note 53, at 178 (noting that “Medicaid and Medicare [are] the primary health insurers for people with disabilities”).

  115. Nora Ellen Groce et al., HIV Issues and People with Disabilities: A Review and Agenda for Research, 77 Soc. Sci. & Med. 31–37 (2013) (analyzing research about the intersection of HIV/AIDS and people with disabilities and calling for greater attention to the topic).

  116. Amy Swango-Wilson, Meaningful Sex Education Programs for Individuals with Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities, 29 Sexuality & Disability 113–16 (2011).

  117. See generally Benfer, supra note 86 (explaining the social determinants of health and the health justice framework).

  118. Soc. Sec. Admin., SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2021, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/‌cola/SSI.html [https://perma.cc/DW5R-6MY3] (last visited July 20, 2021).

  119. Soc. Sec. Admin., Substantial Gainful Activity, https://www.ssa.‌gov/oact/cola/sga.html [https://perma.cc/9YWP-XS5G] (last visited September 2, 2021).

  120. Rocking the Cradle, supra note 53, at 202 (“[T]he most significant difference between parents with disabilities and parents without disabilities is economic . . . .”).

  121. While marriage is certainly not required to form families, it should be available to people with disabilities the same as it is for nondisabled people. However, strict asset programs prevent disabled people from marrying. See Waterstone, supra note 27, at 549 n. 132.

  122. U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Economic Characteristics for the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population by Disability Status, https://data.census.gov/‌cedsci/table?t=Disability&tid=ACSST1Y2019.S1811&hidePreview=true&vintage=2018 [https://perma.cc/6JFJ-DATH] (last visited July 11, 2021).

  123. See Section I.B supra (noting that disabled parents have disproportionate rates of child welfare system involvement and termination of parental rights).

  124. ‘Abolition Is the Only Answer’: A Conversation with Dorothy Roberts, Rise Mag. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.risemagazine.org/2020/10/conversation-with-dorothy-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/9DMC-DQBL] (“Policing captures what this system does. It polices families with the threat of taking children away. Even when its agents don’t remove children, they can take children and that threat is how they impose their power and terror. It is a form of punishment, harm and oppression.” (quoting Dorothy Roberts) (emphasis in original)).

  125. See generally Robyn M. Powell, Achieving Justice for Disabled Parents and Their Children: An Abolitionist Approach, 33 Yale J.L. & Feminism (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (arguing that child welfare system abolition is necessary to protect disabled parents and their children).

  126. Rocking the Cradle, supra note 53, at 16.

Government Speech and First Amendment Capture

Alarm regarding government speech is not new. In earlier decades, scholars worried that the government’s speech might monopolize a marketplace and drown out opposing viewpoints. But today, using a move I term “First Amendment capture,” the government need not be the loudest speaker because it can become the only speaker. First Amendment capture has been made possible by the Supreme Court’s developing government speech doctrine, which holds that government speech is not subject to the Free Speech Clause. Consequently, once speech is declared governmental, the government may censor viewpoints it does not like. First Amendment capture—categorizing contested speech as government speech and then eliminating contrary viewpoints—is an increasingly frequent occurrence and risks giving the government too much power to suppress those who would criticize it or blow the whistle on it. While one solution is to resist the government speech label, this Essay also proposes recognizing “mixed speech” as a potential means of curtailing the expansiveness of the government speech doctrine.

Introduction

Government speech is inevitable; the government cannot operate without speaking.1.See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.Show More Because government speech can educate, inform, and make positive contributions to the marketplace of ideas, government speech is not necessarily problematic.2.See generally Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 7–12 (2000) (listing four ways that government speech can be viewed as an affirmative good).Show More At the same time, government speech may threaten free speech values if it overwhelms critics or distorts debate.

What role government should play in our political discourse was the subject of much debate in the 1980s.3.See, e.g., John E. Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1988) (“In recent years, perhaps due to an awareness of the changing factors that increase the danger to our society from government speech, several scholars have examined the topic of whether the judiciary could use the free speech clause of first amendment to limit governmental speech.”); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 565, 570 (1980) (“The government speech problem is to determine when and by what means government may promote controversial values and when it may not.”); see alsoRichard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 961 (1984) (discussing prominent themes in the government speech debate); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1104 (1979) (arguing that the First Amendment prohibits government from advocating political ideas); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 863 (1979) (arguing that governments should not have free speech rights); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. Rev. 578 (1980) (arguing that partisan government speech does not and should not receive First Amendment protection).Show More Scholars worried that the government might monopolize speech marketplaces and drown out other views.4.See, e.g., Kamenshine, supranote 3, at 1104 (“[P]articipation by the government in the dissemination of political ideas poses a threat to open public debate . . . .”); Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 601 (“[O]ne of the problems to be faced in assessing government speech [is] the concern that government speech could result in unacceptable domination of the marketplace and the need for measures to confine the danger.”).Show More The concern that government speech might distort a marketplace of ideas remains, but thanks to the newly developed government speech doctrine,5.See infra Part I (describing the development of the government speech doctrine).Show More the government need not be the loudest speaker because it can become the only speaker. According to the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine, once speech is deemed government speech, it falls outside the purview of the Free Speech Clause.6.Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (“The Court has also said that ‘government speech’ escapes First Amendment strictures.”).Show More That is, while suppressing a viewpoint in private speech triggers strict scrutiny and is presumptively unconstitutional,7.Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. . . . When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”).Show More the same action under the government speech label is perfectly constitutional as the government may exert complete control over its own speech.8.See infra Part I.Show More A free speech challenge will consequently fail if the contested speech is classified as government speech9.See infra notes 26–34 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving specialty license plates and monuments in public parks).Show More rather than private speech.10 10.Governments often provide spaces, such as the plaza in front of the town hall, for private citizens to speak. These are known as forums. Different doctrinal rules might apply depending on the type of forum, but viewpoint regulations are always subject to strict scrutiny. See generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1975, 1980–89 (2011) (describing public forum doctrine).Show More Thus, the former fear that competing viewpoints will be buried under government speech has given way to the fear that competing viewpoints will be altogether eliminated by the government speech doctrine.11 11.See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 34–35 (2017) (“[W]ithout some meaningful limit on the government’s ability to claim expression as its own, the government speech doctrine could eviscerate the bar on viewpoint discrimination among private speakers.”).Show More

I call this move—classifying contested speech as government speech and then clamping down on certain viewpoints—“First Amendment capture.” “Agency capture” occurs when the regulated gain control of the agency charged with regulating them.12 12.Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Agency Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 21 n.23 (2010) (“Capture, for the purposes of agency design, may be defined as responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being regulated.”).Show More Likewise, the government, which is supposed to be regulated by the First Amendment, gains control of speech in First Amendment capture.

One obvious way to prevent First Amendment capture is to categorize contested speech as private speech. But that may come with its own costs, such as forcing government to support or sponsor denigrating speech or highly religious speech.13 13.See infra Part III.B.Show More Another way to address exponential expansion of government speech is to recognize a new category of speech in addition to private speech and government speech. This new category—“mixed speech”—would cover speech that has both private and government components, and it would trigger intermediate scrutiny.14 14.In contrast, regulations of private speech regularly trigger strict scrutiny while regulations of government speech trigger no scrutiny at all. See infra Part I.Show More This recognition would allow more speech to be subject to the free speech prohibition on viewpoint discrimination yet still allow a degree of government control.15 15.I have discussed this proposal in an earlier work. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 675–77 (2008) [hereinafter Corbin, Mixed Speech]. Unlike this Article, the earlier one did not focus on the problems of First Amendment capture.Show More

This Article has three parts. Part I describes the current government speech doctrine. Part II describes the problems raised by government speech. It begins with a brief review of early government speech literature. It then examines how these concerns manifest today. Part III considers Free Speech Clause solutions,16 16.This Essay focuses on how the Free Speech Clause itself might be mobilized, though obviously solutions might be found elsewhere as well.Show More including the recognition of mixed speech as a potential limit on unregulated government speech.

I.  Government Speech Doctrine

The government speech doctrine is a late twentieth century judicial creation.17 17.Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise.”). The 1991 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), decision is now heralded as one of the first government speech cases, though the decision itself did not use that term. Rather, a decade later Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), identified Rust as a government speech decision: “The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.” Id. at 541.Show More Its primary rule is fairly straightforward: If the speech is the government’s, then the Free Speech Clause does not apply.18 18.Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (“[O]ur cases recognize that ‘[t]he Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.’”).Show More One of the core tenets of the Free Speech Clause is that the government may not censor viewpoints it does not like.19 19.Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (“The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”); see also supra note 7.Show More However, “[t]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”20 20.Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553.Show More

The starting assumption for the government speech doctrine is that the government must be able to control its own speech in order to function.21 21.Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (“[I]mposing a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on government speech would be paralyzing.”).Show More Government officials are chosen because of their political platforms, and “[w]hen a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others.” 22 22.Id.Show More As the Supreme Court has observed, when the government promoted the war effort during World War II, the First Amendment did not demand that it simultaneously discourage those efforts.23 23.Id. at 1758.Show More Similarly, the government could not effectively promote vaccinations if it also had to balance its pro-vaccine message by supporting anti-vaxxers.24 24.Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015).Show More The government cannot do the job it was elected to do without the ability to decide what it says and does not say.25 25.Id. at 2246 (“But, as a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.”).Show More

Two recent cases—Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009)26 26.555 U.S. 460 (2009).Show More and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (2015)27 27.135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).Show More—have cemented the government speech doctrine. In Summum, a small religious group offered to donate a Summum religious monument to a public park that hosted several previously donated monuments, including one of the Ten Commandments.28 28.Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 466.Show More When the town refused, the group accused it of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.29 29.Id.Show More The Supreme Court held that monuments in a public park constitute government speech, and therefore the town could welcome a Ten Commandments monument while refusing Summum’s Seven Aphorisms monument.30 30.Id. at 472.Show More

In Walker, Texas found itself accused of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because, despite offering drivers dozens of specialty license plates, it had refused to make one bearing the confederate flag for the Sons of Confederate Veterans group.31 31.Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.Show More Again, the Supreme Court found the contested speech to be government speech.32 32.Id. at 2246.Show More As a result, Texas was free to reject the Sons of Confederate Veterans license plate.33 33.Id. at 2253.Show More “When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.”34 34.Id. at 2245; see also id. at 2245–46 (“Thus, government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.”).Show More

Although government speech is not subject to the Free Speech Clause, other clauses might limit it. For example, government speech might violate the Equal Protection Clause, which bars discrimination on the basis of race,35 35.Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.”).Show More or the Establishment Clause, which bars endorsing one religion over others.36 36.Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”).Show More However, the Supreme Court has argued that the primary check on government speech is the democratic process.37 37.Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (“[I]t is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech.”).Show More People express their approval or disapproval of the government and its speech with their vote. Because the government “is ultimately ‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy,’”38 38.Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 468 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).Show More the government may discriminate against certain viewpoints in its own speech. “If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”39 39.Id. at 468–69 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 529 U.S. at 235).Show More

In short, under the government speech doctrine, the government can choose its own words. If the electorate does not like the government’s chosen viewpoint, it can act to change the government.

II. Problems of Government Speech

Three justifications are regularly offered for why free speech is so important that government regulation of speech triggers concern and heightened scrutiny.40 40.Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 119, 120 (1989) (arguing that any attempt to articulate a single unifying theory of free speech risks oversimplification).Show More First, free speech promotes a marketplace of ideas, which helps us in our search for knowledge, including political knowledge.41 41.See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).Show More Second, free speech is key for our system of democratic self-governance; a free flow of information ensures that people can keep tabs on the government and make informed political decisions.42 42.See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).Show More Finally, free speech furthers autonomy and self-expression and is thus an end in itself.43 43.See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1997) (“Speech can relate to autonomy in two ways: as itself an exercise of autonomy or as an informational resource arguably essential for meaningful exercise of autonomy.”).Show More Just as a government monopoly over speech might distort the marketplace of ideas, and with it, our ability to govern ourselves, so too does First Amendment capture.

A. First Generation Concerns: Monopoly

To the extent that free speech scholarship in the 1980s examined government speech, the debate focused primarily on the degree to which the government should be permitted to act as a speaker within the marketplace of ideas. Animating these early discussions was a fear that government might overwhelm private speakers and monopolize the market. A government speech monopoly would not only inhibit a robust exchange of ideas but the resulting distorted free speech markets might also undermine the consent of the governed—a cornerstone of our democracy.

At the birth of the government speech doctrine (and before), scholars differed on the degree to which the government should be a speaker in the marketplace of ideas on controversial subjects. While acknowledging the government’s need to communicate in order to enact the democratic will,44 44.Yudof, supra note 3, at865 (“Government expression is critical to the operation of a democratic polity . . .”).Show More some believed the government should speak only when necessary.45 45.Ziegler, supra note 3, at 585–86 (“If the democratic process is to operate with a minimum of distortion, government information and communication functions in connection with structured political questions must be limited by law to those activities necessary for the effective operation of the process.”).Show More Others argued that the government’s speech could actually enrich the marketplace of ideas.46 46.Greene, supra note 2, at 8–11. As Greene points out, government can make distinctive contributions to public debate. Id.at 8. For example, it can subsidize arts and science. Id. at 9. It can use its power of persuasion to alter social norms regarding race, smoking, and overeating. Id. at 10. Government can also check concentrations of private power. Id. at 11; see also John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1137 (2005). (“[G]overnment can and should make a positive difference in the world of ideas . . .”).Show More

In spite of these differences, there was general consensus that a government monopoly would pose a problem with potential constitutional implications.47 47.See, e.g., Shiffrin, supranote 3, at 607 (“If a system of free expression is to be preserved, either custom, or statutes, or constitutionally based limitations must provide assurances that government speech will not unfairly dominate the intellectual marketplace.”).Show More As Richard Delgado noted: “A prominent theme in this ‘government speech’ debate is that the government’s powerful voice can easily overwhelm weaker private voices, creating a monopoly of ideas and inhibiting the dialectic on which we rely to reach decisions.”48 48.See Delgado, supranote 3, at 961–62.Show More Even those like Abner Greene, a strong supporter of the government as a participant in debate,49 49.Greene, supra note 2, at 5 (“Government may, and should, use its speech powers to advance specific conceptions of the good, even if those conceptions are contested, controversial, or seen as favoring a particular viewpoint.”).Show More agreed that “government speech is highly problematic when it is the only voice in a relevant speech market.”50 50.Greene, supra note 2, at 27.Show More Mark Yudof argued that such a government monopoly was tantamount to censoring of private speech: “The passage of time since adoption of the Bill of Rights has revealed that laws and practices that permit massive government communications activities may as effectively silence private speakers as a direct regime of censorship.”51 51.Yudof, supra note 3, at897.Show More Most agreed that government speech that monopolizes might be constrained by the First Amendment.52 52.Greene, supra note 2, at 27 (“[A]ctual monopolization [of the speech market] should be understood to violate the Constitution.”); see also Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1377, 1487 (2001) (“We conclude that government speech should receive little or no immunity from the rules that otherwise apply to government regulations when the government’s speech creates a monopoly for a particular point of view.”).Show More

B. Second Generation Concerns: First Amendment Capture

The worry that the government will drown out private speakers in a particular forum has given way to the worry that the forum will vanish altogether because the speech in it has been deemed government speech.53 53.See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 Iowa L. Rev.1259, 1264 (2010) (“The real point of these [government speech] cases may not be, as the Court innocuously suggests, to facilitate government speech. Rather, the point may be to give the government another tool with which to silence its critics.”).Show More Thus, the fear is not that competing viewpoints will be buried under government speech. Instead, the fear is that the contested speech will be categorized as government speech, giving the government the ability to eliminate competing viewpoints entirely. After all, under the government speech doctrine, government speech lies outside the protection of the Free Speech Clause. 54 54.See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 34–35 (2017) (“[W]ithout some meaningful limit on the government’s ability to claim expression as its own, the government speech doctrine could eviscerate the bar on viewpoint discrimination among private speakers.”).Show More

As described in the introduction, I call this move “First Amendment capture.” In “agency capture,” the regulated gain control of the agency that is supposed to regulate them. For example, the Food and Drug Administration is the agency charged with regulating the food industry. However, if the FDA falls under the influence of the food industry and its lobbyists, it has been captured.55 55.Barkow, supra note 12, at 21 n.23 (2010) (“Capture, for the purposes of agency design, may be defined as responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being regulated.”).Show More In “First Amendment capture,” the government, which is supposed to be regulated by the First Amendment, gains control of speech. As explained above, free speech is protected given the crucial role it plays in advancing knowledge (including political knowledge) and in fostering democratic self-governance.56 56.See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.Show More First Amendment capture undermines these free speech goals by curtailing political speech markets and political accountability.

1. Capture of Forums

This First Amendment capture is evident in the two government speech cases mentioned in Part I, both of which presented the question of whether the speech at issue was private speech in a forum (and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause) or government speech (and therefore under complete government control).

Recall that in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,57 57.555 U.S. 460 (2009).Show More a small religious group known as the Summum attempted to place a monument in a town park. The park already had a donated Ten Commandments monument (along with ten other donated displays),58 58.Id. at 464–65.Show More and the Summum wanted to donate an equivalent monument representing their religion’s main commandments, the Seven Aphorisms.59 59.Id. at 465.Show More The Tenth Circuit debated what kind of forum for private speech the Park represented, eventually deciding that the City violated the Summums’ free speech rights.60 60.Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050–54, 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).Show More The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, unlike speech in public parks, permanent monuments in public parks represented government speech, and “[are] therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”61 61.Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464.Show More As a result, the only monuments seen will be those chosen by the government.

A similar denouement occurred with specialty license plates. These are plates like “Choose Life” that are approved, manufactured, and owned by the government but appear on private vehicles because private individuals select and pay for them.62 62.“First surfacing in the late 1980s, specialty license plates are now available in most states.” The number of choices varies, with some states offering more than a hundred different options. Corbin, supra note 15, at 608–09.Show More Several states were sued on free speech grounds for issuing pro-life plates while refusing to issue pro-choice ones.63 63.Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 787–88 (4th Cir. 2004).Show More In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., Texas declined to issue a Sons of Confederate Veterans plate featuring a confederate flag.64 64.Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–44 (2015).Show More While the Fifth Circuit held that Texas had unconstitutionally discriminated in a forum on the basis of viewpoint,65 65.Id. at 2245.Show More the Supreme Court ruled that specialty license plates were actually government speech, and “[w]hen government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.”66 66.Id.Show More Consequently, the only viewpoints emblazoned on specialty license plates will be the ones endorsed by the government.67 67.See, e.g., ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 2016) (allowing North Carolina to issue pro-life specialty license plates without issuing pro-choice plates).Show More

These may seem like insignificant forums, or rather, former speech forums.68 68.In each case, the court held that the speech was not private speech in a forum, but rather government speech outside the protection of the Free Speech Clause. See supra note 10 (describing forums as government-owned spaces open to private speakers and subject to the Free Speech Clause).Show More How much harm can the government do by controlling park statutes and the messages on specialty license plates? Nevertheless, complete control of even these presumably low-stakes forums may have repercussions. After Summum, for example, the primary religious monuments people will see in public parks and other public spaces are likely to be Christian ones.69 69.Cf. Aleksandra Sandstrom, Majority of States Have All-Christian Congressional Delegations, Pew Res. Ctr. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/21/majority-of-states-have-all-christian-congressional-delegations/ [https://perma.cc/U6C3-3U6Y] (“The vast majority of the nation’s federal lawmakers (91%) describe themselves as Christians, compared with 71% of U.S. adults who say the same.”).Show More This link between American government and Christianity, when made again and again,70 70.For example, municipalities across the country erect a nativity scene, which depicts the birth of Jesus Christ, during Christmastime. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 689–90 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding holiday display with nativity in atrium of civic center despite refusing to include Winter Solstice display); Wells v. City & Cty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding City and County Building’s holiday display with nativity scene despite rejecting Winter Solstice sign).Show More in multiple contexts,71 71.For example, in addition to displays, many towns and cities open their legislative sessions with Christian prayers. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014) (upholding town’s practice of starting town board meetings with prayer despite most prayers being overwhelmingly Christian).Show More inevitably sends a subtle message that America is a Christian nation and that real Americans are Christian Americans.72 72.Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1545, 1582 (2010) (“The power of government expression to reinforce the outsider status of certain groups should not be underestimated. While many factors determine a group’s status, symbols of government are one of them, and government’s religious speech signals who belongs and who does not, who is preferred and who is second-class.”).Show More This message from the government runs contrary to the constitutional promise to reject religious hierarchies in favor of religious equality.

Moreover, government speech has not been limited to parks and plates,73 73.In fact, federal appeals courts have held that speech ranging from advertising banners displayed at public schools, Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 2015), to tourism brochures displayed for a fee at state rest areas, Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 682 F. App’x 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2017), was government speech, thereby allowing the government to exclude viewpoints it found objectionable.Show More and future decisions may more directly implicate democratic self-governance. Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, has wondered, “Could a city library choose to have only books by Republican authors by saying that it is the government speaking?”74 74.Erwin Chemerinsky, Free Speech, Confederate Flags and License Plates, Orange County Reg. (June 25, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/government-668320-texas-license.html [https://perma.cc/6UWX-PPH4].Show More Or could a government Facebook page eliminate unfavorable hyperlinks or public comments on the grounds that everything on its webpage is government speech?75 75.Cf. Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 331 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Town website, including hyperlinks to private websites, was government speech); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 283–85 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that school district’s website, which included links to private websites, was government speech).Show More

In fact, Trump’s Twitter feed was the focus of a free speech lawsuit by litigants arguing that the feed was a forum.76 76.Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2019).Show More Twitter is a modern-day marketplace of ideas.77 77.Two-thirds of adults in the United States now get some of their news from social media, and almost three-quarters of those on Twitter use it at least in part for news. See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, Pew Res. Ctr. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/Y7ZN-P98R] (finding that 67% of users get news on social media at least occasionally and 74% of Twitter users get news on Twitter).Show More Anyone can follow someone and see their “tweets,” whether they contain news or opinion. Moreover, anyone can then comment on the original tweet, either by replying directly or by retweeting the original tweet with added commentary.78 78.Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.Show More Both replies and retweets are publicly visible and amenable to comment.79 79.Id.Show More As is well known, Donald Trump was a prolific tweeter,80 80.Kevin Breuninger, Trump’s Most Memorable Twitter Bombshells of 2018, CNBC.com (Dec. 31, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/31/trumps-top-10-biggest-twitter-bombshells-made-history-in-2018.html [https://perma.cc/F6C2-9ZR7] (noting that Trump averaged nearly 10 tweets per day in 2018).Show More and the tweets from his @realDonaldTrump account generated extensive response and media coverage.81 81.Knight, 928 F.3d at 231 (“The President’s tweets produce an extraordinarily high level of public engagement, typically generating thousands of replies, some of which, in turn, generate hundreds of thousands of additional replies.”).Show More (Although Trump inherited @POTUS from Barack Obama for the duration of his presidency, he preferred @realDonaldTrump, which predated his administration.82 82.Meredith MacLeod, We’ve Read All President Trump’s Tweets, So You Don’t Have to, CTVNews.ca (Apr. 28, 2017, 7:09 PM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/analysis-we-ve-read-all-president-trump-s-tweets-so-you-don-t-have-to-1.3389513 [https://perma.cc/ZK4N-7CED].Show More)

Before a court declared his conduct unconstitutional,83 83.Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“We hold that . . . the blocking of the plaintiffs based on their political speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination that violates the First Amendment.”); Knight, 928 F.3d at 234 (“Because we agree that in blocking the Individual Plaintiffs the President engaged in prohibited viewpoint discrimination, we affirm.”).Show More Trump had taken to blocking people who criticized him on his @realDonaldTrump account.84 84.Ashley Feinberg, A Running List of People Donald Trump Has Blocked on Twitter, Wired (June 14, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/donald-trump-twitter-blocked/ [https://perma.cc/94KS-VCLZ].Show More He blocked everyday people, celebrities, nonprofit organizations, and even journalists.85 85.Id.Show More Seven of these blocked Twitter users sued Trump, arguing that his actions violated the Free Speech Clause by discriminating against them on the basis of viewpoint.86 86.Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549, 553.Show More Trump did not deny that he blocked them because he did not like their comments.87 87.Knight, 928 F.3d at 234 (“The President concedes that he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs because they posted tweets that criticized him or his policies.”).Show More Instead, he argued that the act of blocking did not implicate the Free Speech Clause because his Twitter feed was not a public forum run by the government, but rather, was a purely personal account.88 88.Assoc. Press, Judge to Trump: Muting, Not Blocking Twitter Followers, May End Lawsuit, NBCNews.com (Mar. 8, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/judge-trump-muting-not-blocking-twitter-followers-may-end-lawsuit-n854951 [https://perma.cc/7SSC-KWC8]. (“The government says Trump’s Twitter feed is a personal account and not a public forum requiring him to welcome all voices.”).Show More

While President, Trump’s claim that his Twitter feed was purely private was untenable, and every court to consider it has firmly rejected his defense.89 89.A district court, Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549, and Second Circuit panel, Knight, 928 F.3d at 230–31, have both rejected Trump’s claim, and the Second Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 2020).Show More As one court observed, Trump “use[d] the account to take actions that can be taken only by the President as President.”90 90.Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 567.Show More For example, Trump made official proclamations and announced executive policy from his @realDonaldTrump account.91 91.For example, Trump announced his ban on transgender troops for the first time on Twitter. Jessica Estepa, We’re All Atwitter: Three Times President Trump Made Major Announcements Via Tweets, USA Today (Mar. 13, 2018, 4:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/03/13/were-all-atwitter-3-times-president-trump-made-major-announcements-via-tweets/420085002/ [https://perma.cc/D2HC-KC6A].Show More In fact, the National Archives and Records Administration advised that as official records, the @realDonaldTrump tweets must be preserved pursuant to the Presidential Records Act.92 92.Knight, 928 F.3d at 232.Show More In short, Trump’s Twitter feed, including the interactive part, was not purely private speech, and Trump’s actions with regard to it were government actions that are subject to constitutional limits.93 93.Id. at 236 (“In sum, since [Trump] took office, the President has consistently used the Account as an important tool of governance . . . ”).Show More

Given that Trump used his Twitter account for official purposes, the real risk to the interactive part of Trump’s Twitter feed was not that it would be found to be purely private, but that it would be found to be purely governmental.94 94.Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (endorsing “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . ”).Show More After all, if a court had deemed Trump’s feed to be government speech, then Trump could have exerted total control over its content and excluded anyone who criticized him or challenged his claims. In fact, Trump argued in the alternative that “to the extent [his Twitter] Account [was] government-controlled, posts on it are government speech to which the First Amendment does not apply.”95 95.Knight, 928 F.3d at 234; see also id. at 237, 239.Show More

There is no gainsaying the importance of the President’s feed to the marketplace of political ideas and democratic self-governance. Before he was banned for inciting a violent insurrection,96 96.Brian Fung, Twitter Bans President Trump Permanently, CNN Business (Jan. 9, 2021, 9:19 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/tech/trump-twitter-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/6HDT-GTCZ] (quoting Twitter explaining that “we have permanently suspended the account due to the risk of further incitement of violence”).Show More Twitter was one of President Trump’s primary channels for communicating with the public. Given Trump’s love of Twitter, blocking people meant depriving them of a crucial in-real-time source of information.97 97.Even if other people retweet Trump, the blocked user sees only a gray box.Show More As one plaintiff lamented, “I may not be crazy about President Trump, but he is my president, and I want to know what he is saying.”98 98.Rebecca Pilar Buckwalter-Poza, Philip Cohen, Eugene Gu, Holly Figueroa & Brandon Neely, I Was Blocked by @realDonaldTrump, Knight First Amend. Inst. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/i-was-blocked-realdonaldtrump [https://perma.cc/YH5M-ZUMB] (quoting Holly Figueroa) [hereinafter I Was Blocked].Show More

In addition, Trump’s Twitter feed provided a rare forum for the exchange of different points of view. In the past, Americans typically shared a common source of news, which exposed them to a range of viewpoints.99 99.Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, 59 J. Comm. 19, 20 (2009) (“Forty years ago, the great majority of Americans got their daily news from one of three network newscasts [that] offered a homogeneous and generic ‘point-counterpoint’ perspective on the news, thus ensuring that exposure to the news was a common experience.”).Show More Today, the abundance of news sources allows people to select those outlets that tend to confirm their pre-existing world views.100 100.Patricia Donovan, Study Demonstrates How We Support Our False Beliefs, U. Buff. News Ctr. (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/2009/08/10364.html [https://perma.cc/XL9X-Z8LK]. (“[R]ather than search rationally for information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular belief, people actually seek out information that confirms what they already believe.”); see also Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 Pol. Behav. 303, 307 (2010) (“[R]espondents may engage in a biased search process, seeking out information that supports their preconceptions and avoiding evidence that undercuts their beliefs.”).Show More Studies show that this is especially true for Trump voters, who have an affinity for conservative media such as Fox News and Breitbart.101 101.Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts & Ethan Zuckerman, Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader Media Agenda, Colum. Journalism Rev. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php [https://perma.cc/33JP-HBY5] (noting that Clinton supporters “were highly attentive to traditional media outlets” but Trump supporters inhabited a “distinct and insulated” right-wing media system anchored around Breitbart that “transmit[ted] a hyper-partisan perspective”); see also id. (“[O]ur study suggests that polarization was asymmetric.”); Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel & Amy Mitchell, Trump, Clinton Voters Divided in Their Main Source for Election News, Pew Res. Ctr. (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/01/18/trump-clinton-voters-divided-in-their-main-source-for-election-news/ [https://perma.cc/YNL2-2F4J] (noting that Fox News was the main source of news for 40% of Trump voters).Show More Trump’s Twitter feed was arguably one of the few places where people with divergent political outlooks might interact with each other. For the President to block his critics denied them access to a diverse audience and denied them the opportunity to contribute to the formation of public opinion. As one blocked user, and litigant in the suit against Trump, put it, “[b]eing blocked has kept me from participating in critical public conversations.”102 102.I Was Blocked, supra note 98 (quoting Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza); see also id. (quoting Philip Cohen) (“Being blocked by Trump diminished my ability to respond and engage in the political process.”).Show More

Finally, blocking dissenters created a false sense of consensus. It allowed Trump to “create a space on Twitter—where there are millions of people—that he can manipulate to give the impression that more agree with him than actually do.”103 103.I Was Blocked, supra note 98 (quoting Philip Cohen).Show More Erasing opposing viewpoints enhances the persuasiveness of the remaining ones because studies show that positions perceived as popular wield outsized influence.104 104.This proposition, that a position perceived as popular is likely to wield greater influence, was established by the famous Asch studies. In these studies, when subjects were questioned alone, 99% correctly identified the length of a line. When questioned in the presence of those who intentionally gave the same incorrect answer, 70% agreed with the incorrect answer at least once. Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology 450–59 (1952); see Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 Psychol. Monographs: Gen. & Applied 1, 1, 9–24 (1956).Show More “It is a ‘social psychological truism that individuals tend to yield to a majority position even when that position is clearly incorrect.’”105 105.Saumya Manohar, Comment, Look Who’s Talking Now: “Choose Life” License Plates and Deceptive Government Speech, 25 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 229, 236 (2006) (quoting Anne Maass & Russell D. Clark, III, Internalization Versus Compliance: Differential Processes Underlying Minority Influence and Conformity, 13 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 197, 197 (1983)); see also Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K.H. Ecker & John Cook, Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era, 6 J. Applied Res. Memory & Cognition 353, 361 (2017) (People tend to believe things “that they believe to be widely shared—irrespective of whether or not they are actually widely shared.”).Show More In sum, a free and robust exchange of political ideas should occur on the Twitter feed of the President and other public officials. While Trump is no longer in office, political officials’ use of social media is growing all the time.106 106.See, e.g., Patrick Van Kessel, Regina Widjaya, Sono Shah, Aaron Smith & Adam Hughes, Congress Soars to New Heights on Social Media, Pew Res. Ctr.,(July 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/07/16/congress-soars-to-new-heights-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/JH78-BWU6].Show More Declaring these feeds government speech, subject to total government control, risks distorting the marketplace of political ideas.

2. Capture of Whistleblowers

Potential speech forums are not alone in their importance to democratic self-governance or their vulnerability to First Amendment capture. Government employee speech likewise plays an important role in our democracy, and it has already suffered from the expansion of the government speech doctrine. Citizens in democracies must be able to hold government officials accountable for their actions. To do this, they need information on their public servants.107 107.Lewandowsky, Ecker & Cook, supra note 105, at 354 (“It is a truism that a functioning democracy relies on a well-informed public.”).Show More Because public employees are uniquely well-placed to know what government officials are doing, they are some of the best government whistleblowers.108 108.Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 601, 642 (2016) (“Because political accountability is the primary means by which the public seeks to ensure that public managers are pursuing public goals, speech by public employees plays a particularly important role in self-governance.”).Show More

Unfortunately, the government speech doctrine’s expansion into the government employee speech context discourages whistleblowing by government employees. Previously, the Free Speech Clause would cover this speech.109 109.Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that the idea “that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens . . . has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.”).Show More It did not always protect it, but the Court would perform a balancing test, weighing the public’s interest in hearing speech on matters of public concern against the government employer’s interest in avoiding disruption in the workplace.110 110.City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82–83 (2004) (describing the Pickering-Connick balancing test).Show More Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,111 111.547 U.S. 410 (2006).Show More however, if the employees’ speech is “pursuant to . . . official duties,” it is essentially the government’s speech, and therefore not covered by the Free Speech Clause.112 112.Id.at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The majority accepts the fallacy . . . that any statement made within the scope of public employment is (or should be treated as) the government’s own speech.”).Show More Regardless of how important it may be for political accountability, it lies outside free speech protection.113 113.Id. at 421 (majority opinion) (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).Show More

Due to this new government speech rule, countless public officials lost constitutional protection for reporting government malfeasance in the course of their official duties.114 114.See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Government Employee Religion, 49 Ariz. St. L.J. 1193, 1244 (2017) (collecting cases).Show More “In fact, in the years following Garcetti, the lower federal courts denied protection to numerous government employees who objected to their employers’ illegal practices, health and safety violations, and financial improprieties.”115 115.Kim, supra note 108, at 644; see also Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public Employees, and the First Amendment, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 975, 993 (2013) (“Regrettably, lower courts have learned the lessons of Garcetti quite well. Numerous individuals have suffered adverse employment actions when seeking to expose the kinds of practices that whistleblower protections are designed to bring to light.”).Show More

If government employees can be fired for trying to hold the government to account, then they may just stop trying. As Helen Louise Norton summarized, the Garcetti rule “allows government officials to punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other on-the-job speech that would otherwise inform voters’ views and facilitate their ability to hold the government politically accountable for its choices.” 116 116.Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 4 (2009).Show More In short, the expansion of the government speech doctrine—essentially the First Amendment capture of government employee speech—has undermined government accountability.

Thanks to the government speech doctrine, the government does not need to overpower to dominate the marketplace of ideas. Rather, it manages to eliminate the competition with a doctrinal sleight of hand. Once a stream of information is labeled governmental, the state may completely control it and exclude any contrary opinion or whistleblowing it does not like. The Free Speech Clause provides no protection in these cases of First Amendment capture. As the Supreme Court itself acknowledged, “while the government-speech doctrine is important—indeed, essential—it is a doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse.”117 117.Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).Show More

III. Solutions to First Amendment Capture

There are two potential approaches to limiting the risks of censorship created by an ever-expanding government speech doctrine. The first is to limit what is classified as government, as opposed to private, speech. But as discussed below, this may be an imperfect solution if the speech is not, in fact, purely private. The second is to change free speech doctrine by recognizing “mixed speech” as a new category of speech protected by the Free Speech Clause. Thus, which approach is preferable may be case-specific, but a reevaluation of the doctrine is ultimately needed.118 118.Note that while this Article explains the usefulness of a mixed speech category in containing the excesses of the government speech doctrine, it does not recapitulate the comprehensive analysis of mixed speech available in earlier work. See generallyCorbin, supra note 15.Show More

A. Private Speech Not Government Speech

The less-government-speech approach dictates that when the status of speech is in dispute, the speech should usually be categorized as private speech rather than government speech. In other words, private speech is the default. If the contested speech is deemed private speech, then the government cannot censor private speakers under the guise of government speech because any viewpoint restrictions on private speech are subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.119 119.Regardless of the forum, whether traditional, designated, limited, or nonpublic, the government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint without passing strict scrutiny. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).Show More And only in the rarest of circumstances will speech regulations survive strict scrutiny.120 120.Indeed, the Court tends to characterize them as “presumptively unconstitutional.” See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (“A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint . . . is ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’”).Show More

Accordingly, a court faced with a claim that a President’s or other politician’s Twitter feed was government speech rather than a government forum hosting private speech should hold that it is a forum for private speech. In this way, the debate on the politician’s policy decisions will remain “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”121 121.N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).Show More Everyone would be able to participate in the discussion, and all viewpoints would be aired at one of the few online sites where people with radically different points of view might still interact with each other. Furthermore, the government would no longer be able to manipulate the political conversation to make it seem like its viewpoint was more popular than it really was.122 122.See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.Show More

B. Mixed Speech Not Government Speech

The problem with relying on the less-government-speech approach alone is that sometimes the speech in dispute is not actually private speech, or at least it is not only private speech. Take the specialty license plates at issue in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., discussed earlier.123 123.135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (2015).Show More There is a strong private element. Private individuals select the plate with the message they want, pay extra money for it, and fasten it on their vehicles.124 124.Corbin, supra note 15, at 646–47 (“[N]o one who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase ‘Choose Life’ would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint.”).Show More In my family, we have a “Save the Manatee” specialty license plate because we care enough about these sea creatures to announce that fact and to serve as a “mobile billboard” for their cause.125 125.Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (describing standard license plates “as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”).Show More But specialty license plates are also governmental and irreducibly so. After all, the State approves the plates, manufactures them, owns them, and has its name emblazoned across the top.126 126.Corbin, supra note 15, at 647.Show More People will inevitably attribute the plate’s message not just to the car’s owner, but also to the State that issued it. “When the government component in mixed speech is undeniably strong, as it is with specialty license plates, the messages very likely will be linked to the government, regardless of how courts analyze them.”127 127.Id. at 654.Show More

Consequently, a state has a legitimate interest in not endorsing certain messages on plates that bear its name. In Walker, to avoid condoning racism and violating equal protection norms, Texas declined to issue plates with a confederate flag.128 128.Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (explaining that the state declined the plate because many find the confederate flag offensive and associate it with hate groups); Corbin, supra note 15, at 657 (“States that hoped to keep the Confederate flag off their specialty license plates realized that for many, it represents a celebration of slavery and a not-so-subtly coded message of racial superiority.”).Show More Other states might not want to issue “Say Yes to Jesus” plates to avoid endorsing religion and violating establishment norms.129 129.Corbin, supra note 15, at 659 (“If specialty license plates are treated as purely private speech, then the establishment clause does not forbid, and the free speech clause may require, plates with religious messages. But as discussed above, because the plates are actually mixed speech, the state may well be seen as endorsing these religious messages and will thereby run afoul of the establishment clause.”).Show More Yet, had the Supreme Court held that the license plates—or any other contested speech—were private speech, then the State would not be able to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.130 130.See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining viewpoint regulations are subject to strict scrutiny).Show More If speech is private, then all viewpoints, including racist viewpoints and religious viewpoints, must be allowed.131 131.See supra note 120 and accompanying text (explaining speech regulations subject to strict scrutiny are almost never constitutional).Show More This viewpoint-neutral regime would force the government to associate itself with messages that it should not endorse or tolerate. The same problem may present itself in other situations, whether it be speech by a police chief,132 132.Cf. Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (involving an anti-LGBTQ book written by fire chief and disseminated at work).Show More commemorative bricks on school property,133 133.Cf. Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving commemorative bricks on school property); Demmon v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 342 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (E.D. Va. 2004) (involving bricks on school property).Show More or advertisements on public transportation.134 134.Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 796 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving advertisements on city’s transit system); Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d 947, 949–50 (7th Cir. 2016) (involving advertisements on city’s buses); see also Corbin, supra note 15, at 623–26 (describing examples of mixed speech).Show More

Under the current binary regime, where speech must be labeled either private speech or government speech, there seems to be no satisfactory solution when elements of both are undeniably present. Labeling a contested stream of speech as government speech removes it entirely from free speech protection, creating the problem of First Amendment capture and government censorship.135 135.See supra Part II.B.Show More But insisting that such speech is private speech, with its bar on viewpoint discrimination, risks giving short shrift to the government interests in disassociating from certain speech.136 136.Corbin, supra note 15, at 656 (“From the government’s perspective, a viewpoint neutrality regime would be objectionable because it would force the government to associate itself with messages that it would not voluntarily endorse or tolerate.”).Show More

A third option is warranted. When contested speech cannot be fairly treated as purely private or purely governmental, it should be treated as falling within a new category: mixed speech.137 137.Id. at 671–72.Show More That is, instead of treating mixed speech as private speech or government speech, acknowledge that it is mixed speech, with both private and government interests present. In contrast to strict scrutiny (for private speech) or no scrutiny (for government speech), any government restrictions on viewpoint would be subject to a rigorous intermediate scrutiny.138 138.Id. at 675 (“This three-part test is a rigorous intermediate scrutiny. Its ‘intermediate scrutiny’ counterpart is the heightened scrutiny given to sex classifications under equal protection rather than the cursory scrutiny given to content-neutral restrictions on expressive conduct.”).Show More

A rigorous intermediate scrutiny means that contested streams of information would no longer fall outside the purview of the Free Speech Clause, thereby guarding against attempts to suppress contrary viewpoints simply because the government disapproves of them. At the same time, it would not leave the government without any control over speech that may be attributed to it. If the government articulates a strong enough reason, such as complying with constitutional values (e.g., equal protection or establishment), and a sufficiently tailored means, then the regulation could survive intermediate scrutiny.

Labeling speech as government speech makes it too easy for the government to censor speech it does not like. Classifying such speech as private speech (when appropriate) and recognizing a category of mixed speech (when the government component precludes classification as private speech) would help forestall the expansion of government speech into realms where it does not belong, and as a result, would preserve the marketplace of ideas and protect government whistleblowers.

Conclusion

Although inescapable and not necessarily detrimental, government speech has the potential to undermine the necessary mechanisms of democracy. In particular, the expansion of the government speech doctrine allows for First Amendment capture. Once speech is labeled government speech, the government may exercise complete control over it. Such control may stymy robust political discussion needed for informed political decision-making or suppress whistleblowing needed for political accountability.

One solution to First Amendment capture is to categorize speech as private speech, rather than government speech, so that any viewpoint-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional. Another is to recognize a new category of speech—mixed speech—where viewpoint regulations must pass intermediate scrutiny, thereby allowing the government to regulate when it has a valid reason, yet at the same time preventing First Amendment capture and censorship.

  1. * Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia Law School. I would like to thank the participants at the Sixth Annual Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law School. I would also like to thank Michael Cheah and Jean Phillip Shami, my research assistants Alejandra De La Camera and Luciana Jhon Urranaga, and the Virginia Law Review Online staff. Copyright © 2021 by Caroline Mala Corbin.

  2. See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.

  3. See generally Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev

    .

    1, 7–12 (2000) (listing four ways that government speech can be viewed as an affirmative good).

  4. See, e.g., John E. Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30 Ariz. L. Rev

    .

    1, 9 (1988) (“In recent years, perhaps due to an awareness of the changing factors that increase the danger to our society from government speech, several scholars have examined the topic of whether the judiciary could use the free speech clause of first amendment to limit governmental speech.”); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev

    .

    565, 570 (1980) (“The government speech problem is to determine when and by what means government may promote controversial values and when it may not.”); see also Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. Rev

    .

    961 (1984) (discussing prominent themes in the government speech debate); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Cal. L. Rev

    .

    1104 (1979) (arguing that the First Amendment prohibits government from advocating political ideas); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev

    .

    863 (1979) (arguing that governments should not have free speech rights); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. Rev

    .

    578 (1980) (arguing that partisan government speech does not and should not receive First Amendment protection).

  5. See, e.g., Kamenshine, supra note 3, at 1104 (“[P]articipation by the government in the dissemination of political ideas poses a threat to open public debate . . . .”); Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 601 (“[O]ne of the problems to be faced in assessing government speech [is] the concern that government speech could result in unacceptable domination of the marketplace and the need for measures to confine the danger.”).

  6. See infra Part I (describing the development of the government speech doctrine).

  7. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (“The Court has also said that ‘government speech’ escapes First Amendment strictures.”).

  8. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. . . . When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”).

  9. See infra Part I.

  10. See infra notes 26–34 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving specialty license plates and monuments in public parks).

  11. Governments often provide spaces, such as the plaza in front of the town hall, for private citizens to speak. These are known as forums. Different doctrinal rules might apply depending on the type of forum, but viewpoint regulations are always subject to strict scrutiny. See generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. Rev

    .

    1975, 1980–89 (2011) (describing public forum doctrine).

  12. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev

    .

    33, 34–35 (2017) (“[W]ithout some meaningful limit on the government’s ability to claim expression as its own, the government speech doctrine could eviscerate the bar on viewpoint discrimination among private speakers.”).

  13. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Agency Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev

    .

    15, 21 n.23 (2010) (“Capture, for the purposes of agency design, may be defined as responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being regulated.”).

  14. See infra Part III.B.

  15. In contrast, regulations of private speech regularly trigger strict scrutiny while regulations of government speech trigger no scrutiny at all. See infra Part I.

  16. I have discussed this proposal in an earlier work. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev

    .

    605, 675–77 (2008) [hereinafter Corbin, Mixed Speech]. Unlike this Article, the earlier one did not focus on the problems of First Amendment capture.

  17. This Essay focuses on how the Free Speech Clause itself might be mobilized, though obviously solutions might be found elsewhere as well.

  18. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise.”). The 1991 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), decision is now heralded as one of the first government speech cases, though the decision itself did not use that term. Rather, a decade later Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), identified Rust as a government speech decision: “The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.” Id. at 541.

  19. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (“[O]ur cases recognize that ‘[t]he Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.’”).

  20. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (“The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”); see also supra note 7.

  21. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553.

  22. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (“[I]mposing a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on government speech would be paralyzing.”).

  23. Id.

  24. Id. at 1758.

  25. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015).

  26. Id. at 2246 (“But, as a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.”).

  27. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).

  28. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).

  29. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 466.

  30. Id.

  31. Id. at 472.

  32. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.

  33. Id. at 2246.

  34. Id. at 2253.

  35. Id. at 2245; see also id. at 2245–46 (“Thus, government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.”).

  36. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.”).

  37. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”).

  38. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (“[I]t is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech.”).

  39. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 468 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).

  40. Id. at 468–69 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 529 U.S. at 235).

  41. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 Colum. L. Rev

    .

    119, 120 (1989) (arguing that any attempt to articulate a single unifying theory of free speech risks oversimplification).

  42. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).

  43. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).

  44. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev

    .

    979, 980 (1997) (“Speech can relate to autonomy in two ways: as itself an exercise of autonomy or as an informational resource arguably essential for meaningful exercise of autonomy.”).

  45. Yudof, supra note 3, at 865 (“Government expression is critical to the operation of a democratic polity . . .”).

  46. Ziegler, supra note 3, at 585–86 (“If the democratic process is to operate with a minimum of distortion, government information and communication functions in connection with structured political questions must be limited by law to those activities necessary for the effective operation of the process.”).

  47. Greene, supra note 2, at 8–11. As Greene points out, government can make distinctive contributions to public debate. Id. at 8. For example, it can subsidize arts and science. Id. at 9. It can use its power of persuasion to alter social norms regarding race, smoking, and overeating. Id. at 10. Government can also check concentrations of private power. Id. at 11; see also John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1137 (2005). (“[G]overnment can and should make a positive difference in the world of ideas . . .”).

  48. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 607 (“If a system of free expression is to be preserved, either custom, or statutes, or constitutionally based limitations must provide assurances that government speech will not unfairly dominate the intellectual marketplace.”).

  49. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 961–62.

  50. Greene, supra note 2, at 5 (“Government may, and should, use its speech powers to advance specific conceptions of the good, even if those conceptions are contested, controversial, or seen as favoring a particular viewpoint.”).

  51. Greene, supra note 2, at 27.

  52. Yudof, supra note 3, at 897.

  53. Greene, supra note 2, at 27 (“[A]ctual monopolization [of the speech market] should be understood to violate the Constitution.”); see also Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1377, 1487 (2001) (“We conclude that government speech should receive little or no immunity from the rules that otherwise apply to government regulations when the government’s speech creates a monopoly for a particular point of view.”).

  54. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 Iowa L. Rev.

     

    1259, 1264 (2010) (“The real point of these [government speech] cases may not be, as the Court innocuously suggests, to facilitate government speech. Rather, the point may be to give the government another tool with which to silence its critics.”).

  55. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev

    .

    33, 34–35 (2017) (“[W]ithout some meaningful limit on the government’s ability to claim expression as its own, the government speech doctrine could eviscerate the bar on viewpoint discrimination among private speakers.”).

  56. Barkow, supra note 12, at 21 n.23 (2010) (“Capture, for the purposes of agency design, may be defined as responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being regulated.”).

  57. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

  58. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).

  59. Id. at 464–65.

  60. Id. at 465.

  61. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050–54, 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).

  62. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464.

  63. “First surfacing in the late 1980s, specialty license plates are now available in most states.” The number of choices varies, with some states offering more than a hundred different options. Corbin, supra note 15, at 608–09.

  64. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 787–88 (4th Cir. 2004).

  65. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–44 (2015).

  66. Id. at 2245.

  67. Id.

  68. See, e.g., ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 2016) (allowing North Carolina to issue pro-life specialty license plates without issuing pro-choice plates).

  69. In each case, the court held that the speech was not private speech in a forum, but rather government speech outside the protection of the Free Speech Clause. See supra note 10 (describing forums as government-owned spaces open to private speakers and subject to the Free Speech Clause).

  70. Cf. Aleksandra Sandstrom, Majority of States Have All-Christian Congressional Delegations, Pew Res. Ctr

    .

    (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/21/majority-of-states-have-all-christian-congressional-delegations/ [https://perma.cc/U6C3-3U6Y] (“The vast majority of the nation’s federal lawmakers (91%) describe themselves as Christians, compared with 71% of U.S. adults who say the same.”).

  71. For example, municipalities across the country erect a nativity scene, which depicts the birth of Jesus Christ, during Christmastime. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 689–90 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding holiday display with nativity in atrium of civic center despite refusing to include Winter Solstice display); Wells v. City & Cty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding City and County Building’s holiday display with nativity scene despite rejecting Winter Solstice sign).

  72. For example, in addition to displays, many towns and cities open their legislative sessions with Christian prayers. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014) (upholding town’s practice of starting town board meetings with prayer despite most prayers being overwhelmingly Christian).

  73. Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. Rev

    .

    1545, 1582 (2010) (“The power of government expression to reinforce the outsider status of certain groups should not be underestimated. While many factors determine a group’s status, symbols of government are one of them, and government’s religious speech signals who belongs and who does not, who is preferred and who is second-class.”).

  74. In fact, federal appeals courts have held that speech ranging from advertising banners displayed at public schools, Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 2015), to tourism brochures displayed for a fee at state rest areas, Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 682 F. App’x 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2017), was government speech, thereby allowing the government to exclude viewpoints it found objectionable.

  75. Erwin Chemerinsky, Free Speech, Confederate Flags and License Plates, Orange County Reg. (June 25, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/government-668320-texas-license.html [https://perma.cc/6UWX-PPH4].

  76. Cf. Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 331 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Town website, including hyperlinks to private websites, was government speech); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 283–85 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that school district’s website, which included links to private websites, was government speech).

  77. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2019).

  78. Two-thirds of adults in the United States now get some of their news from social media, and almost three-quarters of those on Twitter use it at least in part for news. See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, Pew Res. Ctr

    .

    (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/Y7ZN-P98R] (finding that 67% of users get news on social media at least occasionally and 74% of Twitter users get news on Twitter).

  79. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.

  80. Id.

  81. Kevin Breuninger, Trump’s Most Memorable Twitter Bombshells of 2018, CNBC.com (Dec. 31, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/31/trumps-top-10-biggest-twitter-bombshells-made-history-in-2018.html [https://perma.cc/F6C2-9ZR7] (noting that Trump averaged nearly 10 tweets per day in 2018).

  82. Knight, 928 F.3d at 231 (“The President’s tweets produce an extraordinarily high level of public engagement, typically generating thousands of replies, some of which, in turn, generate hundreds of thousands of additional replies.”).

  83. Meredith MacLeod, We’ve Read All President Trump’s Tweets, So You Don’t Have to, CTVNews.ca (Apr. 28, 2017, 7:09 PM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/analysis-we-ve-read-all-president-trump-s-tweets-so-you-don-t-have-to-1.3389513 [https://perma.cc/ZK4N-7CED].

  84. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“We hold that . . . the blocking of the plaintiffs based on their political speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination that violates the First Amendment.”); Knight, 928 F.3d at 234 (“Because we agree that in blocking the Individual Plaintiffs the President engaged in prohibited viewpoint discrimination, we affirm.”).

  85. Ashley Feinberg, A Running List of People Donald Trump Has Blocked on Twitter, Wired (June 14, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/donald-trump-twitter-blocked/ [https://perma.cc/94KS-VCLZ].

  86. Id.

     

  87. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549, 553.

  88. Knight, 928 F.3d at 234 (“The President concedes that he blocked the Individual Plaintiffs because they posted tweets that criticized him or his policies.”).

  89. Assoc. Press, Judge to Trump: Muting, Not Blocking Twitter Followers, May End Lawsuit, NBCNews.com (Mar. 8, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/judge-trump-muting-not-blocking-twitter-followers-may-end-lawsuit-n854951 [https://perma.cc/7SSC-KWC8]. (“The government says Trump’s Twitter feed is a personal account and not a public forum requiring him to welcome all voices.”).

  90. A district court, Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549, and Second Circuit panel, Knight, 928 F.3d at 230–31, have both rejected Trump’s claim, and the Second Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 2020).

  91. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 567.

  92. For example, Trump announced his ban on transgender troops for the first time on Twitter. Jessica Estepa, We’re All Atwitter: Three Times President Trump Made Major Announcements Via Tweets, USA Today (Mar. 13, 2018, 4:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/03/13/were-all-atwitter-3-times-president-trump-made-major-announcements-via-tweets/420085002/ [https://perma.cc/D2HC-KC6A].

  93. Knight, 928 F.3d at 232.

  94. Id. at 236 (“In sum, since [Trump] took office, the President has consistently used the Account as an important tool of governance . . . ”).

  95. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (endorsing “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . ”).

  96. Knight, 928 F.3d at 234; see also id. at 237, 239.

  97. Brian Fung, Twitter Bans President Trump Permanently, CNN Business (Jan. 9, 2021, 9:19 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/tech/trump-twitter-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/6HDT-GTCZ] (quoting Twitter explaining that “we have permanently suspended the account due to the risk of further incitement of violence”).

  98. Even if other people retweet Trump, the blocked user sees only a gray box.

  99. Rebecca Pilar Buckwalter-Poza, Philip Cohen, Eugene Gu, Holly Figueroa & Brandon Neely, I Was Blocked by @realDonaldTrump, Knight First Amend. Inst

    .

    (Mar. 25, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/i-was-blocked-realdonaldtrump [https://perma.cc/YH5M-ZUMB] (quoting Holly Figueroa) [hereinafter I Was Blocked].

  100. Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, 59 J. Comm

    .

    19, 20 (2009) (“Forty years ago, the great majority of Americans got their daily news from one of three network newscasts [that] offered a homogeneous and generic ‘point-counterpoint’ perspective on the news, thus ensuring that exposure to the news was a common experience.”).

  101. Patricia Donovan, Study Demonstrates How We Support Our False Beliefs, U. Buff. News Ctr. (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/2009/08/10364.html [https://perma.cc/XL9X-Z8LK]. (“[R]ather than search rationally for information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular belief, people actually seek out information that confirms what they already believe.”); see also Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 Pol. Behav

    .

    303, 307 (2010) (“[R]espondents may engage in a biased search process, seeking out information that supports their preconceptions and avoiding evidence that undercuts their beliefs.”).

  102. Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts & Ethan Zuckerman, Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader Media Agenda, Colum. Journalism Rev

    .

    (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php [https://perma.cc/33JP-HBY5] (noting that Clinton supporters “were highly attentive to traditional media outlets” but Trump supporters inhabited a “distinct and insulated” right-wing media system anchored around Breitbart that “transmit[ted] a hyper-partisan perspective”); see also id. (“[O]ur study suggests that polarization was asymmetric.”); Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel & Amy Mitchell, Trump, Clinton Voters Divided in Their Main Source for Election News, Pew Res. Ctr

    .

    (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/01/18/trump-clinton-voters-divided-in-their-main-source-for-election-news/ [https://perma.cc/YNL2-2F4J] (noting that Fox News was the main source of news for 40% of Trump voters).

  103. I Was Blocked, supra note 98 (quoting Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza); see also id. (quoting Philip Cohen) (“Being blocked by Trump diminished my ability to respond and engage in the political process.”).

  104. I Was Blocked, supra note 98 (quoting Philip Cohen).

  105. This proposition, that a position perceived as popular is likely to wield greater influence, was established by the famous Asch studies. In these studies, when subjects were questioned alone, 99% correctly identified the length of a line. When questioned in the presence of those who intentionally gave the same incorrect answer, 70% agreed with the incorrect answer at least once. Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology 450–59 (1952); see Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 Psychol. Monographs: Gen. & Applied 1, 1, 9–24 (1956).

  106. Saumya Manohar, Comment, Look Who’s Talking Now: “Choose Life” License Plates and Deceptive Government Speech, 25 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev

    .

    229, 236 (2006) (quoting Anne Maass & Russell D. Clark, III, Internalization Versus Compliance: Differential Processes Underlying Minority Influence and Conformity, 13 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol

    .

    197, 197 (1983)); see also Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K.H. Ecker & John Cook, Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era, 6 J. Applied Res. Memory & Cognition 353, 361 (2017) (People tend to believe things “that they believe to be widely shared—irrespective of whether or not they are actually widely shared.”).

  107. See, e.g., Patrick Van Kessel, Regina Widjaya, Sono Shah, Aaron Smith & Adam Hughes, Congress Soars to New Heights on Social Media, Pew Res. Ctr.

    ,

    (July 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/07/16/congress-soars-to-new-heights-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/JH78-BWU6].

  108. Lewandowsky, Ecker & Cook, supra note 105, at 354 (“It is a truism that a functioning democracy relies on a well-informed public.”).

  109. Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94 N.C. L. Rev

    .

    601, 642 (2016) (“Because political accountability is the primary means by which the public seeks to ensure that public managers are pursuing public goals, speech by public employees plays a particularly important role in self-governance.”).

  110. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that the idea “that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens . . . has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.”).

  111. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82–83 (2004) (describing the Pickering-Connick balancing test).

  112. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

  113. Id. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The majority accepts the fallacy . . . that any statement made within the scope of public employment is (or should be treated as) the government’s own speech.”).

  114. Id. at 421 (majority opinion) (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).

  115. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Government Employee Religion, 49 Ariz. St. L.J

    .

    1193, 1244 (2017) (collecting cases).

  116. Kim, supra note 108, at 644; see also Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public Employees, and the First Amendment, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev

    .

    975, 993 (2013) (“Regrettably, lower courts have learned the lessons of Garcetti quite well. Numerous individuals have suffered adverse employment actions when seeking to expose the kinds of practices that whistleblower protections are designed to bring to light.”).

  117. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 4 (2009).

  118. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).

  119. Note that while this Article explains the usefulness of a mixed speech category in containing the excesses of the government speech doctrine, it does not recapitulate the comprehensive analysis of mixed speech available in earlier work. See generally Corbin, supra note 15.

  120. Regardless of the forum, whether traditional, designated, limited, or nonpublic, the government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint without passing strict scrutiny. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).

  121. Indeed, the Court tends to characterize them as “presumptively unconstitutional.” See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (“A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint . . . is ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’”).

  122. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

  123. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.

  124. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (2015).

  125. Corbin, supra note 15, at 646–47 (“[N]o one who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase ‘Choose Life’ would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint.”).

  126. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (describing standard license plates “as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”).

  127. Corbin, supra note 15, at 647.

  128. Id. at 654.

  129. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (explaining that the state declined the plate because many find the confederate flag offensive and associate it with hate groups); Corbin, supra note 15, at 657 (“States that hoped to keep the Confederate flag off their specialty license plates realized that for many, it represents a celebration of slavery and a not-so-subtly coded message of racial superiority.”).

  130. Corbin, supra note 15, at 659 (“If specialty license plates are treated as purely private speech, then the establishment clause does not forbid, and the free speech clause may require, plates with religious messages. But as discussed above, because the plates are actually mixed speech, the state may well be seen as endorsing these religious messages and will thereby run afoul of the establishment clause.”).

  131. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining viewpoint regulations are subject to strict scrutiny).

  132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (explaining speech regulations subject to strict scrutiny are almost never constitutional).

  133. Cf. Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (involving an anti-LGBTQ book written by fire chief and disseminated at work).

  134. Cf. Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving commemorative bricks on school property); Demmon v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 342 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (E.D. Va. 2004) (involving bricks on school property).

  135. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 796 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving advertisements on city’s transit system); Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d 947, 949–50 (7th Cir. 2016) (involving advertisements on city’s buses); see also Corbin, supra note 15, at 623–26 (describing examples of mixed speech).

  136. See supra Part II.B.

  137. Corbin, supra note 15, at 656 (“From the government’s perspective, a viewpoint neutrality regime would be objectionable because it would force the government to associate itself with messages that it would not voluntarily endorse or tolerate.”).

  138. Id. at 671–72.

  139. Id. at 675 (“This three-part test is a rigorous intermediate scrutiny. Its ‘intermediate scrutiny’ counterpart is the heightened scrutiny given to sex classifications under equal protection rather than the cursory scrutiny given to content-neutral restrictions on expressive conduct.”).

Race, Ramos, and the Second Amendment Standard of Review

Gun control in the United States has a racist history. Nevertheless, federal courts and academics have invoked Southern gun restrictions enacted after the Civil War to suggest that history supports stringent regulation of the right to bear arms. We argue that courts’ reliance on these restrictions is illegitimate. Drawing on original research, we reveal how the post-war South restricted gun-ownership for racist reasons, deployed its new laws to disarm free Blacks, yet allowed whites to bear arms with near impunity. We then show how modern reliance on these laws contravenes the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, which deemed similarly tainted statutes unconstitutional. Since the Court will soon consider the validity of modern limits on concealed carry, placing Southern gun restrictions in their proper historical context matters today more than ever. While Southern gun control after the Civil War might tell us something about how the South sought to preserve white supremacy, it tells us almost nothing about the true scope of the Second Amendment.

Introduction

Imagine that a federal court must decide whether some challenged state action impermissibly burdens a constitutional right; say, the First-Amendment right to peacefully assemble. To discern how “fundamental” that right is, the court surveys the historical burdens past state legislatures have imposed upon it. It turns out that several states throughout the South enacted unlawful-assembly statutes from about 1870 to 1920. Relying on those historical restrictions, the court determines that it was then broadly agreed that states could curtail peaceful assembly. And that historical evidence, in the court’s view, shows that such a right must not be very “fundamental.” So on that basis, it upholds a modern law that likewise infringes the right to assemble.

But imagine, too, that the historical evidence the court relied upon was “tainted.” Further research reveals that Southern states enacted unlawful-assembly statutes in that period for racist reasons and enforced them disproportionately against racial minorities. Fearing newly freed slaves’ participation in political life, states passed facially neutral restrictions that they deployed in practice to bust up minority gatherings. The modern court invoking these laws apparently never discerned that critical context, taking them instead at face-value. Would anyone think the court wise to have relied on such tainted history in diluting modern assembly rights?

The answer, surely, is “no.” As the Supreme Court explained last year in Ramos v. Louisiana, laws enacted for racially discriminatory reasons that continue to burden constitutional rights deserve special scrutiny.1.140 S. Ct. 1390, 1410 (2020).Show More “[T]he racially discriminatory reasons” for which states originally adopted such laws cannot simply be “[l]ost in the accounting.”2.Id. at 1401.Show More To the contrary, laws’ “racially biased origins . . . uniquely matter,” especially when those laws continue to burden rights enshrined in the Constitution.3.Id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).Show More In Ramos itself, for instance, the Court deemed unconstitutional tainted state laws that denied criminal defendants their Sixth-Amendment right to be convicted only by a unanimous jury.4.Id. at 1394–95.Show More

But if it’s really so clear that courts must discount racially tainted laws in their calculus of how “fundamental” society considers a right, then something has gone seriously awry in our federal courts in the context of another constitutional guarantee: the Second Amendment. In its Heller decision, the Supreme Court recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep arms.5.District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).Show More Two years later, the Court’s McDonald decision incorporated that right against the states.6.McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). Uncertainty lingers over how the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states. In McDonald, four Justices opted to incorporate the Second Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 742. Justice Thomas wrote alone to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was the proper vehicle to accomplish incorporation. Id. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring). Whether the right is incorporated under the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause matters. The Due Process Clause protects persons, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause extends only to citizens. SeeU.S. Const. amend. XIV. Lower courts have largely ignored this distinction. SeeRyan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 795, 833 (2017) (noting that “lower courts have given little outward sign of even recognizing McDonald as a case calling for analysis under the Marks framework”); see alsoMaxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 504 (2020) (discussing the significance of Justice Thomas’s separate concurrence in McDonald). We take the position that though five Justices agreed to the judgment that the Second Amendment applies to the states, whether it does so via the Due Process Clause or, instead, the Privileges or Immunities Clause remains an open question. We also note that the clauses’ distinct language may affect the outcome in certain cases. Consider, for instance, whether a non-citizen may challenge a state law that restricts public carriage of firearms.Show More And recently, the Court agreed to hear a challenge to New York’s concealed-carry restrictions in the case New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Corlett (“NYSRPA II”).7.N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, (Apr. 26, 2021) (No. 20-843).Show More But for the last decade, the Court has said nothing further about the scope of the individual right. So the task of grappling with basic questions that remain in Heller’s wake, like the Second Amendment’s standard of review, has fallen to the lower courts. In that process, many courts have latched on to the sort of evidence that we just agreed was suspect: Southern gun restrictions enacted from about 1870 to 1920—the South’s race-relations “nadir.”8.Rayford W. Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–1901 (1954); see also Alton Hornsby, Jr., ed., A Companion to African American History 312, 381, 391 (2008).Show More Modern courts claim that those laws establish a historical consensus that states enjoy wide latitude to curtail the right to bear arms. And just as often, those courts have invoked such laws without a hint of appreciation that they might be marred by racial taint.

Though hardly unique, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Young v. Hawaii provides the latest example of this trend.9.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 773 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).Show More There, a majority of the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed Hawaii’s functional ban on bearing arms outside the home. As part of its analysis, the majority presented a historical survey of state gun regulations, focusing in particular on the post-war American South, where such regulations were common. Its survey of Southern cases and statutes, the majority said, revealed that it was then “broadly agreed” that “firearms [ ] could be banned from the public square.”10 10.Id.at 801.Show More Indeed, the majority reasoned, the legislatures of states like Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana evidently did not think those gun-control laws inconsistent with the right to bear arms. Since that historical conception apparently tolerated copious restrictions on the right, the plaintiffs had no firm historical basis to challenge Hawaii’s law.

Writing in dissent, Judge O’Scannlain urged caution about drawing too much from the “legislative scene following the Civil War.”11 11.Id.at 839 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More He noted that the antebellum South had a long history of explicitly race-based bans on gun ownership, and he suggested that Southern states might have been up to something similar after the war, too. Post-war “Black Codes,” for example, sought to infringe “freedmen’s fundamental constitutional rights.”12 12.Id. at 840.Show More And he noted that the majority offered “no enforcement history” for the later, ostensibly race-neutral statutes that it invoked.13 13.Id. at 844.Show More

For the majority, though, Judge O’Scannlain’s warning was hardly a speedbump in its path to affirming Hawaii’s law. In its 113-page opinion, the majority devoted a solitary footnote to his concern about the racial motivations behind the Southern laws the majority relied upon. It “d[id] not disagree” that the Black Codes were a relevant part of “the post-Civil War history.”14 14.Id.at 822 n.43.Show More But it happily noted that soon after the Black Codes’ advent, the nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to facilitate anti-discrimination laws and to bolster freedmen’s rights. Thus, according to the majority, “it is not clear how th[e] history” of racially discriminatory Southern laws—supposedly snuffed out by the Fourteenth Amendment—“informs the issue before us.”15 15.Id.Show More

It is that remarkable statement this Essay seeks to correct. Southern race discrimination via gun-control statutes did not evaporate in 1868. Sadly, it persisted long after and even through facially neutral statutes. By missing that insight, the Young majority and like-minded courts have erred by uncritically invoking gun-control laws from the postbellum South as serious evidence that a broad historical consensus supported limiting gun rights. In response, this Essay employs original primary-source research to establish two key points. First, the desire to limit Black gun ownership often motivated Southern states’ enactment of gun-control laws from around 1870 to 1920. Indeed, white society considered Black gun ownership conducive to chaos and disorder. Second, these racially biased motivations led to disproportionate enforcement of gun-control measures against Black citizens. In other words, these laws do not necessarily show a Southern distaste for the right to bear arms. But they certainly show disdain for exercise of that right by Blacks. So it is ironic—indeed, perverse—that courts should deploy these same tainted laws 150 years later to once again dilute American citizens’ constitutional rights.

The case against courts’ laundering of these racially tainted statutes proceeds in three parts. Part I details the present circuit split on the Second-Amendment standard of review and how various courts of appeals have deployed tainted historical statutes to dilute that standard. Part II presents the historical evidence that these Southern statutes were both racially motivated and unfairly enforced, even when neutral on their face. And Part III shows why continued reliance on such tainted statutes cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos. Put simply, when courts evaluate modern restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms, they should reject sullied statutes and rely instead on untainted historical evidence.

I. A Splintered Standard and a Tainted Record

Like its neighbors in the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment anticipates that citizens may exercise in distinct ways the right that it protects. By the Amendment’s terms, individuals may “keep . . . Arms” for self-defense, but they may also “bear” them.16 16.U.S. Const. amend. II.Show More The Supreme Court’s last words on the subject focused on the former issue—whether states may ban the “keeping” of commonly used arms.17 17.District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–82 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010).Show More Though answering that question in the negative, the Court gave no definitive guidance about the validity of state bans on the bearing of guns via open or concealed carry. Lacking further direction, lower courts have intractably split on whether states may restrict the right to bear arms and on the standard of review that courts must apply to such restrictions.

Some courts have endorsed the view that states may not ban citizens from carrying handguns for self-defense outside the home. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits are notable examples.18 18.Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).Show More Both shunned reliance on the “tiers of scrutiny” framework familiar to other areas of constitutional law, instead extending Heller to protect the bearing of arms outside the home. In reaching that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit declined “another round of historical analysis” to determine the scope of the “bear” right.19 19.Moore, 702 F.3d at 942.Show More In its view, Heller had already “decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”20 20.Id.Show More But other circuits have resisted that conclusion. The First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all adopted an “intermediate scrutiny” standard, under which they have upheld laws severely restricting the right to bear arms.21 21.Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 673 (1st Cir. 2018); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).Show More And critically, circuits in this camp—along with legion academic commentators—have all relied upon postbellum Southern gun control to bolster their rejection of that right.22 22.Many academics have relied on racially tainted postbellum Southern gun-control laws to reinforce their anti-gun-rights arguments. SeeEric J. Mogilnicki & Alexander Schultz, The Incomplete Record in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York, 73 SMU L. Rev. F. 1, 4–6 (2020); David T. Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right” Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 315, 339 (2011) (referencing facially neutral Southern gun control laws passed after the Civil War as historical evidence of constitutional limitations on the Second Amendment); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L. J. 82, 119 n.193, 120 n.195 (2013) (citing postbellum Southern gun-control laws without acknowledging possible tainted motivation for their enactment); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 95, 95 (2016) (fighting back against the “current state of scholarship on Second Amendment history [that] paints post-Civil War firearms regulations as racist efforts by Southern states to prevent blacks from defending themselves against racial violence.”); Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights, 80 L. & Contemp. Prob. 55, 62–64 nn.34–48 (2017) (listing a host of gun restrictions in different states).Show More

First to address the public-carry question was the Second Circuit in the 2012 case Kachalsky v. County of Westchester.23 23.Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81.Show More The dispute involved a New York law that requires citizens to show “proper cause” before obtaining a handgun-carry license—a requirement difficult to meet in practice.24 24.Id.at 84.Show More To analyze that restriction’s validity, the Second Circuit reviewed the “history and tradition of firearm regulation” to select the appropriate level of scrutiny.25 25.Id. at 101.Show More In so doing, the court detailed those historical laws that it thought supported “restrictions on the public carrying of weapons.”26 26.Id.at 90.Show More Among them were several postbellum Southern statutes that, in various ways, restricted gun ownership. Examples the Circuit cited included an 1870 law from Virginia, an 1871 law from Texas, an 1880 law from Kentucky, 1881 laws from Arkansas and North Carolina, and an 1885 law from Florida. That historical survey led the Circuit to conclude that “[i]n the nineteenth century, laws directly regulating concealable weapons for public safety became commonplace and far more expansive in scope.”27 27.Id.at 95.Show More Thus, in its view, “extensive state regulation of handguns has never been considered incompatible with the Second Amendment.” 28 28.Id.at 100.Show More And with that historical gloss, the Circuit settled on intermediate scrutiny to uphold New York’s “proper cause” requirement.29 29.Id.at 96.Show More

Likewise, in the 2013 case Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit looked back to the South to judge a current law in the North.30 30.Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2013).Show More The New Jersey law at issue required handgun-license applicants to demonstrate their “‘justifiable need’ to publicly carry a handgun.”31 31.Id.at 429.Show More In response to the appellants’ contention that this requirement violated the Second Amendment, the Third Circuit claimed that “[i]t remains unsettled whether the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home.”32 32.Id.at 430.Show More To select the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Third Circuit followed Kachalsky and undertook a review of historical gun regulations. The Circuit cited Kachalsky several times for the proposition that “19th Century” history undermined the notion that self-defense outside the home belongs to “the core of the [Second] Amendment.”33 33.Id.at 436.Show More Thus, after settling on intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement.34 34.Id.at 440.Show More

Dissenting, Judge Hardiman objected to the majority’s repeated invocation of Kachalsky. In his view, the Southern statutes that Kachalsky marshaled were distinguishable from New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement.35 35.Id.at 451 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).Show More For instance, he argued, Southerners considered those historical bans permissible only because the weapons they targeted were not the sort of “arms” thought core to the right.36 36.Id.Show More And “[t]o the extent that th[ose] state laws prohibited the carry of weapons used in war”—in other words, “arms”—“they were struck down.”37 37.Id.Show More So Judge Hardiman thought the historical statutes had “little bearing” on modern laws regulating concealed carry.38 38.Id.Show More But he left his criticism there, mentioning no further concern about possible racial taint.

In their own respective treatments of the issue, the First and Tenth Circuits have also invoked Kachalsky to reject Second-Amendment claims. In the 2013 case Peterson v. Martinez, the Tenth Circuit parried a challenge to a Colorado concealed-weapons law after concluding “that the carrying of concealed firearms is not protected by the Second Amendment[.]”39 39.Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013).Show More Citing Kachalsky, the Circuit noted that “concealed carry bans have a lengthy history” and that “most states banned concealed carry in the nineteenth century.”40 40.Id.at 1211.Show More Thus, it concluded, “the Second Amendment does not confer a right to carry concealed weapons.”41 41.Id.Show More Likewise, the First Circuit relied on Kachalsky to conclude “that there is no national consensus, rooted in history, concerning the right to public carriage of firearms.”42 42.Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018).Show More Rather, the restrictions Kachalsky detailed led the Circuit to suggest that history “conflict[ed]” about the scope of the right to bear arms.43 43.Id.Show More And given that supposed conflict, the court upheld the targeted restriction under intermediate scrutiny.44 44.Id. at 676.Show More

While most Circuits have been content to recycle Kachalsky, the Ninth Circuit offered a broader defense of why history undercuts the right to publicly bear arms. In its aforementioned Young decision, the en banc Ninth Circuit considered whether Hawaii’s functional ban on public carry violates the Second Amendment.45 45.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 773 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).Show More Judge Bybee, writing for the majority, held that it does not. Much of the historical record he dissected—for instance, the Statute of Northampton, ancient English treatises, and early colonial restrictions—falls well outside this Essay’s scope.46 46.Id.at 788–805.Show More But after analyzing those sources, the majority, like its sister-circuits, discussed several postbellum Southern statutes. It noted that Tennessee enacted a law in 1870 banning “publicly or privately carry[ing] a dirk, swordcane, Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol[,] or revolver.”47 47.Id.at 806.Show More Three years later, Texas restricted “the carrying of ‘any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-shot, sword-cane, spear, brass-knuckles, bowie-knife, or any other kind of knife.”48 48.Id. at 800.Show More The Louisiana Constitution of 1879, likewise, “provided that the right to keep and bear arms did ‘not prevent the passage of laws to punish those who carr[ied] weapons concealed.’”49 49.Id. at 817.Show More And Alabama, for its part, not only “prohibited persons from carrying a ‘pistol concealed,’ but [ ] also made it ‘unlawful for any person to carry a pistol about his person on premises not his own or under his control.’”50 50.Id.at 811.Show More

The majority then offered “several observations” about these statutes.51 51.Id.at 801.Show More First, it said, this historical survey revealed that “states broadly agreed that small, concealable weapons, including firearms, could be banned from the public square.”52 52.Id.Show More And “[s]econd, although many of the states had constitutional provisions that guaranteed some kind of right to keep and bear arms, state legislatures evidently did not believe that the restrictions [ ] discussed here were inconsistent with their state constitutions.”53 53.Id.at 801–02.Show More All told, then, the relevant history supposedly undercut any “general right to carry arms into the public square for self-defense.”54 54.Id.at 813.Show More

Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent, as we mentioned, broached several important criticisms of the majority’s reasoning. First, it noted the lack of any “record of enforcement” for the statutes at issue.55 55.Id.at 847 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More Merely symbolic gun laws that state governments never enforced presumably tell us little about the polity’s true thoughts on the right to bear arms. Next, Judge O’Scannlain observed that Southern states had long sought to regulate the possession of weapons by Blacks. In support of that point, he noted several sources from the 1860s that decried Southern attempts to strip freedmen of their right to keep and bear arms—a right those sources described as fundamental.56 56.Id.at 839–41, 847.Show More

The majority swept aside those points, however, with almost-blithe facility. It noted that soon after stories of the Black Codes emanated from the South, the nation ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.57 57.Id.at 822 n.43.Show More Its Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses “guaranteed that all citizens would enjoy the same rights as ‘white citizens,’ including Second Amendment rights.”58 58.Id.Show More But, said the majority,

those provisions do not tell us anything about the substance of the Second Amendment, any more than an equal right to enter into contracts or inherit property tells us whether the state may alter the Statute of Frauds or the Rule Against Perpetuities, so long as it does so for all citizens.59 59.Id.Show More

And with that, in an opinion that purported to exhaustively survey the historical evidence, the majority dismissed concerns about how race and discrimination might have informed its analysis.

II. “Every Negro in the City a Walking Arsenal”: The Racial Motivations Underlying Postbellum Southern Gun Control

For about the first two-hundred years of American history, the colonies and early states enacted various racially explicit gun bans. By frustrating slaves’ ability to rebel, these laws preserved white supremacy and the slave-based American economy. As early as 1640, for example, Virginia prohibited Blacks, slave and free, from carrying weapons.60 60.T. Markus Funk, Comment, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 764, 796 (1995) (“In 1640, Virginia set up the first recorded restrictive legislation which prevented blacks from owning a firearm”).Show More And it enacted a more extensive “act for preventing Negroes Insurrections” in 1680.61 61.Act X: An Act for Preventing Negroes Insurrections (June 1680), reprinted in 2 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the laws of Virginia, From the First Session of The Legislature in The Year 1619, 481 (William Waller Hening ed., n.d.), https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/an-act-for-preventing-negroes-insurrections-1680/. [https://perma.cc/X98X-PEP3]. Many of the historical sources we have quoted employ non-standard English. Rather than flagging each idiosyncrasy with a [sic] notation, we have chosen instead to present the source-language as it originally appeared.Show More The law forbade “any negroe or other slave to carry or arme himselfe with any club, staffe, gunn, sword or any other weapon of defence or offence.”62 62.Id.Show More A slave could possess such arms only with “a certificate from his master, mistris or overseer” for “perticuler and necessary occasions.”63 63.Id.Show More Without a permit, a slave in possession of arms would be “sent to the next constable, who [was] hereby enjoyned and required to give the said negroe twenty lashes on his bare back.”64 64.Id.Show More Those lashes, the law specified, were to be “well layd on.”65 65.Id.Show More

Similar laws pervaded other jurisdictions. In 1740, for instance, South Carolina enacted a statute making it illegal “for any slave, unless in the presence of some white person, to carry or make use of fire-arms.”66 66.1741-32 S.C. Acts 168, § 23.Show More A slave could bear arms only with a “license in writing from his master, mistress or overseer.”67 67.Id.Show More Whites who discovered slaves in possession of unlicensed weapons could seize the arms on the spot. If the slave resisted and seriously injured the white person, the law subjected the slave to a mandatory penalty of death.68 68.Id. §§ 23–24.Show More In the same vein, Florida, Georgia, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Mississippi passed their own racially explicit gun bans from around 1800 to 1860.69 69.Black Code, ch. 33, sec. 19, Laws of La. 150, 160 (1806); Act of April 8, 1811, ch. 14, sec. 3, Laws of La. 50, 52–54 (1811); An Act to Govern Patrols, secs. 8–9, Acts of Fla. 52, 55 (1825); Act of Jan. 28, 1831, Fla. Laws 28, 30 (1831); Act of Dec. 23, 1833, sec. 7, 1833 Ga. Laws 226, 228 (1833); An Act Concerning Slaves, ch. 58, sec. 6, 1841 Laws of Tex. 171, 172 (1841); State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250 (1844) (upholding North Carolina’s race-based ban); Act of Jan 1, 1845, ch. 87, 1845 Acts of N.C. 124; Act of Mar. 15, 1852, ch 206, sec. 1, 1852 Laws of Miss. 328; Act of Dec. 19, 1860, no. 64, Sec. 1, 1860 Acts of Ga. 56; see alsoStephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bills of Rights, 41 Baylor L. Rev. 629, 653 (1989) (“On November 6, 1866, the Texas legislature passed its first gun control measure, which was also the closest Texas came to adopting a black code provision to disarm freedmen.”).Show More Louisiana forbade slaves from possessing weapons, while Florida authorized whites to enter Black persons’ homes to search for and seize any firearms.70 70.Black Code, ch. 33, sec. 19, Laws of La. 150, 160 (1806); Act of Dec. 17, 1861, ch. 1291, sec. 11, 1861 Fla. Laws 38, 40.Show More Mississippi, too, heavily restricted slaves’ and free Blacks’ possession of arms. As late as 1865, it barred any “freedman, free negro or mulatto” from possessing “fire-arms of any kind” without a license from “the board of police of his or her county.”71 71.Certain Offenses of Freedmen, 1865 Miss. Laws p. 165, §1, reprinted in 1 Documentary History of Reconstruction 289 (Walter L. Fleming ed. 1950).Show More

Soon after, of course, Mississippi and the broader South lost the American Civil War. One consequence was the panoply of new laws the United States imposed upon that region that aimed to secure the fundamental rights of free Blacks. Those included several Civil Rights and Enforcement Acts, along with the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter’s ratification sought to ensure that freedmen might enjoy “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” along with “the equal protection of the laws.”72 72.U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Show More In the Young Court’s view, apparently, the advent of these guarantees heralded the end of invidious discrimination via Southern gun-control restrictions.73 73.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 822 n.43 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).Show More

But as this Essay shows, that was unfortunately not the case. Rather, Judge O’Scannlain’s dissenting appraisal was nearer the mark in three respects. First, to the extent that Southern states enacted new gun bans after the Civil War, race appears to have often motivated their decision to do so.74 74.Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1307, 1318 (1995) (“Free blacks were subject to a variety of measures meant to limit black access to firearms through licensure or to eliminate such access through outright prohibitions on firearms ownership.”).Show More Second, Southern states enforced these laws against their white populations only loosely. Third, to the extent that Southern states did enforce such laws, they enforced them disproportionately against their Black citizenry.75 75.F. Smith Fussner, That Every Man Be Armed, the Evolution of a Constitutional Right, 3 Const. Comment. 582, 585 (1986) (reviewing Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed (1984)) (“After the Civil War the states of the old Confederacy tried to use pretexts of various kinds to keep blacks from acquiring and using arms.”); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1359, 1415–16 (1998) (noting that “gun control in the nineteenth century was almost exclusively a Southern phenomenon. In the post-Civil War period, the Southern gun laws were clearly aimed at controlling the Freedmen; although written in racially neutral terms, the laws were meant for, and applied almost exclusively to, blacks.”).Show More We examine these points in turn.

A. How Race Informed the South’s Perceived Need for Gun Control

Across both time and space in the Reconstruction and Jim Crow South, white society reflected antipathy for the newfound phenomenon of Black gun ownership. Southern whites understood the relationship between guns and power. Precisely because the keeping of arms undergirds security and autonomy,76 76.Noted constitutional commentator St. George Tucker described the Second Amendment as “the true palladium of liberty” and “[t]he right of self defense [a]s the first law of nature.” 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia 300 (1803). Frederick Douglass likewise famously remarked “that the liberties of the American people were dependent upon the Ballot-box, the Jury-box, and the Cartridge-box[.]” The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass: From 1817–1882, 333 (John Lobb ed., 1882).Show More the antebellum South had denied that right to its Black population. So when, for instance, Black militias formed after the war’s end to protect voting freedmen and to repel lynch mobs, whites lamented Blacks’ nascent capacity for self-defense. That capacity engendered “[t]he white man’s fundamental enmity,” in other words, because it impugned his “position of authority.”77 77.Otis A. Singletary, The Negro Militia Movement During Radical Reconstruction, LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses, at vii (1954).Show More

In response, whites crafted narratives that reframed Black gun ownership not as a means of legitimate self-defense, but as a source of disorder and chaos. Already by 1866, a Norfolk periodical lamented “a mania which seems to exist among a portion of the negro population for carrying concealed weapons.”78 78.Virginia News, Alexandria Gazette and Virginia Advertiser, Dec. 6, 1866, at 1.Show More Likewise, a writer in Memphis, Tennessee complained in 1867 that “[n]early all the negroes in th[is] city carry concealed weapons.”79 79.Locals in Brief, Public Ledger, July 20, 1867, at 1.Show More “As a natural consequence,” the author wrote, “colored shooting affrays are becoming very frequent.”80 80.Id.Show More In 1871 South Carolina, Black gun ownership was said to have “brought the negroes into troubles, for without [arms], they would not have arrayed themselves in hostility to the white people.”81 81.The Fight at Carmel Hill, The Courier, Mar. 17, 1871, at 1.Show More And later writers in both South Carolina and Tennessee explicitly connected Black gun ownership to election fraud and voter intimidation. In 1879, for instance, a Democratic paper in South Carolina rued that the state’s Republican governor had, “in violation of every right of a free citizen, [disarmed] the whites . . . while the negro militia, in the midst of a heated political contest, [was] not only allowed to keep their rifles and muskets, but encouraged to use[ ] them, to menace the whites, and overawe and intimidate colored voters.”82 82.J.H. Evins, Unexampled Forbearance of the Whites, The Weekly Union Times, Apr. 4, 1879, at 1.Show More This show of force supposedly corrupted “the free choice of the voter,” thus rigging the system in favor of Republicans.83 83.Id.Show More In Mississippi too, alleged Republican encouragement for “negroes to carry pistols to the polls” had led to an “inexcusably brutal outrage” in 1881: when a white voter tried to cane a Black man at a polling place over a supposed insult, another Black man pulled a gun, shooting and killing the white assailant.84 84.Murder at Marion, The Memphis Daily Appeal, Nov. 11, 1881, at 1.Show More

These narratives on disorder and chaos persisted over time. In 1882, Kentucky’s Daily Evening Bulletin opined that “[t]his thing of negroes carrying concealed deadly weapons is a growing evil that should receive the strictest enforcement of the law.”85 85.The State of Lewis at Large, Daily Evening Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1882, at 1.Show More An 1883 column from Jacksonville, Florida likewise warned that “every negro in the city” had become “a walking arsenal.”86 86.Crimes in Jacksonville, The Savanah Morning News, Sept. 5, 1883, at 1.Show More Jacksonville police reported that “a large proportion of the negroes in this city are provided with a dirk knife, razor[,] or pistol”—a trend the column suggested should merit severe punishment.87 87.Id.Show More In Georgia too, the Lyons Morning News argued in 1893 for a new concealed-weapons law, since “[a]lmost every negro that one meets is armed.”88 88.The Concealed Weapon Evil, The Morning News, Sept. 8, 1893, at 6.Show More “Some of them,” according to the editor, even “carr[ied] two pistols and a Winchester rifle”—a behavior that “cursed” the population and merited “strictly enforced” legislative countermeasures.89 89.Id.Show More

One incident in North Carolina that drew on these narratives of chaos and disorder deserves special examination. Around the fall of 1898, white-supremacist Democrats, led in part by future North Carolina congressman John D. Bellamy, organized white resistance to the city of Wilmington’s biracial government. Bellamy and other prominent figures conspired to foment anger among white citizens about this so-called “Negro Rule” before the congressional elections of 1898.90 90.LeRae Umfleet, et al., 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report, North Carolina Dep’t of Cultural Resources 59–60, 76, 78, 83–84, 125, 371 (May 31, 2006).Show More After several increasingly violent attacks on Wilmington’s Black citizens, Bellamy’s associate Alfred Waddell assembled a posse of about 2,000 whites.91 91.1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report supra note 90, at 129.Show More After equipping itself at Wilmington’s armory, the posse roamed the streets, killing the Black persons they could find and destroying Wilmington’s Black-owned businesses.92 92.Id. at 121, 133.Show More Perhaps 60 Black citizens perished, while thousands of others fled and took shelter in nearby swamps.93 93.Id. at 1.Show More

Yet when Bellamy was later sued for his role in the massacre, he reframed the event as a “race riot” that ensued only after “a negro mob” had armed itself in “utter disregard . . . for law and order.”94 94.Dockery v. Bellamy: The Taking of Depositions Resumed, The Semi-Weekly Messenger, Apr. 14, 1899, at 3.Show More Bellamy argued that this was to be expected: “[N]egroes constantly carry concealed weapons,” he testified, “and . . . the razor, the pistol, the slingshot[,] and the brass knuckle seem to be their inseparable accompaniments as a class.”95 95.Id.Show More “[A]lthough there are some very respectable law-abiding and property acquiring citizens of that race,” he conceded, “it is a very small portion of them.”96 96.Id.Show More So, in Bellamy’s view, the posse’s brutality did not stem from the violent white-supremacist movement that he had cultivated. The true culprit, he said, was Black citizens’ carriage of arms. Bellamy eventually prevailed in the litigation, allowing him to take his seat in Congress.97 97.1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report supra note 90, at 200–01.Show More But while his actions were especially horrific, his rhetoric was familiar—that Black citizens’ possession of arms had instigated violence and disorder.

These themes continued to reverberate throughout the South during and after the turn of the twentieth century. In 1899, for instance, Cheneyville, Louisiana passed an ordinance that aimed to restrain the “custom among a certain class of worthless negroes to carry concealed weapons upon their persons[.]”98 98.To Restrain Worthless Negroes, New York Tribune, Aug. 14, 1900, at 1.Show More Similar rhetoric surfaced soon after in Georgia. In a 1901 lecture delivered at a Valdosta prison, Judge Estes of the Valdosta superior court opined that it was hard to believe the “worthless[ ],” “pistol toting negroes of the present generation are the descendants of the . . . good old negroes of the former days.”99 99.The Good Old Negroes: Judge Estes’ Lecture to Prisoners at Valdosta, The Morning News, Nov. 24, 1901, at 9.Show More A 1907 Mississippi paper, likewise, bemoaned “negro . . . pistol toting” and suggested “that there is needed extreme legislation for suppression of pistol toting; especially for protection of lives of the peace officers who are called on almost daily to arrest turbulent and recklessly murderous negroes.”100 100.The Pistol Toting Negro in Evidence, The Greenville Times, Dec. 28, 1907, at 1.Show More

Other contemporary sources were just as frank about the racial bias that had motivated Southern gun-control measures. While debating a 1901 South Carolina proposal, State Senator Stanwix Mayfield introduced an amendment requiring applicants for a concealed-carry permit to pay the princely sum of $50.101 101.Synopsis of the Daily Proceedings of the House and Senate, The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1.Show More “If a man thinks he ought to go armed let him pay a license,” Mayfield argued.102 102.Id.Show More Moreover, “[n]egroes will not take out a license and one-half of the population will thus be eliminated.”103 103.Id.Show More And that was the problematic half, in Mayfield’s view, since “[t]here is little trouble” arising from concealed carry “among white people.”104 104.Id.Show More In a similar vein, Charles R. Tarter of Brevard County, Florida suggested in 1907 to Virginia’s Clinch Valley News some lessons that Virginia might take from Florida’s treatment of “the race problem.”105 105.Charles R. Tarter, The Race Problem in Florida, Clinch Valley News, June 28, 1907, at 2.Show More In Florida, Tarter opined, “[w]e have no race problem [ ] in Brevard [C]ounty.”106 106.Id.Show More Rather, “[t]he ‘n——r’ is held in humble submission here.”107 107.Id. (racial slur censored).Show More One aspect of that “submission” was Brevard County’s law requiring that whoever wished to carry a long gun have a bond guaranteed by “two good men.”108 108.Id.Show More As Tarter explained, “[i]t’s purpose was to keep fire arms out of the nigroes hands[,] and it did all it was intended for. No nigro can get a bond accepted,” and “few ever try.”109 109.Id.Show More In Tarter’s view, such a restriction bolstered law and order. “There has never been an assault, or an insult offered a white woman by a n——r in this county,” he claimed, and “in fact, there’s practically but few cases of criminal assault ever in the state.”110 110.Id. (racial slur censored).Show More

Sources in Alabama, too, connected Black gun ownership to themes of disorder and the status of white supremacy. In 1907, Alabama State Senator Evans Hinson warned that “black belt negroes are better armed than whites.”111 111.Evans Hinson, Black Belt Negroes are Better Armed Than Whites, The Age-Herald, May 1, 1907, at 9.Show More Thus, he thought, Alabama needed a “new law regarding carrying weapons.”112 112.Id.Show More Though laws on the books regulated possession of pistols, he thought the law should also cover long guns. Otherwise, he worried that “negroes would have on hand for immediate use incomparably more improved firearms than would the whites.”113 113.Id.Show More Thus, he feared that whites might be outgunned in the event of a future “race riot.”114 114.Id.Show More Alabama newspaperman Edward Ware Barrett, owner of Birmingham’s Age-Herald,115 115.George M. Cruikshank, 2 A History of Birmingham and Its Environs: A Narrative Account of Their Historical Progress, Their People, and Their Principal Interests, 180 (1920).Show More likewise suggested that Black citizens’ gun ownership placed respectable whites under siege. “A man with a home and family,” Barrett remarked, “feels that he cannot go out of town without employing an armed squadron to protect his home against pistol toting negroes[.]”116 116.Edward Ware Barrett, Ned Brace Talks About Things At Home and Makes A Few Suggestions, The Age-Herald, Jan. 7, 1912, at 28.Show More Otherwise, he feared, they might “go out to shoot up his servants and endanger[ ] the lives of his wife and children.”117 117.Id.Show More

So what has this historical survey told us? A couple of things, we think. First, it shows that racist attitudes about Black gun ownership pervaded the post-war American South. White society, or at least those portions of it captured in the cited periodicals, thought Black gun ownership a particularly dangerous reality; one conducive to disorder and corrosive to the Southern social fabric. It was a problem, the sources tell us, in need of novel restrictions and “extreme legislation.”118 118.The Pistol Toting Negro in Evidence, The Greenville Times, Dec. 28, 1907, at 1.Show More Second, and concomitantly, it reveals that courts today should hesitate to invoke Southern gun restrictions as evidence about Southern society’s views on the right to bear arms generally. To the contrary, this evidence reflects Southern society’s specific desire to counter a particular “problem”: its disdain for Black citizens’ keeping and bearing of arms. Parts II.B and II.C, in turn, present the evidence for that observation’s logical corollaries: that Southern states did not enforce these restrictions rigorously against whites, but enforced them with alacrity against Blacks.

B. Southern States’ Under-Enforcement of Gun Control Laws
Against White Society

As noted above, Judge O’Scannlain also criticized the Young majority’s statutory survey for omitting a serious discussion of the laws’ “enforcement history.”119 119.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 844 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More The majority conceded that the question of enforcement was “a fair one.”120 120.Id.at 823.Show More Unenforced statutes may eventually fall “into desuetude,” the majority noted, rendering such legislative proscriptions “merely symbolic.”121 121.Id.Show More But after admitting that enforcement questions were “beyond the materials that [it] ha[d] seen,” the majority incongruously argued that the Southern statutes it cited were “not merely symbolic.”122 122.Id. (emphasis added).Show More Instead, it suggested that the statutes’ commonality across the South was somehow self-proving evidence of their enforcement. And the majority noted that it had assembled a few Southern cases involving weapons prosecutions, which it claimed “proves that the statutes were enforced.”123 123.Id. (first emphasis added).Show More

The majority’s leap from confessing that it had no evidence of enforcement history to its conclusion that it had “prove[n]” the statutes’ enforcement was sophistical.124 124.Id.Show More A few instances of enforcement in reported cases do not show that such laws were enforced broadly or that Southerners considered them an enforcement priority. Indeed, one scholar has labeled reasoning like the majority’s the “lonely fact” fallacy.125 125.Ilan Wurmin, Law Historians’ Fallacies, 91 N.D. L. Rev. 161, 203 (2015). Show More Having identified a few discrete historical examples, the majority then assumed without support that those data points represented general trends.

But they did not, at least according to the evidence we have uncovered. To the contrary, contemporary Southern sources consistently noted two important points. First, the carrying of concealed weapons throughout the postwar South was extremely common. And second, Southern states rarely enforced their laws against that practice. (Save for those occasions when the unfortunate defendant belonged to a racial minority; a trend we discuss in Part II.C.) So Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent was nearer the mark yet again. For the laws the majority cited often were “merely symbolic.”126 126.Young, 992 F.3d at 823.Show More

Already in 1880, for example, a Mississippi periodical observed that the state’s concealed-weapons law “[wa]s not enforced anywhere in the State.”127 127.Concealed Weapons, St. Landry Democrat, Feb. 7, 1880, at 4.Show More And it pointed out the likelihood that “the concealed weapon law will never be strictly enforced in this or any other State, unless the law should go further and give officers the right to search every man to ascertain whether he had concealed weapons on his person or not.”128 128.Id.Show More Such a law, it said, would be both “unconstitutional,” given its imposition on liberty, and “absurd,” given the resources required to enforce it.129 129.Id.Show More Likewise, Louisiana’s Meridional noted in 1878 that the state had “an act prohibiting persons from carrying concealed weapons,” but that it was “not enforced[.]”130 130.The Lafayette Advertiser, Mar. 30, 1878, at 2.Show More The author suggested that some enforcement might be wise, since “one cannot travel fifty yards from the parish seat” without meeting persons armed with concealed pistols.131 131.Id.Show More South Carolina’s Weekly Union Times sounded similar themes in 1880. It noted that while “[t]he law against carrying concealed weapons may be enforced in the towns and cities where special ordinances are passed . . . the State laws on this subject are not worth the paper they are written on, from the fact that they will never be enforced.”132 132.Sins Which the Law Cannot Reach, The Weekly Union Times, Nov. 12, 1880, at 1.Show More Predictably, “nobody [was ever] tried for the offence.”133 133.Id. Likewise, Richmond, Virginia’s Daily State Journal reported a concealed-weapons prosecution in 1872. But it noted that this was “the first case of the kind for some time.” Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapons, The Daily State Journal, Jan. 10, 1872, at 1.Show More

These themes persisted throughout the South for decades. Mississippi’s Magnolia Gazette noted in 1883 that a new weapons law might be desirable. But the column’s author doubted that “it can or will be done,” given the practical difficulties of enforcing such a statute.134 134.An Alarming State of Affairs, Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 30, 1883, at 1.Show More “The law as it exists,” the author noted, “is almost inoperative.”135 135.Id.Show More Five years later, South Carolina’s Laurens Advertiser observed that “the law in regard to carrying concealed weapons[ ] [wa]s never enforced,” given that citizens lacked any “sense of duty” to obey it.136 136.Dials, The Laurens Advertiser, May 2, 1888, at 3.Show More And in Kentucky, similar laws’ enforcement fared no better. In 1891, for instance, Kentucky Governor John Y. Brown simply stopped enforcing the state’s concealed-weapons law for several years.137 137.W.P. Walton, Semi-Weekly Interior Journal, Nov. 20, 1891, at 2.Show More

Again, it must be said, the rarity of prosecutions did not stem from the rarity of concealed carry. To the contrary, a Missouri periodical noted in 1897 that “[t]housands of the so called ‘best men’ of every community in many of the southern states carry daily the faithful revolver in the pistol pocket.”138 138.Concealed Weapons, The Age Herald, Oct. 10, 1897, at 4.Show More It was despite that fact that only “at rare intervals . . . men are prosecuted for carrying concealed weapons.”139 139.Id.Show More Indeed, prosecutions were rare not because carrying was rare, but because there was so “much looseness in the enforcement of the statutes[.]”140 140.Id.Show More

Turn-of-the-century South Carolina was no more enthusiastic about enforcing its own concealed-weapons law. The Union Times wondered in 1900 why the “law against carrying concealed weapons is not more rigidly enforced.”141 141.Carrying Concealed Weapons, The Union Times, Oct. 26, 1900, at 1.Show More It noted that there were “few convictions for violations” and that no one seemed willing to report fellow citizens for concealed carrying.142 142.Id.Show More Perhaps members of South Carolina’s legislature took heed. For a year later, The Yorkville Enquirer reported the passage of a new concealed-weapons law. But it predicted that the new law, like its predecessors, would have little practical consequence. “Other concealed weapon laws,” the paper noted, “have been indifferently enforced.”143 143.The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1.Show More Thus, “there is reason to fear this one will not fare any better.”144 144.Id.Show More That prediction proved accurate. As South Carolina’s Anderson Intelligencer noted in 1905, while the “statute books” had a new law “against the carrying of concealed weapons . . . the enforcement of it is a regular farce.”145 145.Editorial Bull’s Eyes, The Yorkville Enquirer, Oct. 10, 1905, at 1.Show More “Occasionally some poor, unfortunate fellow” was fined,146 146.Id.Contemporary court records from South Carolina also seem to confirm that the state’s concealed-weapons law was not an enforcement priority. The Watchman and Southron reported in 1903 that one South Carolina police court processed 448 arrests throughout 1902. Doings of the Police Force for 1902, The Watchman and Southron, Feb. 25, 1903, at 1. But only a paltry three of those were for carrying concealed weapons. Id.Show More but the law did little overall to deter Southerners’ prolific carriage of arms.

Enforcement also lagged in Arkansas and Alabama. Birmingham’s Age-Herald reported in 1912 that “there seems to be practically no enforcement” of “[t]he law against carrying concealed deadly weapons.”147 147.The Grand Jury’s Report, The Age-Herald, Oct. 28, 1912, at 1.Show More And Arkansas’s Daily Picayune noted in 1921 that “[t]he law against carrying concealed weapons is not enforced, as witness the courts.”148 148.A Celebration, The Daily Picayune, Jan. 8, 1921, at 1.Show More Yet, that journal remarked, there was apparently “no inclination for repeal.”149 149.Id.Show More So the law was indeed symbolic, rather than a robust proscription.150 150.Id.Show More

Indeed, this Part has shown that much the same could be said for concealed-weapons laws across the South. As the cited sources reflect, contemporary Southerners considered the laws “inoperative” and their enforcement impractical.151 151.An Alarming State of Affairs, Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 30, 1883, at 1.Show More “[I]ndifferent[ ]” enforcement had rendered the statutes “not worth the paper they [were] written on” and “a regular farce.”152 152.Sins Which the Law Cannot Reach, The Weekly Union Times, Nov. 12, 1880, at 1; The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1; Editorial Bull’s Eyes, Yorkville Enquirer, Oct. 10, 1905, at 1.Show More As a result, convictions came only at “rare intervals.”153 153.Concealed Weapons, The Age-Herald, Oct. 10, 1897, at 4.Show More And those convicted appear to have been the “unfortunate fellow[s]” who simply happened to stand out from the rest of their gun-toting countrymen.154 154.Editorial Bull’s Eyes, The Yorkville Enquirer, Oct. 10, 1905, at 1.Show More

Given these sources’ depiction of the South’s spotty gun-control regime, one might wonder whether those laws were ever seriously enforced against any segment of Southern society. The answer to that question, it turns out, is “yes.” For contemporary evidence also suggests that despite the laws’ “indifferent[ ]” enforcement as to the South’s alleged best men—its whites—the same laws quite often ensnared its Black citizens.155 155.The Yorkville Enquirer, Feb. 16, 1901, at 1.Show More Of course, we uncovered no evidence that Blacks carried guns at a higher rate than whites in this period. Instead, sources remarked that the pistol was the Southern gentleman’s constant companion. But as Part II.C now reveals, Blacks almost certainly were punished at a much higher rate for concealed carry.

C. How Southern States Disproportionately Enforced Their Gun-Control Laws Against Racial Minorities

We now turn to the third way that the historical sources we uncovered vindicate Judge O’Scannlain. Recall how he admonished the majority to temper its enthusiasm for “the legislative scene following the Civil War” given his suspicion that such laws, though facially neutral, “sought to suppress the ability of freedmen to own guns.”156 156.Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).Show More His intuition was correct, but his critique—much like the majority opinion—lacked a key piece of evidence: the laws’ enforcement history. Without it, the majority brushed aside Judge O’Scannlain’s concerns and appointed the statutes it cited as serious evidence of Southerners’ appetite for gun control.

That was a mistake. As this Part reveals, contemporaneous evidence suggests that the Reconstruction and Jim Crow South enforced these laws “almost exclusively” against Blacks.157 157.Elections a Farce: The Republicans of South Carolina Issue a Strong Address to Congress, The Indianapolis Journal, Jan. 18, 1889, at 7.Show More That is perhaps unsurprising, given our background knowledge about that period in Southern history and the evidence of the laws’ racial motivations detailed in Part II.A. At the same time, though, it guts the Young majority’s view that racially disparate enforcement ceased after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Precisely because these laws were not equally applied to all citizens, singling out Black citizens instead, they may tell us something about a tool the postwar South used to preserve white supremacy. But they tell us almost nothing about a broad Southern consensus in favor of diluting the right to keep and bear arms.

A year after the Civil War’s end, for instance, the city of Norfolk, Virginia deployed a recently passed concealed-weapons law to disarm free Blacks. Indeed, “[u]nder a recent law of the city of Norfolk, . . . the police arrested a large number of negroes for carrying concealed weapons.”158 158.Miscellaneous News Items, Bedford Inquirer, Dec. 21, 1866, at 1.Show More The seizure was especially significant, since it was alleged “that a negro rising was planned for Christmas week[,] in which the authorities were to be overturned.”159 159.Id.Show More Later in 1904, Virginia authorities similarly suggested that they had defused a “race riot” with concealed-weapons arrests.160 160.Another Race Riot is Feared in Norfolk, The Evening Journal, Oct. 26, 1904, at 1.Show More Fearing an “outbreak by the blacks” after a lynching, authorities arrested “[m]any negroes” for weapons possession.161 161.Id.Show More These “culprits” were then “severely dealt with . . . under the Virginia law covering concealed weapons.”162 162.Id.Show More So, much like Virginia’s 1680 “negroes insurrections” law sought to suppress slave revolts with a racially explicit weapons ban, Virginia’s later, facially neutral laws were apparently thought to serve a similar purpose.163 163.Id.; see supranotes 61–65 and accompanying text.Show More

South Carolina, too, enforced its concealed-weapons law along racial lines. South Carolina Republican Ellery M. Brayton complained to the federal Congress in 1887 about how disparate enforcement infected the statute. “[T]he law against carrying concealed weapons,” he noted, “is enforced almost exclusively against negroes.”164 164.Elections a Farce: The Republicans of South Carolina Issue a Strong Address to Congress, The Indianapolis Journal, Jan. 18, 1889, at 7. Contemporary arrest records from South Carolina reflect the racial enforcement disparity. In 1905, for instance, one South Carolina court handled thirty-four concealed weapons arrests; thirty offenders were Black and just four were white. The Sinners’ Record: Annual Summary of Arrests—Charges, Convictions and Acquittals in Recorder’s Court, The Watchman and Southron, Feb. 1, 1905, at 1.Show More And even when the law was enforced against whites, their sentences vis-à-vis Black offenders were radically disparate. An 1883 periodical noted that two South Carolina offenders—one Black, one white—were both tried during the same term of court for the offense of carrying concealed weapons.165 165.Sentences of Court, The Anderson Intelligencer, Nov. 15, 1883 (quoting the Abbeville Press and Banner).Show More The white offender received the opportunity to pay a fine. But the Black offender got six months’ time at the penitentiary.166 166.Id.Show More How, the periodical wondered, could one possibly distinguish those cases?167 167.Id. After noting this race-based sentencing disparity, the original column in the Abbeville Press and Banner lamented, “Does not such discriminations [sic] against the brother in black offend our sense of justice?” Id. Yet when the same column was reprinted in The Anderson Intelligencer, the Intelligencer defended judges’ discretion to impose disparate sentences.Show More

The situation in South Carolina apparently did not improve with time. In 1891, a South Carolina judge recommended that “the law against carrying concealed weapons . . . be more rigidly enforced.”168 168.“The Easter Egg,” The Newberry Herald and News, Mar. 19, 1891, at 1.Show More The paper agreed: “[a]s it is the law is a dead letter, and only an occasional negro is brought to trial for the offense.”169 169.Id.Show More Another source, this time in 1893, also pointed out South Carolina’s enforcement disparity. Twelve Black inmates, it noted, languished “in the South Carolina penitentiary for the simple offense of carrying concealed weapons, a thing that about every white man in the state does.”170 170.Outrages on the Negro: Rev. Dr. Seaton Says that They Must be Stopped, What Prison Records Show, The Evening Star, Aug. 14, 1893, at 7.Show More But while whites did so freely, Black offenders faced hard labor in the convict-lease system.171 171.Id.Show More

Famed journalist and early civil-rights activist Ida B. Wells similarly criticized the South for its obvious enforcement hypocrisy regarding concealed weapons. In a 1900 address, she noted that “[t]here is a law in the south against carrying concealed weapons.”172 172.Ida B. Wells, Negro Lynching: Deprecated by Speakers and a Remedy Suggested, Topeka State Journal, Feb. 17, 1900, at 5. The Anti-Lynching Crusaders, Republican and Herald, Feb. 19, 1900, at 2.Show More “White men carry them with impunity,” she pointed out.173 173.Id.Show More “[B]ut if the negro is caught with a gun[,] he is fined $50 and put in the chain gang for 60 days.”174 174.Id.Show More She was incorrect only insofar as a mere 60 days’ imprisonment was apparently a light sentence for a Black offender.175 175.For instance, one 1893 survey of the rolls of a South Carolina penitentiary revealed that twelve Black prisoners were serving ten-year sentences “for the simple offense of carrying concealed weapons.” Outrages on the Negro: Rev. Dr. Seaton Says that They Must be Stopped, What Prison Records Show, The Evening Star, Aug. 14, 1893, at 7. The prisoners had been given such lengthy sentences, the source suggested, so that they could be impressed into the “lease system of convict labor” then prevalent in the South. Id.Show More

Much like Wells, periodicals across the South noted the enforcement disparity between white “Southern gentlemen” and Black offenders. As the Houston Daily Post remarked in 1902, “[t]here is one law for the ‘n——r and the Chinaman’ who tote pistols . . . and there is another law for the gentleman who arms himself[.]”176 176.The Gentleman Outlaw, Houston Daily Post, Aug., 14, 1902, at 4 (racial slur censored).Show More In other words, minorities risked severe punishment if caught with weapons. Yet “[g]entlemen of high social and commercial standing” could “walk the streets or ride the roads” while armed without question.177 177.Id.Show More Similarly, a South Carolina paper noted in 1911 that while “[t]here are laws upon the statute books against the carrying of concealed weapons, and occasionally some insignificent ‘n——r’ is haled before the courts and fined . . . but it is very rare that a white man is made to pay the penalty.”178 178.The People Alone Responsible, The Manning Times, Nov. 1, 1911, at 8 (racial slur censored).Show More A Missouri periodical, too, noted in 1903 that both Blacks and whites often carried concealed weapons. But it was Black offenders, not whites, that police made the enforcement priority. Indeed, East St. Louis had begun a “roundup of [the] lawless negro class” with “concealed weapons in their possession.”179 179.Police Start on Roundup of Lawless Negro Class, The Republic, May 11, 1903, at 5.Show More Believing that most crimes were “committed by negroes” whose concealed weapons “enabl[ed them] to commit crime quicker,” the police had arrested “a score of negroes” in recent days.180 180.Id.Show More And in Kentucky, too, there was one law for the white “gentleman” but another for the Black offender. As one writer noted in 1908, “[w]hen old Kentucky tries to convict a white lawbreaker[,] she has an awful job.”181 181.Public Ledger, October 15, 1908, at 2.Show More When a white lawyer shot at someone else, for example, “[h]e got off with a light fine for the offense.”182 182.Id.Show More “[A]nd a jury refused to fine him for carrying a pistol.”183 183.Id.Show More But “a N——r,” he noted, “would have been given the limit in half an hour.”184 184.Id. (racial slur censored).Show More

Likewise, South Carolina openly celebrated the use of its weapon laws to disarm Black citizens. In 1911, two South Carolina periodicals commended the efforts of a particular magistrate, William M. Dorroh, to seize Blacks’ firearms. The Herald and News noted that Magistrate Dorroh had “achieved State-wide mention for his fine record in disarming negroes of their concealed weapons.”185 185.Various and All About, The Herald and News, Aug. 29, 1911, at 8.Show More And The Yorkville Enquirer, too, praised Dorroh for his “fine record in the enforcement of the concealed weapons law since he has been in office.”186 186.South Carolina News, The Yorkville Enquirer, July 7, 1911, at 2.Show More But it was a “fine record” precisely because it was so biased against Blacks.187 187.Id.Show More “Thirty-eight is the number of pistols he has taken from negroes in sixty days,” the Enquirer observed.188 188.Id.Show More While it was “a large number of pistols secured at a good rate per day,” even still, “it would take Magistrate Dorroh a considerable time to disarm all the negroes” in his township.189 189.Id.Show More In the meantime, though, “he [was] being generally commended for his efforts.”190 190.Id.Show More

Perhaps a final quotation in the Atlanta Constitution, from a column penned in 1910, best captures the themes we have developed in this Part: “It has not as yet been shown that the Afro-American is more addicted to the habit of pistol-toting than his white brother, but it is evident that he is much more liable to arrest. For centuries, all over the world, it has been regarded as the prerogative of a gentleman to carry arms and a Southern gentleman knows that, in such case, no peace officer is apt to interfere with him. Indeed, one of the class, when challenged for violating the law against carrying concealed weapons remarked, very truthfully, ‘That law was made for n——rs.’”191 191.The Pistol-Toters, The Appeal, July 2, 1910, at 2 (racial slur censored).Show More

III. Why The Racially Biased Origins of Southern Gun Control Uniquely Matter After Ramos

While Part II dealt largely in original research, scholars have long made the broader point that gun control in the United States has racist origins. What has been less clear, though, is why those origins matter today. Some who support a narrow view of the Second Amendment appear to understand these laws’ biased origins yet draw no broader implications from that fact.192 192.See Spitzer, supra note 22, at 78–79.Show More Others have sought to dismiss the relevance of past racism to the present dialogue.193 193.See Frassetto, supra note 22 at 95–97 (arguing that, in Texas, it was pro-freedman, pro-civil-rights Radical Republicans who supported restrictions on the right to carry firearms).Show More In response, we argue that scholars must grapple with gun control’s racist origins—origins that “uniquely matter” since they continue to burden constitutional rights.194 194.Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1408 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see alsoBrief of Italo-American Jurists and Attorneys, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Corlett (No. 20-843) (arguing that the Court in Corlett should consider New York’s restrictive gun law in light of historical evidence reflecting the state’s efforts to single out and disarm Italians).Show More Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ramos v. Louisiana obliges them to do so.

In Ramos, the Court considered the validity of two state statutes—one from Oregon; the other from Louisiana—that permitted conviction by non-unanimous juries in felony trials.195 195.Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.Show More While non-unanimity would cause a mistrial anywhere else, in these states, it could support a sentence of life without parole. In a majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court noted as an initial matter that both states’ laws were “facially race-neutral.”196 196.Id.Show More Nothing about the allowance of a 10-to-2 verdict inherently suggested invidious discrimination. And the reasons for these states’ modern adherence to the non-unanimity rule seemed obscure.

Upon further reflection, though, the Court explained that the “origins” of those laws “are clear.”197 197.Id. (emphasis added).Show More “Louisiana first endorsed nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes at a constitutional convention in 1898,” where all the talk had concerned preserving “the supremacy of the white race.”198 198.Id.Show More Its delegates were well-aware that “overt discrimination against African-American jurors [would] violat[e] the Fourteenth Amendment.”199 199.Id.Show More So, instead, they adopted a facially neutral rule that permitted non-unanimous verdicts. But the real point was “to ensure that African-American juror service would be meaningless.”200 200.Id.Show More Even when a Black person managed to get on the jury, his vote could be overridden by his white peers. Oregon’s rule, too, could “be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute ‘the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries.’”201 201.Id.Show More None of Ramos’s litigants even disputed those points, and courts in both states had “frankly acknowledged that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of their States’ respective nonunanimity rules.”202 202.Id.Show More

So what? Previous parties, amici, and scholars had all urged the Court to treat certain other laws and precedents as “tainted” or “poisoned” for their infection with bias or bigotry.203 203.See, e.g., Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1625, 1626–30 (2013) (detailing such attempts).Show More But the Court had demurred on those past occasions. Such “extralegal” concerns, as Chief Justice Rehnquist once called them, were “not the usual stuff of Supreme Court debate,” and considering them would be a “disservice to the Court’s traditional method of adjudication.”204 204.Id. (quoting John C. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 280 (2001); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1996)).Show More

It was surprising, then, that the Ramos Court seemed to place such import on “the racist origins of Louisiana’s and Oregon’s laws.”205 205.Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405.Show More And it did so despite these states arguably having “purged” the laws’ earlier taint through subsequent reenactments. Indeed, the majority explained that given the laws’ modern implications for a fundamental right, it could not leave “an uncomfortable past unexamined.”206 206.Id. at 1401 n.44.Show More The majority’s tactic also engendered two concurrences that further endorsed its analytical move. Justice Kavanaugh was left wondering why the Court should sanction a law “that is thoroughly racist in its origins,”207 207.Id. at 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).Show More while Justice Sotomayor believed that “the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.”208 208.Id.at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).Show More

Scholars noticed the import of Ramos’s novel approach soon after. “It is not often that the Supreme Court ratifies an entirely new form of judicial argument,” noted Professor Charles Barzun.209 209.Charles Barzun, The Constitution and Genealogy, Balkinization (July 6, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-constitution-and-genealogy.html. [https://perma.cc/EH4M-B3TZ].Show More “But that may be what happened this past term.”210 210.Id.Show More The Ramos Court had elevated laws’ genealogy from an anti-modality to a new and apparently “legitimate modality.”211 211.Id.; see alsoBarzun, supra note 203, at 1631 (“My claim, in short, is that the effort to historicize or impeach a past decision is a legitimate and potentially useful means of evaluating a decision’s authority as a matter of precedent.”).Show More Still, Professor Barzun struggled to explain precisely why the Court thought genealogy relevant. Though laws may be invalid if conceived with animus, Oregon’s and Louisiana’s later reenactments seemed to have purged it. And genealogical arguments may often be logically fallacious. Indeed, logicians call it the “genetic fallacy” to “assume[ ] that a statement, position, or idea must be flawed” simply because its source happens to be flawed.212 212.Jacob E. Van Vleet, Informal Logical Fallacies 19 (2011).Show More

We think, though, that Ramos was not flawed or fallacious or, as the dissent charged, dealing in “ad hominem rhetoric.”213 213.140 S. Ct. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan, argued that the tainted “origins of the Louisiana and Oregon rules have no bearing on the broad constitutional question that the Court decides.” Id. But having “lost” in Ramos, Justice Alito switched gears two months later when the Court in Espinoza considered whether the Montana Supreme Court had violated the Free Exercise Clause when it applied the “no-aid provision” of the Montana Constitution to bar religious schools from benefiting from a state program that provided tuition assistance. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2268 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito argued that Ramos established that the Court may examine the motivation behind the passage of a statute or a state constitutional provision to smoke out illicit bigotry. Justice Alito, quoting Ramos, concluded that Montana’s no-aid provision remained “‘[t]ethered’ to its original ‘bias”’ against Catholics because the state had not “‘actually confront[ed]’ the provision’s ‘tawdry past in reenacting it.”’ Id. at 2274 (quoting 140 S. Ct. at 1410) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). Combining the opinions of Ramos and of Espinoza, six Justices—all but Justices Kagan and Barrett and Chief Justice Roberts—have endorsed and applied the genealogical taint principle.Show More Rather, it told us something important about how future courts and scholars should approach historical analysis and, ultimately, originalism. As many scholars have persuasively argued, we can think of constitutional exegesis as having a pair of key stages: interpretation and then construction.214 214.Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 65–66 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 455–56 (2013).Show More When we interpret a text, we seek to discover its communicative content—what the words meant at the time of their ratification.215 215.Solum, supra note 214, at 457.Show More When we then construe the text, we determine what legal effect we should give to that meaning.216 216.Id.Show More The clearer the text, the smaller the “construction zone.” But sometimes constitutional provisions are “general, abstract, [or] vague,” so we must resort to other heuristics of meaning when applying them “to concrete constitutional cases.”217 217.Id. at 458.Show More

One of those heuristics of meaning, of course, is historical practice.218 218.We are primarily referring here to liquidation. See The Federalist No. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (2001); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019).Show More To discern how fundamental a right really is, we might look to how people in the past viewed the right—how they exercised it and which restrictions upon it they tolerated or endorsed. But Ramos gives us a critical caveat about how we should conduct this historical research. When assessing a past restriction’s probative weight on the true scope of a constitutional guarantee, we cannot simply ignore past actors’ illegitimate and ulterior motives in enacting such restrictions. Rather, illegitimate motives tell us that past actors restricted a right not necessarily because they considered it trivial, but because they thought their impermissible motive—for instance, preservation of white supremacy—the greater priority. So ignoring historical motives (and, perhaps even more important, historical enforcement patterns) might lead us to wrongly over-value certain historical evidence in a modern constitutional calculus. Translated to the controversy before the Court in Ramos itself, concluding that historical actors did not consider jury unanimity an important right because of their longstanding decision to permit nonunanimity would be a mistake. Rather, the impermissible motives behind that historical practice gutted those restrictions’ probative weight in assessing how broad or fundamental was the burdened right.

With that context in mind, understanding Ramos’s import for the Second Amendment becomes simple. When courts—and, later this term, the Supreme Court—assess the scope of the “bear” right, they may consider historical practice relevant in that assessment. But that does not involve simply looking at old laws written on a page. Judges instead must grapple with those laws’ historical motivations and enforcement patterns. And to the extent that such analysis reveals impermissible motives and disparate enforcement, judges must discount the probative weight of that evidence accordingly. In other words, Ramos tells us that it is illegitimate to conclude that the modern “bear” right is susceptible to copious restrictions because racist Southern authorities restricted Black citizens’ past exercise of that right. Such evidence may be powerfully probative of historical racism, but its probative weight regarding history’s true verdict on the scope of the Second Amendment should be considered slim. Otherwise, courts risk laundering past racist restrictions to validate modern burdens on constitutional rights.

Conclusion

On May 10, 1865, Frederick Douglass delivered an address in New York City that advocated for a constitutional amendment to make guarantees in the Bill of Rights directly applicable to the states.219 219.“In What New Skin Will the Old Snake Come Forth?: An Address Delivered in New York, New York, on 10 May 10, 1865,” reprinted in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers 79, 83–84 (John W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991).Show More Without one, he said, state legislatures could “take from [free Blacks] the right to keep and bear arms . . . [n]otwithstanding the provision in the Constitution of the United States.”220 220.Id.Show More As we now know, the nation responded by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment. Ironically, New York today seeks to defend its “proper cause” requirement by invoking old laws of just the sort that Douglass decried. Its brief in opposition to certiorari in NYSRPA II, for instance, cited Kachalsky twenty-nine times and advanced multiple Southern gun-control statutes to argue that history supports continued restrictions on public carry.221 221.Brief of Respondents at iii, v–vi, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, 20-843 (2021), 2021 WL 723110 (citing Kachalsky and several Southern gun-control statutes).Show More Apparently, that historical evidence did not dissuade the Court from taking up the case. Nor, when it turns to the merits, should the Court reinvigorate tainted artifacts of a bygone era to burden constitutional rights in the modern one.

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