Why BIPOC Fails

Introduction

Racial tensions have been endemic to the U.S. since its founding. In 2020, this racial conflict bubbled over into the streets as those supporting Black Lives Matter and opposing a long history of racist police violence congregated to demand justice.1.Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/‌2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/2Q5H-978V].Show More Last year and still now, the global pandemic has placed additional stress on communities of color, which have been disproportionately affected by and infected with COVID-19.2.Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities Persist—And in Some Cases Worsen, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:01 PM) (“People of color get sick and die of COVID-19 at rates higher than whites and higher than their share of the population.”), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-pandemic-deaths-add-up-racial-disparities-persist-and-in-some-cases-worsen [https://perma.cc/TZT9-HHZ2].Show More While they were threatened with loss of life from disease, Black men and women continued to be killed at the hands of police and unchecked vigilantes.3.Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 951, 957–58 (2020).Show More The question thus became whether to stay home to stay safe from a deadly virus or take to the streets to demand safety from state-sanctioned violence. The result was the largest mass protest in U.S. history, with thousands of Black and Brown people masked up fighting for their lives and thousands of allies standing and shouting beside them.4.Buchanan, Bui & Patel, supra note 1.Show More

This level of activism clearly demonstrates that change is both needed and long overdue. The response from the corporate world,5.Corporations that donated to antiracist causes include Home Depot, Ubisoft, Apple, Facebook, Intel, and Peloton. Isabel Togoh, Corporate Donations Tracker: Here Are the Companies Giving Millions to Anti-Racism Efforts, Forbes (June 1, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/06/01/corporate-donations-tracker-here-are-the-companies-giving-millions-to-anti-racism-efforts/?sh=3160129d37dc [https://perma.cc/TL8R-FPXT].Show More sports teams and celebrity athletes,6.Taking a Knee: Athletes Protest Against Racism Around the World—in Pictures, The Guardian (Aug. 27, 2020, 4:35 PM) (“[A]thletes around the world have been kneeling in support of Black Lives Matter and wearing the phrase on jerseys and T-shirts while NBA players boycotted game five of their playoff series in protest of the police shooting against Jacob Blake”), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/gallery/2020/aug/27/nba-strike-athletes-kneeling-black-lives-matter-protest [https://perma.cc/D8PH-ULBT].Show More institutions of higher education,7.Joey Hadden, How the Top 25 Colleges and Universities in the US Are Responding to the Black Lives Matter Protests, Bus. Insider (June 25, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/college-top-us-universities-respond-black-lives-matter-protests-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/692G-PJR6].Show More and people throughout the world8.Jen Kirby, “Black Lives Matter” Has Become a Global Rallying Cry Against Racism and Police Brutality, Vox (June 12, 2020, 7:30 AM) (noting that “[t]he police killing of George Floyd has sparked a worldwide reckoning”), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21285244/‌black-lives-matter-global-protests-george-floyd-uk-belgium.Show More has been largely supportive in terms of recognizing the need for a purposeful commitment to antiracism. One unanswered question asks whether these cries for change could also benefit from an update in the language and terminology that advocates, allies, and academics use when discussing issues of race and racism.9.This Essay introduces these concepts and questions. For more on usage of various terms, limitations of BIPOC, and application to the particular context of legal education, see Meera E. Deo, Beyond BIPOC (in progress 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).Show More

At this moment of reckoning, we have the opportunity and responsibility to reexamine our language and the terms we use to name and claim racism and resistance. While we previously settled for small diversity gains, many now push for greater inclusion, equity, and belonging as well as broader antiracist principles demanding action.10 10.See generally Meera E. Deo, The End of Affirmative Action, 100 N. Carolina L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (proposing an overhaul of affirmative action policies and suggesting broader inclusion of minority groups by differentiating the experiences of each group and the addition of diversity, equity, and inclusion to existing policies).Show More In the context of higher education, for example, law schools have relied for decades on educational diversity as a rationale for affirmative action—a priority that ignores racism, equity, and representation.11 11.Granted, institutions of higher learning have relied on educational diversity as a justification for affirmative action because no other compelling state interests have been deemed constitutional. Meera E. Deo, The Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University of Michigan Law School, 17 Mich. J. Race & L. 63, 68–69 (2011).Show More Yet in 2020, five Black women leaders spearheaded the Law Deans Antiracist Clearinghouse Project to guide the many law schools issuing faculty resolutions committing themselves to becoming (more) antiracist as a signal of more meaningful progress in legal education.12 12.For more on this project, including the five suggested phases schools should engage with on the path to becoming antiracist, see Danielle M. Conway, Danielle Holley-Walker, Kimberly Mutcherson, Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Carla D. Pratt, Law Deans Antiracist Clearinghouse Project, Ass’n Am. Law Schs., https://www.aals.org/antiracist-clearinghouse/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/X3Z5-JHQX].Show More A change in terminology does more than add to the lexicon; it also signals a change in priorities for those working towards racial justice. Should there be additional language updates that signal our updated priorities?

Since roughly May 2020, there has been interest within some circles in the new term “BIPOC”—referring to those who are Black, Indigenous, and People of Color.13 13.Sandra E. Garcia, Where Did BIPOC Come From?, N.Y. Times (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-bipoc.html [https://perma.cc/H978-PFGG]. The exact origins and sudden popular usage of BIPOC remain unclear, though they are traced in more detail in Beyond BIPOC. Deo, supra note 9, at 18-20.Show More The term first appeared online in 2013 and expanded on social media when taken up mainly by educated elites who see themselves as progressive voices on issues of race or ethnicity, regardless of their own identity backgrounds.14 14.Who Does the Acronym “BIPOC” Actually Serve?, The Takeaway (June 25, 2020), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/takeaway/segments/acronym-bipoc-race-language?tab=summary [https://perma.cc/K3UY-ZJQ5]; If podcast: Who Does The Acronym BIPOC Actually Serve?, The Takeaway (June 25, 2020). Both race and ethnicity are fluid (rather than fixed) concepts that change over time and in varying contexts. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.–C.L.L. Rev. 1, 8, 10 (1994).Show More However, what has been missing entirely is a wider conversation about usage of the term—why it may be necessary to update language, how it can be a tool in anti-subordination efforts, and whether this particular term is the most effective at this particular time. New language should not take over without community engagement and deep reflection.

While language is key to anti-subordination, BIPOC damages those efforts rather than being helpful, especially among those searching for new language addressing contemporary issues of race and racism. New terms are useful and should be utilized in antiracism efforts; yet BIPOC itself does a disservice to communities of color and efforts to dismantle systems of racial privilege. Centering particular groups only in name ultimately furthers their marginalization because they remain excluded in fact though referenced in the term, erasing the power that comes from participation and inclusion. BIPOC begins with the premise that we should always center two particular racial groups—Black and Indigenous—within the people of color category, though these communities are not always at the center of the issue being discussed. While concentrating on these two groups may make sense in particular contexts, it cannot be true that every example of race and racism should center Black and Indigenous voices or experiences.

This Essay initiates a discussion about how we should critically examine which issues and data are most relevant to our arguments and advocacy efforts and how we should match our terms to the particular groups at the center of those priorities.15 15.The discussion on limitations of BIPOC continues in Deo, supra note 9, at 20-22.Show More This will mean aggregating groups at times and naming them separately at others; whether finding community through unity or standing separately to highlight distinctions, either of these options is better than BIPOC. Particular examples showcase the failures of BIPOC, both in theory and in practice, including ways in which it can be misleading, confusing, and contribute to the invisibility of the very groups that should be centered in particular contexts.

The Essay begins by outlining the relationship between language and anti-subordination, explaining why words matter as an act of resistance. Part II explores the benefits of unity between groups, resulting in pan-racial umbrella communities such as “people of color” and “women of color” that provide greater strength and solidarity to groups that may be distinct but can nevertheless stand together under one umbrella. Part III provides three initial rationales for why BIPOC is not the best term for our times, as well as a series of examples showing how BIPOC is a misleading representation of communities of color in various contexts. Together, these add evidence to the claim that allies, advocates, and academics should not simply use whatever term is currently in vogue but instead critically examine the language we use and carefully match it to our data, priorities, and conclusions.

I. The Language of Anti-Subordination

Language has a direct connection to subordination, and therefore anti-subordination. “Anti[-]subordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification,” as is the case currently and has been historically in the U.S.16 16.Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 9 (2003); see Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to Critical Race Feminism: A Reader 1, 7 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 151 (1976).Show More Change, they argue, depends in part on law “reform[ing] institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups.”17 17.Balkin & Siegel, supra note 16.Show More Often, the law follows broad social trends demonstrating change, rather than being a leader in those efforts.18 18.See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 12–14 (2011); Jamillah Williams, Naomi Mezey & Lisa Singh, #BlackLivesMatter—Getting from Contemporary Social Movements to Legal Change, 12 Calif. L. Rev. Online 1 ( 2021).Show More

Language, on the other hand, is often the leader, providing an opportunity to rethink and reconceptualize ingrained concepts to transcend original meanings using new terms coined by activists and others on the front lines of change. Clearly, language itself (like race) is both socially constructed and fluid—constantly changing, shifting, and evolving. When using language and especially when crafting new terms to think about race, racism, and resistance, it is therefore critically important that racial categories and terminology are grounded not only in history, but in contemporary context.19 19.See generally Jonathan Rosa & Nelson Flores, Unsettling Race and Language: Toward a Raciolinguistic Perspective, 46 Language in Soc’y 621 (2017); Jonathan Rosa, Looking Like a Language, Sounding Like a Race: Raciolingustic Ideologies and the Learning of Latinidad (2019).Show More Furthermore, changes in terminology can be confusing to outsiders (meaning anyone not referenced by the term) and are especially important for allies and others who are eager to support anti-subordination efforts without always knowing which terms or words are currently preferred.

Consider the reclaiming of dyke in the LGBTQ+ context—an opportunity for women oppressed and maligned for being lesbians to reinvent the term, using their claim on language to share pride in how they name and refer to themselves.20 20.Gregory Coles, Emerging Voices: The Exorcism of Language: Reclaimed Derogatory Terms and their Limits, 78 C. Eng. 424, 424–25 (2016).Show More Similarly, recent interest in adopting crip as an identity moniker related specifically to disabled people seeks to de-stigmatize a term long used to denigrate those who have been “othered”21 21.For more on boundaries between groups, including distinctions between “us” vs. “them,” see Fredrik Barth, Introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries 9, 15–16 (Fredrik Barth ed. 1969).Show More and instead reformulate it as a powerful identity marker uniting people around shared experiences, including resistance to assimilation.22 22.See Carrie Sandahl, Queering the Crip or Cripping the Queer? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance, 9 GLQ 25, 26–27 (2003); Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability 40–41 (2006); Jasmine E. Harris, Reckoning with Race and Disability, 130 Yale L.J.F. (forthcoming 2021).Show More

This reclaiming and resistance in language is similarly evident in the context of race. Some scholars have even called for a new academic focus, whether called raciolinguistics or LangCrit, to study the interplay of race, racism, and language.23 23.H. Samy Alim, Introducing Raciolinguistics: Racing Language and Languaging Race in Hyperracial Times, inRaciolinguistics: How Language Shapes Our Ideas about Race 1, 5 (H. Samy Alim, John R. Rickford & Arnetha F. Ball eds., 2016); Alison Crump, Introducing LangCrit: Critical Language and Race Theory, 11 Critical Inquiry in Language Stud. 207, 207 (2014).Show More Understanding that “racial identities can shift across contexts” means that we need new language to take account of those shifts over time.24 24.Alex Shashkevich, Stanford Experts Highlight Link Between Language and Race in New Book, Stan. News (Dec. 27, 2016), https://news.stanford.edu/2016/12/27/link-language-race-new-book/ [https://perma.cc/YDP7-PJBW].Show More More dramatically, scholars and others must recognize “the central role that language plays in processes of racialization,” and act accordingly—working to shape language as a form of anti-subordination.25 25.Id.Show More

There have been many such efforts over time. The shifts and changes and preferred terms of Negro, Colored, Black, and African American are less a signal of evolution and progress and more an opportunity to push back against stereotypes or expectations associated with various terms at various times—since language, like race, is fluid.26 26.See Ben L. Martin, From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming, 106 Pol. Sci. Q. 83, 83 (1991).Show More Like the reinvention of the terms dyke and crip, Black youth reclaiming the N-word is a prime example of a racial group that took language used to oppress them and turned it into a powerful way to reference “solidarity, censure, and a proactive stance that seeks to bring about positive change.”27 27.Jacquelyn Rahman, The N Word: Its History and Use in the African American Community, 40 J. Eng. Linguistics 137, 137 (2012).Show More

The naming of intersectionality also ushered in transformative change in the context of the combination of race and other identity characteristics.28 28.See Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 140 (coining the term).Show More Whether we call it “multiple consciousness, cosynthesis, holism, interconnectivity, [or] multidimensionality,” the revolutionary idea that intersecting identity characteristics define and limit us in various contexts remains essential to anti-subordination.29 29.Wing, supra note 16, at 1, 7.Show More The concept of intersectionality draws from the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw and other legal scholars referring to those with multiple devalued identity characteristics.30 30.See Crenshaw, supra note 16; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1244 (1991). See generally Wing, supra note 16; Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment23 (2d ed. 2000); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor 6–7 (2002).Show More These Critical Race Theorists argue that those operating at the “intersection of recognized sites of oppression” along multiple domains suffer negative effects based on each as well as all of these identity markers.31 31.Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 58–63 (3d ed. 2017).Show More

Going a step further, we can specifically consider raceXgender identity, which encompasses people whose race intersects with their gender to create not additive (race plus gender) but compounded effects based on identification with two marginalized groups.32 32.Previous scholarship has highlighted how “utilizing the raceXgender nomenclature emphasizes the multifactorial effects of race ‘times’ gender for women of color.” Meera E. Deo, Unequal Profession: Race and Gender in Legal Academia 8 (2019); Meera E. Deo, The Culture of “raceXgender” Bias in Legal Academia, in Power, Legal Education, and Law School Cultures 240, 241 (Meera E. Deo, Mindie Lazarus-Black & Elizabeth Mertz eds., 2019).Show More There are various intersectional combinations even in the race context that could be salient or even essential depending on the arguments being made or issues at hand—including raceXsexual orientation, raceXclass, and raceXage.33 33.Sandahl, supra note 22.Show More These linguistic changes signify the movement to antiracism.

The push for antiracism itself reflects an update in both language and priorities, signaling a shift from protecting diversity to promoting broader action-oriented change. In previous years, advocates were steadfastly focused on promoting racial diversity to advance racial justice. To that end, institutions of higher learning argued in court that admitting a racially diverse student body furthered students’ academic and professional outcomes.34 34.Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 267 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II),136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016); Deo, supra note 10, at 68–72. The defendants in Bakke also argued there were other reasons to support affirmative action—including to increase minority representation among doctors, reduce societal discrimination, and increase service to disadvantaged communities—though none of these were sanctioned by the Court. Meera E. Deo, Affirmative Action Assumptions, 52 UC Davis L. Rev. 2407, 2412-15 (2019).Show More Those making “the business case for diversity” in the corporate world recognized and touted the connection between a company’s financial performance and its level of diversity along various metrics.35 35.Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Vivian Hunt, Kevin Dolan & Sara Prince, McKinsey & Co., Diversity Wins: How Inclusion Matters 13 (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/‌media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Diversity%20and%20Inclusion/Diversity%20wins%20How%20inclusion%20matters/Diversity-wins-How-inclusion-matters-vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7RA-3DT9].Show More The military even asserted that diversity among the troops and leaders of its various branches is a necessary ingredient for national security.36 36.Deo, supra note 10, at 65 n.4 (citing and quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331) (“high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national security.’”).Show More

In the past decade, interests in diversity have broadened to accentuate inclusion, equity, and belonging.37 37.Elizabeth Bodamer, Belonging in Law School (2021) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author).Show More Using the well-litigated and high profile context of higher education, previous emphasis was on admitting students from different backgrounds in an effort to increase racial diversity on campus for the ostensible purpose of improving the quality of education for all students—which truly reflected an interest in admitting students of color to improve the educational experiences of whites.38 38.See Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3115, 3117 (2015); Deo, supra note 10, at 3.Show More More recently, scholars and advocates have shifted their perspective to consider not only who is admitted but also the quality of the interactions and experiences of students of color once on campus.39 39.See, e.g., Meera E. Deo & Chad Christensen, Ind. Univ. Ctr. for Postsecondary Research, 2020 Annual Survey Results: Diversity & Exclusion 6 (2020), https://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Diversity-and-Exclusion-Final-9.29.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P3A-FK26].Show More This consideration not only of diversity but also of inclusion—“a cultural and environmental feeling of belonging” related to members feeling “valued, respected, accepted and encouraged to fully participate”—thus highlights an interest beyond diversity.40 40.Ella Washington & Camille Patrick, 3 Requirements for a Diverse and Inclusive Culture, GALLUP (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.gallup.com/workplace/242138/requirements-diverse-inclusive-culture.aspx [https://perma.cc/A82S-U2MV].Show More Similarly, recent efforts to promote equity and belonging signal the importance of moving beyond diversity to consider broader anti-subordination and even antiracist principles.41 41.Deo, supra note 10.Show More

While the commitment to diversity and the rationales behind it remain intact, and that commitment has expanded to include greater inclusion, equity, and belonging, there has also been a shift toward pursuing the more anti-subordination and justice-oriented concept of antiracism. As scholar and author Ibram X. Kendi shares in his trailblazing book, How to Be an Antiracist, “[T]here is no neutrality in the racism struggle…. One either allows racial inequities to persevere, as a racist, or confronts racial inequities, as an antiracist.”42 42.Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist 9 (2019).Show More In this way, Kendi ties personal preferences to praxis, a central tenet of Critical Race Theory emphasizing that racial justice ideas must transcend the page to inspire “theory-informed action.”43 43.Chandra L. Ford & Collins O. Airhihenbuwa, Critical Race Theory, Race Equity, and Public Health: Toward Antiracism Praxis, 100 Am. J. Pub. Health S30, S31 (2010).Show More Thus, Kendi asserts that “being an antiracist requires persistent self-awareness, constant self-criticism, and regular self-examination.”44 44.Kendi, supra note 42, at 23.Show More Language itself is critical to the antiracist endeavor, including promoting or resisting “a whole vocabulary of old and new words—like ‘cultural wars’ and ‘stereotype’ and ‘implicit bias’.”45 45.Id. at 46–47. See also Michele Goodwin, Complicit Bias: Sexual Harassment and the Communities that Sustain It, Huffington Post (Dec. 11, 2017, 2:18AM) (using a new term “complicit bias” to describe community complicity in sustaining institutional bias and harassment in the workplace), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/complicit-bias-sexual-harassment-and-communities-that_b_5a2e238de4b0d7c3f262244f [https://perma.cc/LLB5-Q7DJ].Show More

Language, both old and new, can also be used to group together disparate groups who nevertheless share common experiences, as discussed below for people of color and other groups. Yet with a goal of anti-subordination in mind, we must push against groupings made purely for convenience’s sake, those that diminish or erase minority perspectives, or others that may seem initially useful or even progressive but in actuality serve to subtly reinforce entrenched norms and retrench existing hierarchies.

II. When Unity Leads to Erasure

Often language assumes unity—it creates the ability to bring people together, especially those who have shared identity characteristics. Creating terms to identify a class of heretofore disparate groups serves to bring them together under a new more inclusive umbrella. But what goes missing when groups band together?

Historically, the purpose of these umbrella groups has been to unite people with shared experiences for mutual political and social benefits.46 46.Constance Grady, Why the Term “BIPOC” Is So Complicated, Explained by Linguists, Vox (June 30, 2020, 9:10 AM) (“In the 1960s and ’70s, . . . groups like the Black Panther Party for Self Defense and the Brown Berets came together in solidarity as people of color, which was a new instantiation of the idea of people having color.”) (internal quotations omitted), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/30/21300294/bipoc-what-does-it-mean-critical-race-linguistics-jonathan-rosa-deandra-miles-hercules.Show More People from distinct backgrounds recognized that there was strength in numbers, and so sought out others who shared some (though not all) of their identity characteristics in order to work toward collective change.47 47.Efrén Pérez, (Mis)Calculations, Psychological Mechanisms, and the Future Politics of People of Color, 6 J. Race, Ethnicity & Pol. 33, 36–37 (2021); Efrén O. Pérez, Diversity’s Child: People of Color and the Politics of Identity (manuscript, 3-5) (forthcoming July 2021).Show More Two of these groups are briefly introduced here to provide context for BIPOC.48 48.The origin, evolution, benefits, and limitations of the terms “people of color” and “women of color” are covered in greater detail in Deo, supra note 9.Show More

One example is the term people of color, which bands together those who are Black, Latinx, Asian American, Native American, Arab American, and other non-whites.49 49.Pérez, supra note 47 (manuscript at 1-4). The term “Latinx” itself has come under scrutiny in this ongoing conversation about preferred language for communities, advocates, and allies. Jonathan Rosa, Looking Like a Language, Sounding Like a Race: Raciolinguistic Ideologies and the Learning of Latinidad (2019); Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora & Mark Hugo Lopez, About One-in-Four U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3% Use It, Pew Research Center (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-have-heard-of-latinx-but-just-3-use-it [https://perma.cc/24FX-D9LP] (explaining the origins and uses of the term “Latinx”).Show More Pan-ethnic groups that nevertheless have disparate ethnic groupings, also have the capacity to incorporate intersectional identity drawing from race (e.g., Asian American) and ethnicity (e.g., Korean American).50 50.See Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity 19–20 (1992).Show More

Finding unity within raceXgender references the larger grouping of women of color, a community comprised of women who are also people of color.51 51.Wing, supra note 29, at 7.Show More By highlighting intersectional raceXgender, the women of color grouping centers the experience of those who tend to be marginalized within both communities of people of color (where men of color have more privilege and power) and women (where white women have more privilege and power).52 52.See Michele Wallace, A Black Feminist’s Search for Sisterhood, in All the Women Are White, All the Black Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies 7, 10 (Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, & Barbara Smith eds., 1982); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1990); but see Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 Yale J. L. & Feminism 13, 18 (1991).Show More

Recently joining the conversation about race and terminology is BIPOC, an acronym for Black, Indigenous, and People of Color.53 53.Garcia, supra note 13; The BIPOC Project, https://www.thebipocproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/GS4R-YQWY] (last visited March 19, 2021) (showing the efforts by activists to center the voices of the Black and Indigenous communities by turning to the term “BIPOC”); Grady, supra note 46.Show More BIPOC was popularized on social media, with some educated elites adopting it and others rejecting its inherent exclusivity, especially without much community engagement.54 54.Garcia, supra note 13.Show More Unlike other terms that grew in usage after months or years of community reflection, BIPOC seemingly erupted on the scene and was taken up by academics and the media in summer 2020 as people flocked to the streets to demand an end to police violence targeting the Black community.55 55.Id.Show More While it is essentially a synonym for people of color, advocates use it to intentionally foreground “Black” and “Indigenous,” arguing that these groups are both foundational to understanding the racial history of the U.S. and often not given the recognition they are due within the larger people of color umbrella.56 56.The BIPOC Project, supra note 53; Chevaz Clarke, BIPOC: What Does It Mean and Where Does It Come From?, CBS News (July 2, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bipoc-meaning-where-does-it-come-from-2020-04-02 [https://perma.cc/P2NW-5ZW7].Show More The term purposefully creates hierarchies between people of color groups, consciously highlighting the two “to acknowledge that not all people of color face equal levels of injustice.”57 57.Clarke, supra note 56.Show More Thus advocates use BIPOC to further a political purpose: to highlight the experience or agenda of Black and Indigenous people as essential, even though they are part of the overall people of color community. However, it is unclear whether changing the label actually creates a commitment to those groups or simply signals change without meaningful progress.

One common phenomenon between each of these terms—people of color, women of color, and BIPOC—is that by striving for collective unity, distinct groups become less visible. For instance, certain groups within the people of color category are routinely marginalized within the umbrella based on their low visibility or representation, including Filipinos and Puerto Ricans (who also tend to be marginalized within their respective pan-ethnic Asian American and Latinx groups).58 58.See generally Anthony Christian Ocampo, The Latinos of Asia: How Filipino Americans Break the Rules of Race (2016) (exploring how Filipinos understand their racial identity).Show More Additionally, male privilege results in the priorities and voices of women of color sometimes being excluded from the larger people of color community (just as they tend not to be prioritized within the larger women’s movement that focuses primarily on white women).59 59.Wing, supra note 16, at 7; Harris, supra note 52, at 585.Show More Women from particular groups within the women of color community can similarly be marginalized or not prioritized, including queer women and Native American women, whose experiences tend to be overlooked within the larger women of color whole.60 60.See, e.g., Victoria Sutton, Guest Post: Native American Exclusion as a Form of Paper Genocide, LSSSE (July 17, 2020), https://lssse.indiana.edu/blog/guest-post-native-american-exclusion-as-a-form-of-paper-genocide [https://perma.cc/SWH3-NUBQ].Show More

BIPOC is purposeful and unapologetic about this exclusion. Because BIPOC purposefully and by definition centers two particular groups (Black and Indigenous), all of the other non-white groups within the fold are marginalized by design, grouped together in the leftover people of color section of BIPOC. Yet Black and Indigenous people are not at the center of every contemporary racial issue. Furthermore, centering these groups in name when they may be excluded from the data or the issue at hand relegates their importance to the periphery of power, signaling disinterest in their actual inclusion.

III. The Failures of BIPOC

The BIPOC term purposefully highlights two groups within the people of color community—Black and Indigenous.61 61.Garcia, supra note 13.Show More Grouping these two together at the exclusion of others is absolutely appropriate in the rare instances where both groups are at the center of the discussion and the data. Generally, however, doing so not only is incorrect but does damage to both the highlighted communities and those that are pushed to the periphery. This Part first provides some theoretical reasons why the BIPOC term does a disservice to various communities of color and then applies theory to practice by examining a variety of contexts in which BIPOC is clearly not the best term for the case.

A. Why BIPOC Fails, in Theory

Those who have been using BIPOC do so in order to show their value and appreciation for Black and Indigenous people even beyond other groups in the people of color community.62 62.The BIPOC Project, supra note 53.Show More These two populations, that have suffered horrifying atrocities and been brushed aside throughout U.S. history, are purposefully pulled to the front. Yet highlighting them in name in every instance referencing race or racism does not necessarily mean their priorities or interests are being represented; sometimes, these two groups are not even relevant to the matter at hand. There are a number of questions to consider before using BIPOC, the answers to which reveal that prioritizing use of the term in all contexts related to communities of color does more harm than good when pursuing antiracist efforts more generally.63 63.The nascent term is also confusing as many, even progressive voices on race/racism, do not know what it means. As a term that has been used largely by educated elites, others have been clueless about it; apparently, many thought it referenced bisexual people of color. NPR Codeswitch, Is It Time To Say R.I.P. to ‘POC’? (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:22AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/29/‌918418825/is-it-time-to-say-r-i-p-to-p-o-c [https://perma.cc/8XYN-K78N].Show More

1. Is BIPOC purely symbolic?

Foregrounding the Black and Indigenous communities within people of color is symbolically significant as it indicates the importance of two groups that have long been sidelined in the United States. However, moving two groups to the front and naming them specifically does not have substantial meaning; foregrounding these groups in name only is what Critical Race Theorist Derrick Bell would call a purely symbolic gesture that may pacify calls for change without making any meaningful progress—and thereby ultimately support the status quo of racial inequities even between communities of color.64 64.See Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: the Permanence of Racism 19 (1992) (arguing that symbolic progress simply provides oppressed groups with the illusion of change without ceding real power, thus further entrenching racial hierarchies).Show More Today, we might call this virtue signaling—using words or actions not for the purpose of moving the needle toward greater progress, but instead primarily to highlight one’s own moral superiority in taking a stance.65 65.Cambridge Dictionary notes that virtue signaling “is the popular modern habit of indicating that one has virtue merely by expressing disgust or favour for certain political ideas or cultural happenings.” Cambridge English Dictionary, Virtual Signaling Definition, [https://perma.cc/F2SX-YWVX]. This definition from Urban Dictionary is even more direct: “To take a conspicuous but essentially useless action ostensibly to support a good cause but actually to show off how much more moral you are than everybody else.” Urban Dictionary, Virtual Signalling Definition, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Virtue%‌20Signalling [https://perma.cc/85A6-GQWT]; see also Deo, supra note 9, at 20.Show More

Data collection on Native Americans is one common and unfortunate example. If there is little or no data on the Native American population for any given project ostensibly about people of color generally and scholars nevertheless report on “the BIPOC experience,” they are actually naming Indigenous communities as central to a project while simultaneously excluding them altogether from the substance.66 66.Sutton, supra note 60.Show More This symbolic inclusion thus suggests that Native populations are central to whatever inquiry is before us but does not insist or even notice whether anyone actually includes them, let alone center their experiences, perspectives, interests, or priorities. Highlighting groups in name only is thus a greater disservice even than excluding them in fact and in name, because it suggests an upheaval of the status quo while actually serving to support it. Centuries of oppression have been sustained on just this form of “progress” that suggests change in name while maintaining ongoing inequities. There is truth to the accusation that unity can lead to erasure, as discussed earlier, but foregrounding a group in name only is pure virtue signaling, which is even more destructive for long-term equity goals.

2. Should every inquiry center Black and Indigenous communities?

What little information exists about the origins and development of BIPOC suggests that the two groups are highlighted for two main reasons. Proponents of BIPOC stress that Black and Indigenous communities are underscored because they have a foundational relationship to race and racism in the United States; in addition, they argue that not all communities of color have suffered equally, so those who have endured the most should be put first.67 67.See Garcia, supra note 13; The BIPOC Project, supra note 53; Clarke, supra note 56.Show More

These rationales rely on two problematic assumptions that, when investigated even briefly, reveal a shaky foundation. First, it is unfounded and counterproductive to assert that the harms of one group are paramount while others are relatively less important; doing so engages in the “Oppression Olympics,” which is “an evocative term to describe intergroup competition and victimhood.”68 68.Ange-Marie Hancock, Solidarity Politics for Millennials: A Guide to Ending the Oppression Olympics 4 (2011).Show More Ranked suffering as a reason to support the BIPOC term relies on comparing the relative oppression of all racial/ethnic groups in the U.S. and concluding that Black and Native peoples should be prioritized in name because they have suffered greater harm than all others. Those who use BIPOC embrace Oppression Olympics by crowing the winners and naming them first because they have suffered the most. This is dangerous for individual groups—both those whose oppression is erased and those who are the supposed winners—as well as destructive for antiracism efforts generally.

Second, even if all advocates agreed that Black and Indigenous people have historically suffered worse and more significant harms than any other racial/ethnic group, that may not justify centering them now by name when referencing all people of color today. There are clear instances of racism that have little or no direct impact on Black or Indigenous communities. At those times, the experiences of people from those communities should not be centered, just as those who are most affected should not be sidelined.69 69.Half a dozen clear examples of race and racism that are not centered on Black and Indigenous communities are presented infra in Part III.B.Show More Using the BIPOC term to reference past harms, especially those endured by Black and Indigenous peoples, could be useful; but assuming a need to prioritize in every current conversation about race, these two groups that have suffered unspeakable historic harms and continue to face oppression today—as do other groups—is misguided. The purposeful sidelining of Latinx, Asian American, Arab American, and other communities of color does not signal progress toward racial justice. Instead, marginalization of these groups promotes racial triangulation, the purposeful hierarchical placement of Asian Americans (and perhaps others) between Black and white with the effect of dividing communities of color and diluting their collective power.70 70.Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 27 Politics and Society 105, 107 (1999).Show More Rather than feed into that structure, attention to intersectional characteristics and especially recognizing similarities between disparate groups and drawing strength and solidarity from them may promote antiracism, help ameliorate past wrongs, and “ultimately help[] us overcome the Oppression Olympics.”71 71.Id.; Hancock, supra note 68, at 4.Show More

3. Does a historical focus promote contemporary antiracism?

There is no doubt that the foundations of race and racism in the U.S. draw directly from the enslavement of Black people and the attempted genocide of Indigenous peoples. At the same time, race and racism are constantly evolving, with racial projects shifting over time and racial formation always in flux.72 72.Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States (3rd ed. 2015).Show More Centuries of oppression against people of color have revealed various contexts in which even the law has been used to subjugate communities of color in order to preserve power in the hands of the white male elite.73 73.The history of legal support for white privilege is explored in greater depth in Deo, supra note 9, manuscript at 6-9 (in progress).Show More Prioritizing historical discrimination, even chapters as atrocious as slavery and genocide, may not fit with every current racial project or application. At times when there are parallels, these should be noted and highlighted. Drawing a connection to historical atrocities may even reveal the ways in which certain efforts are truly contemporary avatars of age-old racism or discrimination.

Yet different groups today also face different pressures. Although contemporary acts of oppression may not rise to the level of past horrors, they are independently horrific and not necessarily derivative of past atrocities. Just as more covert bias has replaced overt oppression in many acts of contemporary discrimination, racism remains in spite of its shifting form.74 74.Omi & Winant, supra note 72, at 39­–46.Show More Current oppression may not tie directly to slavery or genocide, but manifests in the form of violent hate crimes and xenophobic dehumanizing immigration policies. History will always provide significant context for contemporary racism, but it should not define (in name or otherwise) current racial challenges or acts of racial resistance.

B. When BIPOC Misses the Mark, in Practice

In addition to the broad strokes outlined above illustrating the theoretical limitations of BIPOC, the term also distorts the realities of communities of color in practice. In various instances, using the term BIPOC as a synonym for people of color is not just incomplete or imperfect, but also substantively, empirically, and historically incorrect as well as detrimental. This Part introduces a series of contemporary racial contexts where the name BIPOC, if used, would do more harm than good.75 75.The contexts included in this Section are clear examples drawing from contemporary racial issues in the U.S. where the BIPOC term is not the most useful; future work should apply this thesis to more complex situations that are less clear-cut to determine whether the argument holds. See, e.g., Deo, supra note 9.Show More Under these examples, the term itself does not fit the data/community/conclusion under discussion. In these instances, it is better to use the term people of color, or in other cases to draw attention to the community of women of color, or in still other situations to name the particular race or even raceXgender groups most affected rather than foist them inappropriately under a BIPOC umbrella. Clear examples of how BIPOC can be misleading, confusing, or otherwise damaging are explored next.

1. Managing COVID-19

Discussing the effects of COVID-19 “on BIPOC communities” pretends that we have statistics on Native Americans, when in truth it centers the group in name while ignoring their omission from the data. Communities of color as a whole, and Black and Brown communities in particular, have been unduly impacted by the effects of COVID-19.76 76.Harald Schmidt, Lawrence O. Gostin & Michelle A. Williams, Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?, 324 JAMA 2023, 2023 (2020) (“[T]he mortality rate relative to population size is 3.4-fold higher among Black individuals . . ., 3.3-fold higher among Indigenous and Latino communities . . ., 2.9-fold higher among Pacific Islander individuals . . ., and 1.3 higher among Asian [American] populations . . . .”); Harmeet Kaur, The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Hitting Black and Brown Americans Especially Hard on All Fronts, CNN (May 8, 2020, 8:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/08/us/‌coronavirus-pandemic-race-impact-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZZN4-NLVA].Show More The intersection of race and class is especially salient here as people of color communities with fewer economic resources have had a disproportionate share of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths.77 77.Schmidt, Gostin & Williams, supra note 76, at 2023 (discussing priority vaccines for communities of color because COVID-19 “has disproportionately affected racial minorities in the United States resulting in higher rates of infection, hospitalization, and death”).Show More While those in the Black and Latinx communities have suffered grievous harm, the pandemic may be wreaking even greater devastation on Native American populations, although we do not have reliable data to confirm this conclusion.78 78.Lizzie Wade, COVID-19 Data on Native Americans is ‘A National Disgrace.’ This Scientist Is Fighting to Be Counted, Science (Sept. 24, 2020, 12:20PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/covid-19-data-native-americans-national-disgrace-scientist-fighting-be-counted [https://perma.cc/AXL2-YVQN].Show More Current research suggests that “Native Americans and Alaskan Natives are four times more likely to be hospitalized from COVID-19.”79 79.Sarah Blake Morgan, Native Americans Embrace Vaccine, Virus Containment Measures, AP News (February 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/native-americans-coronavirus-vaccine-9b3101d306442fbc5198333017b4737d.Show More In the past few months, the media has highlighted how some Native American communities have successfully vaccinated virtually all members,80 80.See Nora Mabie, Tribes’ Vaccination Effort Proving To Be a Big Success by Emphasizing Elders and Community, Great Falls Tribune (March 23, 2021, 6:00AM), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2021/03/23/montana-native-american-tribes-see-successful-covid-19-vaccine-rollout/4801837001/ [https://perma.cc/KX8E-S94U], (“The Blackfeet Nation has successfully vaccinated more than 95% of its eligible population.”); Harmeet Kaur, Tribal Health Providers Have Figured Out the Key to Covid-19 Vaccine Success. Here’s Their Secret, CNN (February 26, 2021, 8:16AM), https://www.cnn.com/‌2021/02/09/us/tribal-health-providers-covid-vaccine-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/JP94-KX4N].Show More while others struggle to reach the undecided.81 81.Jack Healy, Plenty of Vaccines, but Not Enough Arms: A Warning Sign in Cherokee Nation, N.Y. Times (March 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/us/vaccines-covid-cherokee-native-americans.html [https://perma.cc/EB2A-6F8F].Show More There is significant misinformation and missing information.

Researchers do know that COVID-19 “has taken a disproportionate toll on many Indigenous communities in the United States,” yet the “full impact” of the disease on Native Americans remains unclear based on “racial misclassification and the exclusion of Indigenous communities from data sets and analyses used to make health policy decisions.”82 82.Wade, supra note 78.Show More Using BIPOC would not only be incorrect but also intentionally misleading, as the language implies that Native Americans are central to the data, when in fact they are missing. Ideally, public officials would collect that data and report it along with data on other racial/ethnic groups, but in the absence of data on Native Americans, it is clearly better to acknowledge that the group is not included rather than pretend they are by foregrounding them in name only. The data and information we do have suggest that culture, tradition, following the example of elders, and linguistic reasons are driving vaccine uptake; none of these seem critical for efforts to gain vaccine trust in the Black community, negating the need to group these communities together.83 83.Caroline Radnofsky, Matteo Moschella & Corky Siemaszko, Native Americans Use Culture and Community to Gain Tribes’ Trust in Covid Vaccine, NBC News (Feb. 3, 2021, 6:32PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/native-americans-use-culture-comm‌unity-gain-tribes-trust-covid-vaccine-n1256647 [https://perma.cc/M2TX-LQWA]; Kaur, supra note 80.Show More

Another group disproportionately affected by the coronavirus is Filipino nurses—not nurses as a whole, not people of color generally, not even Filipinos as a group, but Filipino nurses specifically.84 84.National Nurses United, Sins of Omission 12 (2020), https://www.nationalnursesunited.‌org/sites/default/files/nnu/graphics/documents/0920_Covid19_SinsOfOmission_Data_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3W-MLXV]. There is likely a raceXgender effect here too, with greater numbers of Filipinas dying of COVID-19 than even their male counterparts.Show More As of September 2020, thirty-two percent of the registered nurses (RNs) who had died of COVID-19 were Filipino, although Filipinos comprise just four percent of RNs in the U.S.85 85.Id. at 5.Show More Centering Black and Indigenous populations in this conversation—when even a majority (fifty-four percent) of RNs of color who have died of COVID-19 are Filipino—does a disservice to Filipinos by rendering them invisible, lumping them into “other people of color,” while highlighting Black and Indigenous people who are neither the most relevant nor the most impacted in this scenario.86 86.Id.Show More

Pretending that these unique intersectional and historically-based experiences affect Black and Indigenous people in a deeper way than other people of color is disingenuous. COVID-19 has affected Black people differently than it has the Indigenous people—though both communities have suffered terrible consequences due to various structural constraints and limitations. However, grouping them together as BIPOC implies that the Black experience is similar to the Indigenous one, when in fact they are quite different; it also ignores the ways in which Filipinos and others carry a disproportionate share of the burden of deaths among nurses. Instead, journalists, advocates, and others should specify the individual groups involved and impacted in order to honestly report on the experiences of those affected by the pandemic within communities of color.

2. Health Disparities

Before COVID-19, decades of research have documented health disparities between whites and non-whites, especially focused on negative health outcomes for Black patients.87 87.John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 2 (M.P. Zanna ed., 2004); Louis A. Penner, et al., The Experience of Discrimination and Black-White Health Disparities in Medical Care, 35 J. Black Psych. 180, 181 (2009).Show More In comparison, there is little research documenting health effects of Native Americans who are engaged in similar healthcare settings and experiences as non-Native groups—again rendering the BIPOC term inappropriate in this context.88 88.Mary Smith, Native Americans: A Crisis in Health Equity, American Bar Association, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-state-of-healthcare-in-the-united-states/native-american-crisis-in-health-equity [https://perma.cc/UJ2S-BF23].Show More Furthermore, this year under COVID-19, researchers have documented specific negative health outcomes for Black and Latina pregnant women in certain populations.89 89.Leila Goldstein, Latina and Black Pregnant Women Show High Rates of COVID-19 in Southwest Ohio, WOSU Public Media (Jul. 14, 2020), https://radio.wosu.org/post/latina-and-black-pregnant-women-show-high-rates-covid-19-southwest-ohio#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/D3FM-T8EU].Show More The documented populations with increased COVID-19 exposure are limited to two particular raceXgender groups: Black women and Latinas. It would be incorrect to call this a problem affecting the healthcare of Black people generally or the Latinx community as a whole, as men are not pregnant and thus not affected. Similarly, research does not suggest that Asian American women or others beyond the two groups studied have endured similar negative health effects—meaning that even women of color would not be as precise a term, let alone people of color. As with health disparities generally, the little data available on Native Americans means that centering them by name using BIPOC would actually do a disservice to the community, representing purely symbolic inclusion through virtue signaling without actual knowledge of effects on the Indigenous community.

3. Contemporary Hate Crimes

Beyond health effects, COVID-19 and political responses to the coronavirus caused increases in hate crimes against particular populations throughout the U.S. in 2020 and 2021.90 90.Stop AAPI Hate released a report in August 2020 showing increases in hate crimes against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders since March 19, 2020. Stop AAPI Hate, Stop AAPI Hate National Report 3.19.20 – 2.28.21, https://secureservercdn.net/104.238.69.231/a1w.90d. ‌myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/210312-Stop-AAPI-Hate-National-Report-.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3TJ-FAAU]; Kimmy Yam, Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Increased by Nearly 150% in 2020, Mostly in N.Y. and L.A., New Report Says, NBC News (March 9, 2021, 3:37PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/anti-asian-hate-crimes-increased-nearly-150-2020-mostly-n-n1260264 [https://perma.cc/738D-D9ML]; Seashia Vang, US Government Should Better Combat Anti-Asian Racism, More than 1,000 COVID-19 Related Incidents Reported, Human Rights Watch Dispatches (Apr. 17, 2020, 10:00AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/17/us-government-should-better-combat-anti-asian-racism# [https://perma.cc/TF9C-BUDV].Show More Specifically targeted—through acid attacks, beatings, racial slurs, and workplace discrimination—were people who are Chinese, Chinese American, or those who were mistaken by their assailants as having Chinese ancestry.91 91.Stop AAPI Hate reports that 40% of survivors had Chinese ancestry, the largest ethnic group affected. As these attacks depend on external identification, the “Asian” label based on phenotype was likely used as a proxy for “Chinese” and resulted in victimization. Stop AAPI Hate, supra note 90 at 1; Vang, supra note 90.Show More The recent killing of Asian American women specifically foregrounds violence based specifically on raceXgender identity, not about people of color, women of color, and definitely not Black and Indigenous people.92 92.Yam, supra note 90 (revealing that “while [hate] crimes in 2020 decreased overall by 7 percent, those targeting Asian people rose by nearly 150 percent”).Show More Many news articles made a direct connection between high profile politicians calling COVID-19 the “Chinese virus,” “Kung flu,” or other racialized terms and heightened animosity against Asian Americans, especially from whites.93 93.Vang, supra note 90; Hannah Miao, Lawmakers Call for Change in Covid Rhetoric Amid Rise in Violence Against Asian Americans, CNBC (March 18, 2021, 5:36PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/18/lawmakers-call-for-change-in-covid-rhetoric-amid-violence-against-asian-americans.html [https://perma.cc/9886-4S9S].Show More These attacks are not stand-alone acts of violence but are tied to a long history of Chinese exclusion and the hyper-sexualization of Asian and Asian American women.94 94.Harmeet Kaur, Fetishized, Sexualized and Marginalized, Asian Women Are Uniquely Vulnerable to Violence, CNN (March 17, 2021, 8:22PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/‌03/17/us/asian-women-misogyny-spa-shootings-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/MH2B-XMK5].Show More They also draw from the racial triangulation inherent in perceptions of Asian Americans as the “model minority” but nevertheless perpetually foreign.95 95.Kim, supra note 70, at 107–08.Show More

Black and Indigenous people did not experience a rise in hate crimes against them in 2020 because they were not targeted for spreading the coronavirus in the U.S.96 96.In fact, hate crimes decreased for most groups in 2020. Yam, supra note 90.Show More Speaking about this increase in hate crimes against Asian Americans as a BIPOC issue would be incorrect. It would be devastating as well as inaccurate to center Black and Indigenous communities in this conversation, which is not about them or their suffering. Furthermore, using the BIPOC term in this instance would do a disservice to the very Asian Americans who are most affected by these attacks by erasing them from the narrative—relegating them to one of the many invisible remnant people of color groups within BIPOC rather than singling them out as the primary targets of these crimes. Instead, these crimes tie directly to the perception of Asian Americans as forever foreign, un-American, outsiders.97 97.Angelo N. Ancheta, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience 16 (1998).Show More

Similarly, increases in hate crimes against Arab Americans and South Asian Americans in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11 should not now be remembered as a broad BIPOC problem; clearly, particular groups within the umbrella of people of color were targeted and none are highlighted by using the BIPOC moniker.98 98.See Bryan D. Byers & James A. Jones, The Impact of the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11 on Anti-Islamic Hate Crime, 5 J. of Ethnicity in Crim. Just. 43, 43 (2007) (“A statistically significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crime occurred after 9/11 . . . .”); Post 9-11 Backlash, SAALT, https://saalt.org/policy-change/post-9-11-backlash [https://perma.cc/L9SR-XWFB] (“Since Sep­tem­ber 11th, [2001,] South Asian, Sikh, Mus­lim, and Arab Amer­i­cans have been the tar­gets of numer­ous hate crimes, as well as employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion, bul­ly­ing, harass­ment, and pro­fil­ing.”).Show More The increase in hate crimes from two decades ago affected neither the Black nor the Indigenous communities in the way in which it terrorized South Asian, Arab American, and Muslim groups.99 99.Cynthia Lee, Hate Crimes and the War on Terror (2008) (“In the days, weeks, and months immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Arab-Americans, South Asian-Americans, Muslim-Americans, and Sikh-Americans were the targets of widespread hate violence”); Elly Belle, Yes, 9/11 Did Cause an Increase in Islamophobia, Refinery 29 (Sept. 11, 2020, 2:39PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/09/10019797/islamophobia-after-911-september-11-hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/C8F5-DWFW] (noting hate crimes against Muslims jumped from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001).Show More Utilizing BIPOC terminology when discussing these hate crimes would further marginalize the very victims most impacted by those acts of violence by purposefully centering two groups (Black and Indigenous people) whose experiences are not actually central to the hate incidents or ongoing harms.

4. Police Violence

Black men are more likely than any other raceXgender group to experience violence at the hands of the police.100 100.Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 Boston U. L. Rev. 951, 1007-08 (2020).Show More They are “more than twice as likely to be killed by police than are persons of other racial or ethnic groups . . . .”101 101.Id. at 951.Show More As such, police violence is not a BIPOC problem.

While there are a number of issues involving Native Americans and law enforcement—involving tribal sovereignty, jurisdictional concerns, discretionary measures, and enforcement—the experiences of Indigenous people interacting with police are not the same as or even similar to those of Black men.102 102.See Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1638, 1647 n.29 (2016) (discussing various “grey areas” between criminal law and tribal jurisdiction “neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed”); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Criminal Justice in Indian Country: A Theoretical and Empirical Agenda, 2 Ann. Rev. Criminology 337, 337 (2019) (discussing “the complexities of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country”).Show More Black women also are targets of police violence, as we know from the state-sanctioned killings of Breonna Taylor, Sandra Bland, Attatiana Jefferson, and dozens of others.103 103.Brianna Scott, Author: Black Women’s Experiences with Police Brutality Must Be ‘Invisible No More’, NPR (July 16, 2020, 5:37PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/07/16/892015743/author-black-womens-experiences-with-police-brutality-must-be-invisible-no-more [https://perma.cc/UN3P-5ND7]Show More Yet the crisis that is police violence against Black men is not only racial but involves raceXgender biases, stereotypes, and life ending outcomes. No other group has suffered as much targeting of state-sanctioned violence as Black men.104 104.Tia Sherée Gaynor, Seong C. Kang, & Brian N. Williams, Segregated Spaces and Separated Races: The Relationship Between State-Sanctioned Violence, Place, and Black Identity, 7 The Russell Sage Found. J. of the Soc. Sci. 50 (2021).Show More Rather than group them with Black women and Indigenous men and women—as would be the case if we centered them through BIPOC terminology—advocates supporting Black Lives Matter and other efforts for police reform should continue to raise awareness that this should be a concern for all people though it affects, first and foremost, Black men.105 105.Williams, Mezey & Singh, supra note 18.Show More Using BIPOC here, as elsewhere, would be both incorrect and inappropriate. Continuing to center Black Lives Matter, which recognizes the challenges facing both Black men and Black women in police interactions, is critical to the effort. Changing the narrative to BIPOC Lives Matter would clearly be counterproductive as well as improper in dealings with this and other state-sanctioned violence.

5. Mass Incarceration

Over the past two decades, advocates have drawn significant attention to the mass incarceration and resulting disenfranchisement of Black men—not men of color, not people of color, not even Black women to the same degree.106 106.See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow 19 (2020).Show More “Black men are six times as likely to be incarcerated as white men,” a disparity larger than any other raceXgender group.107 107.The Sentencing Project, Criminal Justice Facts (2020), https://www.sentencingproject.‌org/criminal-justice-facts [https://perma.cc/4Y2H-4VZY].Show More

As with police violence, it would be disingenuous to talk about mass incarceration as an issue affecting those in the BIPOC community. Doing so would center one group (Black people) appropriately and another group (Indigenous people) inappropriately, since the little data we have on Indigenous incarceration rates suggest that while over-incarceration is a problem, the causes and context involving the Indigenous population are very different from those facing Black men.108 108.Roxanne Daniel, Since You Asked: What Data Exists about Native American People in the Criminal Justice System?, Prison Policy Initiative (Apr. 22, 2020) (“While Census data reveals that Native populations are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, other information that could shed more light on the issue is sparse”), available at: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/04/22/native [https://perma.cc/S57V-HGUB].Show More Latino men, who are twice as likely to be incarcerated as white men, are facing a crisis as well though it is different from what their Black male counterparts endure.109 109.The Sentencing Project, supra note 107.Show More Instead, because the raceXgender group targeted by criminal justice policies is Black men, that is the community that should specifically be named by allies, advocates, and academics who seek to draw attention to the problem.

6. Current Immigration Policies

The immigration context as a whole is one that cannot draw in a straightforward fashion from BIPOC terminology and still do justice to the groups most affected. A majority of recent immigrants to the U.S. are from Asia and Latin America, neither of which are foregrounded in BIPOC language. Why then would advocates for immigration reform or racial justice in the immigration context talk about the experiences of people from the BIPOC community? Instead, Latinx and Asian Americans should be highlighted in most discussions related to historical or contemporary U.S. immigration policy.110 110.While migration from the African continent to the U.S. has increased significantly in the past few decades, it is a comparatively small fraction of overall immigration; Black immigrants represent about 3% of the U.S. foreign-born population. See Randy Capps, Kristen McCabe & Michael Fix, Diverse Streams: African Migration to the United States, 2 Migration Policy Institute (2012), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/CBI-AfricanMigration.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRA9-FLF4].Show More

There are of course specific contexts even within the immigration arena where it is even more critical that we carefully name the groups affected and center their experiences over all others. Family separation—the policy whereby children were separated from parents applying for asylum or seeking immigration at the U.S.-Mexico border—is a prime example.111 111.Teo Armus & Maria Sacchetti, The Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Still Haven’t Been Found. The Pandemic Isn’t Helping, Wash. Post (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:28PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/21/family-separation-parents-border-covid [https://perma.cc/3NNU-AQJW].Show More Of the 545 children who were taken from their families as early as July 2017 and whose parents cannot now be found, over two-thirds are from Central America; many are currently living with sponsors or extended family members in the U.S., most of whom are likely Latinx as well.112 112.Some of these children may also have Indigenous roots, though in a very different context, history, and environment than Native Americans.Show More Clearly this is an issue that directly affects the Latinx community (a group with significant intra-racial diversity even with regard to ethnicity, language, culture, and other characteristics) over all others, even other immigrants; family separation is not an issue or experience that should center Black or Indigenous Americans over the community that is currently suffering the greatest harm and has the most to gain from a current reckoning and potential reformation.113 113.BIPOC would also be misleading in the immigration context when referencing how U.S. foreign policy prevented people from many predominantly Muslim nations from lawfully entering the country between 2017 and 2021. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1475 (2018); Proclamation No. 10141, 86 Fed. Reg. 7005 (Jan 20, 2021).Show More

Conclusion

In 2020, we witnessed a racial reckoning in the wake of thousands in the streets protesting police violence against the Black community. It remains to be seen whether there will be a resulting reformation, and, if so, whether it will manifest as small but meaningful steps in line with past anti-subordination principles or a long overdue restructuring of the racial hierarchy on the path toward antiracism. Any reformation must pay careful attention to the language we use—including changes in terms involving race, racism, and resistance. There must be opportunities for communities—people of color collectively and separately—to navigate new terms and advocate for how they themselves prefer to be identified.114 114.This Essay lays a foundation for how advocates, academics, and allies should use racial language; it does not prescribe how individuals identify themselves.Show More How we name things is a powerful marker of our priorities and preferences. For instance, while efforts to advance diversity remain, they are now increasingly supplemented with meaningful attention to promote antiracist action. Those who previously pushed for people from diverse backgrounds to have a seat at the table are now demanding their voices be heard and included in decision making.115 115.Deo, supra note 10.Show More

Yet we must safeguard against modifications in language that take hold without advancing real progress. Change may not mean evolution or forward progress. New terms are not always better, especially without grassroots efforts or meaningful reflection among community members. When considering language that groups people from different backgrounds together, the term BIPOC is not better than those previously in use. Using the name people of color gives non-whites from all backgrounds an opportunity to band together when considering issues involving them all, and especially differences between them as a group as compared to whites. Similarly, allies, advocates, and academics who seek to incorporate the critical intersection of raceXgender in particular instances should continue to utilize the term women of color. When individual groups should be highlighted in particular contexts, those should be named specifically instead of using people of color, women of color, or BIPOC.

Using the term BIPOC, however, creates a hierarchy within people of color preferring two groups that, while foundational to U.S. race relations, may not be foundational to every contemporary project or discussion involving race. Furthermore, although the term centers Black and Indigenous people in name, these groups may nevertheless remain at the periphery of power and inclusion—for instance, as continuously occurs when Native Americans are excluded from the data on empirical projects that then seek to reach sweeping generalized conclusions. Virtue signaling—making changes only in name and for the express purpose of highlighting one’s morality—does not indicate progress.

Instead of blindly using the term BIPOC, allies, academics, and advocates should think critically about the issue they seek to promote, consider the data or arguments they have to support their efforts or conclusions, and utilize the term that best fits their needs. Sometimes this will be people of color, when considering how the experiences of people of color as a whole differ from those of whites. Other instances call for the use of women of color, especially when highlighting differences by raceXgender and drawing attention to the experiences of women (as distinct from men of color) from a variety of non-white backgrounds (as distinct from white women).

This Essay has demonstrated instances where BIPOC clearly fails. It can be misleading, overly simplistic, and even incorrect when centering the experiences of Black and Indigenous communities over others within the people of color umbrella. This belittles those who are virtually erased, ignores the realities of the issue under review, and harms the communities it purports to highlight by centering them in name only. It is critical that academics, advocates, and allies utilize language that is better than BIPOC, as is evident after applying the thesis to the clear examples outlined earlier where particular groups, besides Black and Indigenous, must be foregrounded.

The next step in future work is to apply the main thesis presented here—that individual groups should be named and highlighted depending on the context, data, or argument, rather than using the BIPOC term for every racialized situation—to more complex and complicated circumstances. It is easy to see how BIPOC should not be used when discussing immigration policy or hate crimes against Asian Americans during the coronavirus pandemic, but what about the more challenging context of legal education, considering how students from different backgrounds perceive issues of diversity, or how raceXgender background affects law faculty experiences?116 116.The thesis that using the BIPOC term does not work in particular situations is applied to the more complicated context of legal education in Deo, supra note 9.Show More Analyzing this thesis through these and other more nuanced examples will illustrate its broader reach and application.

In both simple and complex cases, grouping disparate peoples together can serve to increase power and political clout; yet it can also erase those who are minorities within the groups. To avoid that risk in particular circumstances, it is sometimes best to disaggregate data and separate groups. The most effective use of language is when allies, advocates, and academics use the names of the groups actually included and centered in the arguments themselves, paying close attention to the context and the communities involved and utilizing matching terms. Although BIPOC fails, there are other paths forward that will lead to more meaningful change.

  1. * JD, PhD, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; William H. Neukom Fellows Research Chair in Diversity and Law, American Bar Foundation (ABF); Director, Law School Survey of Student Engagement (LSSSE). This Essay benefitted from feedback from and conversations with Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Anil Kalhan, Taleed El-Sabawi, Kevin Johnson, Fred Smith, Louise Melling, Raquel Muniz, Orin Kerr, Elizabeth Mertz, Gautam Hans, Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Efrén Pérez, Franita Tolson, and Shaun Ossei-Owusu. Finally, I am grateful to the Virginia Law Review editorial team, especially Allison Burns, Andrew Tynes, Rachel Slepoi, and Elizabeth Adler. All errors and opinions are my own.

  2. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/‌2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/2Q5H-978V].

  3. Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities Persist—And in Some Cases Worsen, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:01 PM) (“People of color get sick and die of COVID-19 at rates higher than whites and higher than their share of the population.”), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-pandemic-deaths-add-up-racial-disparities-persist-and-in-some-cases-worsen [https://perma.cc/TZT9-HHZ2].

  4. Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 951, 957–58 (2020).

  5. Buchanan, Bui & Patel, supra note 1.

  6. Corporations that donated to antiracist causes include Home Depot, Ubisoft, Apple, Facebook, Intel, and Peloton. Isabel Togoh, Corporate Donations Tracker: Here Are the Companies Giving Millions to Anti-Racism Efforts, Forbes (June 1, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/06/01/corporate-donations-tracker-here-are-the-companies-giving-millions-to-anti-racism-efforts/?sh=3160129d37dc [https://perma.cc/TL8R-FPXT].

  7. Taking a Knee: Athletes Protest Against Racism Around the World—in Pictures, The Guardian (Aug. 27, 2020, 4:35 PM) (“[A]thletes around the world have been kneeling in support of Black Lives Matter and wearing the phrase on jerseys and T-shirts while NBA players boycotted game five of their playoff series in protest of the police shooting against Jacob Blake”), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/gallery/2020/aug/27/nba-strike-athletes-kneeling-black-lives-matter-protest [https://perma.cc/D8PH-ULBT].

  8. Joey Hadden, How the Top 25 Colleges and Universities in the US Are Responding to the Black Lives Matter Protests, Bus. Insider (June 25, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/college-top-us-universities-respond-black-lives-matter-protests-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/692G-PJR6].

  9. Jen Kirby, “Black Lives Matter” Has Become a Global Rallying Cry Against Racism and Police Brutality, Vox (June 12, 2020, 7:30 AM) (noting that “[t]he police killing of George Floyd has sparked a worldwide reckoning”), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21285244/‌black-lives-matter-global-protests-george-floyd-uk-belgium.

  10. This Essay introduces these concepts and questions. For more on usage of various terms, limitations of BIPOC, and application to the particular context of legal education, see Meera E. Deo, Beyond BIPOC (in progress 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

  11. See generally Meera E. Deo, The End of Affirmative Action, 100 N. Carolina L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (proposing an overhaul of affirmative action policies and suggesting broader inclusion of minority groups by differentiating the experiences of each group and the addition of diversity, equity, and inclusion to existing policies).

  12. Granted, institutions of higher learning have relied on educational diversity as a justification for affirmative action because no other compelling state interests have been deemed constitutional. Meera E. Deo, The Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University of Michigan Law School, 17 Mich. J. Race & L. 63, 68–69 (2011).

  13. For more on this project, including the five suggested phases schools should engage with on the path to becoming antiracist, see Danielle M. Conway, Danielle Holley-Walker, Kimberly Mutcherson, Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Carla D. Pratt, Law Deans Antiracist Clearinghouse Project, Ass’n Am. Law Schs., https://www.aals.org/antiracist-clearinghouse/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/X3Z5-JHQX].

  14. Sandra E. Garcia, Where Did BIPOC Come From?, N.Y. Times (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-bipoc.html [https://perma.cc/H978-PFGG]. The exact origins and sudden popular usage of BIPOC remain unclear, though they are traced in more detail in Beyond BIPOC. Deo, supra note 9, at 18-20.

  15. Who Does the Acronym “BIPOC” Actually Serve?, The Takeaway (June 25, 2020), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/takeaway/segments/acronym-bipoc-race-language?tab=summary [https://perma.cc/K3UY-ZJQ5]; If podcast: Who Does The Acronym BIPOC Actually Serve?, The Takeaway (June 25, 2020). Both race and ethnicity are fluid (rather than fixed) concepts that change over time and in varying contexts. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.–C.L.L. Rev. 1, 8, 10 (1994).

  16. The discussion on limitations of BIPOC continues in Deo, supra note 9, at 20-22.

  17. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 9 (2003); see Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to Critical Race Feminism: A Reader 1, 7 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 151 (1976).

  18. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 16.

  19. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 12–14 (2011); Jamillah Williams, Naomi Mezey & Lisa Singh, #BlackLivesMatter—Getting from Contemporary Social Movements to Legal Change, 12 Calif. L. Rev. Online 1 ( 2021).

  20. See generally Jonathan Rosa & Nelson Flores, Unsettling Race and Language: Toward a Raciolinguistic Perspective, 46 Language in Soc’y 621 (2017); Jonathan Rosa, Looking Like a Language, Sounding Like a Race: Raciolingustic Ideologies and the Learning of Latinidad (2019).

  21. Gregory Coles, Emerging Voices: The Exorcism of Language: Reclaimed Derogatory Terms and their Limits, 78 C. Eng. 424, 424–25 (2016).

  22. For more on boundaries between groups, including distinctions between “us” vs. “them,” see Fredrik Barth, Introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries 9, 15–16 (Fredrik Barth ed. 1969).

  23. See Carrie Sandahl, Queering the Crip or Cripping the Queer? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance, 9 GLQ 25, 26–27 (2003); Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability 40–41 (2006); Jasmine E. Harris, Reckoning with Race and Disability, 130 Yale L.J.F. (forthcoming 2021).

  24. H. Samy Alim, Introducing Raciolinguistics: Racing Language and Languaging Race in Hyperracial Times, in Raciolinguistics: How Language Shapes Our Ideas about Race 1, 5 (H. Samy Alim, John R. Rickford & Arnetha F. Ball eds., 2016); Alison Crump, Introducing LangCrit: Critical Language and Race Theory, 11 Critical Inquiry in Language Stud. 207, 207 (2014).

  25. Alex Shashkevich, Stanford Experts Highlight Link Between Language and Race in New Book, Stan. News (Dec. 27, 2016), https://news.stanford.edu/2016/12/27/link-language-race-new-book/ [https://perma.cc/YDP7-PJBW].

  26. Id.

  27. See Ben L. Martin, From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming, 106 Pol. Sci. Q. 83, 83 (1991).

  28. Jacquelyn Rahman, The N Word: Its History and Use in the African American Community, 40 J. Eng. Linguistics 137, 137 (2012).

  29. See Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 140 (coining the term).

  30. Wing, supra note 16, at 1, 7.

  31. See Crenshaw, supra note 16; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1244 (1991). See generally Wing, supra note 16; Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment

    23

    (2d ed. 2000); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor 6–7 (2002).

  32. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 58–63 (3d ed. 2017).

  33. Previous scholarship has highlighted how “utilizing the raceXgender nomenclature emphasizes the multifactorial effects of race ‘times’ gender for women of color.” Meera E. Deo, Unequal Profession: Race and Gender in Legal Academia 8 (2019); Meera E. Deo, The Culture of “raceXgender” Bias in Legal Academia, in Power, Legal Education, and Law School Cultures 240, 241 (Meera E. Deo, Mindie Lazarus-Black & Elizabeth Mertz eds., 2019).

  34. Sandahl, supra note 22.

  35. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 267 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016); Deo, supra note 10, at 68–72. The defendants in Bakke also argued there were other reasons to support affirmative action—including to increase minority representation among doctors, reduce societal discrimination, and increase service to disadvantaged communities—though none of these were sanctioned by the Court. Meera E. Deo, Affirmative Action Assumptions, 52 UC Davis L. Rev. 2407, 2412-15 (2019).

  36. Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Vivian Hunt, Kevin Dolan & Sara Prince, McKinsey & Co., Diversity Wins: How Inclusion Matters 13 (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/‌media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Diversity%20and%20Inclusion/Diversity%20wins%20How%20inclusion%20matters/Diversity-wins-How-inclusion-matters-vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7RA-3DT9].

  37. Deo, supra note 10, at 65 n.4 (citing and quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331) (“high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national security.’”).

  38. Elizabeth Bodamer, Belonging in Law School (2021) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author).

  39. See Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3115, 3117 (2015); Deo, supra note 10, at 3.

  40. See, e.g., Meera E. Deo & Chad Christensen, Ind. Univ. Ctr. for Postsecondary Research, 2020 Annual Survey Results: Diversity & Exclusion 6 (2020), https://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Diversity-and-Exclusion-Final-9.29.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P3A-FK26].

  41. Ella Washington & Camille Patrick, 3 Requirements for a Diverse and Inclusive Culture, GALLUP (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.gallup.com/workplace/242138/requirements-diverse-inclusive-culture.aspx [https://perma.cc/A82S-U2MV].

  42. Deo, supra note 10.

  43. Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist 9 (2019).

  44. Chandra L. Ford & Collins O. Airhihenbuwa, Critical Race Theory, Race Equity, and Public Health: Toward Antiracism Praxis, 100 Am. J. Pub. Health S30, S31 (2010).

  45. Kendi, supra note 42, at 23.

  46. Id. at 46–47. See also Michele Goodwin, Complicit Bias: Sexual Harassment and the Communities that Sustain It, Huffington Post (Dec. 11, 2017, 2:18AM) (using a new term “complicit bias” to describe community complicity in sustaining institutional bias and harassment in the workplace), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/complicit-bias-sexual-harassment-and-communities-that_b_5a2e238de4b0d7c3f262244f [https://perma.cc/LLB5-Q7DJ].

  47. Constance Grady, Why the Term “BIPOC” Is So Complicated, Explained by Linguists, Vox (June 30, 2020, 9:10 AM) (“In the 1960s and ’70s, . . . groups like the Black Panther Party for Self Defense and the Brown Berets came together in solidarity as people of color, which was a new instantiation of the idea of people having color.”) (internal quotations omitted), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/30/21300294/bipoc-what-does-it-mean-critical-race-linguistics-jonathan-rosa-deandra-miles-hercules.

  48. Efrén Pérez, (Mis)Calculations, Psychological Mechanisms, and the Future Politics of People of Color, 6 J. Race, Ethnicity & Pol. 33, 36–37 (2021); Efrén O. Pérez, Diversity’s Child: People of Color and the Politics of Identity (manuscript, 3-5) (forthcoming July 2021).

  49. The origin, evolution, benefits, and limitations of the terms “people of color” and “women of color” are covered in greater detail in Deo, supra note 9.

  50. Pérez, supra note 47 (manuscript at 1-4). The term “Latinx” itself has come under scrutiny in this ongoing conversation about preferred language for communities, advocates, and allies. Jonathan Rosa, Looking Like a Language, Sounding Like a Race: Raciolinguistic Ideologies and the Learning of Latinidad (2019); Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora & Mark Hugo Lopez, About One-in-Four U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3% Use It, Pew Research Center (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-have-heard-of-latinx-but-just-3-use-it [https://perma.cc/24FX-D9LP] (explaining the origins and uses of the term “Latinx”).

  51. See Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity 19–20 (1992).

  52. Wing, supra note 29, at 7.

  53. See Michele Wallace, A Black Feminist’s Search for Sisterhood, in All the Women Are White, All the Black Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies 7, 10 (Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, & Barbara Smith eds., 1982); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1990); but see Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 Yale J. L. & Feminism 13, 18 (1991).

  54. Garcia, supra note 13; The BIPOC Project, https://www.thebipocproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/GS4R-YQWY] (last visited March 19, 2021) (showing the efforts by activists to center the voices of the Black and Indigenous communities by turning to the term “BIPOC”); Grady, supra note 46.

  55. Garcia, supra note 13.

  56. Id.

  57. The BIPOC Project, supra note 53; Chevaz Clarke, BIPOC: What Does It Mean and Where Does It Come From?, CBS News (July 2, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bipoc-meaning-where-does-it-come-from-2020-04-02 [https://perma.cc/P2NW-5ZW7].

  58. Clarke, supra note 56.

  59. See generally Anthony Christian Ocampo, The Latinos of Asia: How Filipino Americans Break the Rules of Race (2016) (exploring how Filipinos understand their racial identity).

  60. Wing, supra note 16, at 7; Harris, supra note 52, at 585.

  61. See, e.g., Victoria Sutton, Guest Post: Native American Exclusion as a Form of Paper Genocide, LSSSE (July 17, 2020), https://lssse.indiana.edu/blog/guest-post-native-american-exclusion-as-a-form-of-paper-genocide [https://perma.cc/SWH3-NUBQ].

  62. Garcia, supra note 13.

  63. The BIPOC Project, supra note 53.

  64. The nascent term is also confusing as many, even progressive voices on race/racism, do not know what it means. As a term that has been used largely by educated elites, others have been clueless about it; apparently, many thought it referenced bisexual people of color. NPR Codeswitch, Is It Time To Say R.I.P. to ‘POC’? (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:22AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/29/‌918418825/is-it-time-to-say-r-i-p-to-p-o-c [https://perma.cc/8XYN-K78N].

  65. See Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: the Permanence of Racism 19 (1992) (arguing that symbolic progress simply provides oppressed groups with the illusion of change without ceding real power, thus further entrenching racial hierarchies).

  66. Cambridge Dictionary notes that virtue signaling “is the popular modern habit of indicating that one has virtue merely by expressing disgust or favour for certain political ideas or cultural happenings.” Cambridge English Dictionary, Virtual Signaling Definition, [https://perma.cc/F2SX-YWVX]. This definition from Urban Dictionary is even more direct: “To take a conspicuous but essentially useless action ostensibly to support a good cause but actually to show off how much more moral you are than everybody else.” Urban Dictionary, Virtual Signalling Definition, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Virtue%‌20Signalling [https://perma.cc/85A6-GQWT]; see also Deo, supra note 9, at 20.

  67. Sutton, supra note 60.

  68. See Garcia, supra note 13; The BIPOC Project, supra note 53; Clarke, supra note 56.

  69. Ange-Marie Hancock, Solidarity Politics for Millennials: A Guide to Ending the Oppression Olympics 4 (2011).

  70. Half a dozen clear examples of race and racism that are not centered on Black and Indigenous communities are presented infra in Part III.B.

  71. Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 27 Politics and Society 105, 107 (1999).

  72. Id.; Hancock, supra note 68, at 4.

  73. Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States (3rd ed. 2015).

  74. The history of legal support for white privilege is explored in greater depth in Deo, supra note 9, manuscript at 6-9 (in progress).

  75. Omi & Winant, supra note 72, at 39­–46.

  76. The contexts included in this Section are clear examples drawing from contemporary racial issues in the U.S. where the BIPOC term is not the most useful; future work should apply this thesis to more complex situations that are less clear-cut to determine whether the argument holds. See, e.g., Deo, supra note 9.

  77. Harald Schmidt, Lawrence O. Gostin & Michelle A. Williams, Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?, 324 JAMA 2023, 2023 (2020) (“[T]he mortality rate relative to population size is 3.4-fold higher among Black individuals . . ., 3.3-fold higher among Indigenous and Latino communities . . ., 2.9-fold higher among Pacific Islander individuals . . ., and 1.3 higher among Asian [American] populations . . . .”); Harmeet Kaur, The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Hitting Black and Brown Americans Especially Hard on All Fronts, CNN (May 8, 2020, 8:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/08/us/‌coronavirus-pandemic-race-impact-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZZN4-NLVA].

  78. Schmidt, Gostin & Williams, supra note 76, at 2023 (discussing priority vaccines for communities of color because COVID-19 “has disproportionately affected racial minorities in the United States resulting in higher rates of infection, hospitalization, and death”).

  79. Lizzie Wade, COVID-19 Data on Native Americans is ‘A National Disgrace.’ This Scientist Is Fighting to Be Counted, Science (Sept. 24, 2020, 12:20PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/covid-19-data-native-americans-national-disgrace-scientist-fighting-be-counted [https://perma.cc/AXL2-YVQN].

  80. Sarah Blake Morgan, Native Americans Embrace Vaccine, Virus Containment Measures, AP News (February 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/native-americans-coronavirus-vaccine-9b3101d306442fbc5198333017b4737d.

  81. See Nora Mabie, Tribes’ Vaccination Effort Proving To Be a Big Success by Emphasizing Elders and Community, Great Falls Tribune (March 23, 2021, 6:00AM), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2021/03/23/montana-native-american-tribes-see-successful-covid-19-vaccine-rollout/4801837001/ [https://perma.cc/KX8E-S94U], (“The Blackfeet Nation has successfully vaccinated more than 95% of its eligible population.”); Harmeet Kaur, Tribal Health Providers Have Figured Out the Key to Covid-19 Vaccine Success. Here’s Their Secret, CNN (February 26, 2021, 8:16AM), https://www.cnn.com/‌2021/02/09/us/tribal-health-providers-covid-vaccine-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/JP94-KX4N].

  82. Jack Healy, Plenty of Vaccines, but Not Enough Arms: A Warning Sign in Cherokee Nation, N.Y. Times (March 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/us/vaccines-covid-cherokee-native-americans.html [https://perma.cc/EB2A-6F8F].

  83. Wade, supra note 78.

  84. Caroline Radnofsky, Matteo Moschella & Corky Siemaszko, Native Americans Use Culture and Community to Gain Tribes’ Trust in Covid Vaccine, NBC News (Feb. 3, 2021, 6:32PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/native-americans-use-culture-comm‌unity-gain-tribes-trust-covid-vaccine-n1256647 [https://perma.cc/M2TX-LQWA]; Kaur, supra note 80.

  85. National Nurses United, Sins of Omission 12 (2020), https://www.nationalnursesunited.‌org/sites/default/files/nnu/graphics/documents/0920_Covid19_SinsOfOmission_Data_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3W-MLXV]. There is likely a raceXgender effect here too, with greater numbers of Filipinas dying of COVID-19 than even their male counterparts.

  86. Id. at 5.

  87. Id.

  88. John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 2 (M.P. Zanna ed., 2004); Louis A. Penner, et al., The Experience of Discrimination and Black-White Health Disparities in Medical Care, 35 J. Black Psych. 180, 181 (2009).

  89. Mary Smith, Native Americans: A Crisis in Health Equity, American Bar Association, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-state-of-healthcare-in-the-united-states/native-american-crisis-in-health-equity [https://perma.cc/UJ2S-BF23].

  90. Leila Goldstein, Latina and Black Pregnant Women Show High Rates of COVID-19 in Southwest Ohio, WOSU Public Media (Jul. 14, 2020), https://radio.wosu.org/post/latina-and-black-pregnant-women-show-high-rates-covid-19-southwest-ohio#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/D3FM-T8EU].

  91. Stop AAPI Hate released a report in August 2020 showing increases in hate crimes against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders since March 19, 2020. Stop AAPI Hate, Stop AAPI Hate National Report 3.19.20 – 2.28.21, https://secureservercdn.net/104.238.69.231/a1w.90d. ‌myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/210312-Stop-AAPI-Hate-National-Report-.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3TJ-FAAU]; Kimmy Yam, Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Increased by Nearly 150% in 2020, Mostly in N.Y. and L.A., New Report Says, NBC News (March 9, 2021, 3:37PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/anti-asian-hate-crimes-increased-nearly-150-2020-mostly-n-n1260264 [https://perma.cc/738D-D9ML]; Seashia Vang, US Government Should Better Combat Anti-Asian Racism, More than 1,000 COVID-19 Related Incidents Reported, Human Rights Watch Dispatches (Apr. 17, 2020, 10:00AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/17/us-government-should-better-combat-anti-asian-racism# [https://perma.cc/TF9C-BUDV].

  92. Stop AAPI Hate reports that 40% of survivors had Chinese ancestry, the largest ethnic group affected. As these attacks depend on external identification, the “Asian” label based on phenotype was likely used as a proxy for “Chinese” and resulted in victimization. Stop AAPI Hate, supra note 90 at 1; Vang, supra note 90.

  93. Yam, supra note 90 (revealing that “while [hate] crimes in 2020 decreased overall by 7 percent, those targeting Asian people rose by nearly 150 percent”).

  94. Vang, supra note 90; Hannah Miao, Lawmakers Call for Change in Covid Rhetoric Amid Rise in Violence Against Asian Americans, CNBC (March 18, 2021, 5:36PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/18/lawmakers-call-for-change-in-covid-rhetoric-amid-violence-against-asian-americans.html [https://perma.cc/9886-4S9S].

  95. Harmeet Kaur, Fetishized, Sexualized and Marginalized, Asian Women Are Uniquely Vulnerable to Violence, CNN (March 17, 2021, 8:22PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/‌03/17/us/asian-women-misogyny-spa-shootings-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/MH2B-XMK5].

  96. Kim, supra note 70, at 107–08.

  97. In fact, hate crimes decreased for most groups in 2020. Yam, supra note 90.

  98. Angelo N. Ancheta, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience 16 (1998).

  99. See Bryan D. Byers & James A. Jones, The Impact of the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11 on Anti-Islamic Hate Crime, 5 J. of Ethnicity in Crim. Just. 43, 43 (2007) (“A statistically significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crime occurred after 9/11 . . . .”); Post 9-11 Backlash, SAALT, https://saalt.org/policy-change/post-9-11-backlash [https://perma.cc/L9SR-XWFB] (“Since Sep­tem­ber 11th, [2001,] South Asian, Sikh, Mus­lim, and Arab Amer­i­cans have been the tar­gets of numer­ous hate crimes, as well as employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion, bul­ly­ing, harass­ment, and pro­fil­ing.”).

  100. Cynthia Lee, Hate Crimes and the War on Terror (2008) (“In the days, weeks, and months immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Arab-Americans, South Asian-Americans, Muslim-Americans, and Sikh-Americans were the targets of widespread hate violence”); Elly Belle, Yes, 9/11 Did Cause an Increase in Islamophobia, Refinery 29 (Sept. 11, 2020, 2:39PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/09/10019797/islamophobia-after-911-september-11-hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/C8F5-DWFW] (noting hate crimes against Muslims jumped from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001).

  101. Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 Boston U. L. Rev. 951, 1007-08 (2020).

  102. Id. at 951.

  103. See Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1638, 1647 n.29 (2016) (discussing various “grey areas” between criminal law and tribal jurisdiction “neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed”); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Criminal Justice in Indian Country: A Theoretical and Empirical Agenda, 2 Ann. Rev. Criminology 337, 337 (2019) (discussing “the complexities of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country”).

  104. Brianna Scott, Author: Black Women’s Experiences with Police Brutality Must Be ‘Invisible No More’, NPR (July 16, 2020, 5:37PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/07/16/892015743/author-black-womens-experiences-with-police-brutality-must-be-invisible-no-more [https://perma.cc/UN3P-5ND7]

  105. Tia Sherée Gaynor, Seong C. Kang, & Brian N. Williams, Segregated Spaces and Separated Races: The Relationship Between State-Sanctioned Violence, Place, and Black Identity, 7 The Russell Sage Found. J. of the Soc. Sci. 50 (2021).

  106. Williams, Mezey & Singh, supra note 18.

  107. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow 19 (2020).

  108. The Sentencing Project, Criminal Justice Facts (2020), https://www.sentencingproject.‌org/criminal-justice-facts [https://perma.cc/4Y2H-4VZY].

  109. Roxanne Daniel, Since You Asked: What Data Exists about Native American People in the Criminal Justice System?, Prison Policy Initiative (Apr. 22, 2020) (“While Census data reveals that Native populations are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, other information that could shed more light on the issue is sparse”), available at: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/04/22/native [https://perma.cc/S57V-HGUB].

  110. The Sentencing Project, supra note 107.

  111. While migration from the African continent to the U.S. has increased significantly in the past few decades, it is a comparatively small fraction of overall immigration; Black immigrants represent about 3% of the U.S. foreign-born population. See Randy Capps, Kristen McCabe & Michael Fix, Diverse Streams: African Migration to the United States, 2 Migration Policy Institute (2012), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/CBI-AfricanMigration.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRA9-FLF4].

  112. Teo Armus & Maria Sacchetti, The Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Still Haven’t Been Found. The Pandemic Isn’t Helping, Wash. Post (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:28PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/21/family-separation-parents-border-covid [https://perma.cc/3NNU-AQJW].

  113. Some of these children may also have Indigenous roots, though in a very different context, history, and environment than Native Americans.

  114. BIPOC would also be misleading in the immigration context when referencing how U.S. foreign policy prevented people from many predominantly Muslim nations from lawfully entering the country between 2017 and 2021. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1475 (2018); Proclamation No. 10141, 86 Fed. Reg. 7005 (Jan 20, 2021).

  115. This Essay lays a foundation for how advocates, academics, and allies should use racial language; it does not prescribe how individuals identify themselves.

  116. Deo, supra note 10.

  117. The thesis that using the BIPOC term does not work in particular situations is applied to the more complicated context of legal education in Deo, supra note 9.

Remedying Police Brutality Through Sentencing Reduction

Police brutality is a widespread problem that causes significant physical and psychological trauma, undermines faith in the law, and disproportionately impacts communities of color. Existing remedies to police brutality—including civil suits for damages, criminal prosecution, and internal disciplinary procedures—have in many cases proven inadequate. They fail to sufficiently deter police brutality and fail to adequately compensate victims.

This Essay proposes a novel alternative: remedying police brutality by reducing the sentences of criminal defendants who have been victims of police brutality and subsequently convicted of a crime. When a victim of police brutality is convicted of a crime relating to an incident in which the police committed unnecessary violence, they would be eligible for a reduction in their resulting sentence. The magnitude of the sentence reduction would scale to the severity of the police’s actions. Such a remedy would deter police brutality and adequately compensate victims. Because the remedy would occur within the very same process that produces police brutality—the process of criminal investigation and adjudication—it would restore procedural fairness and reaffirm victims’ rights. The Essay concludes by exploring practical concerns with the remedy, particularly the relative roles of legislatures and courts in its implementation.

Introduction

Late on the night of May 24, 2020, Joseph Troiano left an overcrowded New York City homeless shelter, tired of waiting for a bed, and took his bags with him to the subway, setting the bags down in the seats around him.1.SeeRosa Goldensohn, De Blasio Renders Split Decision on Video of Cop Punching Homeless Man on Subway, The City (July 20, 2020, 9:35 PM), https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/7/20/21332157/de-blasio-subway-video-nypd-cop-punches-homeless-man [https://perma.cc/Y9EP-UV3U]; Adam Harding, Man Hit, Choked and Maced by NYPD in Violent Arrest Video Plans to File $40M Lawsuit, NBC New York (July 17, 2020 2:29 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/man-hit-choked-and-maced-by-nypd-in-violent-arrest-video-plans-to-file-40m-lawsuit/2518793/ [https://perma.cc/Q6AF-ESP9].Show More The subway was nearly empty.2.Goldensohn, supra note 1.Show More Just after midnight, an officer of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) approached him and ordered him to move because he was occupying multiple seats.3.Id.Show More Troiano moved to the next train car.4.Id.Show More The officer, joined by another officer, followed and ordered Troiano to exit, telling him “step off or I got to drag you off.”5.See Harding, supra note 1.Show More

A bodycam video of the incident shows Troiano objecting to the officers’ harassment, then one of them suddenly reaching out to grab him.6.The City, NYPD Subway Arrest, YouTube (July 14, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/‌watch?v=2lgK-apbl8Y [https://perma.cc/9FZ8-CFG8].Show More Troiano swats the officer’s hand.7.Id.Show More The officer grabs Troiano and throws a few quick punches to his head.8.Id.Show More As Troiano yells, the officer pulls him off the train by the back of the neck and throws him on the platform floor.9.Id.Show More Troiano gets up and stands against the platform wall, visibly shaken.10 10.Id.Show More The officer kicks his bags off the train, scattering them on the platform.11 11.Id.Show More As Troiano yells for them to stop, his back still to the wall, the other officer sprays him with pepper spray at point-blank range.12 12.Id.Show More The officers finally bring him to the ground and handcuff him.13 13.Id.Show More

Manhattan District Attorney (D.A.) Cyrus Vance initially charged Troiano with felony assault (for allegedly kicking the officer’s hand while on the platform) and misdemeanor resisting arrest.14 14.Goldensohn, supra note 1.Show More After widespread outrage, the D.A.’s office dropped the felony charge, leaving the resisting arrest charge,15 15.Id.Show More a Class A misdemeanor that carries a maximum penalty of one year in jail and a fine of up to $1,000.16 16.N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.15(1), 205.30 (McKinney 2019).Show More

While the most highly publicized incidents of police brutality tend to involve unjustified killing by the police, many instances of police brutality are non-lethal. It far more often occurs in incidents like the one between the NYPD and Joseph Troiano.17 17.SeeMatthew J. Hickman, Alex R. Piquero & Joel H. Garner, Toward a National Estimate of Police Use of Nonlethal Force, 7 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 563, 577–81, 588–89 (2008) (finding that several hundred thousand arrestees in 2002 experienced nonlethal force from an officer, such as being pushed, grabbed, kicked, hit, or held at gunpoint); Police Shootings, Vice News (Dec. 10, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/a3jjpa/nonfatal-police-shootings-data [https://perma.cc/KT6V-NH35] (providing data on police shootings from 2010 through 2016 at the fifty largest local police departments in the U.S. and finding that “[f]or every person shot and killed by cops in these departments . . . police shot at two more people who survived”). Data on police brutality is extremely limited. In the past few years there have been some efforts to begin national data collection, but the complete results have not yet been published. See, e.g., National Use-of-Force Data Collection, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/‌services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force [https://perma.cc/5V8L-V4CF] (last visited Mar. 18, 2021) (noting that “[t]he FBI released initial data when 40% of the total law enforcement officer population was reached” in July 2020 and that “[a]dditional data will be released at 60% and 80% participation levels”).Show More In legal parlance, these more everyday instances of police brutality are often cast in other terms—“excessive use of force” or “unreasonable force”18 18.See, e.g., Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2016).Show More—but represent essentially the same problem: the police’s unjustified use of physical violence.19 19.Whether “police brutality” is coequal with those terms is subject to some disagreement. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1275, 1276 (1999) (distinguishing “[p]olice brutality” from “police misconduct” on the basis that the former “is conduct that is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its target”).Show More

Police brutality is a dire problem with inadequate remedies. It is an old problem, tied to the nation’s history of racism.20 20.See generally Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 Soc. Just. 156 (2001) (detailing the history of race and policing from slave patrols to the war on drugs).Show More In 2020, a string of police killings of Black victims—Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and Rayshard Brooks, among others—provoked widespread protests that were themselves met by police brutality.21 21.See, e.g., Richard Fausset and Shaila Dewan, Elijah McClain Died After He Was Detained. Now He’s Being Remembered., N.Y. Times (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/us/elijah-mcclain-police-killings.html [https://perma.cc/LU93-HQ7Q]; Adam Gabbatt, Protests About Police Brutality Are Met with Wave of Police Brutality Across U.S., The Guardian (June 6, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/06/police-violence-protests-us-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/GQ3J-G5Q7].Show More The effects of police brutality are immense. The most severe are, of course, suffered by victims themselves as physical and psychological trauma, but police brutality also has broader societal impacts. It undermines faith in the legal system.22 22.See Nathan James et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43904, Public Trust and Law Enforcement–A Discussion for Policymakers 2–3 (2020) (tracking declines in public confidence in the police in recent years).Show More It is linked to lower academic achievement and school attendance.23 23.See Desmond Ang, The Effects of Police Violence on Inner-City Students, 136 Q.J. Econ. 115, 11718 (2021).Show More It disproportionately impacts Black and Hispanic communities.24 24.SeeRoland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force, 127 J. Pol. Econ. 1210, 1213–14 (2019).Show More

Despite how serious of a problem police brutality is, remedies for it are entirely inadequate. A victim can sue an officer for civil damages, but the officer’s conduct might well be covered by qualified immunity.25 25.SeeRachel A. Harmon, Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, in 2 Reforming Criminal Justice: Policing 27, 33–35 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).Show More They could sue the municipality for damages, but discovery would be difficult, the process long, and the settlement potentially inadequate.26 26.Id. at 35. See also Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 325 (2018) (discussing how Black and Hispanic tort claimants’ damage awards are under-calculated as a matter of course because of courts’ reliance on race-sensitive data).Show More They could seek criminal prosecution of the officers, but political pressures might not allow prosecutors to bring an indictment.27 27.Harmon, supra note 25, at 40–43. See also John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 789, 789 (2000) (discussing the “cycle of impunity[] by which the reluctance of local government to prosecute bad cops empowers future misconduct and drives communities to regard the police as adversaries”).Show More They could petition for an internal departmental review of the officer, but the process would be polluted by conflicting incentives and bureaucratic limitations.28 28.Harmon, supra note 25, at 45–46.Show More In short, existing remedies to police brutality are insufficient in both the frequency with which they are invoked and the amount they compensate the victim when they are invoked.

And, if the victim, like Joseph Troiano, has been charged with a crime , they could still end up going to prison. Existing remedies to police brutality treat the victim’s prosecution as a distinct process from the processes through which they may seek a remedy. In a case like Troiano’s where the victim of the police brutality is charged with a crime, the victim must go through their own criminal adjudication and separately seek a remedy to the brutality. But why should a remedy not be available within the very same process that produces police brutality—the criminal investigative and adjudicatory process? After all, victims of other kinds of police misconduct receive the benefit of the exclusionary rule,29 29.SeeMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961).Show More and victims of prosecutorial misconduct can have their cases dismissed as a remedy,30 30.See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 929–30 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment after the government destroyed evidence in spite of defendant’s repeated requests to prosecutor to preserve the evidence); United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1994) (dismissing the case because the prosecution failed to adhere to the defendant’s request to preserve evidence); see also Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 Wash. U.L.Q. 713, 815–19 (1999) (discussing different remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, including dismissal).Show More which are both remedies internal to their criminal adjudication.

This Essay proposes a new remedy to police brutality: reducing the sentences of criminal defendants who have been the victims of police brutality. Part I details the mechanics of the proposal. Part II then describes the benefits of using remedial sentencing for police brutality. The remedy would have two particular benefits: one, it would deter police brutality, and two, it would adequately compensate victims. Finally, Part III explores how legislatures and courts could implement the remedy.

I. The Proposal

The possibility of remedying police brutality at the sentencing phase of a victim’s criminal trial has not been proposed in prior scholarship. Some scholars have, however, proposed remedial sentencing schemes in other contexts. Some, including Judge Guido Calabresi, have proposed using sentence reduction as an alternative remedy to the exclusionary rule.31 31.SeeGuido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 111, 116 (2003); Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 45, 73–74 (1994).Show More Other scholars have argued that sentence reduction could be used to remedy prosecutorial misconduct.32 32.Seegenerally Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 Geo. L.J. 1509 (2009) (proposing sentence reduction as a remedy that would deter prosecutorial misconduct and have corrective and expressive value).Show More And others have argued that it could help amend historical discrimination against minority groups.33 33.SeeMakenzie Way, Remedial Sentencing Legislation as a Tool for Reducing Overrepresentation in Correctional Facilities, Penn L. News (Jan. 6., 2020), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/9534-remedial-sentencing-legislation-as-a-tool-for [https://perma.cc/4AJW-88SX].Show More None, however, have proposed using sentence reduction for police brutality.

Nor has any American court employed remedial sentencing for police brutality.34 34.Although the Supreme Court of Canada has notably used a similar remedy at least once. See R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 208–10 (Can.).Show More But it would hardly be unprecedented. There is a long tradition of remedying police and prosecutorial misconduct within the criminal trial, of which sentencing is a part. The exclusionary rule is the most prominent; a defendant who has been the victim of police misconduct—an illegal search, or perhaps a Miranda violation—receives a remedy within the context of their trial.35 35.SeeMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).Show More As it goes, “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”36 36.People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).Show More As another example, courts, on rare occasions, bar retrial to remedy particularly egregious instances of prosecutorial misconduct that result in mistrials, again providing a remedy within the context of the defendant’s trial.37 37.See Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 Seton Hall L. Rev. 335, 344–46 (2007) (discussing how double jeopardy bars retrials where a mistrial has been declared for prosecutorial conduct that was specifically “intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial” (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982)) but not where the prosecutor’s conduct was intended to win at trial using impermissible means).Show More Remedying police brutality at the sentencing phase of the trial would be consistent with those remedies: it provides a remedy internal to the victim’s criminal adjudication.

Consider what the remedy would look like in practice. First, there would have to be an occurrence of police brutality. The remedy should at least be available for any occurrence of police brutality that violates the Constitution,38 38.Namely, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses.Show More but could also be defined by statute or within sentencing guidelines in order to broaden the scope of the conduct captured beyond a constitutional standard.

The victim would then have to be charged with an offense. The offense could be the offense that the police were investigating or executing an arrest for when the brutality occurred,39 39.As in the case of Jacob Blake, whose shooting in Kenosha, Wisconsin, has received significant media attention. See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Blake, N.Y. Times (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-kenosha.html [https://perma.cc/MX7Q-47QB].Show More or it could be an offense arising out of the police-victim interaction itself (resisting arrest, assault on an officer) as in Troiano’s case. When there is a charge relating to conduct that precedes the brutality, there might have to be some kind of fact-finding process to determine that the police brutality incident is sufficiently related to the charge—that it arises from the investigation of, or arrest for, that particular charge. Needless to say, the remedy is only available if the victim is actually charged with a crime. This means that many victims of police brutality, ones who are never charged with an offense, would not reap its benefits. But the remedy’s limited scope would not render it any less impactful when it does apply.

Victims could invoke the remedy at one of several stages. First, they could indirectly benefit from it during plea bargaining. If a defendant has been the victim of police brutality and might consequently receive a lower sentence if the factfinder finds them guilty, they would likely receive a more favorable plea offer. The potential sentence reduction would act as an extra bargaining chip. Considering how many criminal cases result in plea deals,40 40.See Report: Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on the Decline, Innocence Project (Aug. 7, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline/ [https://perma.cc/9ZNF-MHQA] (finding that “97 percent of [criminal] cases were resolved through plea deals”).Show More the indirect benefits at this stage would be significant. Second, the victim could invoke the right at sentencing if they go to trial and the factfinder finds them guilty. Legislatures or sentencing commissions could establish specific downward departures for victims of police brutality, or judges could take it into account under existing sentencing factors. Third, a victim could invoke the remedy on direct appeal, or, fourth, in a post-conviction proceeding.

Regardless of when the victim invokes the remedy, the magnitude of the compensation—the reduction in the victim’s sentence time—would still have to be determined. In general, more severe instances of police brutality would warrant greater sentence reductions. The compensation should be commensurate with the harm. In cases where the brutality is severe and the defendant’s offense insignificant, the sentence reduction could be complete, producing a sentence without a term of incarceration; in cases where the brutality is less severe and the defendant’s offense significant, the sentence reduction could be relatively minor. This ability to appropriately tailor the size of the compensation to the harm helps produce the deterrent and compensatory effects that make sentence reduction such a promising remedy for police brutality.

II. Benefits of the Remedy

Existing remedies to police brutality provide, at least in theory, two main benefits: deterring further police brutality and compensating victims.41 41.SeeHarmon, supranote 25, at 27–30.Show More Remedying police brutality through sentence reduction should deter further brutality, and is uniquely situated among potential remedies to police brutality to adequately compensate victims.

A. Remedial Sentencing’s Deterrent Effects

Remedying police brutality through sentence reduction should tend to deter further brutality when the costs it imposes on police officers exceed the benefits they gain by committing brutality.42 42.SeeFrank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 292 (1983) (arguing that to satisfy the criminal law goal of deterrence, the criminal process must set “[t]he optimal price for the offense,” which is “just high enough to require offenders to pay for all of the harm their crimes inflict”).Show More Neither of those factors is precisely or easily calculable, but there is enough empirical evidence on police behavior to suggest that remedial sentencing would have a deterrent effect.

What costs does the remedy impose on officers? Empirical evidence suggests a few clear incentives that control police behavior. Most relevantly here, police have an incentive to secure convictions and sentences; they consistently act in ways that will tend to produce more convictions with longer sentences.43 43.See, e.g.,John Pfaff, The Perverse Incentives of Punishment, The Appeal (May 18, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-perverse-incentives-of-punishment-7c1e32b18d07/[ https://perma.cc/WUF5-AZRV] (reporting an especially egregious example of this phenomenon, wherein Todd Entrekin, a sheriff in Etowah, Alabama, “pocketed at least $750,000 budgeted for feeding the people detained in his county jail,” enabling him to purchase a beach house while those incarcerated the jail ate meat “labeled ‘not fit for human consumption’”).Show More Evidence emerging out of studies of wrongful convictions indicates that officers tend to act in a way that secures convictions and long sentences even if, in doing so, they sometimes act unlawfully or in bad faith.44 44.SeeAnthony W. Batts, Maddy deLone & Darrel W. Stephens, Policing and Wrongful Convictions, Nat’l Inst. Just. 4 (2014), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/246328.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5SJ-WCZK].Show More Because police have such a demonstrated interest in securing convictions and long sentences, remedial sentencing should impose costs on them: it produces shorter sentences when they act unlawfully.

An important factor in determining the exact costs that the remedy imposes on police is the likelihood that it would actually be invoked when it is available.45 45.See Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 292 (emphasizing that the price of committing an offense is a product of “[t]he penalty” imposed and “the probability that it will be imposed for a given offense”).Show More This is the failing of many existing remedies to police brutality: they might produce a deterrent effect if they were actually used, but police officers are generally immune from civil suits due to qualified immunity and immune from criminal prosecution because of political insulation.46 46.See Harmon, supranote 25, at 34–35, 43.Show More Remedial sentencing would be comparatively easy to invoke. The victim would be automatically eligible for it at sentencing, and would not have to overcome the institutional barriers involved with civil suits or prosecuting officers. In addition, there would also be no concern with providing the victim an unwarranted windfall because the size of the sentence reduction would be made commensurate with the severity of the police conduct, so judges, generally speaking, should not be reluctant to allow it. Evidence shows that judges might be reluctant to provide a windfall—as the exclusionary rule is in many cases—but they should be less reluctant to provide a remedy that is commensurate with what the defendant deserves.47 47.See Starr, supranote 32, at 1521.Show More

What benefits do the police gain from committing brutality? It is perhaps unintuitive to think of the issue in those terms, so it might be easier to consider the correlative: the costs the police incur by not committing brutality. This factor is crucial to understanding how sentence reduction could deter police brutality. To be sure, the reasons that police brutality occurs are nebulous, subject to active debate, and hardly reducible to a few easily-defined factors.48 48.The genesis of police brutality is a broad and hotly contested subject, but a few key ingredients include poor hiring and training practices, the militarization of the police, and institutionalized racism. SeeRobert E. Worden, The “Causes” of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force, in Criminal Justice Theory: Explaining the Nature and Behavior of Criminal Justice 149–64 (Edward R. Maguire and David E. Duffee eds., 2d ed. 2015) (providing an overview of various theories and studies of police use of force); Rosa Brooks, Stop Training Police Like They’re Joining the Military, The Atlantic (June 10, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/police-academies-paramilitary/612859/ [https://perma.cc/MBR9-68K5] (addressing the relationship between militarizing the police and police brutality and discussing promising efforts to train police to critically engage with the history of paramilitary police forces in the United States); Wayne McElrath & Sarah Turberville, Poisoning Our Police: How the Militarization Mindset Threatens Constitutional Rights and Public Safety, Project on Gov’t Oversight, (June 9, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/06/poisoning-our-police-how-the-militarization-mindset-threatens-constitutional-rights-and-public-safety/ [https://perma.cc/KF74-5CHA]. (arguing that the militarization of police forces imperils public safety and freedom, and recognizing that racism is a fundamental feature of American policing).Show More But the evidence suggests that police brutality is at least partially a product of training and budget shortfalls; police departments that have invested in force-reduction trainings have lower reported instances of excessive force.49 49.See George Wood, Tom R. Tyler & Andrew V. Papachristos, Procedural Justice Training Reduces Police Use of Force and Complaints Against Officers, 117 Proceedings of the Nat’l Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 9815, 9815 (May 5, 2020), available at https://www.pnas.org/content/117/18/9815/ [https://perma.cc/2VJL-2BFR] (finding that large-scale implementation of procedural justice training reduced complaints and use of force).Show More In order to mitigate police brutality, then, municipalities would have to invest in counter-measures, better training in particular. Those measures have costs, and the money that police departments and municipalities save by not investing in them might be considered the “benefits” they receive by committing brutality.

Because that second factor—the benefits the police receive by committing brutality—is so nebulous, it is hard to determine the extent to which remedial sentencing would deter police brutality. But the fact that the remedy would impose costs on the police is clear, and it is also clear that it would likely impose greater costs on the police than alternative remedies because it is so much more likely to be invoked. Therefore, remedial sentencing should tend to deter police brutality at least as well as alternative remedies. Regardless, because the remedy would exist alongside existing remedies to police brutality, its deterrent effects would aggregate with theirs.

B. Remedial Sentencing’s Corrective Effects

The single most important reason to adopt sentence reduction as a remedy to police misconduct is the unique compensatory benefits it offers to victims. Sentence reduction is categorically unlike other remedies to police brutality because it is the only remedy—existing or conceivable—that matches the form and scale of the harm done to the form and scale of the compensation provided.

1. Correspondence in Form

First, in remedial sentencing, there is a corrective effect in the sense that a state-imposed harm (the physical and psychological damage police brutality inflicts upon victims) is compensated by a correlative reduction in a related state-imposed harm (victims’ terms of incarceration). The form of the compensation matches the form of the harm. That correspondence is important in light of the retribution principle for criminal punishment. The idea behind the retribution principle is that, because a defendant has performed a moral wrong, they deserve punishment.50 50.See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1686 (1992).Show More The punishment is its own end, one’s just deserts. The punishment scales to the severity of the crime; more serious crimes beget longer sentences because their perpetrators are thought to deserve more punishment.

The problem when it comes to victims of police brutality who have been convicted of a crime is that they have already suffered a state-imposed harm—the police brutality. Those sentenced without regard to the police brutality suffer a total amount of state-imposed harm disproportional to the severity of the crime they committed: their term of incarceration plus the injury caused by the police. The retribution principle, then, necessitates remedial sentencing. The remedy reduces the term of incarceration to the degree that the total amount of state-imposed injury is commensurate with the severity of the offense. It matches the form of the harm to the form of the compensation—a state-imposed injury and a reduction in a state-imposed injury, respectively.

In a closely related vein, there is also a procedural correspondence between the harm and compensation in remedying police brutality through sentence reduction. Police brutality typically takes place in the process of a criminal investigation or arrest.51 51.SeeHickman, Piquero & Garner, supra note 17, at 577; see also Worden, supranote 48, at 149–51 (describing brutality in investigation and arrest).Show More The investigative stops, seizures, and arrests in which brutality takes place are part of the process that ultimately leads to the victim’s criminal adjudication, which in turn results—if the victim is convicted—in sentencing. Remedying police brutality by reducing the victim’s sentence, then, provides compensation within the very same process that produces the harm. The harm takes place as police investigate or execute an arrest for a victim’s alleged crime, and the compensation frees the victim of the consequences of that investigation.

Why does matching the form of the harm to the form of the compensation matter? After all, other remedies do not match the form of the compensation to the harm; they provide monetary damages or directly punish the offending officers. The proposed remedy’s correspondence in form matters because of what it expresses about the nature of police brutality. The remedy has an expressive benefit in the sense that it sends a message about the inherent wrongfulness of the police’s actions; more so than alternative remedies, it sounds in moral terms. Reducing a defendant’s sentence because they have been a victim of police brutality signals that the legal system recognizes and takes seriously the exact nature of the harm they have suffered. As one scholar puts it, “‘expressive legal remedies’ matter because they express recognition of injury and reaffirmation of the underlying normative principles for how the relevant relationships are to be constituted.”52 52.Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1529 (2000).Show More Providing a remedy in the same form as the injury affirms the nature of the injury—a state-imposed injury that occurs within the criminal process. When the police commit brutality, they produce a state-imposed harm and undermine the process of criminal investigation and adjudication. By reducing a defendant’s sentence, the remedy mitigates the particular damage that the brutality has done to both the victim and the system. It reaffirms the rights of the victim and restores procedural justice.

2. Correspondence in Scale

The second corrective benefit of remedial sentencing is its commensurability. Sentence reduction is a particularly good remedy to the harm caused by police brutality because it is so tailorable to the severity of the harm the defendant has suffered. Not all instances of police brutality are equally severe, so the compensation must be tailorable to the severity of the harm. Remedial sentencing does just that: compensates serious instances of police brutality with significant sentence reductions, and more minor instances of police brutality with relatively token ones.

The ability of remedial sentencing to provide compensation commensurate in scale with the severity of the harm matters for expressive purposes. The remedy cannot just generally affirm the rights of the victim or restore procedural justice; it must do those things in the right magnitude. Providing compensation commensurate in scale with the harm sends a signal about just how morally repugnant the officer’s conduct was, and just how much the victim’s rights have been violated. Of course, there is no easy or inherent way to convert the wrongfulness of a particular incident of police brutality to an amount of sentence time. How many months or years is a beating worth? That conversion process depends on subjective judgments about the severity of police brutality and the meanings of particular amounts of sentence time. The important thing is that there is some scaling. It would be up to legislatures, sentencing commissions, and judges to ensure its consistency.53 53.See infra Part III for discussion of the possible roles of legislatures, sentencing commissions, and courts.Show More

3. Comparison with Alternative Remedies

Some remedies for police brutality (real or proposed) match the form of the compensation to the form of the injury. Others match them in scale. But none do both, which is why sentence reduction, when it would be applicable, could be such a powerful remedy.

Consider potential remedies to police brutality that match in form but not scale. Courts might want to expand the exclusionary rule to cases of police brutality, refusing to admit evidence arising out of police-defendant interactions in which the police commit physical violence. Similarly, courts could outright dismiss cases against defendants who have suffered police brutality. These remedies would match the form of the harm to the compensation by taking place in the process of the victim’s criminal adjudication and would result in a lower state-imposed harm (because the defendant would not be sentenced at all, having not been convicted). But they would not necessarily scale the compensation to the harm. They might provide a windfall by freeing a defendant entirely from a looming sentence.54 54.They also might discourage judges from applying the remedy at all. There have been indications that judges are less likely to apply the exclusionary rule because it might overcompensate victims for the government’s violations of their rights—as Judge Calabresi has noted, judges “are not in the business of letting people out on technicalities.” Calabresi, supra note 31, at 112.Show More

Then consider potential remedies that match in scale but not form. Civil suits for damages at least theoretically scale to the severity of the injury but do not match in form. In the police brutality context, they reward physical and dignitary harms with liquid money. Likewise, prosecuting offending officers—even if warranted for other reasons—does not restore procedural fairness to the victim’s own adjudication, even if the officer’s sentence should loosely scale to the severity of their actions.

Remedial sentencing, by matching both the form and scale of the compensation to those of the harm, reaffirms the rights of the victim and restores procedural fairness. Sentence reduction has unique corrective power to remedy the particular harms done by police brutality.

III. Implementing the Remedy

There are multiple possible paths to implementing a remedial sentencing scheme for police brutality, but choosing among those paths might prove difficult. A particularly crucial choice is whether it would be primarily legislature-driven or court-driven.

If the remedy were to be primarily legislature-driven, legislatures could create statutory downward departures for defendants who have been victims of police brutality during an interaction with the police relating to their instant case. The downward departure could be either advisory or mandatory. There would be no obvious constitutional issue with imposing a mandatory downward departure because, even though the Supreme Court has held mandatory sentence enhancements unconstitutional where the factfinder has not found the elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt,55 55.SeeApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Booker543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).Show More there is no such issue with mandatory sentence reductions. In jurisdictions with sentencing commissions, including the federal system, the sentencing commission might have to promulgate the downward departure in its guidelines.56 56.See, e.g.,U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual§ 1A1.1–3 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018).Show More But establishing the remedy by either statute or guideline would provide the benefits of a fixed rule. Of course, a fixed rule would also have drawbacks, such as reduced case-by-case flexibility.

On the other hand, the major benefit of courts driving the remedy’s implementation is that it could, in some jurisdictions, happen immediately, with no new statutory authorization required. In jurisdictions with indeterminate or largely standards-driven sentencing guidelines, judges could factor a defendant having been the victim of police brutality into their sentence under existing sentencing guidelines—as, for instance, in the federal system. The factors listed in the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, are broad enough that judges already have the discretion to consider police brutality. Under § 3553(a), judges must consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to provide just punishment for the offense.”57 57.18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).Show More For the reasons discussed in Part II supra, having been a victim of police brutality is part of the “history of the defendant” that reduces the need for a long sentence to provide just punishment for the offense. The capaciousness of the sentencing factors should already permit the courts to consider police brutality in issuing sentences.

Both legislature-driven and court-driven approaches have their benefits and drawbacks. A legislative (statutory or guideline-based) remedy would be more definite, but potentially less tailorable. Establishing fixed statutory guidelines for converting the severity of particular instances of police brutality to sentence time would be difficult. If courts were to instead lead the way, the remedy would be easier to implement—perhaps requiring no specific authorization—and easier to tailor in individual cases. But if the remedy were entirely a judicial creation, it might be applied more inconsistently, and some victims might go undercompensated.

Conclusion

This Essay has made the case for remedying police brutality through remedial sentencing. It has sought to show that remedial sentencing would deter police brutality and adequately compensate victims. It has focused on a few key details about the remedy. First, that it exists within the same process of criminal investigation and adjudication that produces police brutality. Second, that it provides victims a reduction in a state-imposed punishment as compensation for a state-imposed injury—compensation in the same form as the injury. Third, that it provides compensation commensurate in magnitude with the severity of the harm. Fourth, and finally, that it could be easily implemented, whether by legislatures, courts, or both.

Remedying police brutality through sentence reduction would not be a panacea to the problem of police brutality. It would deter it, but not entirely. It would go a long way towards restoring procedural fairness and reaffirming victims’ rights, but it would not bring victims complete justice—no remedy could. And it would never be available to victims of police brutality who are not actually charged with a crime. But the stakes of police brutality are so dire, and existing remedies so inadequate, that a remedy that could deter police brutality even a little further and bring some victims a little more justice would be well worth implementing.

  1. * J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Virginia School of Law. Special thanks to the editors of the Virginia Law Review, especially Tyler Demetriou and Hayley Hahn, for their feedback. All errors are my own.
  2. See Rosa Goldensohn, De Blasio Renders Split Decision on Video of Cop Punching Homeless Man on Subway, The City (July 20, 2020, 9:35 PM), https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/7/20/21332157/de-blasio-subway-video-nypd-cop-punches-homeless-man [https://perma.cc/Y9EP-UV3U]; Adam Harding, Man Hit, Choked and Maced by NYPD in Violent Arrest Video Plans to File $40M Lawsuit, NBC New York (July 17, 2020 2:29 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/man-hit-choked-and-maced-by-nypd-in-violent-arrest-video-plans-to-file-40m-lawsuit/2518793/ [https://perma.cc/Q6AF-ESP9].
  3. Goldensohn, supra note 1.
  4. Id.
  5. Id.
  6. See Harding, supra note 1.
  7. The City, NYPD Subway Arrest, YouTube (July 14, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/‌watch?v=2lgK-apbl8Y [https://perma.cc/9FZ8-CFG8].
  8. Id.
  9. Id.
  10. Id.
  11. Id.
  12. Id.
  13. Id.
  14. Id.
  15. Goldensohn, supra note 1.
  16. Id.
  17. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.15(1), 205.30 (McKinney 2019).
  18. See Matthew J. Hickman, Alex R. Piquero & Joel H. Garner, Toward a National Estimate of Police Use of Nonlethal Force, 7 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 563, 577–81, 588–89 (2008) (finding that several hundred thousand arrestees in 2002 experienced nonlethal force from an officer, such as being pushed, grabbed, kicked, hit, or held at gunpoint); Police Shootings, Vice News (Dec. 10, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/a3jjpa/nonfatal-police-shootings-data [https://perma.cc/KT6V-NH35] (providing data on police shootings from 2010 through 2016 at the fifty largest local police departments in the U.S. and finding that “[f]or every person shot and killed by cops in these departments . . . police shot at two more people who survived”). Data on police brutality is extremely limited. In the past few years there have been some efforts to begin national data collection, but the complete results have not yet been published. See, e.g., National Use-of-Force Data Collection, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/‌services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force [https://perma.cc/5V8L-V4CF] (last visited Mar. 18,
    2021

    ) (noting that “[t]he FBI released initial data when 40% of the total law enforcement officer population was reached” in July 2020 and that “[a]dditional data will be released at 60% and 80% participation levels”).

  19. See, e.g., Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2016).
  20. Whether “police brutality” is coequal with those terms is subject to some disagreement. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1275, 1276 (1999) (distinguishing “[p]olice brutality” from “police misconduct” on the basis that the former “is conduct that is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its target”).
  21. See generally Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 Soc. Just. 156 (2001) (detailing the history of race and policing from slave patrols to the war on drugs).
  22. See, e.g., Richard Fausset and Shaila Dewan, Elijah McClain Died After He Was Detained. Now He’s Being Remembered., N.Y. Times (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/us/elijah-mcclain-police-killings.html [https://perma.cc/LU93-HQ7Q]; Adam Gabbatt, Protests About Police Brutality Are Met with Wave of Police Brutality Across U.S., The Guardian (June 6, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/06/police-violence-protests-us-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/GQ3J-G5Q7].
  23. See Nathan James et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43904, Public Trust and Law Enforcement–A Discussion for Policymakers 2–
    3 (2020) (

    tracking declines in public confidence in the police in recent years

    ).

  24. See Desmond Ang, The Effects of Police Violence on Inner-City Students, 136 Q.J. Econ
    . 115, 117

    18 (2021).

  25. See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force, 127 J. Pol. Econ. 1210, 1213–14 (2019).
  26. See Rachel A. Harmon, Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, in 2 Reforming Criminal Justice: Policing 27, 33–35 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
  27. Id. at 35. See also Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 325 (2018) (discussing how Black and Hispanic tort claimants’ damage awards are under-calculated as a matter of course because of courts’ reliance on race-sensitive data).
  28. Harmon, supra note 25, at 40–43. See also John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 789, 789 (2000) (discussing the “cycle of impunity[] by which the reluctance of local government to prosecute bad cops empowers future misconduct and drives communities to regard the police as adversaries”).
  29. Harmon, supra note 25, at 45–46.
  30. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961).
  31. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 929–30 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment after the government destroyed evidence in spite of defendant’s repeated requests to prosecutor to preserve the evidence); United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1994) (dismissing the case because the prosecution failed to adhere to the defendant’s request to preserve evidence); see also Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 Wash. U.L.Q. 713, 815–19 (1999) (discussing different remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, including dismissal).
  32. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 111, 116 (2003); Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 45, 73–74 (1994).
  33. See generally Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 Geo. L.J. 1509 (2009) (proposing sentence reduction as a remedy that would deter prosecutorial misconduct and have corrective and expressive value).
  34. See Makenzie Way, Remedial Sentencing Legislation as a Tool for Reducing Overrepresentation in Correctional Facilities, Penn L. News (Jan. 6., 2020), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/9534-remedial-sentencing-legislation-as-a-tool-for [https://perma.cc/4AJW-88SX].
  35. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has notably used a similar remedy at least once. See R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 208–10 (Can.).
  36. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
  37. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
  38. See Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 Seton Hall L. Rev. 335, 344–46 (2007) (discussing how double jeopardy bars retrials where a mistrial has been declared for prosecutorial conduct that was specifically “intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial” (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982)) but not where the prosecutor’s conduct was intended to win at trial using impermissible means).
  39. Namely, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses.
  40. As in the case of Jacob Blake, whose shooting in Kenosha, Wisconsin, has received significant media attention. See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Blake, N.Y. Times (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-kenosha.html [https://perma.cc/MX7Q-47QB].
  41. See Report: Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on the Decline, Innocence Project (Aug. 7, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline/ [https://perma.cc/9ZNF-MHQA] (finding that “97 percent of [criminal] cases were resolved through plea deals”).
  42. See Harmon, supra note 25, at 27–30.
  43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 292 (1983) (arguing that to satisfy the criminal law goal of deterrence, the criminal process must set “[t]he optimal price for the offense,” which is “just high enough to require offenders to pay for all of the harm their crimes inflict”).
  44. See, e.g., John Pfaff, The Perverse Incentives of Punishment, The Appeal (May 18, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-perverse-incentives-of-punishment-7c1e32b18d07/[ https://perma.cc/WUF5-AZRV] (reporting an especially egregious example of this phenomenon, wherein Todd Entrekin, a sheriff in Etowah, Alabama, “pocketed at least $750,000 budgeted for feeding the people detained in his county jail,” enabling him to purchase a beach house while those incarcerated the jail ate meat “labeled ‘not fit for human consumption’”).
  45. See Anthony W. Batts, Maddy deLone & Darrel W. Stephens, Policing and Wrongful Convictions, Nat’l Inst. Just.
    4 (2014),

    https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/246328.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5SJ-WCZK].

  46. See Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 292 (emphasizing that the price of committing an offense is a product of “[t]he penalty” imposed and “the probability that it will be imposed for a given offense”).
  47. See Harmon, supra note 25, at 34–35, 43.
  48. See Starr, supra note 32, at 1521.
  49. The genesis of police brutality is a broad and hotly contested subject, but a few key ingredients include poor hiring and training practices, the militarization of the police, and institutionalized racism. See Robert E. Worden, The “Causes” of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force, in Criminal Justice Theory: Explaining the Nature and Behavior of Criminal Justice 149–64 (Edward R. Maguire and David E. Duffee eds., 2d ed. 2015) (providing an overview of various theories and studies of police use of force); Rosa Brooks, Stop Training Police Like They’re Joining the Military, The Atlantic (June 10, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/police-academies-paramilitary/612859/ [https://perma.cc/MBR9-68K5] (addressing the relationship between militarizing the police and police brutality and discussing promising efforts to train police to critically engage with the history of paramilitary police forces in the United States); Wayne McElrath & Sarah Turberville, Poisoning Our Police: How the Militarization Mindset Threatens Constitutional Rights and Public Safety, Project on Gov’t Oversight, (June 9, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/06/poisoning-our-police-how-the-militarization-mindset-threatens-constitutional-rights-and-public-safety/ [https://perma.cc/KF74-5CHA]. (arguing that the militarization of police forces imperils public safety and freedom, and recognizing that racism is a fundamental feature of American policing).
  50. See George Wood, Tom R. Tyler & Andrew V. Papachristos, Procedural Justice Training Reduces Police Use of Force and Complaints Against Officers, 117 Proceedings of the Nat’l Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 9815, 9815 (May 5, 2020), available at https://www.pnas.org/content/117/18/9815/ [https://perma.cc/2VJL-2BFR] (finding that large-scale implementation of procedural justice training reduced complaints and use of force).
  51. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1686 (1992).
  52. See Hickman, Piquero & Garner, supra note 17, at 577; see also Worden, supra note 48, at 149–51 (describing brutality in investigation and arrest).
  53. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1529 (2000).
  54. See infra Part III for discussion of the possible roles of legislatures, sentencing commissions, and courts.
  55. They also might discourage judges from applying the remedy at all. There have been indications that judges are less likely to apply the exclusionary rule because it might overcompensate victims for the government’s violations of their rights—as Judge Calabresi has noted, judges “are not in the business of letting people out on technicalities.” Calabresi, supra note 31, at 112.
  56. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
  57. See, e.g., U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1–3 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018).
  58. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Mail-In Ballots and Constraints on Federal Power Under the Electors Clause

Crisis often begets crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be no exception. With rising concerns over crowding at the polls, many states during the 2020 elections opted to allow voters to use mail-in ballots to vote in the general election. The Trump administration, nevertheless, proactively enacted policy changes to hamper the United States Postal Service’s (“USPS”) ability to effectively handle the rise in mail-in voting. Some states sued the Trump administration in response, raising a variety of claims in their lawsuits. One of the lesser discussed claims is that the executive’s actions violated Article II, § 1, cl. 2, otherwise known as the “Electors Clause.” This clause confers upon the states the exclusive power to appoint their electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” Thus, the Electors Clause is unique in that it provides states one of their few enumerated constitutional powers—it is a power that may not be preempted by federal action. But when the federal government uses its own powers, such as the executive’s delegated authority over USPS, to undermine a state’s chosen manner of appointing its electors, such as popular vote by mail-in ballots, a conflict of powers arises. This Essay attempts to resolve this conflict of power, ultimately concluding that within the Electors Clause exists an implied obligation on the federal government to not deliberately undermine a state’s choice to use mail-in ballots in a presidential election.

Introduction

Crisis often begets crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be no exception. With rising concerns over crowding at the polls, many states during the 2020 elections opted to allow voters to use mail-in ballots to vote in the general election. Then-President Trump, nevertheless, came out openly against mail-in ballots, and beginning in April 2020 his administration proactively enacted policy changes to hamper the United States. Postal Service’s (“USPS”) ability to effectively handle the anticipated rise in mail-in voting. In response, a variety of states sued the Trump administration.

These states raised a variety of claims in their lawsuits, some constitutional and some statutory. One of the lesser discussed claims, though, is that the executive’s actions violated the “Electors Clause,” which confers upon the states the exclusive power to appoint their electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”1.U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.Show More Thus, the Electors Clause is unique in that it provides states one of their few enumerated constitutional powers—it is a power that may not be preempted by federal action. But when the federal government uses its own powers, such as the executive’s delegated authority over USPS, to undermine a state’s chosen manner of appointing its electors during a presidential election, such as popular vote by mail-in ballots, a conflict of powers arises. Federal power clashes with state power. The COVID-19 pandemic has therefore elucidated a vertical separation-of-powers crisis that cannot be ignored.

This Essay attempts to resolve this conflict of power, ultimately concluding that within the Electors Clause exists an implied obligation on the federal government to not deliberately undermine a state’s choice to use mail-in ballots in a presidential election. The Essay proceeds as follows: Part I overviews the 2020 mail-in ballot crisis in the United States. Part II discusses the Electors Clause and what makes the clause a unique state power. Finally, Part III introduces the concept of the Electors Clause providing some constraints on using federal powers to influence presidential elections, thus supplying a vital check on an executive or congressional attempt to sabotage mail-in voting.2.It should be noted that this Essay does not cover the post-election litigation that former President Trump instigated to overturn the 2020 presidential election results. This is because such litigation did not present a vertical separation-of-powers conflict, as Trump was bringing forth such litigation as a candidate rather than using any executive power to overturn the results in Wisconsin, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Michigan. For a summary of such cases that were decided on the merits, see Compiling the Truth: A Resource to Refute Trump’s “Stolen Election” Lies, Campaign Legal Ctr. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://campaignlegal.org/‌update/compiling-truth-resource-refute-trumps-stolen-election-lies [https://perma.cc/CG2S-W6KJ].Show More

I. The 2020 Mail-In Ballot Crisis

What is worse than a pandemic? A pandemic in an election year. Such was the case of 2020, where COVID-19 forced the majority of states to reevaluate how they planned to have their citizens vote in the 2020 general election. Prior to the pandemic, only three states used widespread mail-in ballots in their elections.3.David Roberts, Voting by Mail Is Fair, Safe, and Easy. Why Don’t More States Use It?, Vox (May 27, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/27/‌15701708/voting-by-mail (Washington, Oregon, and Colorado).Show More By November 2020, forty-five states (and D.C.) permitted voters to either request a mail-in ballot or automatically receive one,4.See Benjamin Swasey, Map: Mail-In Voting Rules by State—And the Deadlines You Need, NPR (last updated Oct. 14, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/14/‌909338758/map-mail-in-voting-rules-by-state [https://perma.cc/WDA9-5EE4].Show More hoping to avoid mass crowds—and thus mass spreading of the coronavirus—at the polls. Accordingly, an unprecedented percentage of voters (about 46%) this past general election decided to vote by mail.5.Pew Rsch. Ctr., Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His Post-Election Conduct 19 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/11/20/sharp-divisions-on-vote-counts-as-biden-gets-high-marks-for-his-post-election-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/N8FP-B39F]. This helped to create the highest voter turnout in a U.S. presidential election in over a century. See Kevin Schaul, Kate Rabinowitz & Ted Mellnik, 2020 Turnout Is the Highest in over a Century, Wash. Post (last updated Dec. 28, 2020, 4:29 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections/voter-turnout/ [https://perma‌.cc/9U2U-5UPW].Show More

The federal government, however, was less than supportive of this state-led exodus to mail-in voting. Rather, examples abound of outright hostility and obstruction from the executive. Since the beginning of the pandemic, former President Trump had expressed open contempt toward mail-in voting, stating that it “doesn’t work out well for Republicans.”6.Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 8, 2020, 8:20 AM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?dates=%5B%222020-04-07%22%2C%222020-04-08%22%5D [https://perma.cc/6CC4-S4YE].Show More Following this, Postmaster General Louis DeJoy—head of USPS—began issuing a variety of policy changes over the summer of 2020 overhauling agency operations critical to the timely and effective delivery of mail. These changes included the removal of hundreds of collection boxes and high-speed sorting machines, the reduction of overtime, the prohibition of necessary late trips and extra trips, the introduction of a pilot program that disrupted the processing of mail in almost 400 localities, and the refusal to treat election-related mail as First Class Mail.7.Complaint at 2–3, New York v. Trump (D.D.C. filed Aug. 25, 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02340).Show More Following these changes, USPS’s general counsel sent letters to states warning that USPS could not guarantee that mail-in ballots would be delivered in time for the November general election.8.See id. at 3; see also Tara O’Neill, USPS Warns CT: Mail-In Ballots Not Guaranteed by November Election, CTPost (Aug. 14, 2020, 8:35 PM), https://www.ctpost.com/‌local/article/USPS-warns-CT-Mail-in-ballots-not-guaranteed-by-15485399.php [https://perma.cc/53SJ-6P8J] (explaining that at least 46 states and D.C. received letters).Show More In response, House members in August 2020 voted—with most Democrats in favor and most Republicans opposed—to pass a $25 billion relief package for USPS.9.Rachael Bade & Donna Cassata, House Passes Bill to Boost U.S. Postal Service amid Trump Attacks, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 2020, 6:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/‌powerpost/house-poised-to-pass-bill-to-boost-us-postal-service-amid-trump-attacks/2020/08/21/c9196fa8-e3c6-11ea-8181-606e603bb1c4_story.html [https://perma.cc/LXJ7-VHX8].Show More President Trump, however, explicitly stated that he planned to block the relief package in an effort to thwart the use of mail-in ballots.10 10.See Deb Riechmann & Anthony Izaguirre, Trump Admits He’s Blocking Postal Cash to Stop Mail-In Votes, AP News (Aug. 13, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/‌14a2ceda724623604cc8d8e5ab9890ed [https://perma.cc/JUN5-UMNS]. Trump eventually signed a stimulus bill granting $10 billion to USPS for Covid-19-related costs, though this happened post-election. See Trump Signs Stimulus Bill with $10 Billion for USPS, PostalReporter.com (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.postal-reporter.com/blog/trump-signs-stimulus-bill-with-10-billion-for-usps/ [https://perma.cc/7JRE-PHZX].Show More

In the face of this executive action, over twenty states sued Trump and DeJoy, fearful of the effects the USPS changes would have on their residents’ ability to vote.11 11.See Alison Durkee, New York AG Files Multistate Lawsuit, Joins More Than 20 States Suing Postal Service Over DeJoy’s Changes, Forbes (Aug. 25, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2020/08/25/more-than-20-states-attorneys-general-suing-postal-service-usps-changes-despite-dejoy-reversal/?sh=65898ebb4533 [https://perma.cc/2CCJ-LZKD].Show More The suing states’ arguments ranged from constitutional to statutory, and at least three courts issued preliminary injunctions barring USPS from further implementing its policy changes.12 12.See New York v. Trump, No. 20-cv-2340 (EGS), 2020 WL 5763775, at *13 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020); Jones v. USPS, No. 20 Civ. 6516 (VM), 2020 WL 5627002, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020); Washington v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-03127-SAB, 2020 WL 5568557, at *6–7 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2020).Show More The crisis, nonetheless, raises two important questions: Does the federal government have a proper grant of power to manipulate USPS in a manner that undermines mail-in voting, and if so, how? With usage of mail-in ballots likely to remain prevalent in the future, it will be important to answer these questions so that states can shield themselves from further political federal encroachment in forthcoming presidential elections. Accordingly, this Essay seeks to explore these questions, finding the ultimate answer to be that it depends on the federal government’s motive. For now, though, it is enough to say that the executive and Congress wield a wide range of legitimate powers that generally grant them the ability to fund and run USPS as they see fit.13 13.The federal government’s subsidization and regulation of USPS is rooted in at least five federal powers—two legislative and three executive:1. The Postal Clause – The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. The Postal Clause grants Congress the power to regulate “the carriage of the mail, and all measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy transit, and the prompt delivery of its contents.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). Thus, when Congress established USPS, it was vested exclusive control over “the processing, transmission[,] and delivery” of mail shipped through USPS. See Commonwealth v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 335 A.2d 832, 838 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). Moreover, the Postal Clause allows Congress to control the administration of USPS. See, e.g., Sarah Anderson, Scott Klinger & Brian Wakamo, How Congress Manufactured a Postal Crisis — And How to Fix It, Inst. for Pol’y Stud. (July 15, 2019), https://ips-dc.org/how-congress-manufactured-a-postal-crisis-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/4PET-7UF4] (examining how Congress has used its power to control USPS through its retirement funding).2. The Appropriations Clause – The power to fund USPS—and all federal agencies—is vested in Congress under the Appropriations Clause, establishing that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Consequently, the Appropriations Clause accords Congress the “power of the purse” to, for instance, grant USPS a $25 billion relief package. See Sean M. Stiff, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46417, Congress’s Power over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 1 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46417 [https://perma.cc/LE9R-SWET].3. The Presentment Clause – The President has the power to veto “[e]very [b]ill” passed by Congress, including an appropriations bill. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Under this power, the President may veto a $25 billion USPS relief package, as Trump threatened during his Presidency. See Riechmann & Izaguirre, supra note 10. Congress would need a two-thirds majority to override said veto.4. The Vesting & Take Care Clauses – Many scholars would agree that the executive has the power—if not duty—to faithfully execute powers delegated to it by Congress. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 280–81 (2021). The Constitution, after all, vests “[t]he executive Power” in “a President of the United States,” and states that the executive “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3. Congress delegates much rulemaking authority to the Postmaster General. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3061(c)(4)(A) (2018). Thus, nondelegation doctrine concerns aside, the Postmaster General—wielding executive power—may “faithfully execute” their congressionally assigned role by “promulgat[ing] regulations generally as to the conduct of [USPS],” including policy changes such as refusing to treat election-related mail as First-Class Mail. See Daniel L. Pines, The Central Intelligence Agency’s “Family Jewels”: Legal Then? Legal Now?, 84 Ind. L.J. 637, 672 n.306 (2009) (quoting Ex parte Willman, 277 F. 819, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1921)).Naturally, one may be able to point to other powers, but the preceding five seem to be most relevant, at least in the context of mail-in voting.Show More

This Essay, nevertheless, does not concern itself with which federal power is implicated. This does not matter. Rather, as Part II will demonstrate, so long as the federal government is using any of these powers to undermine a state’s decision to use mail-in ballots—which it has14 14.See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.Show More—then a vertical separation-of-powers problem arises between said federal powers and the states’ exclusive power under the Electors Clause to choose the manner of appointing electors.

II. The Electors Clause: A Unique Exclusive State Power

The Constitution explicitly enumerates very few exclusive state powers. Rather, powers not delegated within the Constitution exclusively to the federal government are either reserved to the states,15 15.See U.S. Const. amend. X.Show More or run concurrent between the federal and state governments.16 16.See, e.g., infra section III.A.Show More One of the few exclusive state powers that exists, however, resides in Article II, § 1, cl. 2, known by some scholars as the Electors Clause.17 17.See, e.g., Nathaniel F. Rubin, The Electors Clause and the Governor’s Veto, 106 Cornell L. Rev. Online 57, 60 (2021).Show More Accordingly, this clause grants states a unique defense against federal encroachment into elections, or at the very least presidential elections. This Part will overview this power, its relationship to mail-in voting, and its seeming collision with the federal powers implicated in the 2020 mail-in ballot crisis.

A. The Electors Clause

Article II, § 1, cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”18 18.U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.Show More This does not mean state legislatures carry some of the power to choose the manner of appointing their state’s electors, but all of the power to do so.19 19.Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the language of the Vesting Clause “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power”); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 Nev. L.J. 469, 470 n.11 (2003) (listing the Electors Clause as one of the few exclusive state powers enumerated in the Constitution).Show More As of 2020, all states have chosen to appoint their electors by some method of popular vote, and all but two states have chosen to do this through a traditional winner-take-all method based on state-wide results.20 20.The two exceptions being Maine and Nebraska, which appoint two electors based on the statewide vote and the rest based on results within each congressional district. Meilan Solly, Why Do Maine and Nebraska Split Their Electoral Votes?, Smithsonian Mag. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-do-maine-and-nebraska-split-their-electoral-votes-180976219/ [https://perma.cc/7AMV-MVK6].Show More In doing so, the states have exercised their Electors Clause power—the “manner” chosen by the state legislature is a popular vote, which then determines whether a Democratic slate of electors or Republican slate of electors will be appointed to vote for the President and Vice President.

The importance of the exclusivity of a state’s power under the Electors Clause cannot be overstated. Compare the clause with the Elections Clause, which governs congressional elections. The Elections Clause says that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” somewhat mirroring the Electors Clause; however, the Elections Clause goes on to say that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”21 21.U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.Show More In other words, states may regulate congressional elections, but Congress may preempt said regulations. This preemptive power was illustrated recently in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, in which the Supreme Court held that the National Voter Registration Act’s (NVRA) requirement for states to “accept and use” a Federal Form to register voters for congressional elections preempted Arizona’s additional evidence-of-citizenship requirement for registration.22 22.See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 13–15 (2013).Show More If, however, Arizona’s evidence-of-citizenship requirement had hypothetically been limited to registration for the presidential election, the Court might have come to a different conclusion.23 23.See infra Part III.A.Show More Unlike the Elections Clause, the Electors Clause grants no express preemptive powers to Congress—or any federal branch—thus showcasing the unique power it confers upon the states.24 24.See Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System? Uncooperative Federalism in State and Local Elections, 111 Nw. U.L. Rev. Online 103, 108 (2017) (noting that there is “a strong textual basis for believing that Congress’s authority over presidential elections is limited to its powers to enforce the constitutional right to vote and under the Spending Clause”).Show More

B. The Electors Clause & Mail-In Ballots

This power is not only uniquely exclusive, but broad in scope—broad enough to cover a state’s choice to appoint electors by popular mail-in voting. Last year, the Supreme Court provided a rare analysis of the Electors Clause in Chiafalo v. Washington, which upheld state laws fining faithless electors. The Chiafalo Court began by describing the Electors Clause as “‘conveying the broadest power of determination’ over who becomes an elector.”25 25.Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020) (emphasis added) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).Show More As Justice Kagan states, “[t]he Constitution is barebones about electors.”26 26.Id.Show More Consequently, a state may appoint its electors “in whatever way it likes.”27 27.Id.Show More And if, according to the Court, a state’s choice to punish faithless electors is covered by the Electors Clause, surely a state’s choice to use popular voting by combination of in-person and mail-in ballots (or exclusively mail-in, as is the case in states like Oregon28 28.Sen. Ron Wyden, Opinion, Oregon Has Used Vote by Mail Since Electing Me in 1996. Those Who Say It Can’t Work Are Lying., NBC News (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/oregon-has-used-vote-mail-electing-me-1996-those-who-ncna1195646 [https://perma.cc/PU6T-PWTV].Show More) as its manner of appointing electors also falls under the clause’s protection.29 29.Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 291 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that hosting a “popular election” qualifies as a “manner” of appointing electors).Show More Some may, nevertheless, point out that the decision to implement mail-in ballots has often been made by state election commissions rather than the legislature. However, even when this is the case, courts have suggested that this falls under “Manner.”30 30.See, e.g., Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 983 F.3d 919, 926–27 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)) (“Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the proper inquiry under the Electors Clause is to ask whether a state conducted the election in a manner substantially consistent with the ‘legislative scheme’ for appointing electors.”).Show More

Therefore, when the President or Congress uses their own powers to undermine a state’s decision to utilize mail-in ballots in a presidential election (e.g., vetoing USPS funding), the result appears to be a conflict of powers between the federal and state governments. The next section will discuss this in more detail.

C. When Powers Collide

Let us begin with a realistic hypothetical: The Pennsylvania General Assembly is severely concerned about an ongoing pandemic and wants to avoid crowding during the presidential election. The Assembly thus passes a bill requiring mail-in ballots to automatically be sent to every registered voter in Pennsylvania—said ballots include the presidential candidates. Concerned that swing states moving to mail-in voting will hurt his reelection chances, the president vetoes an appropriations bill that includes USPS funding, and orders the Postmaster General to have USPS no longer treat election-related mail as First-Class Mail. Due to the President’s actions, hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians are not able to receive or send in their ballot in time, and thus may not vote in the presidential election (among other elections).

Pennsylvania sues the president’s administration, arguing that its actions violate Pennsylvania’s exclusive power under the Electors Clause to appoint its electors in a manner chosen by its legislature: mail-in voting.31 31.Two states in fact raised this argument in lawsuits leading up to the 2020 general election. See Complaint at 7, 63, Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, No. 2:20-cv-04096 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 21, 2020); Complaint at 107–08, Washington v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-03127 (E.D. Wash. filed Aug. 18, 2020).Show More The president’s administration responds by asserting that it has the power under the Presentment Clause and Take Care Clause to do what it did. Who wins here? There is, as of now, no clear answer, for it took the COVID-19 pandemic to highlight that this conflict of powers even exists.

Perhaps some may argue that Pennsylvania has no real claim because the federal government never had to create USPS in the first place,32 32.But see John Nichols, Congress Has a Constitutional Duty to Preserve and Promote the Post Office, Nation: Budgets Blog (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/‌article/archive/congress-has-constitutional-duty-preserve-and-promote-post-office (arguing that the Postal Clause creates a congressional “responsibility” to establish a post office).Show More meaning Pennsylvania is not entitled to its service. This Essay submits that the answer is not so simple though. For example, suppose a traveler comes across a river and is told she has two choices to cross said river: a bridge or a boat. She is affirmed by, of all people, the boat’s owner that this choice is hers alone to make. The traveler ultimately chooses the boat. Moments before the traveler enters the boat, however, the boat owner dismantles the engine, rendering the boat inoperable. The traveler exclaims, “Hold on, I thought you said that I had the power to choose how to cross the river?” The boat owner responds, “Yes, you had the power to choose how to cross the river, but I have the power as the boat’s owner to dismantle its engine. Now you must use the bridge!” Are we to pretend that the traveler really had a choice here? That does not feel right. Sure, the boat owner had no obligation to provide the boat in the first place, but it is nevertheless there. And so long as it is there, and travelers are told that they have the power to choose to use it to cross the river, it seems disingenuous to claim that they really have this power if the boat owner can make the boat unusable at any moment to disrupt a traveler’s choice.

Likewise, USPS exists. Perhaps it does not need to exist,33 33.See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 785, 827–28 (1995) (“The postal power included the power not to establish post offices and post roads.”). But see Nichols, supra note 32.Show More but it does. And so long as it exists, the states have the exclusive power to choose to use popular vote by mail-in ballots as their manner of appointing electors. Otherwise, if we accept the notion that the federal government can use its powers to deliberately sabotage a state’s choice to use mail-in ballots in the presidential election, then the Electors Clause is essentially made null. It would not convey the “broadest power of determination” to the states.34 34.Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).Show More

With this said, the question then becomes how to balance the states’ exclusive power under the Electors Clause to run their presidential elections by mail-in ballot with the federal government’s powers to fund and manage USPS. The Supreme Court itself has no clear or consistent method for determining when one constitutional provision takes precedent over another.35 35.Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 457, 485 (2003).Show More Part III posits, nevertheless, that the solution rests within the very subtext of our Constitution.

III. Constraints on Federal Power Under the Electors Clause

In one corner of the ring, we have the federal government. In the other corner, we have the states. Both claim authority over the power to control the use of mail-in ballots in presidential elections. Perhaps, though, there is no need for such a fight. Perhaps the solution to this conflict can be solved easily by simply reframing the issue. This Part does just that. Instead of viewing the mail-in ballot crisis as a conflict between powers, this Part asserts that these powers should be recognized as concurrent. That is, both the federal government and states have legitimate claims to power over the use of mail-in ballots in presidential elections. When framed this way, it becomes possible to look to constitutional doctrines that arise in other instances of concurrent powers, such as the Dormant Commerce Clause, to conclude that within the Electors Clause exists an inferred restraint on federal powers that can be used to balance the competing interests of the federal government and the states in the case of mail-in ballots. This Part lays out such a theory and then goes into said theory’s implications and potential critiques.

A. The Theory

The theory is this: If the federal government uses its powers to discriminate against a state’s power under the Electors Clause to determine the manner in which its electors are appointed, the federal government’s action is per se unconstitutional. If the federal government, nevertheless, uses a legitimate power in a manner that only incidentally impacts a state’s appointment of electors, then this action is permissible so long as the burden is not excessive. Now, how do we get here?

The first step is to recognize that when, say, the president vetoes an appropriations bill to fund USPS, and state X’s legislature votes to conduct its 2020 elections—including the presidential election—entirely by mail-in voting, the two constitutional powers implicated in these decisions are not entirely exclusive. Rather, imagine a Venn diagram, where one bubble is the president’s Presentment Clause power and the other is state X’s Electors Clause power. For the most part, these bubbles do not overlap; however, there is a tiny sliver where the bubbles touch, and in this sliver, it states, “Determining whether mail-in ballots will be a viable form of voting for state X’s citizens in the presidential election.” Thus, within that tiny sliver, the federal government’s power to fund and manage USPS and the states’ power to determine the manner of appointing their electors transform from being exclusive powers into what can best be described as concurrent.

When we accept this concurrent nature, we can look to how the Supreme Court has historically resolved state–federal power conflicts in which the powers were exclusive in some ways but “concurrent . . . [in] other ways.”36 36.See Commerce Clause Limitations on State Regulation, UMKC, http://law2.umkc.edu/‌faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/statecommerce.htm [https://perma.cc/5L7E-E6XZ] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).Show More For instance, we can look to the Dormant Commerce Clause, which arises in cases in which a state’s action impacts interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause confers upon Congress the power to, among other things, “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”37 37.U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.Show More This power has, however, been deemed “not absolutely exclusive,” given the clause’s silence on the states’ power to regulate interstate commerce.38 38.See Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution 41 (2009).Show More Faced with this uncertainty, the Supreme Court laid out the following standard that has become known as the Dormant Commerce Clause: When a state statute intentionally discriminates against interstate commerce, the statute is per se unconstitutional, and will only survive if demonstrated that there is “no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.”39 39.United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338–39 (2007). This is, needless to say, an extraordinarily high bar to meet.Show More If, however, said statute’s effects on interstate commerce are “only incidental,” the statute will only be struck down if it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.40 40.See id. at 346 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).Show More

Given the uncertainty surrounding how federal and state powers interact in situations like the 2020 mail-in ballot crisis, it seems only reasonable to turn to the Dormant Commerce Clause as a helpful doctrinal analogy to provide guidance on navigating through this state–federal powers conflict. And in doing so, we arrive at the following conclusion: The federal government may not use its federal powers to purposefully discriminate against the states’ choosing of a manner of appointing electors; it may, however, generally use its federal powers in a way that only incidentally impacts the states’ Electors Clause powers.

There is, naturally, one key difference between the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Electors Clause, in that the former resolves a conflict between an enumerated federal power and an implied state power, whereas the latter is intended to resolve a conflict between two enumerated powers. This is why this Essay is not claiming there to be a “Dormant Electors Clause”; rather, the constraint on federal powers is derived from the explicit structure of the U.S. Constitution. This is also why it seems necessary to include a disclaimer that this Essay’s theory could presumably work in reverse: A state may not use its Electors Clause power to discriminate against the practice of a federal power (though one may need to get extra creative to imagine what such a scenario might look like). Regardless, turning to the Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence for guidance to develop a doctrinal framework in these Electors Clause cases appears to be the fairest and most constitutionally sound method to respect both federal and state government interests while resolving the conflicts of power that have arisen in the mail-in ballot crisis.

B. The Implications

If a court were to recognize and apply this federal constraint, at least two important implications would follow for mail-in voting. First, the federal government could not use its powers over USPS to deliberately undermine a state’s decision to use mail-in ballots in a presidential election. Accordingly, when then-President Trump openly stated that he was vetoing an appropriations bill to fund USPS specifically because he did not want the funding to assist mail-in voting, he behaved unconstitutionally. Conversely, if, say, Congress defunded USPS for some neutral reason (e.g., obsession with free market values) that only incidentally made it harder to vote by mail, this would almost assuredly be permissible. Of course, the question then becomes how courts would remedy a violation. It seems quite unlikely, for instance, that they could enjoin the President from vetoing a bill. At the very least, the lawsuits against the Trump administration suggest that courts could enjoin USPS from instituting policy changes aimed at making mail-in voting more difficult.41 41.See supra text accompanying note 12.Show More

Furthermore, this federal constraint could indirectly preserve mail-in voting for other elections beyond the presidential one. As noted in Part II.A, the Elections Clause grants Congress exclusive preemptive authority over the regulation of congressional elections, meaning states would have a tougher time arguing that Congress, and the executive by delegation, violated the Constitution by making it more difficult to use mail-in ballots in congressional elections. These elections, however, do not exist on separate ballots. Typically, a ballot will contain all elections relevant to a voter, including presidential, congressional, gubernatorial, etc. Consequently, if a court enjoined the federal government from certain actions negatively impacting mail-in voting because it found discrimination against states’ Electors Clause powers, this would mean that all elections on a ballot containing the presidential election would be protected by proxy.42 42.Midterm elections would naturally not benefit from this though, since there would be no presidential election on the ballot.Show More

C. The Critiques

One critique of this Essay’s theory could be that it violates the Supremacy Clause. It seems odd, after all, to claim that a state action can displace a federal action. The Supremacy Clause, however, has no relevance here, since the Electors Clause is part of the enumerated Constitution, and thus part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”43 43.U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.Show More And since the Supreme Court rejects any hierarchy of constitutional provisions, the Electors Clause may not be preempted.44 44.See Ken Hyle, When Constitutional Rights Clash: Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Potential Legacy, 9 ConLawNOW 200, 202 (2018).Show More

Another critique may point to the fact that the Supreme Court has previously held that Congress has some regulatory powers over presidential elections. In Burroughs v. United States, for example, the Court upheld an act requiring candidate committees, including those for presidential candidates, to keep account of all contributions received or donated by them.45 45.290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934).Show More The Burroughs Court reasoned that Congress possessed the power to preserve the integrity of presidential elections.46 46.See id. at 544–45.Show More As Professors Dan Coenen and Edward Larson note though, there is a difference between controlling the manner in which electors are appointed (e.g., popular vote by mail-in ballots) and adopting electoral procedures necessary to implement said manner (e.g., campaign finance laws to quell the possibility of corruption within a popular election).47 47.See Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 851, 904 (2002) (“Ballot-and-equipment laws simply do not control systems for selecting electors, substantive selection criteria, or candidates who might qualify as proper electors. Rather such laws concern only the implementing procedures to be used if one available substantive manner of selection—that is, the election manner—is chosen by the state.”).Show More Hence, Burroughs does not support any notion that the federal government may encroach on the states’ Electors Clause powers.

Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic revealed a conflict of federal and state powers that shook the 2020 election to its core. And while the 2020 election has passed, the practice of mail-in voting will likely remain prevalent in the future. Moreover, unforeseeable future crises could further change up how states choose to conduct their elections. Consequently, this conflict must be resolved, and this Essay argues that restraining federal powers from being used to discriminate against states’ Electors Clause powers is a fair and constitutional means of doing so.

  1. * J.D. Candidate 2021, Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank Professors Henry P. Monaghan, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, and Richard Briffault for their comments and guidance. Any faults in this Essay are my own.
  2. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
  3. It should be noted that this Essay does not cover the post-election litigation that former President Trump instigated to overturn the 2020 presidential election results. This is because such litigation did not present a vertical separation-of-powers conflict, as Trump was bringing forth such litigation as a candidate rather than using any executive power to overturn the results in Wisconsin, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Michigan. For a summary of such cases that were decided on the merits, see Compiling the Truth: A Resource to Refute Trump’s “Stolen Election” Lies, Campaign Legal Ctr. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://campaignlegal.org/‌update/compiling-truth-resource-refute-trumps-stolen-election-lies [https://perma.cc/CG2S-W6KJ].
  4. David Roberts, Voting by Mail Is Fair, Safe, and Easy. Why Don’t More States Use It?, Vox (May 27, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/27/‌15701708/voting-by-mail (Washington, Oregon, and Colorado).
  5. See Benjamin Swasey, Map: Mail-In Voting Rules by State—And the Deadlines You Need, NPR (last updated Oct. 14, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/14/‌909338758/map-mail-in-voting-rules-by-state [https://perma.cc/WDA9-5EE4].
  6. Pew Rsch. Ctr., Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His Post-Election Conduct 19 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/11/20/sharp-divisions-on-vote-counts-as-biden-gets-high-marks-for-his-post-election-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/N8FP-B39F]. This helped to create the highest voter turnout in a U.S. presidential election in over a century. See Kevin Schaul, Kate Rabinowitz & Ted Mellnik, 2020 Turnout Is the Highest in over a Century, Wash. Post (last updated Dec. 28, 2020, 4:29 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections/voter-turnout/ [https://perma‌.cc/9U2U-5UPW].
  7. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 8, 2020, 8:20 AM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?dates=%5B%222020-04-07%22%2C%222020-04-08%22%5D [https://perma.cc/6CC4-S4YE].
  8. Complaint at 2–3, New York v. Trump (D.D.C. filed Aug. 25, 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02340).
  9. See id. at 3; see also Tara O’Neill, USPS Warns CT: Mail-In Ballots Not Guaranteed by November Election, CTPost (Aug. 14, 2020, 8:35 PM), https://www.ctpost.com/‌local/article/USPS-warns-CT-Mail-in-ballots-not-guaranteed-by-15485399.php [https://perma.cc/53SJ-6P8J] (explaining that at least 46 states and D.C. received letters).
  10. Rachael Bade & Donna Cassata, House Passes Bill to Boost U.S. Postal Service amid Trump Attacks, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 2020, 6:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/‌powerpost/house-poised-to-pass-bill-to-boost-us-postal-service-amid-trump-attacks/2020/08/21/c9196fa8-e3c6-11ea-8181-606e603bb1c4_story.html [https://perma.cc/LXJ7-VHX8].
  11. See Deb Riechmann & Anthony Izaguirre, Trump Admits He’s Blocking Postal Cash to Stop Mail-In Votes, AP News (Aug. 13, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/‌14a2ceda724623604cc8d8e5ab9890ed [https://perma.cc/JUN5-UMNS]. Trump eventually signed a stimulus bill granting $10 billion to USPS for Covid-19-related costs, though this happened post-election. See Trump Signs Stimulus Bill with $10 Billion for USPS, PostalReporter.com (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.postal-reporter.com/blog/trump-signs-stimulus-bill-with-10-billion-for-usps/ [https://perma.cc/7JRE-PHZX].
  12. See Alison Durkee, New York AG Files Multistate Lawsuit, Joins More Than 20 States Suing Postal Service Over DeJoy’s Changes, Forbes (Aug. 25, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2020/08/25/more-than-20-states-attorneys-general-suing-postal-service-usps-changes-despite-dejoy-reversal/?sh=65898ebb4533 [https://perma.cc/2CCJ-LZKD].
  13. See New York v. Trump, No. 20-cv-2340 (EGS), 2020 WL 5763775, at *13 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020); Jones v. USPS, No. 20 Civ. 6516 (VM), 2020 WL 5627002, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020); Washington v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-03127-SAB, 2020 WL 5568557, at *6–7 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2020).
  14. The federal government’s subsidization and regulation of USPS is rooted in at least five federal powers—two legislative and three executive:1. The Postal Clause – The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. The Postal Clause grants Congress the power to regulate “the carriage of the mail, and all measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy transit, and the prompt delivery of its contents.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). Thus, when Congress established USPS, it was vested exclusive control over “the processing, transmission[,] and delivery” of mail shipped through USPS. See Commonwealth v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 335 A.2d 832, 838 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). Moreover, the Postal Clause allows Congress to control the administration of USPS. See, e.g., Sarah Anderson, Scott Klinger & Brian Wakamo, How Congress Manufactured a Postal Crisis — And How to Fix It, Inst. for Pol’y Stud. (July 15, 2019), https://ips-dc.org/how-congress-manufactured-a-postal-crisis-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/4PET-7UF4] (examining how Congress has used its power to control USPS through its retirement funding).

    2. The Appropriations Clause – The power to fund USPS—and all federal agencies—is vested in Congress under the Appropriations Clause, establishing that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Consequently, the Appropriations Clause accords Congress the “power of the purse” to, for instance, grant USPS a $25 billion relief package. See Sean M. Stiff, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46417, Congress’s Power over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 1 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46417 [https://perma.cc/LE9R-SWET].

    3. The Presentment Clause – The President has the power to veto “[e]very [b]ill” passed by Congress, including an appropriations bill. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Under this power, the President may veto a $25 billion USPS relief package, as Trump threatened during his Presidency. See Riechmann & Izaguirre, supra note 10. Congress would need a two-thirds majority to override said veto.

    4. The Vesting & Take Care Clauses – Many scholars would agree that the executive has the power—if not duty—to faithfully execute powers delegated to it by Congress. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 280–81 (2021). The Constitution, after all, vests “[t]he executive Power” in “a President of the United States,” and states that the executive “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3. Congress delegates much rulemaking authority to the Postmaster General. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3061(c)(4)(A) (2018). Thus, nondelegation doctrine concerns aside, the Postmaster General—wielding executive power—may “faithfully execute” their congressionally assigned role by “promulgat[ing] regulations generally as to the conduct of [USPS],” including policy changes such as refusing to treat election-related mail as First-Class Mail. See Daniel L. Pines, The Central Intelligence Agency’s “Family Jewels”: Legal Then? Legal Now?, 84 Ind. L.J. 637, 672 n.306 (2009) (quoting Ex parte Willman, 277 F. 819, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1921)).

    Naturally, one may be able to point to other powers, but the preceding five seem to be most relevant, at least in the context of mail-in voting.

  15. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
  16. See U.S. Const. amend. X.
  17. See, e.g., infra section III.A.
  18. See, e.g., Nathaniel F. Rubin, The Electors Clause and the Governor’s Veto, 106 Cornell L. Rev. Online 57, 60 (2021).
  19. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
  20. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the language of the Vesting Clause “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power”); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 Nev. L.J. 469, 470 n.11 (2003) (listing the Electors Clause as one of the few exclusive state powers enumerated in the Constitution).
  21. The two exceptions being Maine and Nebraska, which appoint two electors based on the statewide vote and the rest based on results within each congressional district. Meilan Solly, Why Do Maine and Nebraska Split Their Electoral Votes?, Smithsonian Mag. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-do-maine-and-nebraska-split-their-electoral-votes-180976219/ [https://perma.cc/7AMV-MVK6].
  22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  23. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 13–15 (2013).
  24. See infra Part III.A.
  25. See Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System? Uncooperative Federalism in State and Local Elections, 111 Nw. U.L. Rev. Online 103, 108 (2017) (noting that there is “a strong textual basis for believing that Congress’s authority over presidential elections is limited to its powers to enforce the constitutional right to vote and under the Spending Clause”).
  26. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020) (emphasis added) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).
  27. Id.
  28. Id.
  29. Sen. Ron Wyden, Opinion, Oregon Has Used Vote by Mail Since Electing Me in 1996. Those Who Say It Can’t Work Are Lying., NBC News (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/oregon-has-used-vote-mail-electing-me-1996-those-who-ncna1195646 [https://perma.cc/PU6T-PWTV].
  30. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 291 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that hosting a “popular election” qualifies as a “manner” of appointing electors).
  31. See, e.g., Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 983 F.3d 919, 926–27 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)) (“Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the proper inquiry under the Electors Clause is to ask whether a state conducted the election in a manner substantially consistent with the ‘legislative scheme’ for appointing electors.”).
  32. Two states in fact raised this argument in lawsuits leading up to the 2020 general election. See Complaint at 7, 63, Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, No. 2:20-cv-04096 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 21, 2020); Complaint at 107–08, Washington v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-03127 (E.D. Wash. filed Aug. 18, 2020).
  33. But see John Nichols, Congress Has a Constitutional Duty to Preserve and Promote the Post Office, Nation: Budgets Blog (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/‌article/archive/congress-has-constitutional-duty-preserve-and-promote-post-office (arguing that the Postal Clause creates a congressional “responsibility” to establish a post office).
  34. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 785, 827–28 (1995) (“The postal power included the power not to establish post offices and post roads.”). But see Nichols, supra note 32.
  35. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).
  36. Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 457, 485 (2003).
  37. See Commerce Clause Limitations on State Regulation, UMKC, http://law2.umkc.edu/‌faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/statecommerce.htm [https://perma.cc/5L7E-E6XZ] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).
  38. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
  39. See Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution 41 (2009).
  40. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338–39 (2007). This is, needless to say, an extraordinarily high bar to meet.
  41. See id. at 346 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
  42. See supra text accompanying note 12.
  43. Midterm elections would naturally not benefit from this though, since there would be no presidential election on the ballot.
  44. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
  45. See Ken Hyle, When Constitutional Rights Clash: Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Potential Legacy, 9 ConLawNOW 200, 202 (2018).
  46. 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934).
  47. See id. at 544–45.
  48. See Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 851, 904 (2002) (“Ballot-and-equipment laws simply do not control systems for selecting electors, substantive selection criteria, or candidates who might qualify as proper electors. Rather such laws concern only the implementing procedures to be used if one available substantive manner of selection—that is, the election manner—is chosen by the state.”).