Is OSHA Unconstitutional?

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to issue whatever standards are reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful places of employment. More than any other provision in federal regulatory law, this language is subject to a plausible nondelegation challenge, because it seems to ask the Secretary to choose among a wide array of intelligible principles for standard-setting. The constitutional challenge raises serious and unresolved questions for both regulatory policy and administrative law. In answering those questions, courts have three principal alternatives. The most aggressive approach would be to invalidate the statute in the hopes of encouraging, for the first time, sustained legislative deliberation about the proper content of occupational safety and health policy. The most modest approach, rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to construe the statutory language to produce floors and ceilings on agency action; that approach would require the Secretary to ban significant risks while forbidding the Secretary from regulating trivial or de minimis risks and also requiring the Secretary to show that any regulations are feasible. The third and preferable approach, also rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to construe the statute so as to require the agency to engage in a form of cost-benefit balancing. Such a construction would have the advantage of promoting greater transparency and accountability at the agency level. At the same time, it would raise difficult questions about the precise nature of such balancing in the context of occupational safety policy and also about legal constraints on agency assessment of both costs and benefits. Because of the distinctive nature of workplace safety, the best approach would give the agency considerable flexibility on questions of valuation while also permitting serious attention to distributional factors.