Home Home Home Home Home
HomeContentSubmissionsMembershipGeneral
Currently in Print:
Vol. 99, June 2013, Issue 4
Constitutional Privileging
by Michael Coenen
A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power
by Lee B. Kovarsky
The Science of Exclusion: Race and Social Capital in Housing Policy
by Stephanie M. Stern
The Principal Problem: Towards a More Limited Role for Fiduciary Law in the Nonprofit Sector
by Natalie Brown
In Brief:
Recently Published Items
Noel Canning v. NLRB - Enforcing Basic Constitutional Limits On Presidential Power
Essay by Noel J. Francisco and James M. Burnham

Unequal Treatment of Religious Exercises Under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate Cases
Essay by Mark Rienzi

Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty
Essay by Douglas Laycock and Thomas C. Berg

[More]
Announcements
Virginia Law Review Announces Centennial Campaign

May Notes Pool Announcement

Notes Accepted from the March 2013 Notes Pool

[More]

Email Updates
Join Our Mailing List
Quick Links
Submit to In Brief

Forthcoming

Archive

Subscriptions

Advertisements

Customer Service

Short-Article Policy

Masthead

Contact Information
Virginia Law Review Association
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903-1789

Phone: 434-924-3079
Fax: 434-982-2818
E-Mail: lawrev@virginia.edu

Contact Valerie Listorti

September 2012, Volume 98, Issue 5

Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws
by Aziz Z. Huq
98 Va. L. Rev. 1001 (2012)   View PDF

When, if ever, should the executive decline to defend in court a federal law it has concluded to be unconstitutional, and yet still enforce that same statute? The question is presented by the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce, but not defend in court, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). But the DOMA § 3 decision is not the first time the executive has bifurcated enforcement of a statute from its defense in court. The practice dates back at least to World War II. Yet the conditions of possibility and the consequences of “enforcement-litigation gaps” have never been specified, investigated, or evaluated. This Article fills that gap. Enforcement-litigation gaps are a form of departmentalism: constitutional practice by a political branch. Reflecting the strong priors many have toward executive branch departmentalism, enforcement-litigation gaps provoke both broad endorsement and strong repudiation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article argues that a categorical response of either kind is unjustified. Enforcement-litigation gaps are neither always justified nor logically inconsistent with larger constitutional values. By clarifying the variables at stake when the executive separates enforcement from litigation, I develop a general framework for distinguishing desirable from undesirable uses of the practice. This framework suggests enforcement-litigation gaps are most justified when the executive defends an Article II value. They rest on weaker footing when the underlying constitutional question relates to the constitutional rights of third parties. The Obama Administration, on this account, acted unwisely in distinguishing the continued enforcement of DOMA § 3 from its defense in federal court—but not for the reasons generally believed.



Click on an icon below to access the full text of this article*

Westlaw Westlaw   |  LexisNexis LexisNexis   |  HeinOnline HeinOnline   |  SSRN SSRN   |  Bloomberg Bloomberg   

* These are third-party content providers; they may require a separate subscription or charge a fee for access.